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Abstract 
This study investigates the nature and the outcomes of the devolution of forestry authority 
to local governments under Indonesia's most recent and far-reaching decentralisation initiatives, 
put in place in 1999. The research focuses on the dynamics of the relationships between district 
governments and other actors in that context, based on case studies of the forest-rich Bulungan 
and Kutai Barat Districts, East Kalimantan. 
The adverse outcomes for both forests and local communities of the previous centralised 
forest governance regime under Indonesia's New Order Government, have been profound and 
well documented. Indonesia's most recent experiment with decentralisation, often referred to as 
regional autonomy, provided an opportunity for decentralized forestry regimes that many 
believed and hoped would improve forest management and provide benefits for local 
communities. Although there are many studies examining the devolution of forestry governance 
to the community or vi llage levels, few focus on the transfer of forestry powers to the local 
government level. 
The research framework developed for this study integrated three approaches in the 
analysis of decentralisation of natural resources governance. The first of these is that proposed 
by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), which emphasizes the analytical dimensions of actors, power, 
and accountability. The second is the institutional analysis suggested by Manor (1999), focusing 
on aspects of democratic, administrative and fiscal decentralisation. The third is a model for 
decentralized forest management suggested by Larson (2003b), highlighting the power relations 
among actors. The research focuses on the initial period of decentralisation, from 1999 to 2004, 
using a qualitative case study approach. 
The changes to the political, administrative, and fiscal framework resulting from 
decentralisation have had a profound effect on the dynamics of forest governance in Indonesia. 
The most dramatic changes were in control of access to timber resources: this moved from the 
Centre to the districts, and then largely back again. Districts also enjoyed significantly 
augmented fiscal powers and increased share of forestry revenue. During the period that 
substantial powers were formally devolved to the district level, the two case study district 
governments exploited the space created by their decentralized mandates quite effectively; as a 
result, local actors were increasingly important in district decisions, and more benefits accrued 
to the local level. However, many of the accountability outcomes expected to follow 
decentralisation did not eventuate. Few downward accountability mechanisms, held to be 
critical for improved natural resource management, were found to be effecti ve in the case study 
districts. Thus, at least during the first few years of decentralisation, increased control of access 
to forest resources and greater share of forestry-derived revenue did not improve forest 
management in the study distric ts. 
The study revealed dynamic and fluid forest politics at the district level. District forestry 
decision-making and operations have reflected the interplay between the legal-regulatory 
vi 
framework, relations between the Centre and district governments, and relations between and 
among actors at the district level. Organisational and individual actors each have their own 
interests and objectives shaping forestry decisions and operations at the district level, and these 
are well-illustrated in the research case studies. 
The ambiguity and inconsistency of the legal-regulatory framework, and the reluctance of 
Central actors to forgo powers, have resulted in tensions and a bitter power struggle between the 
district governments and the Centre. One of the important consequences has been that district 
actors have perceived their window of opportunity to be insecure, and have thus vigorously 
pursued short-term benefits from forest exploitation. Despite the Centre's efforts to retain and 
subsequently regain its powers, the case study district governments were able to develop 
strategies and tactics, at least for a period, to continue to ensure they and other local-level actors 
benefited from regional autonomy. 
Power relations between and among actors have determined the ways in which timber 
politics have been shaped at the district level. Local actors have increasingly influenced district 
government decision-making and forestry operations in the districts, and have destabilized the 
previously firm position of centrally-linked actors operating at the district level. In one district, 
the influence of extra-legal actors was significant and largely unchecked. However, as 
decentralisation progressed, the Centre's policies have ultimately determined district decisions, 
above and beyond local actors' influences. 
Forest exploitation has thus continued at the district level, at the expense of longer-term 
sustainability of the forests. Given the absence of strong downward accountability mechanisms, 
vertical accountability to the judiciary has been the most effeeti ve mechanism in keeping 
districts ' forestry powers in check. 
The research conducted for this thesis suggests that the research framework developed here 
has shown useful in the analysis of forest governance dynamics at the district level under the 
decentralisation regime. Both de jure and de facto powers were taken into account in analysing 
how decentralisation has been played out, and this proved to be important. The institutional 
analysis that advances the importance of decentralised financial powers, and analysis of the role 
of various accountability relations beyond conventional downward accountability were relevant 
and useful. Further research, however, could be useful in determining how downward 
accountability in these contexts can explain the direct causal-effect linkages between local-level 
governance and NRM. The outcomes of this study also suggest that it would be desirable to 
investigate the incentives and motivations likely to lead to improved NRM under local forest 
governance. This is particularly relevant given the emphasis on avoided deforestation and 
reforestation in Indonesia. 
Finally, the rapidly evolving nature of Indonesia's decentralisation, and its progression 
beyond the early phase investigated by this research, suggest that it will be important to 
establish whether the outcomes and trends reported here will continue as they have during this 
vii 
initial period, or whether they will change as the decentralisation process and associated 
institutions mature. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
"In reality nobody is managing the forests, at best only monitoring timber 
production through their documentation." (interview with a senior official at 
the Ministry of Forestry, N-G-1) 
1.1 The problem - management of Indonesia's forests 
In 1967, the New Order government of President Soeharto of Indonesia passed two laws 
which established the administrative arrangements for the exploitation, on a previously 
unimaginable scale, of Indonesia' s natural tropical forests. Law 1 of 1967 on Foreign 
Investment, through land use rights and tax breaks, created favourable conditions for 
multinational companies to invest in Indonesia's natural resource sectors, including forestry. 
Law 5 of 1967 on Basic Forestry, often referred to as the Basic Forestry Law, centralized 
control over forests and decisions about their allocation and use. While domestic companies 
have since replaced their multinational predecessors, the large-scale, centrally-run 
commercialization of Indonesia's forests has allowed the exploitation of the forests to continue. 
The consequences have been profound: the forest industries have become a major source of 
revenue and employment, with exports worth more than USD 7 billion (Bank Indonesia 
Statistics, 2007) ' , direct employment of2.3 million people and a much larger number in indirect 
employment (Ministry of Forestry, 2006b). However, the cost of over three decades of 
continuous exploitation has also been exorbitant: the forests of Indonesia 's forest-rich Outer 
Islands - first Sumatra, then Kalimantan, and most recently Papua - have been lost at a rate 
second highes t in the world, paralleled only by Brazil (Maps of World, 2007). Deforestation 
averaged 1.7 million hectares annually during the first part of the 1990s (Holmes, 2002) and 2 
million hectares annually per year since 1996 (FWUGFW, 2002), or equivalent to 235 and 277 
soccer fields per hour, respectively. 
Under the New Order regime, most of the benefits of forest exploitation were captured by 
Indonesia's business and political elites (Dauvergne, 1997; Ascher, 1998; Barr, 1998; Ross, 
200 I), local communities lost their traditional forest resources and thus their livelihoods 
(SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe, 1993; Barber et al., 1994), and they and the wider community 
lost the biodivcrsi ty1 and the ecosystem services the forests provided (Brookfield et al., 1995; 
MacKinnon and Sumardja, 1996; World Bank, 2001). These issues and their implications have 
been widely analysed and well-summarised (for instance, Hurst, 1990; Barber et al., 1994; 
Dauvergne, 2001: Jepson et al., 200 I; World Bank, 2001; Down to Earth, 2002). 
1 Including wood, wood products, pulp, and paper 
' For a comprehensive study of the effects of commercial logging on wildlife in Kalimantan, see 
Meijaard et al. (2005). 
Of particular relevance to the study is that central control of the country's forests has 
meant that both local governments and local people have had very little say on how local 
resources, including forests, were managed as well as on how their benefits should be shared 
(Kartodihardjo and Jhamtani, 2006). An overview of forest administration and management 
during the New Order period is presented in Appendix 2. 
The dramatic political and social events of 1998 which saw the end of the New Order 
Government led to reformasi, which comprised a suite of administrative, economic and political 
reforms (Turner and Podger, 2003; Aspinal and Fealy, 2003; Nordholt and van Klinken, 2007). 
In 1999, two decentralisation laws, often referred to as regional autonomy laws, were enacted, 
setting in place decentralisation of the governance of Indonesia's natural resources, including its 
forests, to local governments. Although autonomy and decentralisation are different concepts 
(Chapter 2), in the Indonesian case the terms decentralisation and regional autonomy are often 
used interchangeably. 
The period since 1999 has been one of considerable turbulence in the administration of 
Indonesia's forests, and has seen a continuation of forest exploitation and conversion, including 
a marked increase in illegal logging (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002; Smith et al., 2003; 
McCarthy, 2004; Obidzinski, 2005; Wadley and Eilenberg, 2005; Tacconi, 2007) and a rise in 
conflicts over forests (Shroeder-Wildberg and Carius, 2003; Jarvie et al., 2003; Wulan et al., 
2004 ). These rapid and unprecedented developments provide the context for the research 
reported in this thesis. 
1.2 Decentralisation of natural resource management: 
the flavour of the era 
The problem of rapid deforestation as one form of inappropriate natural resource 
management (NRM) is not confined to Indonesia: it is a problem in most developing countries 
(Repetto and Gillis, 1988). Much of the problem has been closely associated with centralized 
control, both of the resource and of the benefits of resource exploitation (for instance, Ascher, 
2000). 
Decentralisation has been promoted in the last three decades as a response to the failures of 
centralized approaches in development (for review see Manor, 1999 and Appendix 1 ). Political, 
fiscal, and administrative powers are being devolved to sub-national governments (World Bank, 
2000). As in development more generally, the unsatisfactory record of the centralized mode of 
NRM has promoted many nations to experiment in devolving their NRM arrangements (for 
instance, Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2004, Chapter 2). 
Decentralisation is now commonly defined as "any act by which Central Government 
cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial 
hierarchy" (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999:475). It has been promoted as a foundation for 
development and democratization (Smith, 1985; Manor, 1999; The World Bank, 2000). 
Decentralisation is often claimed to enable improved resource management through increased 
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local participation in public decision making (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Local people are 
believed to possess better knowledge about local resources and to better observe local 
regulations governing natural resources that were formulated with local people's inputs 
(Carney, 1995; Larson, 2003b). Local governments are assumed to be more familiar with and 
better able to respond to local desires and circumstances than distant, Central authorities. These 
claimed virtues are particularly lauded in the context of democratic decentralisation; these 
arguments are reviewed and elaborated in Appendix 1. 
Despite its assumed potential in improving NRM, the stakes in the decentralisation of 
NRM are high because of the characteristics of natural resources. Natural resources are a source 
of wealth, livelihood, and income. These unique features often encourage rent-seeking 
activities, promote elite capture, and can often lead to conflicts (Appendix 1). 
Indonesia has followed in the footsteps of many other countries and embarked on recent 
decentralisation initiatives that extend to the natural resource sector. The legal basis for these 
most recent decentralisation efforts, as described in the beginning of this chapter, was set up in 
1999. 
1.3 Indonesia's past experiments with decentralisation 
The 1999 decentralisation initiatives came about after several attempts at decentralisation 
reforms. The earlier reforms, however, mostly failed to achieve their objectives or focused on 
trivial aspects (Yusuf, 1997; Mokhsen, 2003). The two major previous decentralisation 
initiatives were launched in 1974 and in 1995. 
In 1974, the Ministry of Home Affairs attempted a major decentralisation initiative through 
the enactment of Law 5 of 1974 on Basic Governance in the Regions, which provided a legal 
basis for the regions' autonomy. Regional governments in the Indonesian context refer to sub-
national governments: provincial, district (kabupaten) and municipal (kotamadya) governments. 
However, this initiative did not result in meaningful local autonomy (Devas, 1997; Yusuf, 1997; 
Mokhsen, 2003): the national government decentralized functions to regions, but largely kept 
decision-making authority in Jakarta's hands (Yusuf, 1997; Mokhsen, 2003). Regional 
governments remained merely administrative units, with very little meaningful authority and 
high dependence on the Centre for resources. This decentralisation attempt thus did not involve 
"power sharing" between the Central and Regional Governments (Amal and Nasikun, l 988). 
The shift was only limited to deconcentration, the least extensive form of decentralisation 
(Appendix l). It thus affirmed and reinforced the Central Government's control over regions 
through, for example, the appointment by the Central Government of regional leaders who were 
loyal to the central authority (Malley, 2003; Mokhsen, 2003). 
Recognizing the slow pace of the 1974-based decentralisation process, the New Order 
government set up a pilot project scheme for decentralisation. The project, initiated by the 
Ministry for Administrative Reform (MENPAN), abolished all vertical line agencies from 
technical agencies (Kandep) and from the Provincial Government (Cahang Dinas), and 
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transferred their tasks and budgets to the apparatus of the district governments. Twenty-six 
districts across Indonesia participated in the project. One of the districts studied in this thesis, 
Kutai Barat, was partitioned from one of these participating districts, the district of Kutai. 
Of particular relevance to this thesis, there had also been limited efforts to decentralize the 
agriculture, infrastructure, health (Mokhsen, 2003) and forest sectors). In the 1950s through to 
the end of 1960s, significant forestry authority was placed in the hands of the first level of sub-
national governments' , the provincial governments. During this (President Soekarno's) period, 
commercial natural forest exploitation, particularly in the Outer Islands, was minimal (Manning, 
1971; Gillis, 1988). 
President Soeharto's 30-year period in office changed all this. The locus of authority over 
forests shifted firmly to the Central Government. Institutions and policies to enable large-scale 
exploitation of natural forests, which had previously remained largely limited to small-scale 
harvests for local markets, were put in place, ostensibly to support the country's economic 
growth (Dauvergnc, 1997; Resosudarmo, 2002). The subsequent exploitation of these forests 
has threatened their existence and quality; over the years, they have been relentlessly damaged 
and converted to other uses (for instance Barber et al., 1994; Dauvergne, 200 l ). Moreover, little 
of the benefits accrued to the local level, to local communities or to local governments. Instead, 
the benefits had largely flowed to businesses and elite circles close to the Centre (Ascher, 1998; 
Barr 1998; Ross, 2001 ). Similar skewed distribution of benefits occurred in all other natural 
resource sectors of Indonesia (Resosudarmo, 2005). 
During the New Order period, the few initiatives to delegate some forestry responsibilities 
to regions were insignificant or ineffective. This was clear, for example, in the area of forest 
protection. Although in 1985 the Central Government transferred forest protection 
responsibilities to the provincial level, most policies related to forest protection continued to be 
made by the Centre, with provincial officials carrying out only technical functions (Rahmadi, 
2000). 5 
Indonesia's wide-ranging reforms post-New Order were partly a response to grievances 
over the imbalance of the distribution of natural resource benefits between the Centre and the 
regions (Van Zorge Report, 1999; Kantaprawira, 2000; Resosudarmo, 2004). These reforms 
began immediately after President Soeharto stepped down from office. Within a month, a 
Government Regulation had already granted some areas of governance to the regions.6 
Al though the types of authority transferred were trivial, comprising mostly authority over minor 
revenue sources or over non-revenue generating activities, this Government Regulation turned 
' Government Regulation 64 of 1957 
' Except for Eastern Indonesia, where these matters had been transferred to the second level of 
sub-national governments. In 1968, however, this district-level authority was shifted to the 
provincial level. 
' Government Regulation 28 of 1985 
• Government Regulation 62 of 1998 
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out to be - as discussed in Chapter 3 - significant in the establishment of district forestry 
regimes. 
1.4 Indonesia's latest decentralisation and forest 
managemenf 
Both the reformasi environment beginning in 1998 and the 1999 regional autonomy laws 
set the stage for local forest management regimes; this was a departure from the previous 
approach of tight central control over forest management. The political turmoil and the 
perceived illegitimacy of the government leading the country immediately after the downfall of 
the New Order, worked to the disadvantage of the Ministry of Forestry in maintaining its 
control over forests. In addition, the frequent changes in the Ministry's leadership during a 
relatively short period, 1998-2001, resulted in a number of Central policies diverging from those 
promulgated during the New Order. In particular, as I discuss further in Chapter 3, the reformasi 
environment has led to a number of Central forest policies in favour of local communities. 
Indonesia's recent decentralisation laws provided the legal basis for the far-reaching 
devolution to local governments of many hitherto centrally-held authorities, and for the 
extensive restructuring of fiscal arrangements to finance its implementation. They imply a shift 
in meaningful decision-making powers in many areas from the Central authorities to local 
governments, including forestry. These recent decentralisation initiatives were expected to 
involve the most extensive type of decentralisation, democratic decentralisation (Chapter 2 and 
Appendix 1), in contrast to the merely administrative decentralisation of previous 
decentralisation experiments. 
The decision to decentralize during a state of economic cris is and political instability 
meant that there were other forces at play that also influenced how decentralisation was to be 
implemented. Fearful of losing momentum and under pressure to make reforms, the 
Government not only passed these two decentralisation laws, but also a flurry of other laws. 
Consequently, laws were written in haste, without sufficient public consultation, and reflected 
divergent interests (Van Zorge Report, 8 May, 2000; Turner and Podger, 2003). The resulting 
legislation ranged from ambiguous to conflicting. For example, the provisions of Law 41 of 
I 999 on Forestry, enacted a few months after the decentralisation laws, tend to retain control 
over forests in the hands of the Central Government. This law therefore conflicts with the 
provisions of Law 22 of 1999 which had transferred sectoral authority, including forestry, to 
local govt:rnrnents. The enactment of this new forestry law is thus of particular relevance to this 
research (Appendix 2). 
' The term forest management here and throughout the thesis is used to refer to a broad scope 
of forestry related activities, including policies or decision making and their implementation. 
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Indonesia's dependence on its natural resource base to finance national development 
extends to sub-national governments. With no industrial capacity and a lack of established 
infrastructure, many local governments outside Java rely on their natural resource base to 
develop their areas. Hence, increased local government powers in forestry under 
decentralisation can have profound implications for the management of the resource. 
1.5 The research and its relevance 
It is now several years since Indonesia's decentralisation initiative was formally 
implemented, on January I, 2001. Studies and analyses of Indonesia's decentralisation have 
been more focused on fiscal, administrative, and political decentralisation in general, and less 
on natural resource management. As described briefly above, decentralisation of natural 
resource management is unique compared to that in other sectors. Because it involves the shift 
of power over productive resources, the decentralisation of NRM is different in terms of the 
potential and risks. Hence, Indonesia's decentralisation provides an opportunity to conduct 
timely empirical research into what decentralisation has meant in practice in the forestry sector. 
1.5.1 Research objectives 
State or centralized natural resource management in many parts of the world has often 
been shown to be unsatisfactory in terms of social and distributional equity, in terms of the 
sustainability of the resource itself, and in terms of environmental and ecological aspects (for 
instance, Potter, 1993; Painter and Durham, 1995; Ascher, 2000; Dauvergne, 2001; Oyono, 
2005). These failures, among others, have led countries to take the alternative path of devolving 
resource management tasks down to the local level. Much research has focused on the 
devolution of forest management authority to community or village levels, such as those on 
community-based forest management (for instance, Enters et al., 200 I ; Edmunds and 
Wollenberg, 2003). In contrast, there has been little focus on the local government level. 8 As 
with communities, decentralisation to local governments is also challenging, due to their lack of 
capacity and resources (for instance, Ferroukhi, 2003), and their potential vulnerability to 
pressures, including those from the communities they represent, for rapid resource exploitation. 
This research therefore focuses on understanding the nature and the outcomes of the 
devolution of authority of forestry matters to local governments. This focus on local 
government corresponds to Indonesia's decentralisation reforms, where the locus of 
decentralisation has been to the local government level, as opposed to the level of community, 
and is therefore of fundamental importance to understanding the Indonesian situation. 
• Of 55 case studies on decentralisation of forests and wildlife in Latin America and Africa, only 
one focused on local government (Agrawal, 2001 b). Increasingly, more studies now include 
local authorities as the emphasis of analysis. The Center for International Forestry Research, for 
instance, pioneered and has continued to carry out studies of Indonesia's decentralisation in 
forestry. 
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Several studies conducted during the beginning of the decentralisation process in certain 
districts of Indonesia showed that it can have profound implications for forests and local 
development (Barr et al. 2001; Casson 2001a, 200lb; McCarthy 200la, 200lb; Potter and 
Badcock, 2001; Resosudarmo and Dermawan 2002; Resosudarmo, 2003, 2004; Soetarto et al., 
2001). Local governments are now at the forefront in determining the direction of resource use 
and local development. Yet how local authorities make their decisions on forests, what factors 
or influences affect these decisions, and the relationship between these decisions and forest use, 
are not yet adequately understood. This research therefore seeks to understand these issues. 
1.5.2 Summary of research framework 
In order to achieve the research objectives, this thesis combines three approaches to 
analyse decentralisation: the framework for analysing decentra lisation in NRM suggested by 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999); the more common way of analysing decentralisation reforms 
through institutional analysis of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation, as 
suggested by Manor (1999); and Larson's (2003b) model for decentralized forest management. 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) propose that three distinct analytical dimensions underlie all 
acts of decentralisation: actors, powers, and accountability. They argue that in order to 
understand the extent of meaningful decentralisation that has taken place (that is, if 
decentralisation has occurred and whether or not it is effective) one needs to understand the 
powers of various actors, the domains in which they exercise their powers, and to whom and 
how they are accountable. 
In this research, Indonesia's decentralisation in the political, administrative, and fi scal 
realms relevant to forestry are analyzed by reviewing the institutional arrangements that provide 
the foundations for formal reforms, namely through the array of relevant legislation and the 
administrative structure and functions of different levels of governments. The implementation 
of these institutional arrangements is then discussed around and within the three themes derived 
from Agrawal and Ribot's framework above. 
While Agrawal and Ribot's framework is concerned with the who and the what, that is, 
who are the actors who have been given what new powers, this research extends to the how 
question. It analyzes how the newly-found formal powers have actually been manifested in 
practice, at the level which is the locus of the power shift, the district. It does this by adapting a 
model proposed by Larson (2003b), which emphasizes power relations between and among 
relevant actors, and integrating it into the research framework (Chapter 2). 
The analysis carried out in this research consists of three main elements. The first element, 
which provides background for the other two, is concerned with what decentralisation formally 
entails for Indonesia in the forestry sector. This necessarily considers the new institutional 
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arrangements provided by the decentralisation legislation. 9 This is reviewed in Appendix 2 as 
the basis for analysis of the next two elements.The second element addresses how local (district) 
governments and the Central Government agency in charge of forestry affairs have, in practice, 
interpreted and acted upon these new arrangements in the case of the forestry sector. The third 
element focuses on the decision-making processes actually occurring at the level which is the 
locus of decentralisation, the district. 
1.5.3 Summary of research methodology 
This research was conducted using Layder's adaptive theory approach (Layder, 1998, 
Chapter 2), which adopts an iterative process and is compatible with the need to analyze both 
the behavioural, micro phenomenon of individual actors and the systemic phenomenon of 
organisations. Jt uses a qualitative (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Schwandt, 1997; Creswell, 
1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 2004), case study approach (Stake, 1995; Flyvberg, 2001; Yin, 
2003), but is supported by quantitative data, whenever possible and/or necessary. 
Two forest-rich districts in the province of East Kalimantan were selected as case 
studies: Kutai Baral and Bulungan Districts. Data were collected through in-depth interviews of 
key informants, close observations of district-level actors' activities, local government reports 
and decisions, legislation and national legal instruments as well as provincial government 
documents, and scrutiny of local and national media. To retain confidentiality, interviewees are 
referred to by the codes they were assigned, no names are mentioned, and their positions are not 
specified unless they specifically gave the consent to be disclosed (Appendix 4). 
1.5.4 Brief background to the case study districts 
Bulungan and Kutai Baral Districts are two of the thirteen districts/municipalities in East 
Kalimantan Province. There are some similarities between the two districts - including in the 
types of forests and the composition of the ethnic groups in the population - but also some 
differences. Notably, Bulungan has mangrove forests along its eastern coast while Kutai Barat is 
a land-Jocked district. 
Bu/ungan District 
Bulungan is located in the north eastern part of the province, between 116'20' - 118°00' 
East Longitude and between 2'06' - 3 °45' North Latitude. To the north lies the district of 
Nunukan, to the east the Sulawesi Sea and the municipality of Tarakan, to the South lies Bcrau 
District, and to the west it shares a border with Malinau District. The capital of the district, 
Tanjung Selor, lies in the southeast of the district (Figure 1.1 ). 
' Legislation here refers to laws and bylaws, including the decentralisation laws and their 
implementing regulations, as well as sectoral decrees. 
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The topography of the district varies from undulating steep lands to lowland areas. In the 
northern and the western parts of the district stretches a mountain belt with steep slopes and 
sheer cliffs. The middle part of the district consists of hills to 500 meters above sea level. The 
lower areas in the south and eastern part of the district consist of plains and tidal wetlands. The 
district encompasses a number of islands, among the largest are Mandul, Mangkudulis Besar, 
Sengatok Besar, and Bunyu Islands. As in Kalimantan in general, the district depends heavily 
on its rivers for both its economy and transport. Bulungan District is supported by an extensive 
network of rivers; the seven major ones are Kayan, Sesayap, Sekatak, Bandan, Pimping, 
Linuang Kayan, and Jelarai rivers (BPS and BAPPEDA Bulungan, 2004). 
The district has an area of 1,800,000 hectares, comprising 13 sub-districts and 87 villages 
(BPS and BAPPEDA Bulungan, 2004). As of 2006, the population of the district was 93,987 
people; 86% of the working population are farmers (BPS and BAPPEDA Bulungan, 2004). The 
four major ethnic groups in the district are Dayak, '0Bulungan, Ban jar, and Tidung. 
The district has 1,386,356 hectares categorized as forests. They comprise Protected 
Forests" 122,462 hectares, Production Forests 721,694 hectares, and areas designated for other 
uses 541, 199 hectares (Kabupaten Bulungan, 2007). 
Kutai Barat District 
Kutai Barat District borders Malinau District to the north, Kutai District to the east, Pasir 
District to the south, and the provinces of Central and West Kalimantan as well as Sarawak to 
the west. It is located 113°49' - 116°26' East Longitude and I '32' North Latitude - 1 '04' South 
Latitude, straddling the Equator (Figure 1.1). 
The district is crossed by the longest river in East Kalimantan, the Mahakam, and six other 
major rivers (Muyub, Peri, Merah, Alau, Boh, Ninjah). The topography of the district is 
distinguished into three zones: lowlands, dry zone highlands, and the zone upstream of the 
Mahakam rapids. 
'
0 Oayak is the broad term used to refer to the indigenous population of Kalimantan. It 
encompasses the different sub-ethnic groups including Dayak Kayan, Benuaq, Tunjung, Lun 
Dayeh, Punan and many others. 
" See Appendix 2 where the Indonesian forest categories are described and explained. 
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The red areas in the map depict the area affected by the 1997-1998 forest fires that ravaged 
East Kalimantan. Although these fires are not discussed in the thesis, the latest available 
data incorporated the burnt vegetation, hence the red areas in the map. 
The district comprises an area of 3,162,870 hectares, and 21 sub-districts and 223 villages. 
In 2006, the population of the district was 14 7 ,776 people (Gonner et al. , 2007); more than 65 % 
of the population depended on agriculture and the forestry sub-sector (Andrianto, 2006). The 
population consists of several ethnic groups: the majority are Dayak (63.9%), followed by Kutai 
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(15.5%), Javanese (10.7%), and the remainder are Banjarese, Bugis, and Batak (Gonner et al., 
2007). 
Within Kutai Barat District's jurisdiction, 1,481,068 hectares are designated as Production 
Forests, 744,038 hectares are Protection Forests, 5,050 hectares are Nature Reserve, and the 
remaining 932,266 are designated for other uses (KKPKD, 200la). 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter one provides an introduction to the entire work, setting the background of the 
study, the objectives of the study, justification for and relevance of the study. It summarizes the 
analytical framework and the methodology used in the research, and presents the organisation of 
the thesis. 
Chapter two describes the research framework. The first part sets forth the objectives of the 
research and the research questions. The second part summarizes, from the detailed review 
presented in Appendix I, relevant concepts and theories that serve as the foundation for the 
research and the research framework. The third part presents the analytical framework by laying 
out the details and relevance of the major models that together form the basis of the research: 
Agrawal and Ribot' s ( 1999) framework, Larson's (2003b) model, as well as the application of 
institutional analysis suggested by Manor (1999). The fourth part justifies the choice of the case 
study and qualitative approaches. 
Chapter three centres on intergovernmental relations and how these relations affect local 
government decision-making in forestry. It discusses the power struggle between districts and 
the Central and provincial governments, showing the dynamics that were played out in districts' 
efforts to uphold district forestry regimes that had been created under decentralisation. The 
chapter first summarizes, from the detailed review provided in Appendix 2, the new formal 
institutional arrangements (legislation and government regulations) and the structure of forestry 
administration as a result of decentralisation. The chapter then discusses the contentious process 
of the transfer of power to districts, detailing the Centre's hesitant initiatives to transfer power 
that ended with its withdrawal and district governments' response toward these actions. Two 
sections highlight Bulungan and Kutai Barat's specific attempts to use the opportunity presented 
under decentralisation to self-govern districts' forests . The next section analyses the wrangling 
over forestry author.ity between district and provincial governments. Pressures from other 
sectors illuminating the importance of other sectors to district forestry governance, particularly 
important when districts' forestry authority were withdrawn, are highlighted in the last section. 
Chapter four focuses on fiscal decentralisation in the forestry sector. It focuses on two 
themes: forestry-derived revenues as a result of the decentralisation of fiscal powers and how 
these revenues were used by districts. The firs t theme includes the change in the structure of 
fiscal relations between district governments and the Centre, how this forestry revenue sharing 
was implemented, and the generation of forestry revenues exclusively benefiting districts' 
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coffers. The second theme observes the extent of districts' commitment to reinvest forestry-
derived revenue back into the resource. 
Chapter five revolves around the Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project as a forestry 
project financed by districts' share of the Reforestation Fund, one of the types of forestry 
revenue discussed in Chapter 4. It first discusses the challenges in the Fund's actual process of 
allocation and distribution to the districts, illustrating that the method of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer may be as important as the actual transfer of the money itself. This is followed by 
an analysis of the implementation of the Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project funded by this 
Fund. 
Chapter six emphasizes the dynamics of district forestry governance, with the actors 
operating at the distric t level as the main focus. It elaborates on district governments' 
interactions with these actors that in turn affect district forestry. It first discusses the role of 
international organisations, NGOs, and academics in district forestry decision-making, followed 
by an analysis of the influence exerted by local people. The next section centres on the role of 
forestry businesses in district forestry regimes, followed by a discussion of a particular set of 
actors influential in Kutai Barat's forestry: the preman. 
Chapter seven analyses the accountability relations and processes relevant to the study 
districts. It examines both the formal and informal accountability processes relevant to fores try 
governance. In particular, it observes all types of accountability relations and processes that 
have worked, rather than maintaining focus on downward accountability as suggested by 
Agrawal and Ribot's framework. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the most important find ings of the research in relation 
to the research questions. It first summarises the major findings, then describes them in more 
detail. A section of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the utility of the research 
framework. The conclusion also provides suggestions for further research and discusses how 
improvements could be made in similar studies. 
Since the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted, there have been several changes in the 
legislation, thus the fluidity of district forestry governance arrangements. The major relevant 
developments are addressed in a short postscript, presented as Appendix 5. 
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Chapter 2: Research Framework 
The previous chapter provides the overall description of the thesis and describes briefly 
how decentralisation has been and is championed in both development and natural resource 
arenas all over the world, including Indonesia. This chapter elaborates the framework of the 
research which rests on the concept of decentralisation and elements believed as critical in 
determining the outcomes of decentralized NRM. It first sets out the objectives of the research 
and th.e research questions. It is followed by a brief overview of the key concepts of 
decentralisation and elements essential in understanding decentralisation as well as justifications 
for its application in NRM; this synopsis draws from the extensive literature review presented in 
Appendix I. The third section of this chapter presents the analytical framework of this research. 
The last section justifies the choice of research methods and approaches. 
2. 1 Objectives of this Research 
The objective of this research is to analyse forestry governance under Indonesia's 
decentralisation. Thus, the core research question is: Has Indonesia's decentralisation led to 
improved forestry governance at the district level? To answer this question, three sub-research 
questions are investigated: 
I. What is the extent and nature of Indonesia's decentralisation in the forestry sector, 
formally and in practice? 
2. How have district decisions that affect forest use and management been shaped in the 
context of decentralisation? 
3. What have been the principal consequences of Indonesia' s decentralisation, and of 
decision-making12 about forests at the district level under that decentralisation, for patterns of 
forest use and management? 
The research does not directly assess the outcomes of this decentralisation for forests, as it 
does not draw on data characterising the biophysical condition of forests pre-and post-
decentralisation. However, the general consequences for forest use and management are 
apparent from the analyses reported in this thesis. 
2.2 Key concepts in decentralisation and elements 
essential in decentralisation of NRM 
This section provides a brief overview of the main concepts of decentralisation and the 
elements essential in understanding decentralisation of NRM. A comprehensive review of the 
decentralisation literature - addressing its benefits and pitfalls, justifications for decentralisation 
" Decision-making refers to a process or outcome, and is an intrinsic part of a policy process 
(Adger et al., 2003). When undertaken by some authority on behalf of society, decision-making 
is analogous to policy-making (Parsons, 1995 in Adger et al .. 2003). 
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m NRM and the elements suggested as crucial in determining the outcomes of NRM 
decentralisation - is presented in Appendix 1. 
Although the term "decentralisation" is often used in different ways, as a basic concept, 
decentralisation refers to the shift of power and resources away from the Central government to 
different territorial units of governments and across local groups (Appendix 1 ). The most 
common types of decentralisation and relevant to the thesis are political decentralisation, often 
referred to as democratic dcentralization, administrative decentralisation, and fiscal 
decentralisation. Democratic decentralisation involves the transfer of powers to sub-national 
level authorities with significant autonomy and which are democratic in some manner (Manor, 
1999; Appendix 1). A central dimension in democratic decentralisation is accountability 
(Manor, 1999; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Appendix I), in particular, downward accountability, 
or accountability of those exercising power, to their constituencies (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Appendix 1). Administrative decentralisation refers to the devolution of power to local-level 
units or extensions of the Central government. The principal distinguishing feature between 
democratic and administrative decentralisation is accountability: democratic decentralisation 
occurs when those exercising power are downwardly accountable to their constituents (Agrawal 
and Ribot, 1999); administrative decentralisation occurs when the actors receiving the powers 
are accountable to their superiors (Ribot, 2004). Fiscal decentralisation refers to the transfer of 
authority to raise revenues and make expenditure decisions from the Central government to sub-
national levels of government (Parker, 1995; Manor, 1999) and the sharing of revenues 
(Mokhsen, 2003). 
Decentralisation in the development arena is justified by reference to the assumed benefits 
of increased efficiency, equity, participation, and responsiveness of government to citizens 
(Parker, l 995; World Bank, 1997; Blair, 2000; Smoke, 2003). The main underlying arguments 
are that decentralisation "brings the state closer to the people", where popular participation in 
decision making is believed to promote democracy (World Bank, 1997) and that local 
governments are believed to be more familiar with local needs compared to a distant Central 
Government, and thus more responsive (Smith, 1985; World Bank, 2000). 
However, in many cases, decentralisation outcomes have fallen short of their assumed 
benefits in terms of both development performance and governance (for instance, Turner and 
Hulme, 1997; Azfar et al., 1999; Smoke, 2003). The caveats of decentralisation include: I) the 
quality of public services declines due to local authorities' lack of capacity; 2) the concentration 
of the benefits of decentralisation within elite circles; 3) the increased distribution and incidence 
of corruption (Appendix I). Irrespective of outcomes, decentralisation nevertheless continues to 
be on the agenda of many countries, in part because centralization has proven not to be a 
desirable alternative. Importantly, decentralisation continues to be promoted not only for its 
assumed desirable end, but also as a means to an end: at the very basic, democratic 
decentralisation allows for citizens to determine their own affairs (Rondinelli et al., 1983; 
Agrawal and Ribot, l 999). 
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Similarly, failures in centralized approaches of NRM have led to heightened interest in 
local-level NRM governance arrangements (Appendix 1), which are held to parallel the 
benefits of decentralisation more generally (that is, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and 
democracy). Thus, the thinking and fashion of decentralisation in development and governance 
has also "infected" the natural resource sectors. In particular and most relevant to this thesis, 
democratic decentralisation has been assumed to improve NRM (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
The potential and stakes of decentralisation of natural resources are higher than those of 
other sectors, because of the specific characteristics of natural resources. Natural resources are 
sources of income and wealth for various segments of the population and for states. The transfer 
of NRM responsibilities, unlike responsibilities in public service sectors, is often seen as 
revenue-generating, rather than as cost-incurring (Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002). Decentralisation 
of NRM provides a vehicle for local governments to generate revenues to finance the 
development of their areas. Thus, local governments' authority over natural resources makes 
local governments politically, economically, and socially important to the local population. The 
commercial value of natural resources, however, has also often led to conflicts between the 
different actors who have interests in them. 
Natural resources also differ from that of other sectors because, despite being locally 
specific, also have multi-scale features. Thus, issues of subsidiarity - to what level should 
natural resource be devolved - are important (Andersson, 2000). The size of of the jurisdiction 
over which powers are devolved and the balance of powers among levels of authority are, 
therefore, important issues in the decentralisation of NRM. 
As discussed comprehensively in Appendix 1, two major elements affecting the outcomes 
of NRM decentralisation are power and accountability (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The key 
elements revolving around the power dimension are I ) the nature and types of power devolved; 
2) the means for the transfer of power; 3) the balance of powers among authorities of power; 
and 4) power relations among and between actors. The effectiveness of decentralized natural 
resource governance is hinged upon the transfer of meaningful discretionary powers to the local 
level (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2005). The means by which power is transferred, that is, 
whether the transfer of power is secure or not, will affect the outcomes of decentralized NRM 
(Conyers, I 990 cited in Ribot, 2005). The granting of unlimited powers to local governments 
can result in indiscriminate exploitation of the natural resources; hence, there is always a need 
for an appropriate balance of powers among levels of government (Larson, 2003b; Ribot, 2004; 
Capistrano and Colfer, 2005). The political and economic nature of natural resources makes 
power relations among and between actors, each with its own interests, important in 
determining the outcomes of decentralized NRM (Larson, 2003b). 
Accountability, in particular downward accountability, is assumed to be critical in 
determining the outcomes of democratic decentralisation. Only if local authorities gaining 
decentralized powers are accountable to their constituents will democratic decentralisation lead 
to improved NRM (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
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Accountability is a complex, ambiguous, and contested concept (Appendix 1 ). 
Accountability is "the obligation to account, a method by which the public is kept informed and 
the powerful in check" (Mulgan, 2003: 1). It is often explained using the principal-agent 
relationship (Mulgan, 2003). In the delegation of power, those who delegate (the principal or 
account-holders) would need to check the actions of those to whom they delegate the power (the 
agents or the accountors). Accountabity is viewed to consist of two principal dimensions: 
answerability and enforcement or rectification (Schedler, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2001; Mulgan, 
2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005). Thus, accountability is complete when agents arc not only 
called to account, but they must also be held to account. 
Mulgan (2003) restricted accountability relations and mechanisms to those involving 
external scrutiny and sanctions, thus involving state accountability institutions. Others, 
however, typically include non-state institutions, such as civil society, as instruments of 
accountability (for example, Peters, 1984; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 
2000). The latter, societal accountability, involves a means of control of power which does not 
involve both components calling and holding anyone to account. 
These concepts and elements provide the basis for the analytical framework of the 
research. 
2.3 Analytical framework 
Cohen and Peterson (1996) pointed out the confusion over and careless use of the 
conceptual term "decentralisation" as one of the most serious methodological issues confronting 
studies of decentralisation (Appendix 1 ). Because of the often multiple meanings associated 
with and the different uses of the term in the analysis of decemralisation (Appendix 1), what is 
meant by decentralisation in this thesis needs to be defined. Thus, decentralisation is defined as 
"any act by which a Central Government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at 
lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy" (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999:475). Ribot (2004) also uses the same definition (see Box 2.1 and Appendix I for 
definitions used in thesis). 
Decentralisation and autonomy are distinguishable but often treated as interrelated 
concepts; the more extensive decentralisation, the larger the autonomy (Smith, 1985; Rolla, 
1998; Verhoest e t al., 2004; Fleurke and Willemse, 2006). Autonomy is interpreted as " the 
extent to which local government determines its own agenda; the extent to which other 
government authorities give local government freedom of policy-making; and the extent to 
which local government is dependent on other authorities in its decision-making practices" 
(Fleurke and Willemse, 2006:75). As noted in Chapter 1, in the Indonesian case, the terms 
decentralisation and regional autonomy are often used interchangeably. 
The analysis here of decentralisation in Indonesia's forestry sector in general and district-
level forestry decision-making in particular applies a modified version of a framework proposed 
by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) for analysing decentralisation. Following Agrawal and Ribot's 
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definition of democratic decentralisation (section 2.2 and Appendix 1 ), they suggest a 
framework that focuses on three dimensions: actors, power, and accountability. They look at the 
actors concerned, that is, who surrenders powers and who receives the powers. The transfer of 
some powers to local-level authorities constitutes some form of decentralisation. However, 
according to this framework, decentralisation will only be effective, that is, whether or not it can 
achieve its stated aim of improved natural resource management, depends on the relations of 
accountability between those who receive power and their constituents. 
Therefore, the overall research framework used in this thesis has three major elements. The 
first is the legal-regulatory and administrative structure of Indonesia' s decentralized governance 
(described in detail in Appendix 2). The second element revolves around the dimensions of 
actors, powers, and accountability as defined by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). The third clement 
concerns power relations between and among relevant actors (Larson, 2003b). As the two major 
research questions posed above overlap with each other in many ways (that is, district decision-
making is analysed in the context of the implementation of decentralisation), by default it is not 
possible to answer the two research questions in isolation from each other. 
Box 2.1 Definitions adopted in this thesis 
Accountability is the obligation to account; a method by which the public is kept 
informed and the powerful in check. 
Actors refer to individuals or organisations with the capacity to act and make decisions 
or influence others. 
Administrative decentralization (or deconcentration) occurs when the actors to whom 
the powers are transferred are accountable to their superiors in a hierarchy. 
Authority is legitimate power. 
Decentralization is any act by which a Central government formally cedes powers to 
actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial 
hierarchy. 
Democratic (or political) decentralization occurs when the actors receiving powers are 
accountable to their constituents. 
Power is the capacity to act, to influence, or control others. 
2.3.1 Agrawal and Ribot's framework for analysis of democratic 
decentralisation 
Agrawal and Ribot ( 1999) argue that to understand the extent of decentralisation, that is, if 
decentralisation has occurred and whether or not it is effective, one needs to understand the 
decision-making powers of various actors, the domains in which they exercise their powers, and 
to whom and how they are accountable. This argument is supported through the framework they 
espouse. 
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Actors 
Within this framework, decentralisation is considered to involve at least three sets of key 
actors. each set positioned at different levels of social action.13 They comprise the Central state 
and its apparatus that relinquishes powers. the local authorities that receive the powers, and the 
local population to whom the local authorities are accountable. Local actors receiving (and 
exercising) power over public resources can include appointed or elected local officials, NGOs, 
local or customary leaders, powerful figures, or corporate bodies such as communities, 
cooperatives, and committees. 
Powers of decision-making 
A full discussion of the theory is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Chapter 1 ). However, 
the thesis employs the concept of powers of decision-making to refer to the particular type of 
powers (concerning forestry) exercised at the local level. 
Because different actors have different interests, Agrawal and Ribot's framework assumes 
that the devolution of similar types of powers to different actors can result in different 
outcomes. Thus, the nature of decentralisation is determined by who receives and exercises 
power and the accountability relations to which those exercising power are subject. 
Corresponding to the categories relevant to the separation of powers and checks and 
balances in state administration and politics, Agrawal and Ribot distinguish four broad powers 
of decision making in decentralisation. These are: 1) the power to make new rules or modify 
existing rules; 2) the power to make decisions on how a certain resource or opportunity is to be 
used; 3) the power to implement the newly created or modified rules and ensure their 
compliance; and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes associated with the creation of the new 
rules and their compliance. These are described in Box 2.2. 
13 The term "stakeholder" is commonly used to refer to people or groups who share a n interest or 
stake in a certain issue, system or activity (Ribot, 2002; Mulgan, 2003), either being affected by 
an activity, having an influence on it, or both (Hobley, 1996 in Sithole, 2002). In actor-oriented 
research, the term "actor" refers to individua ls or social groups with the capacity of agency, for 
decision-making and action (see Hindess, 1988; Long, 1992; Ramirez, 1999, cited in Mahanty, 
2000) 
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Box 2.2 Types of decision making powers 
The power to create new rules is typically 
o Held in some domain of decision making over which governments seek to 
decentralize control, and in relation to some groups of actors; 
o Those actors who exercise the power to design new rules or modify old ones do so 
for some kind of resources and for some groups of people; 
o This set of powers allows decentralized actors to legislate principles that structure 
decisions and actions concerning who can benefit from given resources or 
opportunities, how, and to what extent. 
The powers to make decisions in some domain of action that influences others 
o Increase the autonomy of the actors who gain these powers; 
o Enhance the discretionary authority of local bodies and directly affect the use of 
resources; 
o Decisions need not affect the behaviour of others by prescribing what they must, 
must not, or may do (for example, greater powers in revenue raising or autonomy 
in budget spending means a degree of decentralization has been achieved even if 
the greater of rule making has not been devolved). 
The powers to implement and ensure compliance with decisions and rules: 
o Are the power to execute and monitor whether actors are carrying out the roles 
they are supposed to perform; 
o Also include the power to impose sanctions on non-performing actors and to 
enforce those sanctions; 
o The power to ensure rule-breaking individuals conform to the sanctions imposed 
when they violate rules; 
o The devolution of powers to make decisions and rules without the devolution of 
powers to enforce them can be meaningless; 
o The power to enforce could be transferred to administrative branches of the state 
rather than local governments; but those given the power to enforce should be 
accessible and/or under the control of those who have the power to make decisions 
and rules. 
All of these executive powers (making, implementing, and enforcing decisions) require 
fiscal and administrative resources. 
Power of adjudication: 
o New rules and decisions are likely to be contested and negotiated and will spill 
over into the arena of adjudication; 
o Two aspects of adjudication are important: accessibility and independence; 
o Constituents should have access to channels of adjudication; 
o The channels of adjudication should be institutionalized such that they do not have 
structural links with sectoral interests; 
o Constituents should be able to challenge the rules, decisions, and their 
implementation and enforcement by those who hold decentralized powers, and the 
outcomes of such challenges should not be biased in favour of power holders. 
o Not critical that it be devolved to some representative bodies at the local level, but 
it should be accessible and exercised without systematic bias. 
Source: Agrawal and Ribot, 1999 
Decentralisation, then, involves the transfer of different sets of powers of decis ion making 
and rule making to lower-level actors. According to Agrawal and Ribot's framework, however, 
decentralisation will achieve its stated aims, in this case improved NRM, when the actors 
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exercising decentralized powers are accountable to their constituents. Such accountability is 
explained in Box 2.3. 
Ribot (2001, 2004, 2005) later noted that, although this framework is useful, it has 
limitations in that it does not take into account changes through time and differences in space; 
thus it only provides a static model. He proposed that another dimension, accountable 
representation, is critical for democratic decentralisation to be effective. In this view, equitable 
and efficient resource management is likely to be achieved (through democratic 
decentralisation) if local authorities are not only downwardly accountable to their constituents, 
but also responsive to the local population. 
Box 2.3 Accountability in Agrawal and Ribot's framework 
Accountability 
o Decentralization is likely to be effective when constituents come to exercise 
accountability as a countervailing power; 
o Accountability is also about the mechanisms through which counter powers are 
exercised by those subject to actors with decentralized power; 
o Modes of accountability are relational - therefore must attend to the actors 
among whom relations of accountability exist; 
o Where power is devolved to public actors (such as local governments), the 
primary concern would be downward accountability (accountability relations of 
actors downward to their constituents); but 
o There is some degree of upward accountability of appointed and representative 
actors; 
o Vertical and horizontal ties among branches of government can also shape the 
relations of accountability between local government actors and their 
constituencies; 
o Similarly, the relations between customary authorities and their administrative 
superiors can shape the downward accountability of local authorities receiving 
decentralized powers; 
o However, downward accountability of those who receive powers from the 
Center (state) on behalf of a constituency is the primary dimension of 
decentralization since it can broaden the participation of local populations and 
enhances the responsiveness of empowered actors; 
o Actors can be held downwardly accountable to local constituencies in numerous 
ways. Elections are not sufficient to hold elected officials accountable to their 
constituents; 
o Mechanisms to increase local or downward accountability include among 
others, legal recourse through courts, monitoring by third party (media, NGOs), 
political pressures and lobbying by association, social unrest and resistance, 
widespread participation, central state oversight, taxation. 
Source: Agrawal and Ribot, 1999 
2.3.2 Thesis Framework 
Agrawal and Ribot's framework provides an informative starting point in pursuing the 
objectives of the research. However, other literature and my own research experience both prior 
to and during the research conducted for this thesis suggest that some adaptation of this 
framework may be useful. The framework used in this thesis includes specific emphasis on 
other aspects and highlighting specific issues. It stresses particular emphasis on the legal-
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regulatory framework for decentralisation and for forestry valid in the period within which that 
decentralisation occurred and the administrative structure of government re levant to forestry. It 
specifically observes the decentralisation of financial powers and power relations between and 
among actors, and highlights various accountability relations. The model is based on 
distinguishing the actors and their power and accountability relations in the context of forestry. 
These are described and analysed in the latter part of this section. 
Legal-regulatory framework 
The thesis combines the analytical framework proposed by Agrawal and Ribot with the 
more conventional way of treating decentralisation reforms, that is, through an institutional 
analysis of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation - insofar as they exist - as 
suggested by Manor (1999). The thesis thus first observes the institutional arrangements that 
provide the foundations for formal reforms, through analysis of the legal-regulatory and 
administrative structures underpinning the decentralisation process and decentralized 
governance in forestry in Indonesia. The legal-regulatory framework determines who are the 
actors formally receiving the powers of decision making in decentralisation, what sorts of 
powers are legally devolved to which actors, and what sorts of formal accountability relations 
and mechanisms are present. Their actual implementation is then discussed along the three 
dimensions proposed in Agrawal and Ribot's framework, that is, actors (who receives the 
powers). powers of decision making (rule-making, powers to make and implement decisions, 
and powers of adjudication), and accountability. The process and the dynamics of 
decentralisation are thus examined by observing the extent to which the legal-regulatory 
framework for decentralisation translates into actual decision-making powers held by sub-
national actors, and the extent to which those powers are actually exercised in a manner 
downwardly accountable to their constituents. Focusing on communities and the issue of 
property rights, Thanh and Sikor (2006) used a similar approach, observing the extent to which 
legal acts were translated into actual rights, in their observations of forest devolution in 
Vietnam. However, Hesseling (1996) asserts the possibilities as well as the limits of laws in 
changing local natural resource management behaviour. 
The formal legal-regulatory framework allowing for decentralisation in forestry is not 
limited to legislation in this particular sector. Broader and more general decentralisation 
legislation, including that not directly concerning natural resources, may have particular 
relevance to, if not significantly determine, the way decentralisation processes in forestry take 
shape. This has been observed in other countries, particularly in Latin America (Larson, 2003b; 
Pacheco, 2005). This thesis observes the decentralisation legal-regulatory framework of local 
governance and fiscal balancing between the Centre and the regions (Chapter 3 and Appendix 2, 
and Chapter 4) and the legal-regulatory framework of forestry (Chapter 3 and Appendix 2). 
The analysis of the legal-regulatory framework for decentralisation also allows for the 
examination of the means of the transfer of powers. The security of powers has been noted as 
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one other attribute associated with the powers important m determining the outcome of 
decentralisation initiatives (section 2.2 and Appendix l). 
Fiscal powers 
The thesis framework also differs from that of Agrawal and Ribot in its treatment of fiscal 
decentralisation initiatives. While Agrawal and Ribot treat fiscal decentralisation as a means of 
providing one kind of power, they do not consider it as an analytical category per se. This 
thesis, on the other hand, observes fiscal powers as one major form of power devolved to and 
affecting both how decentralisation in forestry has been played out as well as district forestry 
decision-making under that decentralisation dynamic. 
The incorporation of fiscal decentralisation into the analytical framework is necessary for a 
number of reasons. First, the fiscal and administrative capacity of local authorities is 
fundamental to making political decentralisation work (Appendix 1 ). Adequate financial 
capacity is crucial to local-level autonomy and is often the means by which intergovernmental 
power is exercised (Smith, 1985); thus, in my analysis of decentralisation the financial issues of 
local governments need to be addressed. Lack of fu nding for lower level authorities was the 
most important factor in the failures of the earlier wave of decentralisation attempts in many 
countries (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). Therefore, political decentralisation must be 
accompanied by at least some fiscal decentralisation which provides financial resources, and by 
some administrative decentralisation which supplies bureaucratic resources. For instance, 
Edmiston (2002) found that revenue assignment is crucial both for autonomy and accountability 
in Papua New Guinea's decentralisation. 
Second, the decentralisation framework implemented in Indonesia in the period covered by 
this study does provide for parallel fiscal decentralisation initiatives (Chapter 4). This is a 
marked difference from the previous attempts of decentralisation in Indonesia under the New 
Order (Mokhsen, 2003). Studies conducted in the first few years of Indonesia's 
decentralisation 14 , particularly in the forestry sector (Ngakan et al., 2005; Resosudarmo et al. 
2006), suggest that the opportunity offered by the fiscal decentralisation framework to enhance 
fiscal capacity at the district level determined, to a significant extent, the dynamics of 
decentralisation. 
Administrative structure 
An analysis of decentralisation also requires an understanding of the basic administrative 
structures of the country's territorial division pre and post-decentralisation (Hutchcroft, 2001 ), 
as the administrative structure of the bureaucracy can also affect the outcomes of political 
decentralisation. The three major types of decentralisation, that is, democratic, administrative, 
"See SMERU case studies at http://www.smeru.or.id. 
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and fiscal decentralisation (Appendix l), are interconnected through at least one element: 
accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001). Agrawal and Ribot (1999), for instance, point out that 
horizontal and vertical linkages between positions in the bureaucracy can also determine the 
relations of accountability between local government actors and their constituencies. 
The research therefore considers pertinent legislation, including ministerial acts and 
decrees with lower legal status, insofar as they are relevant to political, administrative, and 
fiscal decentralisation that may have a bearing on district forestry decision-making. The 
administrative structure of the bureaucracy and their corresponding functions and 
responsibilities will also be observed, to the degree that they are relevant to forestry decision-
making. 
Power relations 
The research framework a lso goes a step further than Agrawal and Ribot's framework, to 
include an examination of power relations between and among the actors concerned in the 
process of answering the first two research sub-questions. Power relations are a critical 
component in Larson's (2003b) model in decentralized forest management. 
The balance of powers between actors relinquishing and receiving decentralized powers 
has been assumed to be an important feature for a successful decentralisation in NRM (section 
2.2 and Appendix I). Power relations between and among actors at the local level have been 
suggested as one of the decisive factors in understanding the arena of local decision-making 
about natural resources under decentralisation (Larson, 2003a, 2003b). These power relations 
arc distinguished through the use of the spatial metaphor of "vertical" and "horizontal" power 
relations of actors, discussed below under subheading Actors and depicted in Figures 2. 1 and 
2.2. 
Accountability relations and mechanisms 
One other modification to Agrawal and Ribot's framework applied in this research is in the 
examination of accountability relations. Whereas Agrawal and Ribot concentrate on downward 
accountabi lity mechanisms, this research "keeps an open mind" to other and any accountability 
relations that exist. The analysis thus not only includes downward accountability relations, but 
also other forms and types of accountability relations and processes (Appendix 1) as relevant to 
the actors' responsibilities in the forestry realm. As discussed above, Brinkerhoff (2001 ) notes 
the interconnection of political, administrative and fiscal accountabil ity. Furthermore, other 
relations of accountability may affect downward accountability (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Edmiston, 2002). Moreover, because Indonesia's decentralisation is part of an early phase of a 
democratization process, the concept of downward accountability as used in Agrawal and 
Ribot' s framework is likely to be in a parallel, early stage. In this particular situation, the thesis 
attempts to capture and explore the relevance and value of other accountability relations. This 
approach is supported by African examples where upward and other forms of accountability 
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were found important in decentralisation reforms m the context of development in general 
(Crook, 2003; Olowu, 2003). 
Actors 
As in other analyses (for example, Rhodes, 2003) and consistent with Layder's (1998) 
approach, in this research actors are defined as both individuals and organisations. Specifying 
actors as individuals, collective actors, or those associated with an office is consistent with the 
nature of power, one of the three central dimensions of the definition of decentralisation adopted 
in this study. 
Power may be possessed by an individual or by a collective actor. It may 
also be associated with an office. Discretion may be delegated to an 
individual or to an office according to the judgment of those who delegate. 
Discretion may be presented as that of an individual or that of an office 
holder. There is no fundamental problem here (Barnes 1988: 66). 
The focus of this study, the primary actor, is the district governments, as the loci of 
decentralized power. Other actors interact with the primary actor, or between and among 
themselves. These other actors are positioned at two levels. The first set of actors is positioned 
vertically above the local government actors, that is, state actors at the national level. Also 
discussed to a much lesser degree are other state actors in between the two levels, that is, the 
state actors at the provincial level. The second set of actors consists of groups of non-local state 
(government) actors whose major activities take place at the district level. The third set of actors 
is the population or constituents of the district, whose activities are mostly concentrated at the 
village level and therefore within the district. Relations between the primary actor and the first 
set of actors illustrate the "vertical" relations; relations between the primary actor and the 
second and third sets of actors illustrate the "horizontal" relations (Figures 2. 1 and 2.2). 
T.he major actors in the analysis of decentralisation are therefore the Central Government, 
as the actor relinquishing powers, the district governments, as the loci of powers transferred, 
and the constituents in the districts, as the ultimate power holders (Figure 2.1 ). The research 
thus specifically analyses the dynamics of the relations between the Central government and 
district governments and in a more limited fashion, also those between the district governments 
and the provincial government. Hutchcroft (2001) emphasizes the necessity of supplementing 
general observations with historical examination of the territorial dynamics of politics and 
administration, that is, the pre-existing character of Central-local relations. Rhodes (2003) 
asserts that the relations between local governments and Central Government do not represent 
one-way dependency but are actually two ways of interdepcndency. '5 According to Smith 
" The links between Central government departments and local authorities are often termed 
"central-local relations" (Rhodes, 2003:7). These relations were seen as too narrow (Rhodes, 
1993), however, prompting the usage of the term intergovernmental relations, or IGR. IGR is 
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(1985), local governments acquire a measure of autonomy. The extent of discretion which local 
governments can exercise is limited by the influence and sometimes the control exerted by the 
national government. 
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Figure 2.1 Scheme of research framework for decentralisation in forestry 
For the analysis of district decision-making, the research framework sees the district 
government units, Bulungan and Kutai Barat bureaucrats, or the entire district government 
entity, as the central actors, in relation to other actors (Figure 2.2). It includes observations of 
the ways in which these cenffal actors interact with other sets of actors and the ways in which 
these interactions influence the decision-making of the former. The factors or motivations of 
these actors in their decision making are observed as they relate to other actors. Andersson 
(2003), citing Larson (2000) and Pacheco (2000), noted the motivation and incentives of local 
defined as "patterned, interdependent, and bargained behaviour among national, state, and 
local officials" (Wright, 1988 cited in Rhodes, 2003:7). 
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governments as the most important factors determining local governments' forestry decisions 
under a decentralized situation. 
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Figure 2.2 Scheme of research framework for the analysis of district decision-
making 
Several relevant groups of actors operating at the district level are identified in this 
research. They consist of international organisations, academics, NGOs, the timber industry, 
communities, a specific influential actor called the preman (Chapter 6), and the media. 
Communities are refen-ed to as the local people or masyarakat living within the jurisdiction of 
the district, usually groups at the village level. 16 Within the broader context of local government 
16 The term "communities" is used to refer to groups of varying sizes and composition. They are 
not homogeneous, but are pluralistic and stratified. 
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institutions, the district legislative body (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) is also 
discussed. These actors are identified based on at least one of the following considerations: 1) 
the existing literature that suggests their importance in local development and resource 
governance (NGOs, academics, international organisations, and the media); 2) their role in 
forestry, by default (the timber industry, communities); 3) their role as defined by the legal-
regulatory framework (the local legislative body); and 4) observations in the field (the preman). 
2.4 Research methods 
The methodology adopted in the study includes the use of Layder ' s adaptive theory, the 
case study approach, and the use of qualitative methods. 
2.4.1 Layder's adaptive theory 
The research makes use of Layder's adaptive theory approach (Layder, 1998). Three major 
features of this theory are applied: 1) the findings and conclusions are both shaped by incoming 
empirical evidence, and filtered by theory, concepts and ideas informing the research; 2) 
research is iterative throughout the process; the activities of problem definition, data collection 
and analysis, theorizing, and reviewing are continuous and concurrent processes; 3) the 
approach allows for a micro (including behavioural phenomena) as well as a macro (systemic) 
level of analysis. 
The adaptive theory approach is compatible with the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative data, or some combination of the two, the use of surveys and fixed-choice 
questionnaires, case studies, observation techniques, and in depth-interviewing (Layder, 1998). 
Following Laydcr' s adaptive theory approach, therefore, this research is initially guided by 
several bodies of literature. The first set includes literature that utilizes and defines specific 
concepts, including decentralisation, accountability, and power. The second includes several 
disciplinary approaches, including political ecology, political economy, public policy and 
government studies, and forest management and policy. The third strand of literature concerns 
the methodological aspects of social science research. 
2.4.2 The case study approach 
Schwandt (1997:12) regards a case study as: "a specific instance of a phenomenon selected 
for study, bounded in time and space" (see also Smith, 1978, cited in Stake, 1995; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). A case study approach is undertaken because of the particular interest in that 
particular case (intrinsic case study), to provide insight into an issue of external interest or 
refinement of theory (instrumental case study), or to inquire into a phenomenon or general 
condition by involving the study of a number of cases (collective case study) (Stake, 1995). 
Flyvbjerg argues the strength of the case study approach, in which context-dependent 
knowledge is critical in the study of human affairs (Flyvbjerg, 200 1). The case study strategy is 
appropriate when the questions being posed are "how" and "why" questions, when the 
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researcher has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real-life context (Yin, 2003). The case study approach is therefore appropriate for 
use in this study, as it is a contextual/situated analysis attempting particularly to understand how 
Indonesia's decentralisation has been manifested in the particular context of forestry and district 
forestry decision-making. 
Indonesia as a case study 
The selection of Indonesia for the study is appropriate for several reasons. The first of 
these is the establishment of a decentralisation legal-regulatory framework that provides the 
basis for the far-reaching devolution of much hitherto centrally-held authority to local 
governments, including authority over forestry and over fiscal matters. Second, as historical 
context to a certain extent often determines the trajectory of decentralisation reforms (Manor, 
1999), Indonesia's case presents one example of the devolution of extensive and broad-ranging 
powers to the local level, after previous experiences of limited or failed decentralisation reforms 
(Devas, 1997; Mokhsen, 2003; section 1.3). The previous "failed" attempts to devolve 
meaningful powers to the local level may have a bearing on the implementation of the current 
decentralisation reforms. Third, the decision to decentralize was made while the country was in 
a state of economic crisis and political instability, and legislation was pushed through in haste 
and without sufficient public consultation (Turner and Podger, 2003). This consequently leads 
to huge challenges and complications in implementation. Fourth, natural resource 
decentralisation experiences around the world to date show that the types of powers devolved 
and to what levels, as well as their outcomes, are dependent on the context: "one shoe does not 
fit all" (Capistrano and Colfer, 2005:298). The Indonesian experience will provide additional 
insights into the experiences observed in other contexts. 
A detai led study of decentralisation in the forestry context is o( great interest to researchers 
and policy makers in and outside Indonesia. First, studies and analysis of Indonesia's 
decentralisation have been largely oriented around fiscal, administrative, and political 
decentralisation in general. 11 What studies there are on forestry governance under 
decentralisation have mostly been done by or under the auspices of CIFOR. 11 Thus, although 
increasing attention has been paid to natural resource decentralisation, there remain many 
unresolved issues, particularly in the area of forestry. Decentralisation in natural resource 
management is unique compared to that experienced by other sectors because of the higher 
potential , but at the same time, also the greater stakes involved (section 2.2 and Appendix I). 
Second, Indonesia is endowed with the world's third largest area of tropical forests, rich in 
valuable timber and in biodiversity. Covering 1.3% of the world's land area, Indonesia has 10% 
11 For instance, SMERU studies: http://www.smeru.go.id; http://wvtw.asiafoundation.«_9m; 
http://www. worldbank. org 
1
• see http://www.cifor.cgiar.org 
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of the world's known species of flora, 12% of known species of mammals, 7.3% of the known 
species of reptilia, and 17% of the known bird species (BAPPENAS, 2003). The island of 
Kalimantan alone, which covers 0.2% of the earth's land area, provides habitat for l in 25 of all 
known plants and l in 20 of all identified birds and mammals (MacKinnon et al., 1996:632). 
Rich with commercially-valuable Dipterocarps (MacKinnon et al., 1996), in the last three 
decades these forests have been exploited intensively and are dwindling rapidly in terms of both 
area and quality. In the latest estimate, based on Jandsat imagery, out of the 124 million hectares 
of the Forest Estate (kawasan hutan), only 94 million hectares remain forested (Ministry of 
Forestry, 2005a).19 The deforestation rate is staggering by any standard, estimated in the order 
of 2 million hectares per year (Chapter I and Appendix 2). The promises held out by 
decentralized natural resource management provide some hope for better management of these 
forests. Understanding the dynamics of decentralized forest governance is therefore necessary to 
understand the prospects for improved forest management. Third, this thesis continues the 
author's previous research in forest governance and decentralisation (Resosudarmo and 
Dermawan, 2002; Resosudarmo, 2003, 2004), building from that base to undertake an in-depth 
analysis of the local dynamics of forestry regimes under decentralisation. 
Study sites 
Two specific research sites were selected for intensive study in this research. They were 
Bulungan and Kutai Barat Districts in the province of East Kal imantan. The two districts were 
selected based on the following considerations: 
Forest-rich districts 
Bulungan and Kutai Barat are both forest-rich districts, and a large proportion of the 
population, mostly indigenous communities, depend on these forests to some degree for their 
livelihood . In addition, the ti mber industry has been and is an important sector in both districts, 
thus a source of both local government revenues and employment opportunity. However, the 
forests of both districts are rapidly being exploited. Thus, both district governments have the 
opportunity to use the resource for their development but face real challenges maintaining it. 
"Original" versus "new" districts 
One particular trend occurring across Indonesia under decentralisation has been the 
partitioning of many existing districts into several independent new districts. Bulungan was part 
of a larger, original district with the same name. The original Bulungan was legally partitioned 
in 1999 to become three independent districts, one of which remains as Bulungan, but with a 
significantly reduced area of jurisdiction; hence an "original" district. Kutai Barat was 
established from the partitioning of a larger district, Kutai, and is a "new" district. Thus, Kutai 
,. However, a more pessimistic perspective estimated that only 68 million hectares of forests 
nation-wide remain (WALHI , 2007) 
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Barat has the opportunity to start "afresh" in comparison with Bulungan, in terms of its 
bureaucratic structure, its development policies, and in particular, in terms of its newly acquired 
responsibility and experience to manage forests. 
Participation in the 1995 decentralisation pilot program 
Prior to the current decentralisation reforms, the original Kutai District from which Kutai 
Barat originated was one of 26 districts participating in the 1995 nation-wide pilot program on 
decentralisation. In East Kalimantan province, this has implications under the current 
decentralisation in terms of the administration of forestry. Districts that took part in the pilot 
program now have only one forestry unit operating at the district level, the District Forestry 
Service. All. forestry services at the district level are administered and provided by the District 
Forestry Service. All new districts established from the partitioning of such districts, such as 
Kutai Barat, also have only one forestry unit operating at the district level. By contrast, districts 
which did not participate in the decentralisation pilot program now have two separate forestry 
agencies functioning at the district level: the District Forestry Service itself and the forestry 
technical implementing unit as the arm of the Provincial Forestry Service (Figure A2.3). As 
Bulungan did not take part in the aforementioned program, two forestry units thus operate in 
parallel in the district. The circumstantial difference in the forestry structures of the two districts 
thus provides a useful comparison and contrast in terms the actual powers devolved to district 
governments and their implications for district forestry decision-making. This difference is 
further elucidated in Appendix 2. 
Geographic location 
Although both districts are quite remote, the capital of Kutai Barat is situated closer to the 
provincial capital Samarinda, and can be reached directly from there by river, road, and air. In 
contrast, the capital of Bulungan has to be reached by combination of air and boat (sea and 
river). While it is possible to travel to Bulungan's capital by road, road conditions arc very poor 
and journey times are very long. Because forestry-related activities in East Kalimantan province 
prior to decentralisation were to a large extent determined by the activities occurring in 
Samarinda (for instance, the national government extended its powers in managing and 
control ling forestry activities through its regional office in Samarinda; environmental NGOs 
were concentrated in or worked from Samarinda), the dissimilarity in terms of the districts' 
proximity to the provincial capital may lead to distinguishable variations in district forestry 
decision-making. In addition, Samarinda is the centre for timber marketing activities of East 
Kalirnantan; most timber produced in Kutai Barat goes to or through this provincial capital. 
There is, however, a smaller timber market and producing centre in East Kalimantan, Tarakan, a 
municipality in the north of the province. The capital of Bulungan, Tanjung Selor, although 
distant from Samarinda, is only one hour by boat from Tarakan. All traded timber originating 
from Bulungan goes to or through this municipality. 
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The multitude of actors at the district level 
There is a different level of engagement of external actors, including international 
organisations and NGOs operating in the two districts. Compared to Bulungan, for instance, 
there are a higher number of external actors in forest-related activities in Kutai Barat (Chapter 
6). As these external actors arc analysed as one distinct group of actors (Figure 2.2), the two 
districts' different circumstances in terms of the extent of their engagement can provide a richer 
analysis of their roles, allowing for some comparisons or contrasts between the two. 
Practical considerations 
Practical considerations were important factors in the selection of districts. Considering the 
sensitivity of the inquiries and for practical reasons, the two districts were selected based on the 
possibility of carrying out effective field work, as networks and channels through which the 
researcher could gain the trust of district actors were available. 
2.4.3 Qualitative method, data collection and analysis 
Major field work was conducted in January-March and July-August 2004, with follow up 
in January 2006. Personal communications with informants, through email and telephone, 
wherever possible, continued until May 2007. 
The research primarily adopted a qualitative approach (for instance, Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Schwandt, 1997; Miller and Dingwall, 1997; Creswell, 1998; Huberman and Miles, 2002; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2003, 2005). The analysis of fiscal decentralisation, however, necessarily 
made use of quantitative data. 
Initially, for consistency, the research strove for the use of semi-structured interviews. 
Soon thereafter, however, it was clear that structured interviews were ineffective in revealing 
important issues. Underlying motivations and interests, for instance, were more effectively 
revealed through in-depth interviews. Consequently, most interviews were in-depth. One of the 
main issues was the inequality in the depth of the interviews and information gathered (among 
others, attributed to perceived risk, personalities of interviewees, their positions, the subject 
matter, and time constraints). 
Government actors being the primary focus, the major challenges were associated with 
making the interviews actually happen and in obtaining "factual" information. Spending time to 
get to know interviewees and becoming known and accepted by them was critical for gathering 
information that was not merely rhetoric. The strategy of inquiry for most key informants then 
had to accommodate each circumstance: most were interviewed in-depth, some more than once 
and in length. The methods used in these situations are often referred to as the ethnographic 
approach (for instance, Atkinson and Hammersley, 2000). The numerous relevant actors in both 
districts and the limited time, added to the difficulties in obtaining comprehensive and detailed 
information evenly across actors or cases. 
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The interviews as much as possible were triangulated and supported by government reports 
and government-generated data. The research also involved a search for and use of relevant 
local and national media reports from 1998 to July 2007, in order to follow the dynamics of the 
fluid and continual changes. The research also analyses "grey" literature and other relevant 
research reports (see for instance, Stewart, 1984, for the use of secondary information sources 
and methods). 
Analysis of the legal-regulatory framework required the gathering of sometimes sensitive 
government documents at all levels of government. Provincial directives and ministerial 
directives, for instance, were often confidential or were seldom readily obtained. This was also 
true for district government documents. Only general and selective Ministry of Forestry's 
documents, for instance, are accessible through the web. The gathering of media reports and 
government documents consumed considerable time and resources. 
The analysis was done manually. It involved reading the transcripts and notes from 
interviews over and over again many times, comparing them with each other, and assessing 
them against official reports and government documents. In particular, interviewees often 
conveyed issues in an indirect or subtle way using certain set phrases or body language. Content 
analysis through word identification or using a computer-aided analytical tool therefore would 
not have been helpful. 
During the course of the research and subsequent analysis, confidentiality of information 
and sources has emerged as an important issue. Many cases involving local bureaucrats in the 
alleged abuse of public authority across Indonesia, including in the area of study, have been and 
continue to be brought to court. To maintain confidentiality and due to the sensitivity of some of 
the information, each actor is given a code. For example, a government official in Kutai Barat 
District, 4'h on the list among Kutai Barat government officials interviewed, is coded K-G-4 
(Appendix 4). Some interviewees were interviewed several times. Hence, K-G-4c denotes a 
third interview with the same government officia l. Where the explanation provided by 
interviewees refers explicitly to an individual or concerns sensitive issues, their names or 
positions are disclosed only with their agreement. To maintain confidentiality of the same 
interviewee during other interviews, an asterisk is used in place of the third clement of the code, 
thus K-G-*. 
The next chapter focuses on intergovernmental relations and how these re lations affect 
local government decision-making in forestry under decentralization. It first sets out brietly the 
first major elements of the research framework discusses above, that is, the legal-regulatory 
framework for the decentralization of forestry authority, and the relevant administrative 
structure of government under that decentral ization. 
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Chapter 3: The Dynamics of Power over 
Forestry Decision-making: District versus 
Higher Levels of Government 
The disjuncture between the idealized processes of decentralisation and how they have 
actually occurred in practice in many parts of the world has been increasingly documented 
(Appendix I). The causes of such gaps have included politically-motivated institutional 
conflicts. Those with political powers at higher levels of government, or those who stand to lose 
from decentralisation, tend to pursue avenues to circumvent or reverse the process. Parts of 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa have seen reluctance by Central Governments or Central 
Government units to relinquish power, in particular over natural resources (Colfer and 
Capistrano, 2005; Ribot et al., 2006). A similar pattern is observed in the Indonesian forestry 
sector. 
The ways in which actors originally receiving decentralized powers have responded to 
Central Government's strategies to regain or retain power, however, have been much Jess 
documented. As Hidayat (2005) points out, even under circumstances of minimum 
decentralized authority or autonomy during the New Order period, local actors sought to pursue 
ways to advance their interests within the constraints and limitations imposed on them. The 
central argument of this chapter is that, under decentralisation, Central Government policies 
have indeed significantly affected local government forestry decisions, but only after they have 
been sieved through local government's own interests and objectives. 
This chapter focuses on the power struggle over forestry decision-making authority 
between the Central Government, as the actor relinquishing power under decentralisation, and 
district governments, as the actor gaining the power. This vertical relationship between local 
and higher levels of government is illustrated in the schematic diagram of the research 
framework (Figure 2.1 ). This power struggle revolves around two themes. The first relates to 
the tussle for formal authority between the two levels of government. The second revolves 
around the losers' attempts (in this case, as we shall see, the local governments) to pursue their 
objectives within the limitations dictated by the outcomes of this struggle. The tussle also 
involved a third actor, the provincial government, but to a lesser degree. The chapter then 
relates the dynamics and the outcome of this power struggle to the power dimension of Agrawal 
and Ribot' s framework for analysis of decentralisation (Chapter 2). 
Prior to this analysis and discussion of power relations, it is necessary to review 
Indonesia's legal-regulatory framework for the devolution of authority to local governments, 
and the changes in government administrative structure as a result of that decentralisation. 
However, because historical context strongly determines the trajectory of any decentralisation 
reforms (Manor, 1999), it is useful to first review forestry governance in the period preceding 
decentralisation, viz. the New Order period. The following synopsis of forestry administration 
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prior to decentralisation, and of the new institutional arrangements under decentralisation, is 
drawn from the comprehensive review and analysis of these arrangements presented in 
Appendix 2. 
3.1 Brief overview of Indonesia's forestry under the 
New Order and the legal-regulatory and 
administrative framework for decentralized forestry 
governance (1999-2004) 
Centralized control over Indonesia's forests under the New Order period was made 
possible through the enactment of Law 5 of 1967 on Basic Forestry, often referred to as the 
Basic Forestry Law (the BFL). 
3.1.1 The Basic Forestry Law (the BFL), central control, and 
intensive logging 
The Basic Forestry Law served two purposes. First, it provided the national government 
with de Jure control over forests in the Outer Islands. Second, it provided the framework for the 
commercial exploitation of Outer Island Forests - until then harvested manually for local needs 
- as the "engine of development" by generating revenue the country urgently needed 
(Resosudarmo, 2002: 162-163). Thus, the BFL profoundly changed the ways in which Outer 
Islands forests were managed. 
The Central Government's authority over forests encompasses both 
protection/conservation and production. Most importantly, the BFL allowed the Minister in 
charge of forestry to designate forest areas as Forest Estate (kawasan hutan)20 providing these 
areas with legal tenure as state-controlled forest land (GOl/FAO, 1990). Several forest 
categories were subsequently specified: Conservation Forests, Protection Forests, Production 
Forests (comprising Production Forests and Limited Production Forests), and Conversion 
Forests. These categories remain unchanged to date. Some 144 million hectares, almost 70% of 
Indonesia's total land area, was classified as Forest Estate - although not all of this was 
forested, and the area has since declined significantly as a consequence of deforestation and 
conversion (Appendix 2). 
Subsequent national policies promoted large-scale commercial timber production through 
the issuance of large concession rights, Forest Exploitation Rights (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, 
HPH). 21 The HPH is a large-scale forest concession license granted to private or state-owned 
companies by the Central Government, for a duration of 35 years.22 Between 1970 and 1989, the 
20 Article 7(2) 
" Government Regulation 21 of 1970 
" Although HPH is actually the license held by large concessionaires, the term HPH is also used 
to refer to the concessionaires or operators holding the license. The term HPH in this thesis thus 
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Provincial Forestry Service could issue limited small-scale licenses for up to 100 hectares, 
Forest Products Harvesting Rights (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, HPHH). In return for the 
rights to the timber resources, HPH concessionaires were obliged to pay license fees and 
royalties (see Chapter 4). 23 
Forest administration and management under this regime was characterised by: l) firm 
Central control over the lucrative forest resources of the Outer Islands; 2) allocation of rights 
over these resources by the Centre, based on patronage - to nurture and maintain loyalty to the 
regime in power; and 3) a lack of enforcement of regulations on harvesting methods and 
reforestation responsibilities. Consequently, 1) forest exploitation was carried out unsustainably, 
compounded by poor reforestation; 2) forest benefits largely accrued to the Centre and 
centrally-linked actors; 3) local people in these forests areas with historical claims over their 
rights became marginalized (Appendix 2). 
Reformasi and the current decentralisation not only arose, at least partly, as a reaction to 
perceived injustices with regard to who had benefited from the extraction of forest resources, 
but were also expected to address these injustices and improve the quality of forest 
management. 24 
3.1.2 The decentralisation laws 
A set of landmark decisions paved the way for administrative, political, and fiscal reforms 
in May 1999: Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25 of 1999 on Fiscal 
Balancing between the Centre and the Regions. 25 Consistent with the ways in which these two 
laws have been referred to in Indonesia, unless otherwise noted, usage of the terms the 
"decentralisation law" or the " regional autonomy law" refers to Law 22 of 1999; and "fiscal 
decentralisation law" refers to Law 25 of 1999. When the terms "decentralisation laws" or 
"regional autonomy laws" are used, they refer to both Law 22 and Law 25 of 1999 together. 
This section is concerned with Law 22 of 1999; Law 25 of 1999 is explained in Chapter 4. 
Major stipulations of Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Governance 
Law 22 of 1999 provided for three major changes relevant to this thesis. Firstly, it 
transferred political, administrative, and fiscal powers to regions; regions were defined as 
provinces, districts, and municipalities. Under this law, power was largely transferred to 
districts (rural areas) and municipalities (urban areas), previously the second-tier of sub-national 
governments; this bypassed the provinces, previously the first tier of sub-national governments. 
follows this common use of the term, to refer to either the right/license of large-scale forest 
exploitation or the holder/operator of that right/license. 
13 The Reforestation Fund was a performance bond, but later ettectively became nationally 
imposed charges to allow the government to carry out reforestation activities. 
" lnteNiew with N-G-6a 
" See Mokhsen (2003) and Turner and Podger (2003) on the processes of the formulation of 
the two laws. 
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The law expanded the role of regional governments as autonomous entities. Provinces perform 
both autonomous and deconcentration functions, the latter as the arm of the Central Government 
(Appendix 2). All authority - with the exception of foreign relations, national defence and 
security, monetary and fiscal affairs, and religion - were granted to regions (Resosudarmo, 
2004; Appendix 2). Thus, authority over natural resources was also shifted to regions. However, 
with respect to the authority over natural resources, the law contains provisions that are 
ambiguous and inconsistent (Resosudarmo, 2004; Appendix 2). The law also eliminated the 
hierarchical relationship between districts/municipalities and the provinces, and stre_ngthened 
the role and authority of the regional legislative bodies, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 
(DPRD). 
As in other Indonesian laws, the law is implemented through implementing regulations, in 
this case Government Regulation 25 of 2000 (Appendix 3), as well as other legal instruments. 
The hierarchy of Indonesia's legal instruments, which fai ls to specify the relationship between 
certain important legal instruments, including Ministerial Decrees, has led to different 
interpretations among levels of government. The hierarchy of Indonesia's legal instruments is 
depicted in Figure A2. l in Appendix l. 
3.1.3 The 1999 forestry law 
In September 1999, the Government passed a new forestry Jaw, Law 41 of 1999 on 
Forestry (Appendix 2). This Jaw is inconsistent with Law 22 of 1999; it retains the basic tenets 
concerning the locus of control and tenure over forests specified in its predecessor, Law 5 of 
1967. State control under Law 41 grants the Centre the authority to regulate and administer all 
aspects related to forests, forest areas, and forest products, and to assign the status of a particular 
area as a forest or non-forest area. The administration of forests includes forestry planning and 
forest management. Thus, the Ministry of Forestry has formal control over all areas under the 
category of Forest Estate (kawasan hutan) and importantly, has the authority to determine any 
conversion of forest lands into non-forest uses. The law, however, does provide a provision that 
allows for the delegation of authority to local governments. 
The provisions of the 1999 forestry law also need to be further elaborated by implementing 
regulations and other legal instruments. Of particular relevance to this thesis is Government 
Regulation 34 of 2002 concerning Forest Structuring and Development of Forest Management 
Plans. Most importantly, this government regulation specifies who has the authority over 
logging licensing (see Appendix 2). The 1999 forestry law and Government Regulation 34 of 
2002 clearly affirm the authority of the Central Government over forestry affairs. Thus, in 
contrast to the 1999 decentralisation laws, the forestry legal-regulatory framework has a 
centralistic tone. 
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3.1.4 The structure of forestry administration under 
decentralisation 
Decentralisation changed the structure of forestry administration in two major ways. First, 
it abolished the Forestry Regional Offices (Kantor Wilayah Kehutanan, Kanwil). Second, there 
are no longer direct reporting responsibilities between the forestry unit overseeing forestry at the 
district level, the District Forestry Service, with the Provincial Forestry Service (Appendix 2). 
There may also be significant differences between the structure of forestry administration 
in districts, as is the case for Bulungan and Kutai Barat Districts in this study (Appendix 2). 
Bulungan has two forestry units operating at the district level: the District Forestry Service 
responsible to the Bupati (district head), and the Provincial Technical Implementation Unit 
(Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah, UPTD) responsible to the Provincial Forestry Service. By 
contrast, only one forestry unit, the District Forestry Service, operates in Kutai Barat. This 
difference has implications for the actual forestry powers that can be exercised by the district 
governments. 
3.2 Decentralisation of forestry powers to district 
governments: a hesitant and contentious process 
Among the most illuminating examples of the dynamics of the po.wer struggle in the 
forestry sector between district governments and the Central Government have been the issues 
of logging licensing authority, the passage of District Regulations (Peraturan Daerah or 
PERDA). and the conversion of Forest Estate (kawasan hutan) into other uses. 
3.2.1 Reformasi and district small-scale logging licenses 
One distinct feature of decentralisation in the forestry sector - compared to other sectors 
such as in services - has been the de facto implementation preceding the de jure (for example, 
Rhee, 2001; Resosudarmo and Derma wan, 2002). This was enabled by a series of Central 
policies as part of the country's wide ranging political, economic, and social reforms or 
reformasi. 
In the natural resource sector, the reformasi period was characterized by a more open 
expression and articulation of past grievances over what were perceived in the regions as the 
skewed distribution of natural-resource derived benefits against regions and the local population 
where those resources originated. The Habibie Government, the successor to the New Order 
government, passed policies and legislation reforming many areas, including forestry, and 
appointed figures believed to be "reform-minded" individuals to the Cabinet. The result was the 
formulation of a number of forestry policies that diverged from those of the past, and that were 
intended to mitigate local populations' and regional governments' dissatisfactions over forestry 
policies. 
During this period, President Habibie signed two government regulations augmenting the 
authority of Bupatis in the forestry sector: Government Regulation 62 of 1998 on the Granting 
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of Some Governmental Affairs to Regions and Government Regulation 6 of 1999 on Forest 
Utilisation and Forest Products Harvesting in Production Forests (Appendix 3 and section 
3.2.2). The first of these authorized districts to manage private forests (hutan milik/rakyat), 
while the latter gave Bupatis the authority to issue licenses for the harvesting of timber forest 
products over areas of not more than 100 hectares, or a specified volume, for a maximum 
duration of 1 year . 
The then Forestry and Estate Crops Minister26 , Muslimin Nasution, who had experience in 
promoting cooperatives in the past, issued a series of Ministerial Decrees more favourable to 
previously neglected groups, including customary (adat) communities and local populations in 
and around forest areas. His decrees gave these groups the opportunity to participate more 
meaningfully in forestry activities, notably through district-issued licenses for logging. They 
were The Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 310 of 1999 on Guidelines for the 
Granting of Rights to Forest Products Harvesting, the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops 
Decree 317 of 1999 on Rights of Customary Communities to Forest Products Harvesting in 
Production Forests, and Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Ministerial Decree 318 of 1999 
on the Participation of Communities in Forest Utilisation (Appendix 3). These policies also 
notably promoted adoption of the people-oriented economic concept of cooperatives, in contrast 
to the predominantly large-scale capitalistic entities, in forestry activities. 
The above set of policies specified several main points. Districts could grant licenses for 
small-scale timber harvesting activities to individual Indonesian citizens living in and around 
forest areas, to cooperatives, or to wholly Indonesian-owned corporate entities in production 
forests targeted for conversion, provided that there were no associated existing Hak 
Pengusahaan Hutan, HPH (that is, centrally-licensed, large-scale timber concessions, section 
3.1. 1 and Appendix 2) over the area. Districts could also now issue licenses of small-scale 
timber harvesting activities in Production Forest areas with existing HPH, to customary 
communities. In this latter case, timber activities could only be carried out with the consent of 
the HPH and only on are~s outside the HPH's annual working plan. Finally, HPH were obliged 
to involve the local populations in the HPH' s activities, including them as part of the HPH' s 
labour force and in HPH's timber felling-related activities . 
Consistent with the spirit of the national policy to engage and empower local communities 
in the forestry sector, these decrees limited the area under the licenses to small-scale areas of 
100 hectares, the duration to I year, and types of equipment used to non-mechanical equipment. 
" For a short period, May 1998 to April 2000, the Ministry of Forestry extended to the Estate 
Crops sector and became the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops. It subsequently reverted to 
the Ministry of Forestry. 
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These policies immediately established unprecedented district forestry regimes that were 
virtually non existent during most of the New Order. 27 The opportunities emerging from the 
political and social changes during this reformasi period were quickly seized by the two districts 
studied. The specific features of the districts and the way in which forestry activities were 
carried out in the past were among the factors motivating the districts to create their own 
initiatives. 
As described in Chapter I, the two districts are characterized with an abundance of forests, 
a high proportion of the population reliant on forests for their livelihoods in one way or another, 
and a history of logging activities. However, they lacked other forms of non-resource based 
industries and the established infrastructure required for developing other forms of industry. 
Consequently, for the two districts, forestry was then seen as one of the most convenient, 
prospective, and readily available activities to pursue. 
During the New Order, as was true for other districts across Indonesia, forestry activities in 
the two districts were largely centrally-imposed undertakings. Centralized management 
encompassed the entire spectrum of forestry activities, from policy to implementation to 
monitoring. There was limited involvement of local communities, and in particular, benefits 
mostly flowed to the Centre. There was overall a strong perception that too much was imposed 
and taken by the Centre: almost all interviews with district-level actors confirmed this 
impression. This background motivated districts to create their own forestry regimes, under 
which they decided and implemented their own policies designed to retain most of the benefits 
in the districts. The two case study districts immediately applied these policies for their benefit 
by issuing ostensibly small-scale district licenses to communities, through cooperatives. 
3.2.2 Decentralisation and the proliferation of district licenses 
In May 1999, the Government simultaneously passed the two decentralisation laws - Law 
22 of 1999 on Regional Governance (also referred to as the regional autonomy law) (section 3.1 
and Appendix 2) and Law 25 of 1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Centre and the Regions 
(Chapter 4). The opportunities brought earlier by reformasi through the formulation of national 
policies sympathetic to communities and to local governments were greatly amplified by the 
passage of these two laws. Local governments' perception that autonomy was half-heartedly 
relinquished and could be withdrawn - affirmed by contradictions in the provisions of the 
regional autonomy law and the forestry law (section 3.1 and Appendix 2) - shaped distrust on 
the part of local governments of the Centre's true intention and only enhanced local 
" With the exception of a short period, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. During this period, 
district governments in East Kalimantan issued small-scale licenses to the local population. 
Logging operations, however, were carried out manually. Timber was moved downstream 
through flooded rivers during the rainy seasons. This was known as the banjir kap phenomenon. 
Large-scale commercialization of Indonesia's national forests ended these operations. For 
documentation, see Magenda (1971) and Potter (1991 ); see also Appendix 2. 
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governments' efforts to make use of favourable national policies to their advantage. Among the 
most notable, many superfluous logging licenses were issued. As of November 2001, Kutai 
Barat had issued 497 small-scale licenses; by 2002, as many as 1,3 19 licenses were operating in 
the district (Rustamaji, 2002). Similarly, 585 100-hectare licenses were operating in Bulungan 
in 2000 and 618 in 2001. 28 These small-scale district licenses varied in name but were similar in 
their operations: Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, HPHH (Forest Products Harvesting Rights), 
Jjin Pemungutan dan Pemanfaatan Kayu, IPPK (Licenses for Timber Harvesting and 
Utilisation), and Jjin Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Kayu, IPHHK (Licenses for Timber Forest 
Product Harvesting). 
District governments issued these logging licenses to fulfil various social, economic, and 
political objectives. The most common explanation given for their proliferation relates to the 
perception that it was high time the locals enjoyed the material benefits - in this case an income 
stream - from forests in their area. Almost all local actors from the various categories 
interviewed (including local governments, community leaders and the local population, NGOs, 
and even centrally-licensed timber business actors) in the two districts shared a common 
perception, that is, any extraction of local forests prior to regional autonomy for the benefit of 
national or non-local actors was unfair or unjust and now it was their tum to enjoy the benefit. 29 
Another justification given for districts' issuance of logging licenses was to accumulate 
Locally Generated Revenues or Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD). In addition to PSDH and DR 
payments, which are nationally-imposed forestry fees (Appendix 2 and Chapter 4), districts also 
applied fees that entirely and directly accrued to their own coffers. They included an area-based 
contribution, a Third Party Contribution or Sumbangan Pihak Ketiga (SPK), and a volume-
based payment, a levy or retribusi. The significance of these payments and how they affected 
districts ' actions are discussed in Chapter 4. 
For both study districts, the issuance of district licenses also served political objectives. 
The period during which national legislation worked in their favour coincided with the election 
of the Bupatis of both Bulungan and Kutai Barat Districts. As described in Chapter 2, the 
original Bulungan District underwent partitioning during this period into three districts, one of 
which encompassed the original Bulungan District but now with a much smaller jurisdiction 
(the district being studied). Kutai Barat District, on the other hand, was a newly established 
district, partitioned from the original Kutai District. The government appointed interim Bupatis 
to lead each of these districts during the transition period. The districts then elected new 
Bupatis, through representation (that is, not direct election, but by the local legislature - Chapter 
7). The interim Bupatis of both case study districts were candidates in the election. The issuance 
" Unpublished data, Bulungan District Government (2000 and 2001) 
" Similar local perception that "it is now the locals" turn to enjoy the benefit of forest extraction 
after many years of remaining at the periphery under centralized control of forests was also 
reported in Cameroon (Oyono et al., 2005). 
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of district logging licenses can thus be seen as a populist move to attract political support 
because it allowed for increased community participation in commercial timber harvest and 
provided a new form of income stream for the people of the district. Each logging license was 
individually issued by the Bupati, therefore had the potential to boost the Bupati's image of 
being pro-local people. However, environmental aspects were not considered in the issuance of 
licenses. 30 
The issuance of logging licenses and timber activities under these licenses was also 
associated with the capture of informal benefits to certain actors, for personal and organisational 
use. These issues are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
With the districts' general perception that their new-found power - first presented by 
reformasi and then compounded by regional autonomy - may not last, the main aim of districts' 
decisions was to use the opportunity quickly. Consequently, the districts' numerous licenses 
were issued in haste and gave little thought to appropriate technical, social, and resource 
considerations. As a result, these logging licenses were issued indiscriminately. Thus, in 
practice, the issuance of district licenses and logging operations under these licenses often 
deviated both from national guidelines, and more importantly, from the spirit of national 
policies - that is, to empower and benefit local communities living in and around forests. 
Thus, the two districts issued licenses that often breached national guidelines, in particular 
in terms of restrictions on the area and the ways in which logging operations were carried out. 
This was done in order to filter the advantageous aspects of national policy and ignore those that 
restricted districts ' interests. The two districts issued several JOO-hectare licenses to one 
licensee, which could total thousands of hectares at a time. Furthermore, in some cases one 
licensee owned several companies under different names. For example, Bulungan granted 81 
licenses or over 8, JOO hectares to three different companies, each of which could be traced to 
the same single ownership.31 In total this area would be equivalent to a medium sized 
concession. Hence, the ways in which these licenses were issued allowed a single licensee to 
carry out logging activities above and beyond the supposed I 00 hectares, as originally intended 
by the spirit of the Ministerial Decrees that provided the legal basis for these district licenses, to 
empower local communities through their direct participation. In addition, the list of the licenses 
available to the researcher showed that many of Bulungan's licenses were allocated in areas that 
were part already of a Centrally-licensed HPH concession area. 32 
Both districts allowed for mechanization of felling activities, against the intention of the 
Ministerial Decree which emphasized that scope of the activities be limited to small-scale and 
30 As bluntly admitted by senior officials of Bulungan and Kutai Barat Forestry Services, B-G-16 
and K-G-1b 
" PT KAS, PT PB, and PT BBP, respectively, owned by A (from Bulungan District Forestry 
Service documents) 
" They include PT 11, PT AH, PT I, PT IM 
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community-oriented undertakings. In reality, communities holding the licenses formed 
partnerships with logging companies and Jogging activities were carried out using heavy 
mechanized equipment, resulting in a higher rate of felling. Senior district forestry officials also 
admitted that the requirements for environmental impact assessment and other environmental 
conditions were not met. 33 
The implementation of logging activities under these district-issued licenses in the two 
districts was typically similar. The licensees (that is, a group of community members or 
cooperatives formed by community members) mostly did not have the means, including the 
capital and technical abilities, to carry out the felling activities themselves. Therefore they had 
to seek partners that would act as the "capital providers" (cukong) and operators and/or 
contractors. In Kutai Barat these roles were often played by the HPH in the areas where these 
licenses were located. This is consistent with observations by Nanang and Devung (2004). In 
Bulungan, many of these cukong were Malaysian investors (Chapter 6). In exchange, these 
communities received a certain level of fees, usually based on the volume of timber felled. 
However, community members did take part in the activities as paid labourers, in work ranging 
from felling and measurement to transportation. A few representatives of the community usually 
were also given the task of making sure that the company or operator reported the accurate 
volume of timber felled, as the fees received by the community were dependent on the recorded 
volume of logs cut. It was also clear that virtually none of these operators carried out any 
replanting or other conservation measures. 3' It was also not unusual that logging was carried out 
outside the areas covered by the license. Many horizontal conflicts arose from these activities, 
in particular over issues around the fees received, as reported by many interviewees from the 
two districts. Nevertheless, in these two districts and one other, interviewees noted some 
positive outcomes, including the communities' improved skills in negotiating with external 
actors, such that companies began to take account of the existence and rights of communities. 35 
These were consistent with observations made by other researchers for Kutai Baral (Nanang and 
Devung, 2004). 
The manifestation of local governments' increased authority, in the form of indiscriminate 
issuing of logging licenses and operations, was seen by the Ministry of Forestry as a threat to 
the sustainability of the forests and to national control over the resource. As it had been aware 
of the consequences of the new arrangements from early on, in April 2000, the Ministry of 
Forestry and Estate Crops, now under new leadership, had already attempted to suspend its 
earlier Decree that provided the guidelines for the issuance of these small-scale licenses. Nur 
" For instance, with a senior forestry official of Kutai Baral, K-G-21 
'' For example, interviews with a village representative in charge of monitoring timber operations 
under Bulungan district's small-scale license, B-C-5, and village head in Bulungan, B-C-7. This 
finding accords with analysis by KKPKD (2001 a) and Nanang and Devung (2004) tor Kutai 
Baral, and Lembaga Pionir Bulungan-CIFOR (2003) for Bulungan. 
" For example, interview with B-G-8 
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Mahmudi Ismail, Muslimin Nasution's successor, issued Ministerial Decree 084 of 2000 
suspending the Ministerial Decree 310 of 1999, but to no avail. Insisting that districts were now 
autonomous, local governments continued to issue logging licenses. Performing its 
deconcentration function, in October 2000, the Provincial Forestry Service instructed all District 
Forestry Services within East Kalimantan not to provide technical recommendations required 
for the issuance of new HPHH licenses, to the Bupatis.'J(, As described in section 3.1 and 
Appendix 2, under Law 22 of 1999, District Forestry Services did not have a hierarchical 
relationship with the Provincial Forestry Service. Thus this instruction made no impression on 
the district governments who continued to issue HPHH licenses. 
The stated reason for the suspension was that Government Regulation 6 of 1999 - the 
implementing regulation for the previous Forestry Law (Law 5 of 1967), and the regulation 
elaborated by Ministerial Decree 310 of 1999 - was no longer suitable. At the time, the 
implementing government regulation for the new forestry law had not been promulgated. The 
suspension was to take effect until the implementing government regulation for the new forestry 
law was issued; this government regulation was issued much later, in June 2002. 
In May 2000, the Government passed the implementing regulation of Law 22 of 1999, 
Government Regulation 25 of 2000. This regulation specified the Centre's and provincial 
governments' authority by sector. In the forestry sector, the Centre was assigned the authority to 
determine the criteria and standards for the licensing of the utilization of forest areas, the 
utilization of forests and the harvesting of forest products and their tariffs (Appendix 2). 
Government Regulation 25 of 2000 gave provincial governments the authority to grant licenses 
for the utilization of timber forest products and non-timber forest products for areas spanning 
more than one district. Because this regulation assigned residual powers to districts and 
municipalities, districts were left with the tasks not specified in the regulation, including, 
presumably, logging licensing (Bell, 2001). 
As 1 January 2001, the official date for the implementation of regional autonomy, drew 
closer, pressures mounted on the Ministry of Forestry to hand over the authority for logging 
licensing. In November 2000, the Ministry of Forestry released Decree 05. l of 2000, granting 
district governments an unprecedented, substantially enlarged authority over the licensing of 
forest concessions (Appendix 3). This Ministerial Decree made specific reference to the 1999 
forestry law and the regional autonomy law. It gave Bupatis the authority to grant a range of 
logging licenses: from small-scale licenses of 100 hectares each to individuals and cooperatives, 
to large scale licenses up to a maximum 50 thousand hectares37 to cooperatives, small-scale and 
medium scale businesses, state-owned enterprises, regionally owned enterprises, and large 
36 Letter of the head of East Kalimantan's Provincial Forestry Service to District Forestry 
Services and UPTDs in East Kalimantan No. 522.11 /415/DK-11/2000 on Instruction to Suspend 
IHPHH, dated 6 October 2000 
n Up to 100 thousand hectares in the province of Papua 
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corporations. This authority granted to districts to issue large-scale logging licenses was the first 
in the history of the Republic. The decree, however, specified an important caveat: the issuance 
of all these licenses was restricted to areas with no existing centrally-licensed HPH. 
This means that between April and November 2000, if the districts had consistently 
followed each and every one of the Ministry of Forestry's decrees, they should have adhered to 
the provision of the Ministry of Forestry's April 2000 decree (which suspended the authority of 
districts to issue logging licenses) and halted the issuance of logging licenses, at least until the 
issuance of the Ministry of Forestry's November decree (which reinstated and augmented the 
extent of districts' authority to issue licenses). However, during this specific period, Bulungan 
and Kutai Baral governments simply ignored the April 2000 decree. They continued to issue 
licenses and did so explicitly, continuing to make reference to the suspended Ministry of 
Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 310 of 1999." During this period (in June 2000), the Bupati 
of Bulungan not only continued to grant (ostensibly) 100-hectare licenses, but went further, 
issuing a Decree on the Licensing of the Harvesting of Timber Products in Private Forests, 
People's Forests and Adat Forests. 39 This Bupati' s decree also made reference, for its 
legitimacy, to the already suspended Ministry of Forestry Decree 310 of 1999. 
The issuance of the Ministry of Forestry's November 2000 Decree significantly boosted 
district governments' authority over logging licensing. The two districts now had the authority 
to issue logging licenses of various sizes, and this prompted them to continue to issue small-
scale logging licenses indiscriminately. In addition to numerous small-scale logging licenses, 
some districts strove to issue medium and large-scale logging licenses. The latter involved a 
more complex process, because the requirements were stricter, and it was more difficult to find 
large and unfragmented tracts of forest areas that were not already under active HPHs. Despite 
the difficulties, however, Kutai Barat managed to issue 2 1 medium to large-scale licenses, now 
with a different name, IUPHHK or Ijin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu (previously 
known as HPHs). 
As districts were basing their decisions on a Ministerial Decree that made reference to the 
decentralisation law, this was now a decentralisation-related phenomenon. Similar issues around 
logging licenses and their operations raised earlier continued, notably indiscriminate issuance of 
licenses and logging operations under them. 
Unlike Kutai Barat, Bulungan was not able to issue IUPHHK, but was quick to discover 
another avenue to use the opportunity. The district is close to Tarakan, the second timber 
marketing centre in East Kalimantan, and close to the Malaysian border in the northern part of 
" For example, copies of two HPHH licenses, issued on June 14 and August 8, 2000 by Kutai 
Baral District, respectively, referred to Law 22 of 1999, Law 41 of 1999, Government Regulation 
62 of 1998, the suspended Ministry of Forestry's Decree 310 of 1999, and Bupatls Decree 004 
of 20 Apri l, 2000 
" Decree of the Bupati of Bulungan 196 of 2000 
44 
Kalimantan. Many of the capital providers (cukong) behind district-licensed logging operations 
were Malaysian investors. Both the district's location and the Malaysian connection created the 
opportunity for Bulungan to export logs directly to Malaysia. Log exports had been nationally 
banned between 1985 and 1997 to support the establishment of a domestic wood processing 
industry. This ban was lifted, but with many restrictions, in 1998; under stringent requirements 
and procedures HPHs were allowed to export a limited volume of logs within the limited 
national quota determined by the Ministry of Forestry. In February 2001, in the pursuit of 
generating PAD (see Chapter 4), Bulungan produced two district regulations (PERDA) allowing 
for both the exportation of logs and the application of district charges for logs to be exported. A 
significant volume of timber produced in the district, ostensibly through district-licensed 
logging operations, was then exported directly, without any coordination with the Ministry of 
Forestry or the Ministry of Industry and Trade as national policy decreed. Bulungan generated 
very significant earnings for the district's coffers from these log exports (Chapter 4). Such 
lucrative, direct exports made the issuance of district logging licenses even more attractive and 
further loosened the Centre's control over logging activities. This action Jed to the Ministry of 
Forestry and the Ministry of Industry and Trade issuing joint decrees explicitly and totally 
banning the exportation of Jogs in October 200 l. •0 
These developments posed a threat to the Ministry of Forestry's control over the Forest 
Estate. Most notably threatening the Ministry of Forestry's power was the fact that many district 
licenses were issued in areas with existing centrally-issued HPHs, prompting it to take measures 
to regain its power. Perceiving that matters were rapidly moving out of control, on 21 February 
2002, the Ministry of Forestry issued Decree 541 of 2002, revoking its own previous Decree 
05.1 of 2000 that had given local governments the authority to issue small to large-scale Jogging 
licenses. Decree 54 1 was to be effective on March 1, 2002. On this basis, neither Bupatis nor 
Governors, starting from March I, 2002, had any logging licensing authority. However, the two 
district governments nevertheless continued to issue licenses, thereby challenging the Centre's 
directives. 
Facing this relentless challenge from local governments, m June 2002 the Central 
Government issued the implementing regulation of the new forestry law, Government 
Regulation 34 of 2002 concerning Forest Structuring and Development of Forest Management 
Plans, Utilisation of Forests and Use of Forest Areas. This government regulation affirmed the 
Ministry of Forestry's authority and severely circumscribed that of the Bupatis. The Ministry of 
Forestry now had and continues to have the sole authority to issue commercial logging licenses. 
The Bupatis' authority, on the other hand, was now limited to the issuance of permits for the 
collection of wood for household purposes, up to a meager 20 cubic meters. 
" Accord ing to the Minister of Forestry at the time, export ban is applied to curb illegal logging 
(Kompas, 3 May 2002) 
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Although the power of regional governments over issuing logging licenses had been 
removed earlier in February 2002 through enactment of Ministerial Decree 541 of 2002, a 
Government Regulation is much stronger than a Ministerial Decree as it is explicitly placed 
higher in the legal hierarchy in relation to a district bylaw or District Regulation (PERDA) 
(Appendix 2). This meant that district decisions must now conform to Government Regulation 
34 of 2002. Thus, from the point of view of local governments, the passage of this government 
regulation was a major drawback and was perceived by many as "recentralization": the power 
pendulum had swung back to the Centre. 
Previously, district governments had clung to the regional autonomy law in their decision 
to continue to issue logging licenses, arguing that the position of a district regulation/PERDA 
was higher than that of a ministerial decree. Ironically, however, in issuing licenses, local 
governments had referred to earlier ministerial decrees that had given them the authority to 
issue them, but they did not follow later ministerial decrees that had revoked the very same 
authority. Furthermore, the Ministry of Home Affairs' Decree 130-67 of 2002 affirmed the 
administrative authority of levels of governments in various sectors, including in forestry." 
With the issuance of Government Regulation 34 of 2002, the local governments' argument 
could no longer stand up, and the Centre regained the upper hand. 
Even though Government Regulation 34 of 2002 has strong legal standing, district 
governments did not immediately bow down to its provisions. At district level and, in the case 
of Papua, at provincial level, apparently even this government regulation was, for a period, 
"contested". 
The contentious nature of authority over the issuance of concession licenses was so fierce 
that the Ministry of Forestry needed to assert its " regained" authority over logging licensing 
through extended efforts for several years after the enactment of Government Regulation 34 of 
2002. In early October 2002, in what seems to have been a desperate effort, the Ministry of 
Forestry circulated a letter to local governments ordering them to stop the issuance of medium 
and large-scale logging licenses (IUPHHK) in their areas, and to report on all licenses that had 
been granted to the Ministry of Forestry .41 A week later, the Ministry of Forestry sent a 
"socialization team"'3 to the capital of East Kalimantan province to hold a meeting with the 
Bupatis, Mayors, and the Governor of the province with the intention of directly informing and 
reminding these regional and local state actors of this government regulation. This event, 
however, was also used by the provincial government to convey its dissatisfaction over the way 
in which forestry administration was handled under regional autonomy, requesting that 
" For instance, interview with a senior forestry official of the East Kalimantan Provincial Forestry 
Service, P-G-5. 
'' Ministry of Forestry's Letter 1714 of 3 October 2002 on the issuance of medium and large-
scale logging licenses (IUPHHK) 
""Socializing", from the Indonesian term sosia/isasi, means publicising a certain program or 
disseminating information (see also section 5.2.2}. 
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provinces be granted a greater authority over forest administration and an increased supervisory 
role. The governor, for instance, pointed out the way districts in the province had responded to 
Government Regulation 34 of 2002, despite its higher legal standing vis-a-vis districts' 
regulations (PERDA). Most districts in the province rejected this government regulation, did 
not respond, or continued to refer to PERDAs made prior to the passage of the regulation. Many 
of these PERDAs therefore had conflicting stipulations, over which the Governor had no 
control." In March 2003 the Ministry of Forestry again reaffirmed its authority through a 
Ministerial Letter addressed to the Governors and Bupatis.45 However, districts in the province 
of West Kalimantan - Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, and Pontianak - continued to issue small- and 
medium-scale licenses well into 2003 (Dermawan, 2004; Ministry of Forestry Decree 249 of 
2004; Yasmi et al. , 2005). 
In January 2005, the Ministry of Forestry circulated yet another letter to warn sub-national 
leaders that the Ministry of Forestry has exclusive authority to issue commercial logging 
licenses.•• Apparently, even though most regions had ceased issuing logging licenses by this 
time, this was not the case in Papua. In March of that year, the Governor of Papua's numerous 
logging licenses issued to customary communities made national headlines (Media Indonesia, 
22 March 2005, see also section 4 .3.3).47 The Ministry of Forestry contended that their issuance 
contravened Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry and Government Regulation 34 of 2002 because, by 
June 2002, the Governor no longer had the authority to issue such licenses. Consequently, 
timber harvested under these licenses was considered illegal. On March 29, 2005, the Ministry 
issued a Ministerial Regulation revoking its earlier Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops 
Decree 317 of 1999 on Rights of Customary Communities to Forest Products Harvesting in 
Production Forests.48 This was a last-ditch effort by the Ministry of Forestry to prevent further 
issuance of sub-national level logging licenses. 
The local governments and the Ministry of Forestry each stood by its own arguments in the 
struggle for power over logging licensing authority. Officials of the two districts complained 
that the Ministry of Forestry changed its policy too often and too rapidly and were adamant that 
it was not possible to expect them to make changes to districts' policies as swiftly as the 
changes in the Centre's policies, due to operational considerations.'9 The districts' main 
argument for the proliferation of district licenses has been to allow communities to obtain 
benefits from local forests, which had not occurred during the New Order period. Officials of 
the two local governments argued that it was difficult for districts to adjust quickly to the 
" The Governor of East Kalimantan's s peech, 10 October 2002 
'' Letter of the Ministry of Forestry 185 of 31 March 2003 on the issuance of IUPHHK and 
IPHHK (small-scale logging licenses) on Production Forests 
" Letter of the Ministry of Forestry S.26/Menhut-Vll/2005 
" Unlike other regions, in Papua and Aceh, autonomy resides with the province, not with the 
districts . 
•• Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.07 of 2005 
•• For instance, interviews with B-G-4a and K-G-1 c 
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changes in national policy, because it was the district governments that had to face and explain 
the changes to the local population, to whom the licenses were issued. so They further insisted 
that adjustments associated with these changes needed time, in particular to prevent unrest or 
violence on the part of local communities. As licenses were obtained at a cost, district 
governments also feared litigation by license holders if their licenses were withdrawn before 
logging operations could commence or if any provisions in the licenses were altered. 
While district officials were clearly concerned about actions they saw as "recentralization", 
they were convinced that authority over forestry matters was rightfully theirs and that this was 
now "the era of autonomy". Most district officials interviewed, including those outside the 
forestry service, did not believe that forestry had been decentralized in the first place. At best, 
district' s autonomy in the forestry sector had always been "half hearted''. 51 Officials of both 
Bulungan and Kutai Barat argued that the forests exist within the districts' jurisdiction - rather 
than within the province's or the Centre's - and were determined to manage and administer 
these resources themselves. 
The Ministry of Forestry's justifications for withdrawing districts ' authority have included 
genuine concern over forest sustainability, but also arose out of fear of losing control over the 
Forest Estate (kawasan hutan). About local governments' accusations of recentralization, a 
senior official at the Ministry of Forestry pointed out that there has been no "recentralization", 
but a "correction of policies''.si Referring to the Ministry' s groundbreaking November 2000 
decree, this key official pointed out that the Ministry had in fact previously attempted to grant 
local governments substantial authority through its November 2000 decree, but that this 
authority had been largely abused. As the senior official explained: 
"We have tried to decentralize, giving them quote unquote increased 
authority to regions, with Ministerial Decree 05.l, although subsequently it 
was misinterpreted. And then there were other decisions that were 
misinterpreted. . .. That was why we corrected our policies with the 
revocation of Decree 05.l through Decree 541, which was strengthened by 
Government Regulation 34 passed in June 2002." (interview with N-G-9) 
Insisting that all of the Ministry's policies were based on the objective of achieving 
sustainable management, this official did not believe that local governments at this point in time 
were capable of carrying out sustainable management; he felt that decentralisation needed to be 
done in phases. 
50 For instance, interviews with B-G-4a, B-G-6; B-G-16; K-G-1c 
" The Indonesian phrases commonly used to describe local government's perception of 
decentralisation as a halfhearted process were "otonomi setengah hat!' (half-hearted autonomy) 
and "kepala dilepas ekor dipegang" (head - of a snake - released but its tail maintained). 
" Interview with a senior Ministry of Forestry official, N-G-9 
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Ministry of Forestry officials, pointing to the numerous instances of indiscriminate 
issuance of logging licenses and of districts ignoring the Ministry of Forestry's efforts to halt 
them, insisted that decentralisation had gone too far, beyond what was intended or what should 
have occurred.53 They held the common perception that local governments had shown little 
regard for proper management of forests and have been merely treating them as a source of 
formal and informal revenue. The concerns of the Ministry of Forestry officials that district 
governments had gone too far were echoed by a senior official at the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and a senior official of a donor agency supporting the Ministry of Home Affairs in 
decentralisation measures. 5' 
In particular, the Ministry of Home Affairs felt that it was difficult for the Ministry to carry 
out its supervisory role over more than 400 autonomous districts/municipalities. Provinces were 
not able to carry out their supervisory role as the "hands" of the Central Government, because 
districts mostly continued to ignore provinces' instructions. As a consequence, these Ministry of 
Home Affairs officials felt strongly that Law 22 of 1999 needed extensive revision. 
A senior Ministry of Home Affairs official interviewed also felt that the Ministry of Home 
Affairs had lost control over many districts' policies. Previously, in order to be legal , all district 
regulations had first to be signed and endorsed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Under 
decentralisation, districts/municipalities, endorsed by their local legislative bodies, produced 
numerous local regulations. Formally, the Ministry needed to review and approve (or reject) 
districts' regulations within 30 days after the date of passage. In practice, however, it was 
impossible to do this within the given time frame, as there are more than 400 
districts/municipalities, each with its burgeoning new regulations. Lacking the necessary 
resources, the Ministry had relied on the districts to report their new regulations. This meant that 
if districts did not report them, the Ministry would not have been aware of them. As a result, 
there were many problematic district regulations/policies, including, for instance, double 
taxation. 55 
Provincial forestry officials, in particular, also complained that districts now acted as freely 
as they wanted, and did not heed them. Similar to most of the officials at the Centre, they 
perceived that in practice, decentralisation in forestry had gone too far. They felt that they had 
lost control of districts' forestry-related actions, and demanded revision of Law 22, in particular 
to restore the hierarchical relation between the province and districts. 56' 57 
" Interviews with senior Ministry of Forestry officials, N-G-1 and N-G-5 
5
' Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Home Affairs, N-G-6a, and a senior official of a 
donor agency in Jakarta, N-1-3 
" Interviews with a senior official of the Ministry of Home Affairs official, N-G-6a and N-G-6b 
"' Interviews with senior officials of the East Kalimantan provincial forestry service, P-G-5 and 
P-G-8b 
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3.2.3 Districts' responses to their diminishing authority in 
forestry decisions 
"If there arc loopholes in higher level policies or regulations, then we 
determine our policies." (A senior official of Bulungan District Forestry 
Service, B-G- 17) 
With diminishing authority after only a short period, district governments were now 
severely constrained in pursuing their objectives. Whenever possible, they strove to operate 
within the boundaries of their legal authority, but without relinquishing the potential benefits 
associated with forest activities or authority. Despite the supremacy of a government regulation 
vis-a-vis a district regulation, the two case study districts found strategic ways to continue 
district-licensed logging operations for some time, until well into 2004. 
Bulungan 's strategy 
Bulungan devised a strategy to allow district-based (ostensibly) small-scale logging 
activities to continue by "manoeuvring" the provision of Government Regulation 34 of 2002 
that had revoked districts' authority to issue logging licenses. This district deliberately 
interpreted the regulation as only applying to the issuance of new district logging licenses. 
Based on this interpretation, Bulungan issued an "extension" to licenses that had expired, or 
"revised" the specifications in the original licenses. As the duration of Bulungan' s original 
licenses were between 6 months and I year, if one refers to Government Regulation 34 of 2002, 
all licenses should have expired by June 2003, or a year after the introduction of this Central 
Government regulation. The extension and/or revisions of original licenses enabled logging 
operations to continue beyond June 2003. 
Bulungan government justified the extension or revision of the small-scale logging licenses 
that expired before or by June 2003 on the grounds of unmet quotas or under-harvesting. 58 For 
example, some license holders were not able to harvest timber commensurate with the stock 
potential estimated in the original licenses because of operational circumstances, including 
weather or temporarily unfavourable timber prices. In this case, the original licenses were 
extended. In other instances, the actual timber stock was lower than that estimated under the 
original licenses. Under this situation, license holders were given permission to log in another 
area to meet the estimated volume; hence, the original licenses were revised (and extended). 
Overlap with an area under other district licenses or central HPH licenses also prompted 
'' In October 2004, both Law 22 of 1999 and Law 25 of 1999 were succeeded by a revised 
version, which accommodated some of the concerns of the Ministry of Forestry and the 
provincial authorities (see Appendix 5, Postscript). 
" Interviews with senior officials of Bulungan District Forestry Service, B-G-8a and B-G-16, 
respectively and a DPRD member of Bulungan in charge of forestry, B-L-2 
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revision of licenses. Available data showed that, by July 2003, Bulungan had extended and/or 
revised at least thirty-five licenses, each permit covering an area ranging from 100 hectares to 
1500 hectares, to a total of 18,000 hectares. 59 
Bulungan had to maintain the "current" status of its licenses, because the status of a license 
is important with respect to the legality of the logging operations and the legality of the timber 
harvested. A "current" license is needed for a timber operation to be "legal" and the operator is 
required to obtain documents to transport the timber, Surat Keterangan Hasil Rutan (SKSHH), 
without which the said logs would be considered illegal (see also Chapter 4). The extension and 
revision of district licenses that had originally expired within one year after the cut-off date of 
districts ' licensing authority, therefore, served two purposes. First, it enabled logging operations 
to occur, based on district licenses effectively issued after the June 2002 cut-off date. Second, it 
ensured that timber produced in the district could be legally marketed. 
Figure 3.1 Is this legal timber? 
One of the checkpoints where documents that must accompany timber 
transported out of the district, Bulungan. Such documents determine 
the legality of logs. Photo by Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, 2004 
Higher levels of government, however, were alerted to this situation and exerted pressures 
on the extension and revision of district logging licenses, to the extent that Bulungan 
government had to respond. In January 2004, the Governor of East Kalimantan, with the 
involvement of the district attorney, warned the district government to cease the issuance and/or 
extension and revision of district licenses. 60"61 
s
9 A list of extended and revised IPPK licenses (source: Bulungan District Forestry Service, 
2003) 
60 Interview with a senior official of Bulungan District Forestry Service, B-G-Bb 
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As described in section 3.1.4 and Appendix 2, in Bulungan District an UPTD - the 
technical unit of the Provincial Forestry Service operating at the district level - operates in 
paralle l with the District Forestry Service. The District Forestry Service primarily handled the 
administration of timber operations under district logging licenses, while the UPTD handled 
those that pertained to centrally-licensed HPHs. One of the important responsibilities of the 
UPTD was (and still is) to administer the SKSHH, the document required for the transportation 
of all timber, including - at the time when district licenses were issued - that harvested under 
district licenses. The existence of the UPTD not only curtailed the responsibility of the District 
Forestry Service, but also enabled the UPTD to remain informed of district licenses and to 
convey the information to the provincial level. 
The demise of district licenses would thus have severely limited the operations or actions 
of the District Forestry Service. Consequently, district forestry officials quickly sought ways to 
stall or stop the process. They rushed to seek outside assistance to help them map existing 
district licenses, in an attempt to show and prove to the Ministry of Forestry that these licenses 
were mostly located in KBNKs, that is, outside the Ministry of Forestry's territory (see also 
section 3.4). However, finding such assistance took time. On this occasion, presumably due to 
the involvement of the district attorney in the Governor's warning letter, the Bupati took the 
matter seriously and responded swiftly, before the District Forestry Service could offer a 
solution. 
In February, 2004, the Bupati sent his response to the East Kalimantan Governor regarding 
the cancellation of Bulungan's small-scale logging licenses. 61 This letter explained the district's 
two important policies with regard to the issuance of district licenses: I) all revisions and 
extensions of licenses granted by Bulungan government in 2003 had expired on December 31, 
2003; and 2) as of December 31, 2003, Bulungan government did not grant any new, extension, 
or revisions of licenses. 
Thus, this means that Bulungan 's small-scale logging activities had fomially continued for 
some time - under licenses extended and/or revised after the 2002 Central Government policies 
that had revoked districts' authority over logging licensing (that is, Ministry of Forestry Decree 
541 of 2002 and Government Regulation 34 of 2002) - until 31 December 2003. However, at 
least until July 2004, although district-licensed timber activities had largely subsided, some of 
these activities - therefore questionable in terms of their legality - continued to occur 
•
1 East Kalimantan Governor's letter No. 522/86/Ek.Proda 1/2004 dated 29 January 2004 on the 
Cancellation of IPKs. IPK or ljin Pemanfaatan Kayu is a license for the clear cutting of forests, 
carried out to convert the Forest Estate into other, non-forest uses. These licenses are to be 
given only for forest areas targeted for conversion (see section 3.4) and issued by the 
Ministry of Forestry or delegated to provinces. In the case of Bulungan, district small-scale 
logging license, the IPPK, was often conflated with the term IPK. 
•
2 Bupati's Letter 522/86/Ek.Proda 1/2004 on the Termination of the Issuance of District Small-
scale Licenses, 20 February 2004. 
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sporadically. Furthermore, up until the time of writing, local media reports suggest that illegal 
logging activities have continued to take place in the district. 
Kutai Barat's Strategy 
Kutai Barat applied a strategy different from that of Bulungan. Rather than revising or 
extending their small-scale logging licenses that had expired - and most of them had expired by 
December 2002 - the district allowed logging activities under district licenses to continue by 
"manipulating" the application of a technical procedure, commonly known as Stock Opname or 
SO. The concept of SO refers to stock inventory of logs. The activities are usually carried out 
when a logging license is about to expire, at year end, and in cases where there is still timber 
remaining from SO in the previous year. The understanding of SO has included stock inventory 
of logs already harvested/felled, but that have not been moved out of the area of harvest, at the 
time the licenses expired, were about to expire, or at year end. 
Kutai Barat District Forestry Service, however, allowed logging activities based on SOs 
that had referred not only to the inventory of logs already felled, but also to timber stock still 
standing and not yet harvested. The District Forestry Service continued to provide 
administrative services - among the most important, the required timber transportation 
documents, the SKSHH (see also Chapter 4) - also for timber from SOs that referred to stocks 
remaining standing at the time the inventory was carried out, towards the end of 2004. This 
means that logging activities effectively continued well beyond the expiry date of district 
licenses, and certainly beyond the date of the issuance of Ministry of Forestry Decree 541 of 
2002 and Government Regulation 34 of 2002 that had revoked the authority of district 
governments to issue logging licenses. 
There was a significant difference in the nature of the two districts' strategies. Bulungan's 
was an administrative strategy, while Kutai Barat's was a technical one. The major actor 
responsible for the extension or revision of licenses, as for the issuance of original licenses, was 
the office of the Bupati. Thus, in the case of Bulungan, the Bupati's office was formally 
involved in the extension of licenses. The principal actor involved in Kutai Barat's SO strategy, 
however, had been the District Forestry Service, as SO was a technical procedure. In the case of 
Kutai Barat, the decision to deviate from the conventional SO concept was formally made at the 
discretion of the head of the District Forestry Service. The office of the Bupati may not be 
involved in, or may not even formally be informed of, these activities. However, while the 
Bupati did explicitly express his disapproval of the way that SO had been carried out by the 
district's Forestry Service (Chapter 4), he was nevertheless keen to continue to accumulate 
revenue from this sector (Chapter 4). Furthermore, informal interventions from higher-level 
district officials (Chapter 7) suggest that it is not possible to determine whether the head of the 
District Forestry Service's decis ion on the district's implementation of the SOs was indeed 
purely his decision. 
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Ultimately, however, district decisions are strongly influenced by national policies. In 
practice, districts had to seriously consider the risks of legal action being taken for challenging 
national policies, in any of their operations.6' By the end of 2004, increasing national pressures 
forced the two local governments to formally halt timber operations under the small-scale 
district licenses. However, illegal Jogging activities have continued to occur in these areas. 
3.2.4 Kutai Barat's medium to large-scale licenses 
During its short period in (formal) power, Kutai Baral was able to go beyond making 
decisions pertaining to small-scale logging activities. Referring to Government Regulation 6 of 
1999 and the short-lived Forestry Ministerial Decree 05.l of 2000, under which local 
governments were authorized to grant small to large-scale logging licenses, this district issued 
21 medium and large-scale logging licenses in Production Forests. These licenses were referred 
to as IUPHHK or ljin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu, which was a new term replacing 
HPH, the term used to describe large-scale concession rights issued in the New Order period. 
The area covered by each of these IUPHHK ranged from 5,000 to 50,000 hectares, and totaled 
481 ,942 hectares. The duration of the licenses was 20 years (Table 3. 1 ). 
The issuance of Kutai Barat's medium to large-scale logging licenses is significant, 
because first, it would not have happened during the New Order Period, when larger-scale 
licenses were all allocated by the Central Government (section 3. 1 and Appendix 2). Second, 
ironically, in issuing these licenses, Kutai Barat made reference to a Ministerial Decree that, 
from the perspective of district governments, had been questionable in terms of its status in the 
legal hierarchy vis-a-vis district regulations, particularly in si tuations where districts would be 
disadvantaged if the national decree were to be applied (section 3.2.2). The issuance of Kutai 
Barat' s medium and large-scale licenses thus demonstrates that the district used or referred to 
national policies that worked in its favour while it ignored (for a period, successfully) those that 
limited its discretion. 
0
' Interview with the Bupati of Kutai Barat, K-G-* 
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Table 3.1 List of Kutai Barat's Medium to L arae-scale Licenses 
Name of Company Date of Area 
License (Ha) 
PT RSM 17-Jun-Ol 32,750 
PTWLA 28-Dec-Ol 19,900 
PTKWS 28-Dec-01 20,500 
PT ACK 23-Jan-02 17,340 
KSU MPP l l -Feb-02 16,475 
PTNPP 14-Feb-02 8,200 
YPSDM 15-Feb-02 20,000 
KPKPJ 15-Feb-02 5,000 
PTWKL 15-Feb-02 50,000 
PTPSWL 19-Feb-02 5,000 
PTMKT 19-Feb-02 24,820 
KBJ 19-Feb-02 15,025 
CVPJM 19-Feb-02 18,395 
YUHL l 9-Feb-02 10,232 
PTRKR 20-Feb-02 45,000 
PTHKL 21-Feb-02 49,500 
KSU JPJ 27-Feb-02 50,000 
PtSMS 27-Feb-02 35,250 
KPN 28-Feb-02 3,730 
PT KS 28-Feb-02 18,000 
KUDMJ 28-Feb-02 16,825 
Total 481,942 
Source: Report on Target and Realization of Production, 
Kutai Barat Forestry Service (2004) 
Conflicts with national policies and guidelines 
Similar to the small-scale logging licenses, some of these medium and large-scale licenses 
were also problematic in terms of their inconsistency with national policy and guidelines. They 
gave rise to four main problems: the date of and/or process of the issuance of licenses; the 
concession area under the district license overlapping with the area of an existing centrally-
licensed HPH; a license issued in a protected area; and district-licensed logging operations 
trespassing on the area of an existing HPH. 
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At first glance, the date of issuance of the district's IUPHHK licenses did not appear to 
have been an issue, but closer examination reveals this not to have been the case. What did not 
seem obvious at first was the fact that a greater portion of these licenses was granted in 
February 2002, or approaching the date of the withdrawal of districts' authority to issue licenses 
(March l , 2002; section 3.2.2). This was towards the end of the period during which district 
governments' authority to grant these licenses, if a Ministerial Decree had any clout, would 
cease. This means that with respect to the date of issuance, all of the medium and large-scale 
logging licenses issued by Kutai Barat government would be formally considered legal. 
However, the date of issuance of some of these IUPHHK licenses was very close to the 
"cutoff' date of districts' authority, and so questions were raised about the actual process of the 
granting of the licenses. A key district forestry official suggested that the dates of some of the 
licenses appeared to have been "adjusted" to enable them to be included within the period 
during which Bupatis still had the authority to issue logging licenses. As this senior district 
forestry official suggested: 
"I will not say it formally, but informally, it appears because it was close to 
the date the Bupati' s authority was revoked .... the dates were probably 
adjusted, backdated." 64 (interview with K-G-3b) 
Another senior official of the District Forestry Service disclosed a more convincing and 
straightforward description: 
"But we only knew about the regulation [later] ... However, people had 
submitted their proposals way beforehand, and we were in the midst of 
process ing them. We had no choice; the date couldn't go beyond the end of 
February. So, they were backdated." (interview with K-G- ld) 
The same senior official, when interviewed a year and a half later, however, gave a milder 
response: 
"The licenses had to be issued prior to the date our authority was revoked. 
So, for some of them, they were issued before the process to fulfil all the 
requirements were completed. We then had to continue with the process 
after the licenses were granted." (interview with K-G-1 f) 
Although it was not possible to obtain district documents that could provide evidence of 
the district's attempts to backdate the issuance of district IUPHHK licenses, other district 
.. Licenses were issued by the Bupatls office, with technical recommendations provided by the 
District Forestry Service. 
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documents did suggest that backdating in the administration of logging activities under district 
IUPHHK did take place. These documents showed that there were efforts to backdate district's 
endorsement of the working plans (RKL - Rencana Kerja Lima Tahunan and RKPH - Rencana 
Kerja Pengusahaan Hutan) and working maps of a company holding a district IUPHHK, from 
as late as April 2004 to June 2002.65 Before any logging activities could commence, 
Government Regulation 34 of 2002 requires that these working plans, RKL and RKPH, would 
need to be completed within 3 months and one year after the issuance of the IUPHHK, 
respectively. Apparently the district was making sure that the company's working plans were 
endorsed within the timeframe specified by that government regulation, thereby making sure 
that the district government worked within legal corridors. 
Either way, whether backdating the issuance of the IUPHHK - as suggested by the earlier 
interview with a senior district forestry official - or completing the requirements of the process 
after the licenses were granted - as suggested by the follow-up interview - has meant that the 
process of the granting of atleast some of these IUPHHK licenses was illegitimate. Later, as it 
turned out, the Ministry of Forestry specifically placed these two issues, the date of the issuance 
of the license and the requirements that must be met during the process of the application of 
licenses, among the criteria in the Ministry's subsequent verification of district IUPHHK (see 
below). 
A district IUPHHK holder who was actually only asked simply how long it took him to 
obtain his license, had instead emphasized when he got the license in relation to the cutoff date, 
the date when the Bupati no longer had the authority to grant logging licenses. He asserted: 
"I got my license in February 2002, I am sure prior to the date when 
IUPHHK licenses could no longer be granted by the Bupati." [my 
emphasis](interview with K-P-2) 
According to another entrepreneur operating in Kutai Barat, the practice of back-dating 
documents to meet legal requirements was quite common."' 
During an interview, however, the Bupati insisted that the district government had not 
violated national policies and guidelines in the issuance of the district's IUPHHK. He 
maintained that I) all of these licenses were issued prior to the withdrawal of districts' 
authority, and that 2) these licenses were given in Production Forests but had been allocated 
outside active HPH concessions. 67 Further evidence, however, has shown that, for some of these 
•• Staff evaluation on the issuance of RKL, RKPH and working map for KUD MJ to be issued by 
the Bupati(12 April, 2004), with handwritten memo (24 April, 2004) from the Bupatiasking 
clarification of the need to backdate the issuance of documents. 
66 Interview with K-P-1 
•• Interview with the Bupati of Kutai Baral, K-G-* 
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licenses, the latter was not the case and had become an issue that the district has had to deal 
with since the beginning of 2004. 
Districts' authority to grant IUPHHK resulted in the issuance of Kutai Barat' s licenses 
whose area overlapped with a forest concession license issued by the Ministry of Forestry. This 
has intensified the tension between the two levels of government and caused uncertainty and 
confusion on the part of affected logging companies. 
The Bupati issued an IUPHHK to PT WLA on December 28, 2001 over a 19,900 ha area 
(Table 3.1 ). However, the Ministry of Forestry's subsequent assessment of this IUPHHK found 
that the entire area under PT WLA's license overlapped with the area of a centrally-issued 
IUPHHK (previously known as HPH licenses) under the name of PT BRT, whose concession 
right was granted on 11October,1999. 
This scrutiny resulted in the Ministry of Forestry's revocation of the said district's license 
on June 17, 2004. The Ministry justified its decision by referring to Government Regulation 34 
of 2002 that gave it the authority to impart, control, and monitor the policies of Governors, 
Bupatis, and Mayors to maintain the smooth operations of forest structuring and planning, and 
the utilization and use of the Forest Estate. It supported its action stating that it was done to 
ensure legal certainty in the timber business sector, in this case, that of PT BRT which was 
granted a Central timber license over the area in question prior to PT WLA being issued a 
license.68 
According to a senior district forestry official, this overlap was discovered only by chance. 
Each medium and large-scale concession holder can only carry out logging activities following 
an approved annual working plan, the Rencana Kerja Tahunan or RKT. PT BRT was in the 
process of applying for its annual working plan when it found out about the overlap. PT BRT 
first complained to the district government and then took the matter all the way to the Ministry 
of Forestry. 6" 
Ministerial Decree 05.1 of 2000 explicitly specified an important caveat to districts' 
authority over logging licensing, that districts must not issue IUPHHK on any acti ve centrally-
licensed concession area (section 3.2.2). PT BRT, a centrally-licensed IUPHHK (previously 
known as HPH) holder which was part of a large and long standing timber group AK, therefore 
had a strong legal basis to pursue its rights over the area in question to the Ministry of Forestry. 
The District Forestry Service's involvement in the granting of the RKT has been in 
providing technical recommendations. R KTs are approved by the Provincial Forestry Service.7° 
In the above case, this has necessitated both of the contending concession holders, the centrally-
licensed PT BRT and the district-licensed PT WLA, to work with the District Forestry Service, 
•• Ministry of Forestry Decree 214 of 2004 
" Interviews with a senior official of Kutai Baral District Forest ry Service, K-G-3a and K-G-3b 
'
0 Ministry of Forestry Decree 16 of 2003 
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each seeking an outcome that worked in their favour. PT BRT needed to ensure that no other 
companies operated in their area and that they be issued an RKT to carry out logging activities 
for that year. PT WLA needed to ascertain that their license was legitimate and operational. This 
led to a situation where the District Forestry Service involved could cake advantage of the case 
for personal benefit (see also Chapter 6 for interactions between timber businesses and district 
officials). The forestry official interviewed explained that he was consulted by both of the 
contending concession holders, each wanting to secure its operation. In his words: 
"I act as a consultant for both parties. I have interests." (interview with K-G-
3b) 
It was not clear how the district had issued a large-scale license whose entire area 
overlapped with a centrally-licensed logging concession, while the provisions of national policy 
(assuming that the time of issuance of the district license was within the period when district 
authority to issue logging licenses was still valid) on districts' au thority stated explicitly that 
districts must not grant logging licenses over an area that already had active rights over it. 
District licenses were issued by the Bupati, based on the technical recommendations of the 
District Forestry Service. It was Kutai Baral Forestry Service's responsibility, therefore, to 
ensure that all of the technical requirements pertaining to WLA 's license were met, prior to 
providing the recommendation to the Bupati's office for the issuance of the license. That 
included ascertaining that the area under the proposed license was clear of any existing active 
rights. Thus, the "blunder" could have occurred within the District Forestry Service, for 
whatever reason, the District Forestry Service either genuinely did not know that the area had an 
active right over it, acted as if it did not know about it and purposely gave the technical 
recommendation to the Bupati' s office in support of the license, or knew about it but 
nevertheless gave its recommendation to go ahead with the license. 
District forestry officials declined to provide an explicit explanation. However, they did 
provide an indirect explanation, suggesting that the District Forestry Service was under pressure 
to give the recommendation in support of the license. The Wakil Bupati", then second in charge 
in the district (and who in 2006 won the district election and became the new Bupati), was said 
to have a stake in PT WLA and was instrumental in the process of the issuance of this 
company's license." Key district forestry officials confided that one of the biggest challenges in 
carrying out their responsibililles was not in the technical aspects of the tasks, but more often in 
addressing pressures from district state actors higher up in the hierarchy. While district forestry 
officials were often pressured to make certain decisions in the interest of these higher ranking 
" The Deputy Bupati 
" Interviews with officials of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, KG-3a, K-G-3b, K-G-25 
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bureaucratic actors, these district forestry officials were often the ones who subsequently had to 
be accountable for these actions (Chapter 7). 
Although it was the Bupati who would ultimately be responsible for the issuance of 
licenses, the exercise of sanctions thus far has involved the revocation of licenses, while the 
Bupati himself so far has remained untouched. Legal sanction associated with district decisions 
has been limited so far to corruption charges. With regard to the case of PT WLA, at some point 
in 2004, the then head of the District Forestry Service was initially investigated for alleged 
corruption associated with PT WLA's timber transporting documents, the SKSHH. The 
probing was initiated by inquiries made by the Ministry of Forestry and the Provincial Forestry 
Service (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2006). At the time of writing, it was not clear whether or 
not the process was being pursued further. 
Another example of Kutai Barat's problematic medium and large-scale logging licensing 
involved the IUPHHK issued to KPKPJ (Table 3.1 ). Some of the area under this license fell 
within a Protected Forest category. During my fieldwork in July 2004, the district was in the 
process of submitting a request to the Ministry of Forestry to convert this area into the 
Production Forest category, and in exchange, had proposed another area to be converted to 
Protection Forest category. It is not known how the process has advanced, but in January 2006, 
this district IUPHHK was to have been revoked. n 
As in the case of PT WLA, district forestry officials declined to provide an explicit 
explanation. However, similar to the case of PT WLA, a senior and key district forestry official 
suggested that the district forestry unit had a good reason for recommending the issuance of the 
license in the first place. The recommendation was given e ither because the district forestry 
office genuinely did not know that the area in question was under a protected area category, - a 
reason plausible considering the lack of accurate data, including the few available maps that 
they could work with - or that it was given deliberately over a protected area. If the 
recommendation had been given purposely over a protected area it could be either a deliberate 
move or prompted by pressures imposed by higher ranks in the district bureaucracy. He 
emphasized: 
"Either way, it will be difficult to prove administratively." (interview with 
K-G-3b) 
Problems associated with Kutai Baral' s IUPHHK were not confined to the issuance of 
licenses, but also to their operations. They included a district IUPHHK-based timber activities 
trespassing on a centrally- licensed concession area. For instance, in March 2004, PT TB , a 
HPH operator, complained to the District Forestry Service that the holder of a district IUPHHK, 
" Interview with K-G-1f 
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PT PSWL, was transporting logs through its concession area. This resulted in the District 
Forestry Service suspending all administrative services to PT PSWL until the matter was 
resolved. 74 
Other issues surrounding Kutai Barat's IUPHHK 
Kutai Barat's IUPHHKs were problematic not only in terms of their inconsistency with 
national policy and guidelines, but also in terms of the certainty of the concession area specified 
under the license in relation to other district IUPHHKs. 
District documents suggested that there were issues of overlaps of areas among district 
lUPHHKs, sowing the seeds for conflict. For instance, part of the 50,000 hectare area of KSU 
JPJ had overlapped with the adjacent PT MKT (southern border of KSU JPJ) and KPN. 's The 
overlap was discovered by the office of the Secretary of the District through an evaluation of 
maps and environmental assessments provided by the District Forestry Service and the District 
Environment Office, respectively, after the issuance of the licenses. The oversight may, as in 
the case of the overlap of PT WLA and PT BRT, have different explanations. The problem 
could have resulted either from the Jack of careful scrutiny in the rush to grant the licenses in 
time - to issue the licenses prior to the cut-off date of district licensing authority, from having to 
accommodate various interests and pressures, or simply from the inadequacy of available data. 
This also suggested that the environmental impact assessments which should have been done 
prior to the issuance of the licenses were only conducted after the licenses were issued. This 
was consistent with the explanation provided by the senior forestry official cited earlier, that 
some of the requirements were completed after the licenses had been issued. Clearly, there were 
important weaknesses within the process of granting district IUPHHKs. 
The District Forestry Service was also unable to effectively monitor the operations of its 
IUPHHK, leading to illegal harvesting. In November 2005, the local media reported that a 
subcontractor of PT PSWL allegedly used a 2004 Stock Opname (SO) document provided by 
the District Forestry Service (section 3.2.3) to harvest timber in 2005 (Kaltim Post, 10 
November 2005h). Similarly, the subcontractor of PT KS, holder of another district IUPHHK, 
was accused of conducting illegal logging activities (Kaltim Post, 25 October, 2005g). The 
_ contractors of KUD MJ and PT KS, each holding a district IUPHHK, had reportedly logged 
outside the area under the licenses and had encroached into a protected area (Kaltim Post, 16 
May, 2006b). 
' ' Letter from the acting Head of Kutai Barat District Forestry Service 522.11 /316/DK-111/111/2004 
to PT PSWL, dated 11 March 2004 
" Letter from the Secretary of Kutai Baral District to heads of the District Forestry Service and 
the District Environment Office, respectively, 21 May 2002, requesting explanation of overlap of 
the KSU JPJ area with PT MKT and KPN 
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National actions over district's "contesting" decisions 
As explained above, the overlap of the concession area under Kutai Barat's license issued 
to PT WLA with the concession area under a license issued by the Ministry of Forestry to PT 
BRT was discovered fortuitously. Clearly more powerful now with the passage of Government 
Regulation 34 of 2002, in 2005, the Ministry of Forestry began to take a tougher stance and 
declared that all local medium and large-scale district licenses were now required to follow a 
verification process carried out by the Ministry. 76 
The validity of districts' IUPHHK is now tested by the Ministry of Forestry against four 
criteria. The first verifies whether the license in question was issued during the period within 
which the authority of the issuance of licenses was placed with regional authorities. This means 
within the period covered by Ministry of Forestry Decree 05.1 of 2000 (from 6 November 2000) 
until the effective date of its suspension through the Ministry of Forestry Decree 541 of 2002 (to 
1 March, 2002). The second criterion scrutinizes whether the procedures for the issuance of the 
license had followed those stipulated by Ministerial pecree OS. I of 2000. The third criterion 
assesses the area covered under the license, to see whether this area had any other legal rights 
over it or not. The fourth criterion focuses on the completion of the required documents, 
including environmental impact assessments. 
Only if all of these criteria were met would the Ministry of Forestry recognize and endorse 
district IUPHHKs. At first, the Ministry 's endorsement was conferred by notifying Bupatis that 
these licenses had adhered to the existing laws and regulations; only then could technical and 
administrative services be provided to the logging company in question. In 2006, the Ministry 
took further steps to make sure it gained control over previously district-licensed companies and 
their operations. Rather than endorsing district licenses, all of these licenses are now to be 
renewed by the Ministry of Forestry. By renewing existing (arid active) distric t licenses, the 
Ministry of Forestry now became the grantee of the licenses." In doing so, the Ministry of 
Forestry makes sure that all existing forestry companies arc once again under its sole control 
and must directly interact with the Ministry of Forestry. 
As of June 2005, at least two of Kutai Barat' s "problematic" IUPHHKs, PT WLA and 
KSU JPJ, were revoked (Kaltim Post, 29 June, 2005b). Two others were inactive due to various 
operational difficulties (Kaltim Post, 29 June, 2005b). One of the inactive companies was a 
local government-owned enterprise (Badan Usaha Milik Daerah, BUMD). As of January 2006, 
the IUPHHK for a concession right which was entirely located on a protected area was also 
reportedly revoked. 78 Apparently, the Ministry of Forestry had also revoked IUPHHK licenses 
'
0 Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.03 of 2005; the stated purpose of this verification process 
was to ensure the sustainability of forests and the cenainty of forestry business. 
" Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.05 of 2006 
" Interview with K-G-11 
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issued by other districts. 79 Similar to the case of Kutai Barat, no other sanctions were applied to 
the Bupatis involved. 
The above discussion has shown that although Kutai Barat was able to issue medium to 
large-scale licenses, in the end it had to bow to the Centre's directives. The Centre's pressures 
were so great that the Bupati had no option but to withdraw some of the IUPHHK he had issued 
himself, on the grounds of not meeting national requirements. 80 The self-withdrawal of the 
Bupati 's licenses, despite the risk of being sued by license holders, illustrates the culmination of 
the power struggle between district governments and the Central Government over logging 
licensing authority: the Bupati lost the battle. 
The tussle for authority over logging licensing, however, was only one among several 
"battles" between district governments and the Ministry of Forestry. The following two sections 
describe the struggle for a substantially broader and more far-reaching authority over forestry in 
the two study districts. 
3.3 Controversial District Regulation (PERDA) 
Among Kutai Barat' s major forestry decisions have been the formulation of a District 
Regulation on Forestry, PERDA 18 on District Forestry. Issued in November 2002, this PERDA 
has been highly controversial because, although it is similar in structure to Law 41 of 1999 on 
Forestry, it is in stark contrast in substance. Many of the provisions of this PERDA contradict 
Law 4 I of 1999 on Forestry. 
PERDA I 8 shifts the authority for administering forests, including planning and 
management, from the Central Government to the district. The PERDA contradicts the forestry 
law in three contentious areas of responsibility: determining the status and function of forests; 
recognizing and determining customary (adat) areas; and administering forests. The PERDA 
gives authority in these three important areas to the district government, while Law 4 I of 1999 
on Forestry places it with the Ministry of Forestry. Clearly infringing the authority of the 
Ministry of Forestry, the formulation of this PERDA invoked conflict between the two levels of 
government and "damaged" the relationship between the Ministry of Forestry and the Bupati of 
Kutai Barat. 
The Ministry of Forestry expressed its displeasure over the matter and strove to cancel the 
PERDA. Because the authority to cancel a PERDA resides with the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
"' For example, the IUPHHK issued by the district of Malinau in East Kalimantan (Ministry of 
Forestry Decree 477 of 2004), municipality of Pontianak in West Kalimantan (Ministry of 
Forestry Decree 249 of 2004), Belitung district in the Bangka Belitung Island Province (Ministry 
of Forestry Decree 127 of 2005), an IUPHHK license issued by the Governor of Papua (Ministry 
of Forestry Decree 204 of 2004);see Appendix 3. 
" Personal communications with FS, Kutai Barat's forestry official, December 6, 2006 and 
January 16, 2007 
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in April 2003 the Ministry of Forestry requested the latter to cancel this particular PERDA. ' 1 
However, instead, the Ministry of Home Affairs recommended that the district government go 
ahead with it, as long as it conformed to the decentralisation law. 82 A senior official at the 
Ministry of Home Affairs maintained that sectoral laws such as the forestry law should conform 
to the decentralisation laws. 13 Referring to Article 133 of Law 22 of 1999, he insisted that in the 
case of a conflict, district decisions should refer to the decentralisation Jaw, rather than the 
sectoral Jaw. At the time of writing of this thesis, there has been no further development on the 
issue. 
A high ranking Ministry of Forestry official explained that the Ministry of Forestry had 
sent hundreds of district decisions regarded by the Ministry as contravening national legislation 
or policies (laws, government regulations, and ministerial decrees), to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, requesting the latter to revoke these district decisions. However, very few were 
followed up, and when they were, the process was drawn out. 8• 
This instance not only highlights the disharmony existing between two government 
agencies at the Centre, but also the competition for power between ministries at the national 
level in the implementation of decentralisation. One of the failures in the previous 
decentralisation effort - the 1995 pilot project on decentralisation in 26 districts across 
Indonesia (section 1.3) - was the fear among central government agencies of the Ministry of 
Home Affair's increased power vis-a-vis other departments (Mokhsen, 2003). 
The Ministry of Forestry sought to overcome this obstacle by identifying high-level 
individuals at the Ministry of Home Affairs who shared a common understanding with the 
Ministry of Forestry and thus could work together to support the Ministry of Forestry's effort to 
enforce national forestry policies. In addition, the Ministry of Forestry also built alliances with 
the district attorney to carry out investigations on "defiant" Bupatis and district officials who 
were perceived to have breached national legislation or policies. The Ministry of Forestry's 
strategy had been, rather than requesting the Ministry of Home Affairs to take action on district 
decisions perceived to be in contravention of national legislation or policies - including 
Bupati's Decrees - to directly revoke them. This explains the Ministry of Forestry's revocation 
of district IUPHHKs (section 3.2.4).85 
1
' Letter of the Ministry of Forestry to the Ministry of Home Affairs 196/Menhut-11/03 and 
interview with a senior Ministry of Forestry official, N-G-9 
" Interview with the Bupati of Kutai Baral, K-G-* 
" Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Home Affairs, N-G-6b 
•• Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Forestry, N-G-9 
., Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Forestry, N-G-9 
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It is worth noting that the views of decentralisation within the Ministry of Home Affairs 
itself were polarized. 36 While one group genuinely supported decentralisation down to the 
district level, another group was more reluctant for decentralisation to go forward. 
Although Kutai Barat's PERDA on Forestry has not been cancelled, in practice the district 
government finds it difficult to exercise or implement its provisions. Fear of legal consequences 
for violating the forestry law and Government Regulation 34 of 2002 has hindered the district 
from formulating policies based on this PERDA. Furthermore, in practice it is difficult for Kutai 
Barat to implement its policies - which are not consistent with certain national policies - if 
relevant external actors follow the national policies, rather than Kutai Barat' s policies. For 
instance, it is hardly possible to determine the function of a particular forest area for other 
purposes if it has an existing centrally-issued concession right in the same area. Kutai Barat's 
policies that had been implemented, such as the district's issuance of logging licenses, 
ultimately had to be stopped for fear of legal scrutiny. In this case, although the Ministry of 
Forestry has not been successful in its attempt to cancel the PERDA itself, the Ministry of 
Forestry nevertheless in effect exercises de facto leverage. 
The Ministry of Forestry, however, succeeded in the cancellation of a controversial 
regulation of another district, this time involving a 2001 PERDA on community forestry, of the 
district of Wonosobo, Central Java. As requested by the Ministry of Forestry, in 2005 the 
Ministry of Home Affairs cancelled this PERDA for contravening the forestry law. 87 The four-
year process shows the persistence of the Ministry of Forestry in upholding its legitimacy. It is 
not clear why the two cases, the Wonosobo and the Kutai Barat cases, had such different 
outcomes. 
3.4 Bulungan's agro-industrial development and the 
pursuit of greater district control over forested 
lands 
Unlike Kutai Barat, Bulungan did not pursue medium and large-scale IUPHHK logging 
licenses; instead it looked for other ways to benefit from its forests. This initiative primarily 
stemmed from the restrictions imposed by national policies that had initially limited the 
district's opportunity to establish district logging regimes and then formally extinguished it 
altogether. Although Bulungan for a while had managed to find ways around these national 
policies, in the end it had to comply for fear of legal scrutiny and sanctions. 
Bulungan thus has focused on the conversion of the Forest Estate (kawasan hutan), that is, 
the conversion of lands under the control of the Ministry of Forestry, much of which is still 
forested, to non-forest uses. This has been in line with the district's emphasis on developing 
" Interview with senior Ministry of Home Affairs officials, N-G-6b and N-G-8, and a senior official 
of a donor project assistance on decentralisation, N-1-3 
" Ministry of Home Affairs Decree 9 of 2005 
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agribusiness-based activities, particularly oil palm plantations. This development has enormous 
implications for the future of forests. 
One of the major thrusts of Law 41 of 1999 is that control over the Forest Estate (kawasan 
hutan) rests with the State. The Central Government, represented by the Ministry of Forestry, 
determines the status of forests, whether State or Rights Forest, and the functions of all forests, 
Conservation, Protection or Production Forests (section 3.1 and Appendix 2). As long as an area 
is categorized as forest, its status and its functions are determined by the Ministry of Forestry. 
This has implications with respect to what district governments (and provincial governments) 
can or cannot do with fores ts under their jurisdictions. 
Bulungan was fully aware of this limitation and therefore sought to gain control over 
forests within the district by proposing to convert Forest Estate into non-forest uses, thereby 
removing it from the jurisdiction of the Ministry. 
In spatial planning maps, lands fall into two basic categories: Forest Estate for forestry 
activities, the Kawasan Budidaya Kehutanan (KBK), and areas for purposes other than fores ts, 
known as either Areal Penggunaan Lain (APL) or Kawasan Budidaya Non Kehutanan 
(KBNK). The KBK category includes all lands under the Ministry of Forestry (that is, the 
permanent Forest Estate or kawasan hutan) which are categorized into Production Forests, 
Protection Forests, and Conservation Forests. The KBNK category consists of all land area 
designated for non-forestry purposes, including Forest Estate that has been released from the 
KBK category. Once an area is assigned as a KBNK, the Ministry of Forestry will no longer 
have formal control over that particular area because it is no longer part of the permanent Forest 
Estate. Rather, the administration of areas under the KBNK category, such as land titling, is 
maintained by the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional or BPN). Considering 
the restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Forestry in the management and administration of 
KB Ks, it is in the interest of Bulungan District to convert KB Ks into KBNKs. 
District officials argued that much of the forested area within the district had been 
designated (by the Ministry of Forestry) for forestry development, the KBK category, and had 
mostly been allocated to large-scale centrally-licensed HPHs. u District data suggest that as of 
2003, of the district' s 1.4 million hectares of forest, some 887 ,334 hectares, or more than half, 
were allocated to four HPHs. 89 This made it much harder for the district government to allocate 
licenses over areas that were still viable for logging activities but did not overlap with areas 
under HPH concessions. For instance, in 2001-2002, the allocation of several district licenses in 
a KBK area that belonged to PT 11 - a state-owned HPH company - resulted in conflict 
" For instance, interviews with B-G-16 and B-G-5 
" Data on the licensing of the utilization of forests as of June 2003 (source: Bulungan District 
Forestry Service) 
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between the HPH company and district license holders. Under pressure from the Ministry of 
Forestry, the district government subsequently had to revise its licenses to KBNK. 90·91 
Under regional autonomy, the advantage of KBNK categories over KBK categories to 
districts has become even more pronounced. On the one hand, restrictions imposed by the 
Ministry of Forestry on activities that could be initiated by district governments in KBK 
categories were disincentives for districts to maintain KBK areas. As described in sections 3.2.1 
and 3.2.2 districts were authorized, for a short period, to issue small-scale licenses in KBK 
areas, provided that areas under these licenses did not overlap with any existing HPH, or in the 
case of areas with existing HPHs, with the consent of the relevant HPH holders. A KBNK 
category, on the other hand, would result in greater district authority. Once an area became a 
KBNK, it would not only be excluded from the Ministry of Forestry's jurisdiction, but would 
also allow the district government to issue mining and plantation licenses over the area. 
According to Government Regulation 25 of 2000 (see Appendix 2), districts now have the 
authority to issue plantation and general mining licenses.92 The Home Affairs Ministerial 
Decree 130-67 of 2002 further affirmed that the authority to issue Plantation Licenses or !Jin 
Usaha Perkebunan (IUP) now resides with the Bupatis. These two types of licenses can only be 
issued in KBNK areas. As districts' increased authority to issue plantation licenses in KBNK 
areas was in line with Bulungan's Strategic Plan, which focuses its development on the 
agroindustry sector, a KBNK area now becomes far more attractive to Bulungan than a KBK 
area. 
As put bluntly by officials at the district planning agency (BAPPEDA), Bulungan's main 
objectives in proposing the conversion of KBK into KBNK were to gain control over the area in 
question and have the power to issue Jicenses.93 They also argued that the issuance of district 
licenses for a specified (development) purpose would prevent encroachment from other uses.9' 
Bulungan has, from early on, sought to convert certain areas of KBK into KBNK, but the 
district's proposed conversion was rejected by the Ministry of Forestry. One sucfi case involved 
the district's proposal to the Ministry of Forestry in 2000 to convert some 20 thousand hectares 
of KBK into a KBNK area in the subdistrict of TP for the purpose of developing an oil palm 
plantation; the plantation was to be established by PT BPS. As described in Appendix 2, the 
assignment of Forest Estate and its release remains under the authority of the Ministry of 
Forestry. The need for approval of the Ministry of Forestry in the conversion of KB Ks to 
'°Interviews with B-N-1f and with 8-G-8a 
" Note that as shown in district documents, many district licenses did overlap with PT 11. It is not 
clear why some overlapping licenses were particularly a problem and had to be revised while 
others managed to go ahead with their activities. 
" Districts' authority to issue general mining (that is, outside the oil and gas sectors) was also 
affirmed by Government Regulation 75 of 2001 on the Second Amendment of Government 
Regulation 32 on the Implementation of Law 11 of 1967 on the Basic Mining Law. 
"Interviews with B-G-9a and B-G-10 
" Interviews with 8-G-9a and B-G-10 
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KBNKs has severely limited the actual capacity of districts to plan the uses of their own areas. 
After three years waiting for approval, Bulungan officials attempted to negotiate directly with 
the Ministry of Forestry to push for this conversion. Senior officials including the head of the 
district's planning agency and the head of the district's economic unit met the Ministry of 
Forestry in April 2003 in Jakarta, proposing to swap the KBK area for an equal area of KBNK. 95 
However, as of mid 2004, the Ministry of Forestry held its position and rejected the proposed 
conversion. A senior Ministry of Forestry official insisted that the proposed conversion was far 
from necessary, because the district had vast areas of KBNK on which plantations could be 
established. This official suspected that it was really the timber on the proposed land area that 
was being targeted. 96 Both the Ministry of Forestry's and the district' s data show that more than 
500 thousand hectares within the district were already classified as KBNK (Table 3.2). 
Reports have suggested that licenses to establish oil palm plantations in the province of 
East Kalimantan as well as in other provinces were often abused, and that plans to establish 
such plantations have largely failed. Rather than establishing plantations, such licenses have 
often been used to merely harvest the timber on the land (for instance, Casson 2001c; Kompas 9 
December, 2003; Colchester et al., 2006). Oil palm plantation development in East Kalimantan 
began in 1990, but was reportedly far below target. Much of the land allocated for oil palm 
plantation, scattered across districts and municipalities throughout the province, had been 
stripped of its timber and abandoned. As of 2003, these neglected lands included areas in the 
two case study districts: 353,500 hectares were allocated to 17 plantation companies in 
Bulungan and 530,042 hectares were allocated to 23 companies in Kutai Barat (Kompas, 9 
December, 2003). 
District officials, however, argued that they had good reason to propose the above 
conversion to KBNK. For instance, a senior district executive, an individual identified as a 
strong influence in district decisions, claimed that virtually all KBNKs had either been claimed 
by masyarakat (communities) or already had existing plantation licenses. 97 The district therefore 
had to request that more area under KBK be released and converted into KBNK. 
Rather than waiting for the Ministry's approval of the proposed 20,000 hectare conversion, 
the Bulungan government had went ahead with its plan. In 2001, some 11 ,000 hectares were 
allocated to PT BPS through 110 district small -scale logging licenses, ostensibly to make way 
for the establishment of an oil palm plantation in subdistrict TP.98 In November 2002, the Bupati 
extended some of PT BPS' existing licenses covering an area of some 3,660 hectares. 99 The 
" lnteNiews with B-G-9a and B-G-17 
90 lnteNiew with N-G-9 
" lnteNiew with a senior Bulungan official, B-G-4b 
•• Bupati of Bulungan Decree 522.1 1 /01 to 30/Ek. Prod a 1/01; Decree 522.11 /31 to 42/Ek. Prada 
1/01; Decree 522.11 /43 to 54/Ek. Proda 1/01; Decree 522.11155 to 66/Ek. Prodal/01; Decree 
522.11 .67 to 80/Ek.Proda 1/01; Decree 522.11/81 to 11 O/Ek.Proda 1/01 
"Bupati of Bulungan Decree 522/43/Ek.Proda 1/2002 
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district spatial plan shows that the area proposed for conversion to the Ministry of Forestry was 
located in the same subdistrict and was earmarked for the expansion of PT BPS (BAPPEDA, 
2003, cited in Samsu et al., 2005). 
During fieldwork in January 2004, the case of the licenses issued to PT BPS stirred a 
heated debate in the district's legislative body, the DPRD. Some of the DPRD members 
questioned the executive's decision to extend the district's licenses, arguing that the area had 
been stripped of its timber. Although these licenses were allocated to clear-cut the timber on the 
land to make way for the establishment of the oil palm plantation, apparently there had been 
minimal oil palm development activity. At the same time, the legislature was concerned that the 
district's license to establish an oil palm plantation on a KBK area remained problematic, with 
the Ministry of Forestry refusing to release the Forest Estate into KBNK. 100 However, the 
district legislature in this particular case could only criticize the Bupati's decision, but not alter 
it. This was an example of the limited function of the DPRD as the peoples' representative body 
to whom the executive should, in theory, be accountable (Chapter 7). 
In June 2003, the district passed a District Regulation on District Spatial Planning, PERDA 
5 of 2003. 101 This PERDA assigned the areas for its forests under different categories. However, 
there are discrepancies between the district's assignments and those of the Ministry of Forestry. 
The land area of Bulungan in the PERDA was larger than the area determined under 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 79 of 2001. According to a senior BAPPEDA official, at the time 
of partitioning of the district in 1999, boundaries with neighbouring districts were fuzzy and the 
district government just accepted this. After conducting a series of surveys, the district claimed 
that the boundaries in its proposed spatial plan maps were more accurate. 102 
Table 3.2 Forest categories in Bulungan District according to the Ministry of 
Forestrv and Bulungan Spatial Plan 
Ministry of Forestry District Spatial Plan 
(hectares) 103 (hectares) 
KBK (Production Forests) 721,695 767,738 
KBNK (Other Uses) 542,199 572,055 
Protection Forests 122,462 122,462 
Source: Dinas Kehutanan Kabupaten Bulungan, 2003 and Bulungan District Regulation 5 
of 2003 on Bulungan District Spatial Plan for 2001-2010 
Similar to the district' s argument on the issuance of district logging Licenses, the district 
government insisted that a PERDA is higher in the legal hierarchy than a Ministerial Decree and 
100 Interviews with a senior official of Bulungan Agricultural Forestry Office, B-G-19 and 
Bulungan's DPRD members in charge of forestry affairs, B-L-1 b and B-L-2 
101 Bulungan District Regulation 5 of 2003 on Bulungan District Spatial Plan for 2001-201 O 
wi Interviews with a senior Bulungan BAPPEDA official, B-G-9a and B-G-9b 
103 Appendix of Ministry of Forestry Decree 79 of 2001 , cited in Dinas Kehutanan Kabupaten 
Bulungan, 2003 
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that the district's PERDA on the District Spatial Planning should prevail over the Ministry of 
Forestry's Decree.'°' Hence, the district maintained that its specification of its forest area and 
each category within it should prevail over the Ministry of Forestry's. 
Various interviews and comparison between the maps of the existing district spatial plan 
and the proposed district spatial plan or Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Wilayah Kabupaten 
(RUTRWK) indicated that the district wished to convert some areas of KBK to KBNK 
categories, including coastal areas on the eastern part of the district that had already become 
established fish ponds.'0 ' Some 300,000 hectares of KBK were proposed for conversion to 
KBNK. '06 A senior official of the BAPPEDA explained that the district's proposed conversion 
of KBK to KBNK in the RUTRWK was based on considerations that these KBK areas were 
already largely degraded. These degraded land areas, the official argued, clearly demonstrated 
the previous failures of the Central Government to exercise control over their use and 
management. '0' Pointing at past failures, he further argued that these areas be regulated and 
managed for non-forestry purposes, and suggested that it would be better if the district did it. He 
pointed out, however, that the district also proposed that the area covered under the Protection 
Forest category be increased. 108 
Maintaining degraded KBKs was even less attractive to the Bulungan government. When 
presented with another option to maintain KBKs, such as through reforestation efforts, the 
responses indicated that reforestation was not perceived as a workable solution by district 
officials. '09 They noted that, firstly, funding was an issue. This was somewhat inconsistent with 
the fact that over 50 billion rupiahs of the DAK-DR Fund (Chapter 4) were received by the 
district during 2001 -2003, some of which were idle or appeared to have been used for other 
purposes (Chapter 5). Secondly, pointing to the DAK-DR Forest and Land Rehabilitation 
(RHL) Project (Chapter 5), they were sceptical that reforestation and rehabilitation efforts 
would succeed. Thirdly, they believed that communities (masyarakat) would prefer oil palm 
plantation development over reforestation activities to foster livelihoods. Bulungan 
government's justification for its policy on oil palm development in the regional autonomy 
period was similar to its justification for the issuance of district logging licenses, which was to 
improve livelihoods and to provide income opportunities for the local population. 110 This 
inevitably raises questions about the commitment of the district to the nationally-guided Forest 
and Land Rehabilitation Project funded by the OAK-DR (Chapter 5). 
"" Interview with a senior Bulungan BAPPEDA official, B-G-9a 
'
0
' Samsu et al. (2005), with external assistance, compared the existing spatial plan maps with 
the proposed spatial plan maps 
106 Interview with a senior Bulungan official, B-G-4b 
'
0
' Interview with a senior BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-9b 
'
0
' Interview with a senior BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-9a; this was also depicted in 
Bulungan's proposed spatial plan (BAPPEDA, 2003 cited in Samsu et al., 2005) 
'
09 Interviews with BAPPEDA officials of Bulungan, 8-G-9a and B-G-10 
"
0 Interview with a senior official of Bulungan, B-G-4a 
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The proposed distric t spatial plan (RUTRWK) must, by a process known as paduserasi, be 
accommodated in and be made compatible with the provincial spatial plan or Rencana Tata 
Ruang Wilayah Propinsi (RTRWP) and endorsed by the provincial administration. In turn, the 
provincial spatial plan has to be compatible with the Ministry of Forestry's Forest Use by 
Consensus Map or Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan (TGHK). Bulungan exerted significant 
efforts in negotiating with the provincial administration and with adjacent districts to approve 
the changes in its RURTWK, including the head of the BAPPEDA going back and forth to 
Samarinda, the capital of East Kalimantan. However, as of July 2004, the district's proposed 
conversion had not been endorsed by the provincial administration. According to senior district 
officials, apparently the provincial administration did not have the courage to endorse 
Bulungan's proposed changes. 11 1 Because all proposed conversion of KB Ks into KBNKs must 
be approved by the Ministry of Forestry, the province must obtain approval from this Ministry 
for any changes in its RTRWP. 
By January 2006, the paduserasi process between the RURTWK and RUTRWP was 
completed. Much to the d ismay of Bulungan government, however , its proposed RURTWK had 
to undergo many revisions, as many aspects of the proposed conversion were not approved. 112 
Consequently, among districts and municipalities in the province, Bulungan was the last to 
agree to and the last to sign the paduserasi between the RURTWK and RURTWP. 
Oil palm plantation development has been a national policy in the last decade. One of the 
priorities of President Megawati and more recently President Bambang Yudhoyono113 in the 
agriculture sector has been to develop massive oil plantations in the Outer Islands. Supportive 
national policies for oil palm plantation expansion, as well as the diminishing and much higher 
restrictions on district-led forestry activities, have led to a burgeoning of district plantation 
licenses, despite the failures of past licenses. In August 2004, President Megawati signed Law 
18 of 2004 on Plantations. This law strengthened the authority of Bupatis in issuing plantation 
licenses in areas of land under the administrative jurisdiction of the National Land Agency, 
Badan Perranahan Nasional (BPN), meaning, in the KBNK category. The policy of East 
Kalimantan province to establish one million hectares of oil palm plantation across the province 
further legitimized the Bulungan government's objectives. 
Although district officials' position on plantation development appeared to be ambivalent, 
nevertheless the orientation of district policy on this issue was clear. While openly 
acknowledging that most existing oi l palm plantation licenses issued in the past (that is, in the 
1990s) had failed to establish the planned plantations - while the forests on which the 
plantations were to be developed had been destroyed - they nevertheless appeared keen to set 
111 Interview with senior Bulungan officials, B-G-4b and B-G-9b 
" 'Interview with a senior BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-1 Od 
'" The Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia, July 2001 to October 2004, and October 2004 to 
the present, respectively 
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aside more areas for new plantations. 11' The newly elected Bupati, for instance, was very much 
aware that the timber on the lands reserved for oil palm plantation development was one of the 
factors attracting investors. Nevertheless, he urged the population to support the Bulungan 
government's policy in order to lure potential oil palm plantation investments into the district 
(Tribun Kaltim, 24 July, 2006). 
By July 2004, the district had approved seven oil palm plantation developments. At the 
time, at least one site was also being proposed for coal mining. The district was then 
considering which activity between these two would bring more revenue to the district. 11' By 
July 2006, the district had approved 14 oil palm plantation developments, and two applications 
were in the pipeline (Kaltim Post, 5 July, 2006d). The area covered by each of the licenses 
range from 6,000 to 20,000 hectares. 
It is not clear whether these licenses were given strictly over KBNK, as they legally should 
have been. However, the proliferation of the district's plantation licenses was inconsistent with 
its earlier argument for the proposed conversion of KBNK to KBK. Previously, district officials 
had contended that it was difficult for the district to assign an area for oil palm development on 
KBNKs - such as the case of PT BPS above - due to lack of available KBNK areas without 
existing claims and/or rights over them. Many of these licenses were issued prior to the 
completion of the padu serasi between the RURTWK (district spatial plan) and the RTRWP 
(provincial spatial plan): this means prior to any provincial endorsement of Bulungan's 
proposed expansion of KBNK areas. More importantly, they were issued prior to the Ministry 
of Forestry's signing off the RTRWP of East Kalimantan province. As of January 2007, the 
paduserasi between the RTRWP of East Kalimantan province and the TGHK was still in 
process . 
A local NGO figure focusing on development issues was sceptical about the assignment of 
these oil palm licenses and their implementation: 
"Although on the maps they may be on KBNK, in reality the activities may 
well not be in this category. Who is to control such activities?" (interview 
with B-N-5) 
Control over the development of KBNK areas, including their licensing, not only gave the 
district government a higher degree of discretion to make and enforce their policies to achieve 
its stated objectives (that is, including district revenue, local employment, and means of 
community livelihood), but a lso provides other means to collect informal revenues. As 
'" Interviews with 8APPEDA officials of 8ulungan, 8-G-9a and 8-G-1 O; with a senior official 
from the District Agricultural Office, 8-G-19; with a senior official in the economic unit, 8-G-17; 
and with a senior official of the district development unit, 8-G-12 
'" Interview with a 8APPEDA official of 8ulungan, 8-G-10 
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disclosed by a local entrepreneur, the process of getting a plantation license is much easier now 
because it can be done in the district, whereas previously it had to be done at the provincial 
level. 116 However, the increased convenience had not been without costs, as more money was 
now being spent to help smooth out the processes (Chapter 6). 117 At least two of these licenses 
were issued just as the then outgoing Bupati ended his term in office. 118 A local NGO figure 
suggested that the Bupati was using this as his last opportunity to gain either political leverage 
for the (then) upcoming election or for personal gain. 119 
The new Bupati has pledged to exercise much tougher supervision and control over oi l 
palm plantation investors to make sure that they do establish the plantations, rather than just 
harvest the timber on the lands in question (Tribun Kaltim, 24 July, 2006). For this purpose, in 
August 2006, the district government submitted a draft of a district regulation (RAPERDA) on 
Plantation Licensing (/jin Usaha Perkebunan) for the endorsement by the DPRD (Tribun 
Kaltim, 24 July, 2006; Kaltim Post, 30 August, 2006f). One of the objectives of the proposed 
district regulation was to give the district government the legal authority, if necessary, to revoke 
the licenses in cases of violations, including the clear felling of an area under license solely for 
its timber without subsequent plantation development (Tribun Kaltim, 24 July, 2006). Although 
the district is taking this precaution only after some l 4 licenses were already issued, rather than 
prior to their issuance, this points to some improvement in district's policy with regard to land 
use. 
The district now also applies a performance bond to plantation companies, known as uang 
kesungguhan (literally, "money that proves a company is committed to establishing the 
plantation"). 120 The money is to be returned to the company once the plantation is established. 
However, the size of this uang kesungguhan , a mere 25 thousand rupiah or 2.5 USD per hectare, 
is miniscule by today's standard, in particular when compared to the potential risk and loss 
associated with failure in developing the plantation. The amount is also hardly a disincentive for 
a company when compared to the potential gains it could reap from the timber proceeds. 
One of the potential risks of oil palm plantation development as recognized by the district 
government, is how easy it would be for a company to extend its clearing activities and to log 
outside the area under the license. Harvesting timber outside the area covered under the 
district's logging licenses was not uncommon (section 3.2.2). 121 The Bupati was hopeful that 
this time the district would be able to enforce its decisions and to step up monitoring through 
increased community support (Kaltim Post, 21 May, 2006c). However, given the district's poor 
116 Interview with a local businessman and an adat leader, B-P-8 
"' Interview with a local businessman and an adat leader, B-P-8) 
11
' PT BSMP and PT BCAP 
11
• Interview with the director of a local environmental NGO, B-N-1h 
'"' Interview with a senior official in economic unit of Bulungan, B-G-17 
" ' Interview with a senior official of Bulungan Forestry Service, B-G-16 
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record of enforcing its decisions and its ineffective monitoring of district-licensed timber 
activities, it remains unlikely that the district will fare better in the case of plantation activities. 
Many of the companies obtaining district oil palm plantation licenses are based outside the 
district, including in Jakarta, Balikpapan, or Tarakan. For instance, one company, PT SKI, is a 
subsidiary company of PT M Group, which is the agrobusiness division of PT GG, one of 
Indonesia's largest, oldest cigarette companies. Several of these licenses are held by regional 
entrepreneurs based in the nearby municipality who also own other businesses in the province. 
The remaining licenses are held by prominent local entrepreneurs based in the district. 
Strikingly, the local and regional entrepreneurs holding district oil palm licenses were the same 
individuals involved in the timber businesses through holding the district' s small-scale logging 
licenses. According to a district official, local and regional entrepreneurs shifted to oil palm 
plantation ventures as soon as district small-scale logging licenses were no longer in 
operation. 122 Also similar to the case of small-scale logging licenses, Malaysian investors have 
provided the capital for many of these oil palm development ventures. 121 Furthermore, they have 
proposed to develop areas still heavily forested. 12' This trend raises concern and apprehension 
about the actual motivation of these entrepreneurs and causes one to speculate whether or not 
the district's licenses to develop oil palm establishment will in fact be used for oil palm 
development or simply be abused again, as in the past, to obtain valuable timber. 
3.5 District-provincial wrangling over forestry authority 
The tension over forestry authority has not been confined to the relationship between 
district and national levels but has also arisen between district and provincial levels. In the case 
of Bulungan this conflict has been associated with the existence of two forestry offices, each 
directly responsible to different levels of government. Kutai Barat did not encounter this 
problem; however, some tensions over forestry administration have also occurred between the 
district government and the Provincial Forestry Service. 
3.5.1 Relationship between Bulungan District and the Provincial 
Forestry Service 
As noted in section 3.1.4 and Appendix 2, there are two forestry units operating in 
Bulungan: the District Forestry Service (Dinas Kehutanan) and the Regional Technical 
Implementation Unit or Unit Pelaksaruz Teknis Daerah (UPTD). The District Forestry Service is 
a district unit responsible for the administration of district forestry matters, while the UPTD 
serves as the arm of the Provincial Forestry Service operating at the district level. Kutai Barat, 
"' Interview with a senior official of Bulungan's economic unit, B-G-17 
123 Interview with a senior official of Bulungan Agricultural Office, B-G-19, and personal 
communication the director of an NGO based in Bulungan, 19 September, 2006 
" ' Interview with a DPRD member of Bulungan, B·L-1b 
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on the other hand, being a new district partitioned from a "mother" district under the 1995 
decentralisation pilot program, has only a District Forestry Service and no UPTD. 
The presence of two forestry units operating at the district level has brought confusion with 
regard to the responsibilities and the services provided by each unit. The District Forestry 
Service was mainly responsible for the administration of district licenses, while the UPTD was 
responsible for the administration of centrally-licensed HPHs. However, there were no clear 
guidelines as to the separation of tasks. Some of the administration of HPH activities, including 
production reports, was handled by the District Forestry Service. 125 Consequently, HPH holders 
needed to deal with both offices. Similarly, district-licensed logging companies also needed the 
services of both offices, as all SKSHH documents were issued by the UPTD (Chapter 4). As 
revealed by one HPH employee: 
"Regional autonomy creates confusion for us; we don't know who handles 
what. We therefore have no choice but to deal with and provide for both 
offices. We need to exist." (interview with B-P-1) 
Bulungan' s officials pointed to the UPTD operating in the district as one blatant example 
of the unwillingness of higher levels of government to let go of their power over forestry 
administration. The Bupati was at first very reluctant to recognize the UPTD, but had no choice 
because the District Forestry Service could not issue the SKSHH documents 126; in districts with 
UPTD, only the UPTD was authorized to issue these documents. Without these documents, 
timber can not be marketed. 
Both units compete for administrative authority at the district level. Interview's with 
officials from the two units clearly disclosed frictions between them, although they were often 
suppressed because of a previous professional relationship. Prior to decentralisation, the head of 
the District Forestry Service was the head of the Provincial Branch Forestry Service (Cabang 
Dinas Kehutanan or CDK, Appendix 2) overseeing forestry in the district, while the head of the 
UPTD was the secretary of the CDK. 
The presence of UPTD in the district has circumscribed district forestry decisions and 
actions, and as described in the next chapter, also has implications for the district's ability to 
monitor its share of forestry revenue. It has meant that, although a large proportion of forests in 
the district were under centrally-licensed HPHs, the district had little control over their 
operations. A UPTD in the district has a lso meant that the province could closely monitor 
district forestry strategies and actions , including those associated with district logging licenses 
and activities. The Governor's letter warning the Bupati of the district to stop the issuance of 
'" Laporan Hasil Produksi (LHP) 
"" Interview with a member of an NGO, 8-N-1 a 
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district small-scale logging licenses, extension, and revisions, and all associated timber 
operations in January 2004 (section 3.2.3) was partly attributed to the role of the UPTD as the 
"eyes and ears" of the provincial government in the district. 
Rather than easing the tension between the two levels of government, the "demise" of 
district licenses has exacerbated it. The termination of district logging licensing meant that the 
District Forestry Service had lost much of its power, in particular because a significant 
component of its responsibility was handling processes associated with district logging licensing 
and operations. In addition, district licensing and operations had given a range of district state 
actors the opportunity to gain informal benefits (Chapter 6). Consequently, their termination 
meant that these actors would now need to seek other sources or opportunities. 
By July 2006, one of the most pressing agendas of Bulungan's DPRD was to propose the 
abolition of the UPTD to the provincial administration (Kaltim Post, 18 July, 2006e). It was 
argued that under regional autonomy the existence of UPTD in the district no longer had a legal 
basis and that it was "undermining the operation of other district units". 
3.5.2 Relationship between Kutai Barat District and the 
Provincial Forestry Service 
In the case of Kutai Barat, the tussle over forestry authority between the provincial and 
district governments is illustrated through one administrative aspect associated with district 
medium-to large-scale IUPHHK. As noted above, one of the procedures that must be followed 
through by a logging company holding a IUPHHK prior to a logging operation in a particular 
year is to have its annual working plan or Rencana Kerja Tahunan (RKT - section 3.2.4) 
endorsed by the government. Forestry Ministry Decree 16 of 2003 stipulates that RKTs are 
endorsed by the head of the Provincial Forestry Service, on the recommendation of District 
Forestry Services. Apparently, however, some districts in East Kalimantan did not heed this 
Forestry Ministry Decree. On 7 May 2004, the head of the East Kalimantan Provincial Forestry 
Service circulated a reminder to all District Forestry Services within the province that the 
authority to endorse RKTs lies with the head of Provincial Forestry Service."' Until July 2004 
however, RKTs for the district IUPHHKs were endorsed by the District Forestry Service. 128 
Two of Kutai Barat's bylaws, District Regulation 2 of 2001 on the Authority of District 
Government and District Regulation 18 of 2002 on District Forestry (section 3.3) provided the 
district's authority in fores t administration. If one adheres to these two district PERDAs, the 
District Forestry Service could well be authorized to endorse the RKTs of timber companies 
iii Letter of the Head of the East Kalimantan Provincial Forestry Service 522.110.1 /1611 /DK-
11/2004. 
" 'According to a senior official of the District Forestry Service, this had been the policy of the 
former head of the District Forestry Service. For example, the 2004 RKT of PT ACK was 
endorsed by the Head of Kutai Baral Forestry Service Decree 522.1 10.1/26/Kpts/DK-111/2004 on 
27 February, 2004. 
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operating under district IUPHHKs. 129 However, their legality did not go unchallenged. 
Increasing pressures from the Provincial Forestry Service with regard to the province's 
authority in the endorsement of RKT was foreseen to create operational problems. RKTs are 
important for any timber to be considered legal and form part of the administration of SKSHHs, 
the nationally-required transporting documents accompanying timber (supposedly) acquired 
legally. Every SKSHH is issued at the point of origin of the timber, and then invalidated at the 
point of destination. 130 Problems could arise when the timber transported has reached its 
destination, which is usually outside the district in which the timber was produced. Here, the 
officials in charge for the SKSHH's invalidation are outside Kutai Barat's jurisdiction and do 
not report nor are responsible to the district of origin. These invalidating officials may consider 
Kutai Barat's issuance of the SKSHH as illegitimate because it was issued based on an 
illegitimately endorsed RKT and may refuse to invalidate the SKSHH. Timber accompanied by 
an illegitimate SKSHH would be classified as illegal timber, leading to its possible rejection by 
potential buyers. 
As of July 2004, the District Forestry Service continued to provide RKTs to companies 
operating under district IUPHHKs and continued to administer the SKSHHs of companies 
operating under district IUPHHKs as well as those operating under centrally-licensed 
concessions. 131 Formerly, Kutai Barat' s SK SHH for timber produced under the district's 
IUPHHK had not encountered any problems at the point of destination, which meant that Kutai 
Barat's endorsement of RKT was not an issue. It is not clear why it was not a problem at that 
time. In July 2004, however, both the District Forestry Service and logging companies under 
district IUPHHKs were busy trying to resolve this issue. It was in the interests of both parties 
that these logging companies continued to be granted endorsement of their RKTs, despite 
intens ified pressures exerted by the provincial government. 
The concern over the status of timber logged under district-endorsed RKTs, that is , 
whether or not they were considered legal, has, according to a senior district forestry official, to 
do with the Ministry of Forestry's plan at the time to submit a tough illegal logging law, which 
was later aba~doned after the instalment of a new forestry minister. 132 After a period of much 
effort and repeated warnings from higher levels of government, by the end of 2004 both districts 
appeared to have stopped the extension and/or revision of district logging licenses and their 
"' Kutai Baral District Regulation 2 of 2001 on the Authority of District Government and Kutai 
Baral District Regulation 18 of 2002 on District Forestry 
"
0 The Indonesian term for the invalidation of the document is "dimatikan", literally "made dead". 
"' Interview with a senior official of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, K-G-20 
" ' A senior official at the Ministry of Forestry disclosed that a draft of the tough Illegal Logging 
Law was submitted to the national legislature (DPR) in April 2004 (interview with N-G-9). At the 
time of the interview, this official was hopeful that the Law would be passed by the DPR. 
Unfortunately, the period coincided with the national election and diverted the focus of the DPR 
members. A subsequent change in the Cabinet in October 2004 resulted in the abandonment of 
the proposed draft. 
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associated timber operations, as well as logging operations in the disguise of extended SOs 
(section 3.2.33.2.3). These decisions also apparently coincided with the national plan at the time 
to pass the aforementioned illegal logging law. 
3.6 Pressures from other sectors 
The "battle" between the different levels of government continues to date, albeit not 
directly in the forestry sector. Bulungan is very actively seeking to realize its plan to establish 
oil palm plantations. Although these plantations are to be developed on lands that are outside 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry, it is common knowledge - and district officials 
themselves recognized this fact- that acquiring timber on the land is a major incentive for 
investors to establish these plantations. Considering both the lack of capacity and the lack of 
willingness of the district government, coupled with the deteriorating capacity of the Ministry of 
Forestry to exert on-the-ground control, timber felling could easily encroach on productive 
Forest Estate. 
Another development in Bulungan that has bearing on its forests pertains to the fishery 
sector. By September 2006, the district government encouraged the legalization of the 
establishment of brackish water fish ponds in the area of what had been once mangrove forests 
in the eastern coast of the district. m In 2004, during fieldwork, this policy was high on the 
district government's agenda, but had been undermined due to the status of the area as Forest 
Estate. It is not known whether these areas had been accommodated as slated for conversion to 
non-forest uses in the provincial spatial plan. However, according to a Ministry o f Forestry 
official in charge of planning, as of September 2006 the Ministry of Forestry had not approved 
any release of Forest Estate to non-forest uses in East Kalimantan. 134 
The withdrawal of district' s power in forestry has also led to Kutai Barat government 
turning its focus to other sectors. By September, 2006 the district was also active in exploiting 
its coal resources and developing oil palm and rubber plantations. Legally, these activities can 
only be conducted in areas outside the Forest Estate or in Forest Estate that has been released by 
the Ministry of Forestry for specific purposes. However, Kutai Barat's issuance of an IUPHHK 
that overlapped with a Central license illustrates the ways in which it was willing to challenge 
the Ministry of Forestry's jurisdiction, and the ways in which the Ministry of Forestry had Jost 
significant control over districts' ac tions involving activities in Forest Estate. As of September 
2006, the district reportedly had plans lo build a road through a Nature Reserve to facili tate 
three large coal mining operations. 11' Under the 1999 decentralisation law, the management of 
Nature Reserves is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Forestry. 
"' Personal communication with S, the director of a local NGO, 19 September 2006 
,,. Personal Communication with 8, official of the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Forestry, 25 
September 2006 
"' Email communications with EM, an NGO activist working in Kutai Baral, 7 September, 2006 
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It is notable that districts' current and newer strategies with important implications in the 
forestry sector are made possible by districts' authority outside the forestry sector. Legislation 
and national policies providing that authority include the 2004 law governing the plantation 
sector, the implementing regulation of the decentralisation law assigning district authority in the 
plantation and mining sectors, and the Ministry of Home Affairs' Ministerial Decree affirming 
districts' authority in these two sectors (section 3.4). The withdrawal of districts' forestry 
powers, therefore, does not mean that districts do not make decisions that have implications for 
the forestry sector. On the contrary, it suggests that districts' decisions outside the forestry 
sector are increasingly relevant to the forestry sector, precisely because they now have to look 
to these other sectors to achieve their objectives. 
3. 7 Conclusions 
The ceding of forestry powers from the Centre to district governments under Indonesia's 
decentralisation was ambiguous. The two major laws governing decentralized forest 
management, the regional autonomy law and the forestry law, were inconsistent in terms of the 
loci of authority to administer forests. The regional autonomy law tended to grant powers to 
local governments, while the forestry law tended to maintain forestry powers with the Ministry 
of Forestry. Moreover, inconsistencies in the assignment of power over natural resources to sub-
national governments not only occurred between the two laws, but between provisions in the 
decentralisation legislation itself. 
For a short period, however, significant powers were devolved to district governments. The 
Ministry of Forestry relinquished one of the most sought-after types of authority in forestry 
administration, logging licensing authority, to Bupatis. However, the fundamental authority in 
forestry, the authority over forest lands, that is, the control over the Forest Estate or kawasan 
hutan, continued to remain with the Centre. 
Despite the ambiguity and partial nature of the release of powers, district governments did 
for a short period enjoy a significantly higher authority compared to the past. The authority to 
issue logging licenses - from small to large-scale - was a significant development, in particular 
from the perspective of the emphasis on the management of the forests, which had been and 
continues to be largely on the commercial exploitation of forests. Hence the establishment of 
district timber regimes. 
The inconsistencies in the two most pertinent pieces of legislation were fundamental in the 
trajectory of forestry decentralisation. They show a degree of reluctance on the part of (at least 
some clements of) the Central government to relinquish forestry po wers to local governments. 
District governments made use of their short stint of increased authority, taking the attitude that 
it may not last, due to historical distrust over past Central Government forestry policies, which 
was now, under decentral isation, compounded by the unfavourable provisions of the forestry 
law. Consequently, the two case study districts issued logging licenses indiscriminately, without 
due regard to their ecological consequences. 
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The result was a continuous tussle over forestry authority between and among levels of 
government, from the very beginning of decentralisation. On the one hand, the Ministry of 
Forestry had to follow the trend of other sectors in relinquishing powers to local governments, 
as guided by the regional autonomy law, but on the other hand, it wished to retain its powers to 
any extent possible. Under this situation, the Ministry of Forestry had to formulate a logging 
licensing policy favourable to local governments. But it soon realized the consequences and 
sought to regain this authority by withdrawing, ironically, this very same policy. Thus, the 
relinquishing of the powers that had been devolved was also temporary, as the Central 
Government subsequently issued a regulation that strengthened the provisions of the forestry 
law. 
The two district governments sought to find ways around national policies and regulations. 
At first, districts could go forward with their forestry decisions by selectively following national 
policies that benefited them, while ignoring those that constrained them. As the struggle for 
power peaked, districts manoeuvred by filtering national policies and regulations, identifying 
their weaknesses, and manipulating them to achieve their objectives. In this way, both study 
districts for a period continued to successfully entertain their own interests and objectives, 
despite being severely constrained and limited by the new government policy. 
Thus, referring to the decision-making power dimension in Agrawal and Ribot's 
framework (Chapter 2), district governments did receive formal powers, albeit over a short 
period, to make decisions over forest resource use. During this limited period, the two district 
governments could exercise these powers and they proved adept at doing so. 
After the status of the withdrawal of districts ' authority was no longer debatable, as it was 
affirmed by a government regulation which had a definite legal status vis-a-vis a district 
regulation, the two districts could still, for a period, apply their strategies and make and 
implement their decisions covertly, despite the formal withdrawal of their decision-making 
powers. This raises an important point with respect to the power dimension suggested in 
Agrawal and Ribot's framework in analyzing decentralisation: that framework did not 
specifically distinguish between de facto and de Jure decision-making powers over resource use 
in analysing decentralisation. 
However, this chapter has shown that local governments will attempt to strategize, when 
and if they can, to use higher-level policies that would otherwise undermine districts' discretion, 
in a way that would benefit the districts. Under Indonesia's decentralisation, vertical power 
relationships as, in this case, manifested in constraining national policies, have influenced 
districts' decisions significantly, but only after they have been filtered through the local 
governments' own objectives and interests. 
District governments' "defiance" and/or manoeuvres that resulted in de facto decision-
making powers clearly have implications for forest resource use. This suggests that local 
governments' de facto decision-making powers - in this case local governments being the loci 
of power under the decentralisation arrangement - as opposed to formal decision-making 
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p_owers, are important in determining the outcome of the decentralisation of power over natural 
resources. 
This chapter has also described how a similar trend of district "defiance" of unfavourable 
national policies has been observed in other forest-rich districts, in some cases to a more severe 
degree. The actual exercise of these other districts' "acts of defiance" also shows that districts' 
de facto decision-making powers - at least for a period - had prevailed over de Jure decision-
making powers, affirming the re levance of the former in the analysis of decentralisation. 
Kutai Barat's formul ation of a district regulation on forestry is consistent with one of the 
forms of the power dimension in Agrawal and Ribot's framework, that is, the powers to change 
old rules or make new rules. However, in this case, the difficulties in its implementation suggest 
that, although the Ministry of Forestry was not able to withdraw the particular regulation, in 
practice it does have leverage vis-a-vis the district government. The non-implementation of this 
district regulation also has implications for natural resource use. In this case, it is consistent with 
Agrawal and Ribot's proposal that the power to implement and enforce decisions is an 
important element in natural resource decentralisation. 
This chapter has shown that vertical power re lations, in this case the power relations 
between district governments and the Centre, have been key to the implementation of 
decentralisation and to the dynamics of district governments' decis ion making in forestry. It has 
also shown how the relations between "competing" agencies at the Centre have affected 
Central-local relations and their outcome. The dynamics of vertical power relations between 
local governments and the provincial government, though discussed in a more limited fashion, 
have also been shown to have affected district government forestry decision-making. The 
findings suggest that this element of the research framework (Figure 2. 1) is useful in analysing 
decentralisation (research question # I) and at the same time, the dynamics of district forestry 
decision-making (research question #2). 
Ultimately, districts ' policies have been highly influenced by national policies, above and 
beyond local conside rations, such as decisions that aim to benefit local communities through 
income generation and livelihood from forestry activities. The two district governments 
ultimately have had to bow to national pressures. The raison d'etre for this was the fear of legal 
consequences, which are increasingly a reality. 
The overall theme of this chapter, as in the thesis as a whole, is local governments' 
decision-making in the forestry realm under Indonesia 's decentralisation. Under Indonesia's 
decentralisation, power relations between district governments and the Ministry of Forestry 
have significantly shaped district forestry decisions. However, this chapter has shown that 
losing the battle in the struggle for forestry powers has meant that districts have intensified their 
e fforts outside the forestry sector to find other ways to achieve their objectives. Bulungan's 
plans and strategies to convert Forest Estate into non-forest uses, Kutai Barat's recent support 
for mining-related activities within a Nature Reserve, and national policies augmenting the 
authority of local governments in other sectors with implications for forests, illustrate that 
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district government forestry decision-making has been and will continue to be affected by the 
dynamics of other sectors. Therefore, to understand the dynamics of power over forestry 
decision-making, it is not sufficient to only address the respective power of actors (that is, local 
governments) in the forestry sector, but it is also important to understand how these actors use 
their authority in other sectors, and the consequences of those decisions for forests. 
Forestry rent, both formal and informal, has been the major motivation for district 
initiatives in forestry and has been the underlying impetus for the power struggle over forestry 
authority. This chapter has described a formal form of forestry rent, that is, income stream and 
livelihood for the local people, as one of the important driving forces of districts' issuance of 
district timber licenses. The accumulation of the informal forestry rent, as one of the more 
covert objectives of district decisions, is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The next chapter 
revolves around formal forestry rent derived from forestry activities in the districts: forestry 
revenue that accrues to district governments' budgets. It analyses interactions between the two 
district governments and the Centre within the context of lhe decentralisation of fiscal powers. 
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Chapter 4: Sharing the profits but not the 
responsibility: fiscal decentralisation and 
its implications for district forestry 
development136 
The preceding chapter observed how the two local governments, by establishing district 
forestry regimes, responded to their increased authority provided by Law 22 of 1999. From the 
onset and continuing throughout, the dynamics of change were beset by a tug-of-war over de 
Jure forestry powers between levels of government. With the withdrawal of the local 
governments' authority to issue logging licenses, the Central Government, represented by the 
Ministry of Forestry, has since gained "victory". However, for a period of time, the two district 
governments were able to put in place coping strategies and continue to benefit from their de 
facto forestry regimes. 
One of the underlying motivations for the power struggle over forestry authority has been 
forestry resource rent, both formal and informal. This chapter discusses the issues around the 
former: forestry-derived revenues that constitute the districts' budgets. 
Forestry revenues have been important for the two study districts' finances as a means of 
financing their development in general. Within Agrawal and Ribot's framework (Chapter 2), 
forestry revenues are seen to contribute to local governments' fiscal powers. Decentralisation of 
decision-making powers with no means or powers to implement the decisions renders it 
ineffective. Together with administrative powers, fiscal sources are necessary to execute these 
decisions. 
Under Indonesia's decentralisation, the role of forestry-derived revenues in the two local 
governments' finances has become more pronounced. Law 25 of 1999 on Fiscal Balancing 
between the Centre and the Regions increased local governments' fiscal powers through two 
fundamental changes: I) an increased share of natural resource-revenue and 2) regional 
governments now have more discretion over the management of central funds allocated to 
them. 137 Simultaneously, the law decreed that local governments fill their budgetary needs 
through Locally Generated Revenues (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, PAD). Local governments 
acted upon the opportunities opened up by the provisions in the law by creating district forestry 
regimes centred on commercial timber activities (Chapter 3). Rent from these activities accrues 
through nationally and locally imposed fees and taxes and is collected by districts in the form of 
forestry revenue share and PAD. Districts also continue to receive a share of forestry revenues 
'
3
' A version of sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.1 and some of the information in the remainder of the 
chapter were used and published in Resosudarmo et al. (2006). 
m As noted in Chapter 1 and section 3.1.2, regions refer to provinces, districts (kabupaten), 
and municipalities (kota). "Local governments" refers to district and municipal governments. 
83 
derived from timber activities operating under Central licenses. Districts' forestry revenue share 
is obtained from the redistribution of forestry revenues pooled in the Central Treasury Office. 
PAD is both collected and managed directly by districts. 
This chapter follows two themes: the significance of forestry-derived revenues in districts' 
budgets as a result of the decentralisation of fiscal powers; and how these revenues were used 
by the districts. The firs t theme comprises two issues: I) the redistribution of forestry revenues 
from the Centre to local governments and 2) PAD from forestry. While the same types of 
nationally-imposed forestry fees and royalties applied under the New Order continued to be 
applied under decentra lisation, the portion of forestry-derived revenues redistributed to local 
governments now differs from that during the New Order, to the districts' advantage. However, 
the processes surrounding their allocation and disbursement are an issue. Just as the devolution 
of forestry authority involved struggles among levels of governments, the implementation of 
forestry-revenue sharing, particularly for local governments, has also involved a "struggle". 
Unlike shared revenues, forestry revenues derived from locally-imposed fees and charges 
directly accrue to local governments and therefore do not involve intergovernmental 
interactions. Their generation, therefore, is not affected by the same issues as forestry revenue 
transfers, and is thus more attractive to districts. 
The first theme, covered in sections 4.1 to 4.5, begins with an overview of regional 
government (provincial, district and municipality) finance immediately before decentralisation 
(during the New Order period). Section 4.6 addresses the second theme: how forestry-derived 
revenue has been used by the two districts , that is, the ways in which and to what extent it has 
been reinvested back into the forests as the source of the revenue. 
4. 1 Overview of regional government finance prior to 
decentralisation 
During the New Order period, Indonesia's fiscal system was highly centralized. Regional 
governments (provinces, districts and municipalities) relied heavily on Central Government 
transfers for their revenues (Bawazier, 1988; Devas 1989; Lewis, 2003; Alisyahbana, 2005). 
These transfers comprised mostly routine and development grants as well as a limited amount of 
revenue shared between the regions and the Centre. Between 1995 and 2000, provincial 
governments generated only about 40 percent of their revenues through local taxes and fees 
(Lewis, 2003). The remaining 60 percent came from Central transfers, consisting of two Central 
Government grants, the Subsidy for Autonomous Regions (Subsidi Daerah Otonom, SDO) and 
the INPRES (lnstruksi Presiden, Presidential Instruction) grant program, and shared revenue. 
Similarly, district and municipal governments were highly dependent on allocations from 
Jakarta: 85 percent of their revenues were derived from Central Government transfers (Lewis, 
2003). The SDO grants were the most important source of revenue for regions, representing 
31 % and 43% of provincial and local government revenues, respectively. The INPRES 
constituted 17% and 28% of provincial and local government revenues, respectively. Revenue 
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sharing, which comprised mostly property taxes and some forestry and mining revenues, made 
up on average 12% of provinces' revenues and 14% of districts/municipalities' revenues. 
The SDO was allocated to provincial and district governments to pay for staff salaries and 
other routine administrative expenditures. Provincial and district governments, however, had 
little discretion over the use of these funds, as they were directly linked to nationally-determined 
staffing levels and salary structures (DJPKPD, 2004 ). Lewis (2003) noted that, rather than 
promoting regional governments' autonomy, the SDO served as an instrument of central control 
over regional governments. 
The Central Government initiated the INPRES grants in the early 1970s to boost 
employment through rural infrastructure projects. In the beginning, INPRES grants took the 
form of block grants, giving regional governments some flexibility in their administration. 
Later, INPRES grants evolved to become general-purpose grants, the General INPRES 
(IN PRES Umum) and specific-purpose grants, Special INPRES (INPRES Khusus). The specific-
purpose grants were distributed to finance national development priorities, for example the 
construction of roads, schools, public health facilities and sanitation schemes, as well as the 
well-known assistance for poor and Jess-developed villages (JNPRES Desa Tertinggal), and 
reforestation (reboisasi) and regreening (penghijauan or afforestation) activities. 138 
During the New Order period, the Central Government controlled the most economically 
valuable natural resources. It maintained control by holding authority to grant exploitation 
permits and by retaining the revenues. The Central Government allocated permits for the 
exploitation of oi l, gas, gold, copper, coal and forests. Only small-scale, minor mining 
commodities were left to the authority of provincial governments, and none to districts . The 
entire revenue from the oil and gas sectors, the most lucrative natural resources, went into the 
National Treasury (Table 4.1 ). In the forestry sector, while provincial and district governments 
did obtain a portion of the revenues, a larger portion was nevertheless retained by the Centre. 
During this period regional governments had limited opportunities to raise their own 
revenues due to national restrictions on the types of revenue sources they could apply. Sub-
national governments could only apply fees and charges with minor revenue potential 
(Bawazier, 1988; Devas, 1989; Shah and Qureshi, 1994; Lewis, 2003). Their already limited 
ability to generate their own revenues was further restricted with the introduction of Law 18 of 
1997 on Regional Taxes and Levies. District governments, for instance, were only authorized to 
apply levies on six minor sources of trivial revenue, none of which came from forestry: 
advertisements, hotels and restaurants, entertainment, street lighting, C-grade mining (sand and 
gravel), and surface and ground water. 
"' Regreening is the rehabilitation of critical lands outside the Forest Estate (see Chapter 5). 
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4.2 State forestry resource rent and distribution prior to 
decentralisation 
State resource rent from the timber sector is derived from a variety of fees and royalties. 
During the New Order, the government imposed taxes and fees which were paid directly to 
Central Government accounts. The three major types of fores try taxes and fees were and 
continue to be 1) Timber Concession Fee or luran Hak Pengusahaan Hutan (IHPH), 2) Forest 
Product Royalty or luran Hasil Hutan (IHH), which later became known as Forestry Resource 
Rent Provision or Provisi Sumber Daya Hutan (PSDH), and 3) Reforestation Fund OT Dana 
Reboisasi (DR). The Timber Concession Fee or IHPH is a one-off area-based fee payable at the 
time when the logging license is issued. Forest Resource Rent Provision or PSDH is a volume-
based royalty on each cubic meter of timber harvested. The Reforestation Fund OT DR is also a 
volume-based fee levied on each cubic meter of timber harvested. The DR was initially 
introduced as a refundable performance bond to encourage reforestation and rehabilitation 
activities, but later was specified as a non-refundable forest fee. The Central Government 
periodically (albeit not regularly) determines the size of the PSDH and DR fees, which vary 
according to the type and location of the timber harvested. 139 
. The same types of forestry taxes and fees continue to be applied to date. Most importantly, 
these taxes and fees also applied to timber produced under district licenses (Chapter 3). 
During the New Order period, several distinct features marked the administration and 
distribution of revenues from the forestry sector. To whom the revenues accrued is the fi rst 
feature. The Central Government secured a majority of the revenues from the forestry sector. 
However, compared to other natural resource sectors, regional governments received a 
comparatively larger portion of revenues from this sector (Table 4.1 ). 
The second feature relates to the legal instrument specifying the proportion of forestry 
revenues distributed to each level of government, which was determined through a Presidential 
Decree (Keputusan Presiden, Keppres). As explained in Appendix 2, a Presidential Decree has 
a lower legal standing than a Law or a Government Regulation. Thus the share of forestry 
revenues returned to producing regions was decided largely at the discretion of the President. 
During this period, the proportion of forestry revenues redistributed back to regions changed 
several times, as determined by Presidential Decrees. During 1968-1990, 70% of timber 
royalties (IHPH and IHH) went to provincial governments and the remaining 30% flowed to the 
Central Government. 04° Between 1990 and 2001, while the percentage of IHPH retained by 
"' For instance, at the time of writing, the PSOH rates were determined by Ministry of Industry 
and Trade's Decree 436 of 2004. Similarly at the time of writing the OR rates continue to be 
based on Government Regulation 92 of 1999. 
""Joint Decrees of Ministry of Home Affairs and Agriculture 20 of 1968 and 10/3 of 1968 (Surat 
keputusan Bersama Menteri Oa/am Negeri dan Menteri Pertanian No. 20 Tahun 1968 dan 
Keputusan No 1013 1968 (cited in Greenomics, 2004) 
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regional governments remained the same, the portion of IHH/PSDH redistributed to regional 
governments declined to 45 % (Table 4.1 ). 1• 1 
The third characteristic relates to the principal actor in the process of allocation and 
distribution of the regions' share of forestry revenues. The Ministry of Forestry as the technical 
department was responsible for calculating and determining the actual amount of the funds 
allocated to regions. 
The fourth feature underlines the insignificance of local governments' position (that is, 
districts and municipalities) vis-a-vis other levels of government with regard to the process of 
forestry revenue redistribution. During this period, districts were administratively the second 
tier of sub-national governments directly reporting to the province and had limited autonomy 
(Mokhsen, 2003). This position had a bearing on the actual flow of forestry revenue distribution 
to districts. The Central Government distributed the districts' share of forestry revenues 
indirectly through the provincial government. 1• 2 Most notably, the mechanisms for the process 
of allocation and distribution of forestry revenue transfers to districts were not clear and 
transparent. '0 The fifth feature invo lves the financial administration of forestry revenues in 
reference to the national budget. Revenues from this sector were not included in the s tate budget 
but were treated as off-budget funds and administered by the Ministry of Forestry. Thus, unlike 
the uses of funds in the national budget administered by the Ministry of Finance and requiring 
parliament's approval, the Ministry of Forestry had significant control and discretion over the 
use of the money. However, President Soeharto often used his power to direct the uses of 
forestry revenues (Ascher, 1998; Christanty and Atje, 2004). As a result, through Presidential 
Decrees, the DR Fund was used to finance non-forestry developments, including the national 
aeroplane industry and the one million hectare peatland Project in Central Kalimantan. 
In 1997, the government began to restructure the management of off-budget funds.,., Now 
non-tax revenues from natural resources, including forestry, are included in the state budget. 
However, the inclusion of the Reforestation Fund (DR) in the State Budget only began in 
1999. " 5 This means that the allocation of the use of forestry funds, both the IHH/PSDH and the 
DR, now has to go through the same mechanisms as other state budgetary funds. It requires the 
approval of the state legislature; moreover, the responsibility for their management has shifted 
from the Ministry of Forestry to the Ministry of Finance. 
'" Presidential Decree 30 of 1990 and Presidential Decree 67 of 1990 
'''Presidential Decree 30 of 1990 and Presidential Decree 67 of 1998 
"'See also, Kompas, 19 May 2004b 
'" Law 20 of 1997; relevant implementing regulations concerning forestry levies were 
Government Regulation 22of1997, Government Regulations Nos. 51 , 52, and 59 of 1998, and 
Government Regulation 7 4 of 1999 
'" Government Regulation 92 of 1999 
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4.3 Regional government finance after decentralisation 
Under decentralisation, provincial and local governments assumed much greater 
expenditure responsibilities (see also, Lewis, 2005). Districts, for instance, are now responsible 
for the provisions of services in the public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, 
communications, industry and trade, capital investment, environment, land, cooperatives, and 
labour sectors. 
The increased expenditure responsibilities of regional governments, however, have not 
been accompanied by the devolution of increased major tax bases. Law 34 of 2000 on the 
Amendments to Law 18 of 1997 on Regional Government Taxes and Charges continues to limit 
the kinds of taxes that regional governments can apply. Nevertheless, both provinces and 
districts/municipalities may collect various user charges and fees. Districts and municipalities 
arc now also allowed to create their own taxes through local bylaws (local regulations/PERDA), 
however, they are subject to cenain criteria and Central Government approval. 
The system of intergovernmental transfers was also significantly restructured and 
expanded, effectively beginning in 2001. Of particular interest to this thesis, regional 
governments now gained greater access to substantial amounts of natural resource revenues than 
previously. 
4.3.1 Sources of local government finances 
Law 25 of 1999 stipulated that regional governments (that is, provinces, districts, and 
municipalities) can 'obtain the funds needed to finance decentralisation from several sources: 
Balancing Funds (Dana Perimbangan), Regionally/locally Generated Revenues (PAD), 
Regional Borrowing (Pinjaman Daerah), and other legal sources of income. The following 
briefly describes the major components of each of these sources. 
Balancing Funds 
Law 25 of 1999 specified three types of Balancing Funds: 1) the General Allocation Fund 
(Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU); 2) the Specific Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK); 
and 3) shared revenues from land and natural resource taxes. 
The General Allocation Fund (DAU) 
DAU is the core of the new system of inter-governmental transfers. The DAU has 
effectively replaced the SDO and JNPRES Umum block grants (section 6.1) transferred during 
the pre-decentralisation period. The major difference is that now it is structured to favour 
districts over provinces. As with the SDO, the DAU is used to cover routine expenditures, 
particularly the salary of public servants. These funds are allocated from the national 
government budget according to a specified formula. 
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The Specific Allocation Fund - DAK 
This consists of revenues from the Central Government budget that are allocated to 
regional governments to assist in financing special needs. These include needs that cannot be 
predicted using the general allocation formula, unlike DAU, as they are specific to the needs of 
a particular region. The allocation of DAK from the central budget depends on the availability 
of fiscal resources. Of particular relevance to this chapter, Law 25 of 1999 specified that 40 
percent of the Reforestation Fund (DR) is to be allocated to regions and administered under the 
DAK (henceforth the DAK-DR). The remaining 60 percent is allocated to the Central 
Government. 
Shared Revenues from Land and Natural Resource Taxes 
In addition to the establishment of intergovernmental transfers through DAU and OAK, 
Law 25 of 1999 represented a major breakthrough in the distribution of natural resource rents 
among levels of governments. It modified the manner in which revenues from natural resource 
royalties, fees and land taxes are shared among the Central Government, provinces, districts, 
and municipalities. The magnitude of these revenues varied from the more modest Land and 
Building Tax (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan) and Transfer Fee on Land and Building Rights (Bea 
Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan) to the more substantial natural resource royalties, 
including those for forestry. The law also determined the percentage of revenues generated from 
the oil, gas, mining, forestry and fisheries sectors that would be distributed among the national, 
provincial, and district/municipal governments. 
Under this new system, the regions' share of natural resource royalties has increased 
significantly. In the oil and gas sectors, Jakarta now retains 85 percent and 70 percent of these 
royalties, respectively, compared to 100 percent during the pre-decentralisation period. In the 
forestry sector, 80 percent of both the Timber Concession Fee (IHPH) and the Forest Resource 
Rent Provision (PSDH) is now returned to the regions. With the IHPH fee, the 80 percent 
allocated to the regions is divided between the province (16 percent) and the 
district/municipality in which the timber is produced (64 percent). Similarly, the regions' share 
of the PSDH is divided among the province (16 percent), the producing district or municipality 
(32 percent), and among other districts or municipalities in the province (32 percent). Table 4.1 
shows the proportion of natural resource-derived revenues transferred back to regions prior to 
and under decentralisation. '46 
'"' Law 33 of 2004, which superseded Law 25 of 1999, did not change any of the natural 
resource revenue sharing arrangements. Beginning in 2005, however, the OAK-DR became 
part of revenue transfer, similar to the PSDH, but the distribution scheme remains the same 
(that is, 40% to regions, 60% to the Central Government). 
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Regionally or Locally-Generated Revenues - PAD 
Law 25 of 1999 emphasized that under decentralisation, each regional government is expected 
to secure a proportion of its income from Regionally or Locally Generated Revenues, 
Pendapatan Asli Daerah or PAD. This category refers to the revenues that a regional 
government can directly raise from within its own jurisdiction, as opposed to transfers from the 
Central Government or other external sources. The law distinguished three major sources o.f 
PAD: regional taxes, regional levies, and revenues from regional government enterprises 
(Sadan Usaha Milik Daerah, BUMD). 
Regional Borrowing 
Law 25 of 1999 authorized regional governments to seek funding through borrowing 
schemes. 147 However, it allowed regional governments to borrow funds from foreign sources 
only through the Central Government. 
Other Legal Sources of Income 
The last category of revenue sources available to regional governments pertains to emergency 
situations. In cases where regional governments face sudden and unforeseen budgetary needs, 
Law 25 of 1999 stipulated that emergency funds may be made available from the national 
government budget. 
'" Regulations and procedures related to regional borrowing were further specified in 
Government Regulation 107 of 2000 on Regional Borrowing 
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Table 4.1 Tax and Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Sche.me between Central 
and Sub-national Governments before and under Decentralisation 14' 
( % of allocation) 
Source Pre-decentralization Decentralization 
CG PG LG CG PG RPLG OLGP OLG 
Land and Building 10 16 64 16 64 (+) + 
tax
1
'' 
Land and building 20 16 64 16 64 (+) + 
transfer fee 150 
Income tax 100 80 8 12 
Oil 100 85 3 6 6 
LNG 100 70 6 12 12 
Mining-land rent 20 16 64 20 16 64 
Mining-royalty 20 16 64 20 16 32 32 
Timber Concession 30 56 14151 20 16 64 
Fee (IHPH) 
Forest Resource 
Rent provision 55 30 15 m 20 16 32 32 
(PSDH) 
Reforestation Fund 100 60 40 
Fishery Not 
clear 20 80 
Source: Presidential Decree 30 of 1990; Government Regulation 79 of 1992; Presidential 
Decree 67 of 1998; Shah and Qureshi, 1994; Law 25 of 1999; Government Regulation 104 of 
2000; Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan Dacrah, 2004 
Note: CG: Central Government, PG: provincial governments; LG: local governments; RPLG: 
resources-producing local governments; OLGP: other local governments in the province; 
OLG: all other local governments. 
The new fiscal arrangement between the Centre and the regions changed the structure of 
local government revenues. During the first two years of decentralisation, for instance, on 
1
'' The proportions of natural resource revenues redistributed to the provinces of Aceh and 
Papua follow a ditterent scheme. These are stipulated in Law 18 of 2001 on Aceh Special 
Autonomy and Law 21 of 2001 on Papua Special Autonomy. 
" ' Land and Building Tax: 9% of the 90% of regional governments' share is allocated for 
collection costs and distributed to state and local government treasuries; Central Government's 
share is distributed to all districts and municipalities across Indonesia (65% distributed evenly to 
districts and municipalities across Indonesia, 35% as incentives for districts and municipalities 
that have exceeded their land tax revenue target) (articles 2 and 4 of Government Regulation 
104 of 2000). 
150 Land and building transfer fee: Central Government's share is distributed evenly to all districts 
and municipalities across Indonesia (article 7 of Government Regulation 104 of 2000). 
1
" 70% of the IHPH were transferred to provincial governments; local governments receive 20% 
of revenues received by the province (Shah and Qureshi, 1994:46). 
1
" 15% of the 45% regional share was to be used for financing the development of districts 
(Presidential Decree 30 of 1990 and Presidential Decree 67 of 1998). 
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average, shared revenue became significantly more important. Revenue from all types of shared 
sources increased from an annual average of 14% during 1999/2000 to 23% in 2002, 
respectively (Lewis, 2005). Central grants (now in the form of DAU and DAK) continued to 
make up the bulk of district government revenues, decreasing slightly from 76% in 1999/2000 
to 69% in 2002. Conversely, PAD has, on average, become relatively less important to districts, 
declining to 8 percent in 2002 from 10% in 1999/2000. 
The new revenue sharing arrangement provided resource-rich areas with access to 
increases in Central transfers. The relevance of the change in fiscal powers for the two case 
study districts is more pronounced because they are located in East Kalimantan, a province rich 
with natural resources, notably oil and gas, and the districts themselves are endowed with 
substantial tracts of forests (sections 1.5.4 and 2.4.2). For the two districts, therefore, the 
increased share of natural resource revenue has meant an increase in revenue not only from 
forests, but also from the oil, gas, and mining sectors. As this thesis is concerned about the 
forestry sector, the following sections focus on the two districts' forestry-derived revenues. 
4.3.2 The significance of forestry-derived revenues for the case 
study districts 
Forestry-derived revenues consti tute a significant portion of the two districts' budget. The 
importance of natural resource revenue transfers under decentralisation for the two districts is 
reflected in the district budget (Table 4.2). For example, natural resource transfer constituted 
43%, 47%, 49% of Bulungan's entire budget in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. Similarly, 
natural resource transfer was 56%, 41%, and 46% of Kutai Barat's budget for 2001, 2002, and 
2003, respectively. Forestry transfers in these three consecutive years were 5.4%, 2.5%, and 
10% of Bulungan's budget, respectively, and translated into 21, 10, and 51 billion rupiahs or 
equivalent to 2.3, 1.1 , and 5.7 million USD. 15' For Kutai Barat, forestry transfers were higher, 
40, 19, and 91 billion rupiah or 4.4, 2.1, and 10.1 million USD for 2001 , 2002, and 2003, 
respectively. Districts' share of forestry revenues came from forestry fees and royalties for 
timber produced under both centrally-licensed HPHs and district licenses. 
"
3 Calculated at exchange rate of 9,000 rupiah per USO 
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Table 4.2 The significance of natural resource-derived revenues in district 
finances (in percentage)"' 
Bulungan District ( % ) Kutai Barat District ( % ) 
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
Forestry PADffotal 74 8 15 25 46 22 
District PAD 
Forestry PADffotal 4 0.4 0.6 0.5 3 0.8 
District Revenue 
Total PADffotal 5.5 4.4 4. 1 1.9 6.7 3.8 
District Revenue 
Forestry Revenue 12.4 5.3 20.5 19 9 30 
Transferffotal NR 
Transfer 
Forestry Revenue 5.4 2.5 10 I I 4 14 
Tra nsferffotal 
Distr ict Revenue 
Total Forestry 8.7 5.4 12.7 11.3 6.7 14.4 
Revenuerrotal 
District Revenue 
Mining Revenue 4.6 7 6.7 5 12 11 
Transferffotal NR 
Transfer 
Mining Revenue 2 3.3 3.3 3 5 5 
Transferrrotal 
District Revenue 
Oil&Gas 83 87,7 72,8 76 79 59 
Tra nsferffotal NR 
Transfer 
Oil&Gas 36 4 1 36 43 33 27 
Tra nsferffotal 
District Revenue 
Total NR Revenue 43.5 46.8 48.9 56 41 46 
Transferffotal 
District Revenue 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by revenue offices of Bulungan and Kutai Barat 
Districts. 
Notes: 
1. PAD: Pendapatan Asli Daerah or Locally Generated Revenues; NR=Natural Resource 
2 . The Reforestation Fund (the OAK-DR) is formally given a specific category, the 
Specific Allocation Fund, and included as part of the Balancing Funds (see section 4.3.1 ). 
However, to reflect the actual forestry fees and royalties redistributed to districts, and 
because it is effec tively a form of shared revenues, in the calculations of Table 4.2 the 
OAK-DR is included as a Natural Resource Revenue transfer. 
"' The circumstances of both districts render the documentation of their revenues prior to this 
period either unavailable or irrelevant. The district of Kutai Baral was only formally established 
in late 1999 and was led by a temporary Bupati until his election in 2001. As a result, data 
repositories during the 1999 and 2000 transition years were often scattered between the original 
district of Kutai lnduk and the new district of Kutai Baral. Bulungan District has become much 
smaller than the original Bulungan. Its partitioning in 1999 therefore renders the comparison of 
district revenue prior to this period with the decentralisation period largely irrelevant. 
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4.3.3 The contribution of forestry revenues for timber produced 
under district licenses: the double standard of legality 
As noted in section 4.2, timber produced under district licenses was also subject to the 
same forestry taxes and fees; the most significant and levied on a continuous basis are the 
PSDH and DR. In this respect, one notable issue involving revenues generated from timber 
operations under district logging licenses has been related to the uncertainty over their legality. 
The Ministry of Forestry in effect applied a double standard to these licenses. While at different 
points in time it regarded them as illegal, it still applied forestry taxes and fees to timber 
produced under these licenses. 
District government officials complained that the Central and provincial governments were 
inconsistent in their action with respect to how the latter have regarded district licenses on the 
one hand, and how they have, on the other hand, extracted forestry fees for timber produced by 
activities under the very same district licenses. iss National and provincial governments were 
adamant that district licenses and thus the associated timber activities throughout a certain 
period (Chapter 3) were in contravention of higher regulations or policies, and therefore 
illegal. is6 However, the same governments nevertheless accepted and continued to enjoy their 
share of forestry royalty and fees paid for timber produced under these licenses. As illustrated in 
Table 4.1, the national government by default receives a 20% share of PSDH revenues and 60% 
of DR revenues. Provincial governments have the right to 16% of PSDH revenues derived from 
companies operating in their respective jurisdictions. 
Table 4.3 shows the amount of PSDH and DR payments from timber produced under Kutai 
Barat's small-scale timber licenses and, following the formula specified by Law 25 of 1999, 
how much of this amount would have contributed to the national coffers. In 2003, Kutai Barat's 
small-scale licenses alone contributed more than 8 million USD in DR earnings to the Central 
Government. In the same year, both the Central and Provincial governments each received 
nearly I million and 800 thousand USD from PSDH funds, respectively. 
"' For instance, interview with a senior official of Bulungan District Forestry Service, B-G-16 
,,. For instance, interview with B-G-3 
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T bl 4 3 PSDH d DR a e . an II I di t i tr t f paymen s rom sma -sea e src 1censes, K t . B u a1 ara 
Year PSDH (USD) DR (USD) Central Central Provincial 
Government Government Government 
Share of Share of DR Share of 
PSDH (USD) (USD) PSDH 
(USD) 
2001 4,295,639 9,709,850 859,128 5,825,910 687,302 
2002 3, 123,176 6,586,812 624,635 3,952,087 499,708 
2003 4,944,734 14,357,171 988,947 8,614,303 791,1 57 
2004 (as 320,725 927,273.3 l 64,145 556,364 51,316 
of 
March) 
Source: Kutai Barat District Forestry Service, 2004. Laporan Realisasi Penerimaan /uran 
Kehutanan (LRPIK) for HPHHs, HPHHKs, IUPHHKs, and HPHs 
DR payments from timber operations under district licenses did make up a proportion of 
DR revenue accumulated in the national account. This apparently continued at least through the 
beginning of 2005, or nearly three years after regional/local licenses should have ceased to be 
issued legally. is'Three different sources supported this fact. Firstly, a list of DR payments made 
to the Ministry of Forestry' s account in Bank Mandiri shows that many of the 2004 payments 
were made by cooperatives and non-HPHs (that means mostly by companies operating under 
district or, in the case of Papua, provincial licenses). 158 Secondly, at a meeting in mid July 2004 
in Jakarta , one MOF official in the unit responsible for the calculation of forestry revenues 
ad milled that around 50% of forestry royalty payments made to the Ministry of Forestry's 
account comprises forestry fees obligations for timber produced under district or provincial (in 
the case of Papua) logging licenses. The official further acknowledged that by accepting these 
payments, the Ministry of Forestry in effect has been ambivalent towards activities they 
themselves consider illegal, turning a blind eye to such activities, or at the very least not 
discouraging them. 159 Thirdly, the contention between the Ministry of Forestry and the Governor 
of Papua over the legality (or rather, illegality) of hundreds of Papua's licenses at least until 
2005 (section 3.2.2) has led to the Ministry of Forestry's admission that it did receive a huge 
'" Regional licenses refer mostly to district licenses. However, in the case of Papua, consistent 
with the Special Autonomy status of the province, logging licenses were issued by the 
Governor, rather than by the Bupatis. 
"' A copy of a partial list of the payors and payments made to the Ministry of Forestry's DR 
account in Bank Mandiri was obtained. 
'" Disclosed at a meeting held at the Ministry of Forestry on July 6, 2004. The exact period over 
which this trend occurred was not mentioned. 
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amount of forestry fees from timber operations under licenses issued by the Governor of 
Papua. 160 However, the MOF argued that the Ministry had no way of knowing that these 
payments were made unc;ier "illegal" licenses. 
For district governments, the size of these monies underscores the importance of the 
accuracy of the allocation, that is, following their interpretation of the formula specified in Law 
25 of 1999. Districts expect that they will receive a share commensurate with the percentage of 
the payments made for timber produced in each district's jurisdiction. 
The importance of forestry revenue transfers to the district budget has meant that it is in 
the best interest of districts to monitor the level of transfers and to receive them early in the 
budget year. As depicted in Table 4.1, Law 25 of 1999 and its implementing regulations 
explicitly defined the respective percentage share of natural resource revenues to each level of 
government. Despite this predefined share, to the discontent of local governments, procedural 
and operational complexities have coloured the implementation of their transfer. The following 
section describes the process of allocation and distribution of forestry revenue transfers and the 
issues surrounding their implementation in the two districts. 161 
4.4 The implementation of forest revenue transfers 
under decentralisation 
Law 25 of 1999 guaranteed that a certain pre-specified proportion of forestry-derived 
revenues would be returned to local governments as shared revenue. Despite this guarantee, 
however, the implementation of the processes of allocation and distribution of forestry revenue 
share to regions has placed local governments at a disadvantage. The process of their attainment 
has involved yet another "struggle" on the part of district governments. This section illustrates 
the struggle of district governments in their attempts to obtain - as they see it - a "more proper 
and prompt share" of forestry revenues. 
The two local governments studied are concerned about the actual process of allocation 
and distribution of natural resource revenue transfers, in particular with regard to their accuracy 
and timing. During 2001-2003, the disbursement of the funds was usually late or delayed, often 
well into the budget year. These untimely disbursements were not their highest concern, 
however, because district officials believe that they are legally entitled to these transfers and 
were therefore confident that the funds would eventually get transferred. The more important 
1
"" Tempo /nteraktif, 23 March, 2005 and Media Indonesia, 22 March, 2005 
1
•
1 There are some similarities as well as differences with regard to the implementation of 
revenue sharing in the oil and gas and the mining sectors. For instance, in November 2006 coal 
producing districts formed the Association of Coal Producing Districts (Asosiasi Kabupaten 
Penghasil Batubara). This association was established to boost the districts' bargaining power 
with the National Government. Districts perceive that although the formulae for the calculation 
and the allocation of mining royalties are specified, they have actually received less than their 
entitlement. The association demands that the mechanisms for the allocation be made clearer 
(Noe, 2006). 
96 
issue has revolved around districts' perception of the accuracy of the amount transferred. 
District governments are not confident that the transfers are accurate and perceive that they 
might have in fact received a smaller share than their entitlement. This perception is shared by 
other districts in the country, highlighted in the national meeting of the Association of District 
Governments as one of the issues to be taken to the Central Government (APKASI, 2003). 162 As 
these transfers make up a significant portion of districts' finances, their unpredictability, that is, 
the uncertainty about when districts would receive the actual funds and how much, complicates 
the planning and management of districts' budget and potentially undermines the 
implementation of districts' programs. This section focuses on the two largest types of forestry-
dcrived revenue transfers, the PSDH and the DR. 163 
The major issue in districts' disquiet over the process of forest revenue sharing has been 
the non-transparent process of allocation of their share and its distribution to districts. The two 
major actors involved in the process are two Central Ministries: the Ministry of Forestry and the 
Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Forestry as the technical ministry identifies the size of 
each district's contribution and calculates each district's allocation. Based on the Ministry of 
Forestry's calculations, the Ministry of Finance disburses these monies to districts. 
District governments are not involved in the process and there are no systematic or 
transparent ways for districts to find out their respective contribution, whether the contribution 
of each district is recorded accurately, the size of the districts' allocations, and whether in the 
end they actually received their entire allocation. The Provincial Forestry Service, however, as 
the arm of the Central Government carrying the deconcentration function (Figure A.2.3 in 
Appendix 2) has some involvement in the process, although it has no influence over it. 
The lack of transparency in this process has led to districts perceiving that intervention can 
be made in the process of forestry revenue allocation and distribution, to the benefit of the 
districts. The two district governments thus have taken steps to intervene in the process by 
approaching the relevant national actors informally. 
4.4.1 The process of determining the origins and size of 
forestry fees 
The process of allocation of forestry revenue transfers during 2001-2004 was as follows. 
Each year, the Ministry of Forestry (MOF) provides estimates of regions' (that is, provincial, 
district, and municipality) portions of the PSDH and DR (as specified in Table 4. l) to the 
Ministry of Finance (MOFIN) based on projected PSDH and DR receipts from each province. 
"'During APKASl's national annual meeting in 2003, this issue was raised as one of the 
important issues facing district governments under regional autonomy. APKASI is the 
Association of District Governments across Indonesia. 
,., The third type of forestry-derived revenues is obtained from the Timber Concession Fee or 
luran Hak Pengusahaan Hutan (IHPH) payments (section 4.2). As this is a one-off fee applied to 
new licenses, it does not provide an ongoing or continuous income for the state. 
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These estimates are made based on the projected volume of timber harvested in the Annual 
Cutting Plan (RKT), and therefore may not be the actual figures allocated to regions, and may 
be adjusted later in the year. 
The actual annual PSDH and DR allocation for regions is determined by the Ministry of 
Forestry based on the actual payment receipts. 164 The process begins by identifying the origin 
and size of timber payments. Specifically, this involves the identification of how much of each 
type of timber fee (that is, either PSDH or DR) was paid, by which timber companies and in 
which jurisdiction these timber companies operate. The total receipts from a particular type of 
timber fee originating from a particular district would then be used to calculate that district's 
share and that of other districts/municipalities within the province, of that type of revenue. For 
instance, following the revenue sharing formula presented in Table 4.1, a producing district 
such as Kutai Barat gets 32% of the total PSDH payment made by timber companies operating 
in the district, while other districts in the same province, such as Bulungan, share the remaining 
32% of the payments equally among them. Similarly, as a producing district, Bulungan gets 
32% of the entire PSDH payment by timber companies operating in the district, while other 
districts in the same province, such as Kutai Baral, share the remaining 32% of the payments 
equally among them. For an accurate estimate of a particular district's entitlement over forestry 
revenue transfer, therefore, a particular district needs not only to maintain data on payments 
made by timber companies operating in that district, but also needs to obtain data on payments 
made by timber companies operating in all of the (timber) producing districts in the province. 
Neither of these is an easy task. 
The procedures for and administration of the payment of forestry 
fees 
The collection of forestry royalties is an ongoing problem in Indonesia. For instance, 
unpaid 2003 DR and PSDH .obligations reached 1.28 trillion rupiah (142 million USD) (Tempo 
Interaktif, 12 July 2004). Of this amount, 785 billion rupiah (87 million USO) were debts owed 
by 65 HPH holders, each debt amounting to 5 billion rupiah (0.6 million USD), suggesting the 
magnitude of debts accumulated by individual companies. By July 2004, the Ministry of 
Forestry was able to collect only half of this amount. ln June 2005, deferred PSDH and DR 
payments amounted to nearly 480 billion rupiah (53 million USO) (Kompas, 24 June, 2005). To 
a significant extent, this can be attributed to the procedures of these payments, prompting the 
Ministry to look for ways to improve the processes. 
, .. Letter of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Forestry to Provincial Forestry Services No. 
2176/11-AEN/2002 and interview with a senior official at the Ministry of Finance, N-G-1 0. 
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The methods of collection of forestry fees and royalties prior to decentralisation 
Two notable issues involving the procedure for forestry royalty payments in the period 
prior to 1999 are identified. The first relates to how timber companies' forestry royalty 
obligations were determined. Payments of PSDH and DR were made based on self-assessment: 
timber companies were trusted to calculate and determine their forestry royalty/fee obligations 
themselves. 161 This policy was intended to cut down on bureaucratic procedures and make the 
process more efficient (Greenomics, 2004). 
The second issue concerns the absence of a working system that would ensure that forestry 
royalty obligations were met. Royalties were calculated and due after harvest, but there were no 
administrative procedures to make sure that the fees were actually paid. The administrative 
procedure prior to the marketing of harvested timber concerns the transportation of timber from 
its place of origin to destination. To be considered legal, the movement of timber had to be 
accompanied by a timber transport document, called SAKB. 166 This document, as the calculation 
of the obligatory forestry payment, was also issued by the timber companies themselves. 
However, self-assessment of timber royalty and self-issuance of timber transport documents 
were often abused (Greenomics, 2004). They encouraged extensive exploitation and deviations 
between actual production and those reported and in the calculation of forestry royalty 
obligations. During this period, it was also legal and possible for companies, with interest, to 
defer the payment of PSDH and DR obligations until after the timber was transported out and 
marketed. The issuance of SAKB as the last administrative "guard" was not linked to the 
fulfilment of PSDH and DR payment obligations. This resulted in the Government having very 
little control over the actual receipts of PSDH and DR payments. 
The methods of collection of forestry fees and royalties after decentralisation 
In 1999, the Ministry of Forestry revised its policy on the issuance of SAKE and linked it 
to forestry royalty obligations. 167 This transport document was now no longer issued by timber 
companies themselves, but by a designated Ministry of Forestry official. Furthermore, now the 
amounts of PSDH and DR due were determined based on a Timber Production Report or LHP 
(Laporan Hasil Produksi) , a report providing details of the types and volumes of a particular 
timber harvest, which had to be verified by an appointed Ministry of Forestry official. This 
revised policy specified that the timber royalty must be paid before the timber could be moved 
16
' The foundations and guidelines for self-assessment method for PSDH/IHH were laid out in 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 403 of 1990, Ministry of Forestry Decree 613 of 1992, Ministry of 
Forestry Decree 271 of 1993 and Ministry of Forestry Decree 358 of 1996 (cited in Greenomics, 
2004). The following Forestry Ministerial Decrees laid out the foundation and guidelines for the 
self-assessment of DR payments: Ministry of Forestry Decree 404 of 1990, Ministry of Forestry 
Decree 614 of 1992, Ministry of Forestry Decree 272 of 1993 and Ministry of Forestry Decree 
359 of 1996 (cited in Greenomics, 2004). 
166 The transport document for processed timber was referred as SAKO, Surat Angkutan Kayu 
Olahan. 
16
' Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 316 of 1999 
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from the area of harvest to its destination. This means that they must be paid prior to the 
issuance of the SAKB. Thus the issuance of the SAKB served as a way of ensuring that the 
obligation to pay timber fees is fulfilled. 
In May 2000, SAKB and SAKO documents were replaced with a single timber transport 
document, known as the Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan or SKSHH (see also section 
3.5.2). Similar to its predecessor (the SAKB), the SKSHH is issued by a designated MOF 
official. The designated official was appointed by the head of the Kanwil (Forestry Regional 
Office) (Figure A2.2), the coordinating forestry office reporting directly to the Ministry of 
Forestry in Jakarta. 168 After the abolition of the Kanwil, the Provincial Forestry Service took 
over the task of appointing the SKSHH official. 
Apparently, however, in practice it was a different story. The LHP was verified 169 by a 
designated forestry official, but the fulfilment of PSDH and DR payments was not required for 
the issuance of SKSHH. Until at least the end of 2003, it was common for centrally-licensed 
HPH companies to defer actual payment of their PSDH and DR obligations for at least one 
month after the SKSHH was issued. 110 However, many HPH holders deferred payment for long 
periods of time, in particular after the 1997-1998 economic crises. The official procedure 
allowed HPH holders to defer their PSDH and DR payments with a 2% interest. However, 
SKSHHs were often issued regardless of the status of the PSDH and DR; such issuance usually 
involved some "informal transactions" (section 6.3.2).111 
In April 2003, apparently triggered by the enormous accumulation of unpaid or deferred 
PSDH and DR obligations, the Ministry of Forestry attempted a major overhaul of its policies 
regarding these payments. As described in section 4.2, by this time the PSDH and DR revenues 
were now managed as part of the national budget under the Ministry of Finance. This means 
that the size of PSDH and DR revenues collected (or uncollected) would be more open to 
external scrutiny. In April 2003 the Ministry of Forestry simultaneously issued a set of decrees 
requiring: I) that all timber companies must pay any deferred PSDH and DR owed before their 
next year's felling allowance (specified in the RKT) was granted; 2) timber companies must 
now pay PSDH and DR in advance of the granting of the next year's entire felling quota based 
on stock estimates (ULHC). 172 
"
8 The Kanwi/ was abolished shortly thereafter, as a consequence of the decentralisation law 
(see Appendix 2) 
... Officially, a minimum of 10% of the entire volume of timber is actually checked. 
"
0 lnteNiews with staff of a HPH, B-P-1; senior Bulungan UPTD official, 8-G-26; Kutai 8arat's 
official, K-G-20; and a senior APHI official, P-8-1 
"
1 Interview with P-8-1. The abuse of SKSHH was commonly reported across Indonesia and 
acknowledged by the Ministry of Forestry (for instance, Ministry of Forestry, 2005b). 
1
" Ministry of Forestry Decree 124 of 2003, Ministry of Forestry Decree 126 of 2003, and 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 128 of 2003. These decrees were effective retrospectively to 
January 1, 2003. 
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One of the decrees also placed a district forestry official, rather than a provincial staff 
member, in charge of the verification of the LHP. District officials of both case study districts 
saw this as bringing with it an increased authority in the forestry sector. 173 Later, the verification 
of LHP proved to be an important step required for the issuance of the SKSHH, as the PSDH 
and DR were required to be paid after and based on the verified LI-IP. 
The provisions of the decrees requiring prepayment of PSDH and DR were strongly 
opposed by timber companies and Governors. The latter were in charge of issuing the RKTs, 
thus have an interest in the matter. One of the major arguments was that companies' limited 
cash flow would not allow for a one-off payment of PSDH and DR for the entire stock 
estimates. The second major argument was that PSDH and DR payments made based on timber 
stock estimates would not be accurate because the estimates do not necessarily reflect the actual 
timber cut. The Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires (Asosiasi Pengusaha Rutan 
Indonesia, APHI) also lobbied the Ministry of Forestry to revise this policy. In December 2003, 
due to the strong opposition, the Ministry eased its policy by changing the requirement of PSDH 
and DR payments to be made after a certain volume of timber is felled and only for that 
particular volume of timber. However, proof of payment of PSDH and DR is now required prior 
to the issuance of the SKSHH. Although the requirements in the December 2003 policy change 
were more lenient than the intentions of the April 2003 policy, it was nevertheless a major step to 
ensure that the royalties for state assets are actually paid. A similar procedure had been 
attempted earlier through a 1999 Ministerial Decree, but had failed to occur in practice, in 
particular in relation to HPH holders. 
From the point of view of the Central and provincial governments, the major purpose for 
the issuance of the SKSHH is to serve as "the last guard" for the monitoring and control of 
timber production. '" The document is the final requirement in timber administration after the 
timber is harvested and before it is marketed. The stated objective is to ensure that the timber 
harvested and transported out of a district has been produced under a legal license. 175 
Since 2003 (for HPH holders in practice it began in 2004), the SKSHH set of documents 
has also functioned as a means of control over forestry royalty obligations. With the issuance of 
SKSHH now being subject to the payment of the due PSDH and DR fees, the appointment of 
officials responsible for the issuance of the SKSHH comes to the fore. To maintain control, the 
Ministry of Forestry stipulates that each official in charge of the issuance of the SKSHH is 
designated by the Provincial Forestry Service. 176 Note also that under decentralisation, the 
province (and therefore the units within the province) has dual functions: as an autonomous 
government but also as an arm of the Centre (that is, carrying its dcconcentration function). 
"' Interviews with 8-G-Sa and K-G-3b 
'" Interviews with P-G-5 and K-G-21 
"' Ministry of Forestry Decree 126 of 2003 
"' Ministry of Forestry Decree 126 of 2003 
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The administration of forestry payments in the two case study districts 
As described in Appendix 2, for most districts, as in Bulungan, there are two forestry 
offices operating at the district level: the District Forestry Service and the technical 
implementation unit of the Provincial Forestry Service, Unit Pelaksana Teknis Dinas (UPTD). 
The staff of the District Forestry Service ultimately reports to the Bupati, while the staff of the 
UPTD are responsible to the Provincial Forestry Service and ultimately to the Governor. The 
responsibilities of these two forestry units are not clear-cut; there are some overlaps and both 
units are competing for authority. The District Forestry Service has been responsible for 
administering some of the day-to-day operations of timber companies/logging activities, mostly 
those operating under district licenses. The UPTD is responsible for the administration of the 
operations of centrally- licensed logging companies (HPH). However, most importantly, the 
administration of the SKSHH documents for all timber produced in the district, by companies 
operating both under district and Central licenses, has been handled by the UPTD. This means 
that the official designated to issue the SKSHH document works for the Provincial Forestry 
Service and is on the provincial government's payroll. 
Kutai Barat, on the other hand, being a new district partitioned from an original district that 
took part in an earlier pilot project on decentralisation, does not have a UPTD. All forestry 
administration at the district level is handled by one unit, the District Forestry Service. As in 
Bulungan, the District Forestry Service is a district unit responsible to the Bupati. However, the 
official in charge of the SKSHH document, although assigned by the Provincial Forestry 
Service, is on the district's payroll. This is a notable difference from the situation of Bulungan. 
In the case of districts with no UPTD such as Kutai Baral, the Provincial Forestry Service has to 
appoint staff from the District Forestry Service as the official in charge for the issuance of the 
SKSHH. The Provincial Forestry Service thus makes sure that it chooses individuals with a 
track record of some degree of loyalty to the province. For instance, the official designated for 
the issuance of the SKSHH in Kutai Barat was previously a staff member in the branch of the 
Provincial Forestry Service (Cabang Dinas Kehutanan, CDK) (Figure A.2.2) and was known to 
have good personal relationship with officials in the Provincial Forestry Service in Samarinda. 
CD Ks were abolished after decentralisation (Figure A.2.3) 
Apparently, the 1999 policy requiring the fulfilment of PSDH and DR obligations prior to 
the granting of the timber transport document (then SAKB but in 2000 became SKSHH) was 
not enforced or was unenforceable on timber produced from HPH holders; however, district-
licensed operators were required to pay their PSDH and DR fees before their timber transport 
document was issued. "' In Kutai Baral, the timely payment of PSDH and DR obligations from 
'" Interview with B-G-8a; personal communication with FS, a forestry official of Kutai Baral, 28 
January 2006; Kutai Baral government's documents. Ministry of Forestry Decree 124 of 2003, 
Ministry of Forestry 128 of 2003, Ministry of Forestry Decree 445 of 2003, and Ministry of 
Forestry Decree 446 of 2003. 
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timber felled under district licenses appears to have been more strictly enforced from the 
beginning and even prior to 2003. For instance, Kutai Barat's documents suggest that proof of 
payment of PSDH and DR for district-licensed timber harvesting carried out in 2002 was one of 
the considerations for the issuance of the SKSHH document. 
This requirement suggests that the district was very much interested in making sure that 
timber harvested under district licenses was regarded as legal and the legal procedures set up by 
the Centre were followed. In the case of Kutai Barat, all forestry administration under district 
licenses, from the issuance of the logging license and administration of logging activities to the 
issuance of SKSHH, was handled by the District Forestry Service. Thus, the district government 
had the sole authority and power over district-licensed operators from the beginning to the end. 
It exercised its power by requiring these operators to make their PSDH and DR payments to 
obtain their SKSHH, thereby following the Ministry of Forestry's 1999 and 2003 policies. This 
reinforces the analysis in Chapter 3: districts, as much as possible, do attempt to operate within 
legal boundaries. 
In the case of Bulungan, because the SKSHH document is issued by the UPTD, rather than 
by the District Forestry Service, the district lacked control over the payment of PSDH and DR 
obligations not only for timber produced under Central licenses, but also for those harvested 
under district licenses. By contrast, this was where the UPTD, a provincial forestry unit at the 
district level, exercised power over timber companies operating under district licenses. Because 
SKSHH is the document that officially distinguishes legal from illegal timber, it was in the 
interest of district timber operators to obtain this document. They therefore placed priority on 
the fulfilment of PSDH and DR obligations, rather than on district-imposed fees. 
Both arrangements, however, provided room for the abuse of office. The issuance of the 
SKSHH document has been commonly associated with informal payment to relevant officials 
(section 6.3.2), because of its importance in terms of the legal status of the timber. 118 
Reporting of forestry royalty payments 
Although there was no explicit hierarchical relationship between the Provincial Forestry 
Service and the District Forestry Service, the former played an important role in the 
administration of forestry fees and royalties. 
The case of Bulungan: the consequences of duality of fores t1y administration 
The existence of UPTD in Bulungan resulted in difficulties of access to PSDH and DR 
data leading to incompleteness or inaccuracy of PSDH and DR attributed to the district as the 
producing area. 
"' Interviews with B-P-8; P-B-1 
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The procedures for payment of forestry royalty presented above illustrate the role of 
UPTD, as the provincial forestry unit operating in Bulungan, in the administration of data 
concerning PSDH and DR payments under decentralisation. Consequently, reports to the 
Provincial Forestry Service of forestry revenue contributions from Bulungan were the 
responsibility of the UPTD. This has continued to the date of writing (2007). The requirement 
. for the payment of PSDH and DR prior to the issuance of SKSHH strengthens the control of 
provinces over both timber production and forestry payments. 
To monitor the forestry revenue sharing process, district governments must maintain data 
on forestry royalty payments for timber harvested in their jurisdiction. Because the 
administration of SKSHH in Bulungan is handled by the UPTD, the district has to rely on the 
UPTD to supply data on PSDH and DR payments for timber produced in the district vital for the 
monitoring of district's share of forestry revenues. These data include both timber produced by 
companies operating under HPHs but also, at least up until 2004, all data on PSDH and DR 
payments made by district-licensed timber operators. 019 This dual administrative arrangement, 
that is, the co-existence of two forestry units at the district level, poses a constraint to 
Bulungan's effective record-keeping of its overall timber production data and the timber's 
associated PSDH and DR payments because it is largely dependent on the cooperation of the 
UPTD. 
The existence of two forestry units at the district level, however, added another step to the 
process recording forestry payments. Critically, the UPTD office issues the SKSHH document, 
including that produced under district licenses. District officials thus needed to interact with the 
UPTD office for two purposes: 1) to reconcile the district's data on timber produced and the 
associated royalty paid under district licenses with that recorded by the UPTD as part of the 
SKSHH set of documents, and 2) to obtain data on how much timber royalties were paid for 
timber produced by centrally-licensed HPH concessions operating within the district's 
jurisdiction. 
Another difficulty associated with the co-existence of UPTD has had to do with the 
jurisdictions of the UPTD offices. UPTD offices handle forestry matters according to 
watersheds, rather than administrative boundaries. '80 This arrangement has resulted in the 
admi.nistration of some of the timber produced in Bulungan by yet another UPTD office located 
in the neighbouring municipality, Tarakan. Therefore, to obtain the complete data on forestry 
royalties for all the timber produced in the district, Bulungan is not only dependent on the 
UPTD office operating in the district, but also on the UPTD office located in Tarakan 
municipality. All UPTD officials however, are on the provincial payroll and therefore do not 
care whether or not forestry royalty payments are accurately attributed to each district 
"' As described in Chapter 3, district-licensed small-scale logging should have formally stopped 
by 2004, but at the time of fieldwork, some have actually continued to operate. 
"
0 Interview with B-G-16 
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administered within their unit. Furthermore, as noted above, the province's share of forestry 
revenue ultimately depends only on the total forestry royalty and fees paid for timber produced 
within the province and does not depend on the specific contributions of each district and 
municipality within the province. Therefore, the provincial officials lack the incentives to 
ensure that the origins of forestry royalty payments (that is, from which district or municipality) 
are accurately reflected in their data. Provincial officials' main concern is only to make sure that 
all forestry royalty payments from every district and municipality within the province are duly 
recorded as originating from that province. 
The district government's need to obtain data from UPTD offices necessitates a good 
relationship between them. Personal relationships that had existed prior to decentralisation 
between the head of the District Forestry Service and the head of the UPTD in Bulungan - both 
had worked for the branch office of the Provincial Forestry Service in the original Bulungan 
District (see also section 3.5. I ) - made forestry data sharing, including on forestry royalty 
payments, possible. The Bulungan-based UPTD also routinely forwards a summary report of 
PSDH and DR payments to the District Revenue Office.'" The relationship between Bulungan 
District Forestry Service and the UPTD positioned in Tarakan, however, was less amicable. 182 
According to a senior official at the District Forestry Service, they have had to "beg" to obtain 
data on timber produced in Bulungan and its corresponding PSDH and DR payments recorded 
by this particular UPTD. m 
The case of Kutai Ba rat: the consequences of provincial administration of HP Hs and 
geographical location 
Kutai Barat did not have to address the issues facing Bulungan of dual forestry 
administration but had other, no less important, concerns. In the case of Kutai Baral, because 
the District Forestry Service is the only forestry unit operating in the district, data on timber 
production and the corresponding PSDH and DR proof of payments required for the issuance of 
the SKSHH documents are recorded and maintained by this unit This arrangement, for the 
purposes of estimating and monitoring the district's share of forest revenues originating from 
the district, would seem to place Kutai Barat at an advantage over Bulungan. 
Apparently, however, this was not the case during the first several years of 
decentralisation. Until at least the end of 2003, centrally-licensed timber operators in practice 
continued self-assessing their PSDH and DR obligations and as noted above, their fulfilment 
was not attached to the issuance of SKSHH. This timber transport document was issued 
regardless of (PSDH and DR) payment. Furthermore, the administration of the payment was 
handled by the Provincial Forestry Service. Therefore, even though the SKSHH are issued by 
'" Interview with B-G-15 
"' Interview with B-G-16 
"' Interview with B-G-16 
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the District Forestry Service, until the end of 2003 the District Forestry Service did not maintain 
up to date and ongoing records for the PSDH and DR payments made by HPHs, but obtained 
the data through annual reports sent by the Province. 184 Until 2003, for the purposes of 
monitoring the districts' contribution of PSDH and DR and estimating district's expected share, 
district officials had to estimate the PSDH and DR contributions from HPH concession holders 
operating in the district based on timber production. As the policy linking PSDH and DR 
payment with the issuance of the SKSHH began to be enforced on HPH holders more strictly in 
2004, Kutai Barat's circumstance - in which the SKSHH official is on the district payroll -
became an advantage to the district. 
Kutai Barat is responsible for the reporting of all timber production in the district. The 
district also reports the PSDH and DR payments which, until 2003, were only those for timber 
harvested under district licenses, and beginning 2004, including those from HPH operators. 
District documents also show that the District Forestry Service carbon-copied each payment 
instruction to the Provincial Forestry Service. This suggests two things. First, the District 
Forestry Service felt the need to inform the provincial government that they were following 
national policies (that timber produced under district licenses was also liable for royalty 
payments). Second, the Provincial Forestry Service was made aware, not only of the payment, 
but also of the district license. 
Another issue facing Kutai Barat was that some of the timber produced in the district had 
been recorded as originating from the downstream, adjacent district of Kutai Kertanegara. The 
geographic location of Kutai Baral requires that all timber exiting from that district destined for 
the provincial capital, Samarinda via the only two available routes, the river system or by road, 
must go through Kutai Kertanegara. The Bupati was convinced that a significant quantity of 
timber produced in the district, rather than being correctly recorded as originating from the 
district, was erroneously recorded as originating from Kutai Kertanegara and notably, had been 
provided their SKSHH documents by this district. This would have resulted in the 
underreporting of the volume of timber produced in Kutai Barat and simultaneously, the 
underreporting of the district's forestry royalty contribution. The Bupati was concerned that the 
district would Jose the corresponding forest revenues to Kutai Kertanegara while the associated 
environmental consequences resulting from the timber harvest would be borne by Kutai Barat. '8s 
For this reason the Bupati instructed the head of the District Forestry Service to approach its 
Kutai Kertanegara counterpart to resolve the issue. However, the head of the District Forestry 
Service insisted that he had refused to provide this timber with the necessary SKSHH 
documents in the first place, as it had mostly been felled illegally. This issue of illegal timber 
'" Interview with K-G-20 
'" Interview with K-G-5 
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was one of several that caused disagreements between the Bupati and the head of the District 
Forestry Service and is discussed further in section 6.4. 
Complications on royalties derived from district licenses 
The issuance of numerous logging licenses by district governments across Indonesia's 
forest-rich districts (Chapter 3) complicated the process of the allocation of forest revenue 
sharing. Unlike in most of the New Order period when the Ministry of Forestry had virtually the 
sole authority to issue logging licenses and therefore maintained all the corresponding 
documentation and records, under decentralisation the Ministry of Forestry did not have direct 
access to complete data on timber companies and their activities in the regions, in particular 
those operating under district licenses. The Ministry of Forestry only maintained complete 
records on companies working under its licenses. However, as most timber produced under such 
logging licenses, like the HPHH and IPHHK issued by Kutai Barat and the IPPK issued by 
Bulungan, were also subject to PSDH and DR fees, the Ministry of Forestry also needed to 
determine the origin (which districts/municipalities) of forestry revenues derived from timber 
produced under district licenses. 
The Ministry's lack of control over the issuance of district licenses was among the reasons 
suggested by the Ministry to explain the tardiness of forestry revenue redistribution to 
regions.186 Among the major difficulties was in the identification of the source of forestry 
royalty contribution (which district/municipality). As a consequence, the Ministry of Forestry 
has had to rely on data supplied by the province to assist in determining the origins of some of 
the PSDH and DR payments, in particular those made by companies working under district 
licenses. The concern of the Ministry of Forestry over lack of regional data, however, appears to 
be less a concern over inaccurate identification of the origins of forestry payments, than a 
concern over the Ministry's declining control over forest area and its management, and the 
overall rate of timber production. 187 
The Ministry of Forestry, however, had access to baseline data to begin the process of 
determining forestry revenue allocations to regions. These data were in the form of bank 
printouts detailing each payment transferred by timber companies. Timber companies submitted 
their PSDH payments to a Ministry of Forestry account in Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank), 
and DR payments to a Ministry of Forestry's account in one of the largest state banks, Bank 
Mandiri. 188 Using these data, sometime around mid year, Ministry of Forestry officials travelled 
to provincial capitals to conduct an activity known as the "reconciliation process" or 
... Interviews with N-G-2 and N-G-9 
11
' Interview with N-G-9 
m According to a senior official in the unit administering forestry fees (Bina Juran Kehutanan dan 
Peredaran Hasil Hutan), these monies remain in these Ministry of Forestry's accounts for seven 
days, before being transferred to the Central Treasury (interview with N-G-2). Beginning in 
1997, revenues from natural resources were administered as part of the national budget, thus, 
by the Ministry of Finance. 
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rekonsiliasi. This refers to a manual reconciliation between the MOF's (Jakarta bank' s printout) 
data and the provincial data on DR and PSDH payments. The data critical for the calculation of 
forest revenue share comprise the amounts of DR and PSDH payments made by companies in 
each producing district, that is, to pinpoint where each payment came from. Rather than 
reconciling with data maintained by individual districts in which the timber was produced, 
however, the Ministry of Forestry reconciled their data with those gathered (through reports 
from the UPTD and District Forestry Services) by the Provincial Forestry Service. 
The flow of the process suggests the important role of the province in the allocation of 
forestry revenue sharing. This is because the Ministry of Forestry made no effort to discover the 
origins of the payments coming directly from districts, thus reports from districts to the province 
and what the province did with them were important. The provincial official in charge of the 
reports, however, complained that only a few districts reported their timber activities. 189 The 
official specifically praised the reports from the UPTD operating in Bulungan, and complained 
about the non-cooperation of Kutai Barat in providing reports on timber activities. 
The last statement was somewhat contradictory, however. Kutai Barat documents reveal 
that it carbon-copied district licenses to the Provincial Forestry Service and sent reports related 
to PSDH and DR obligations of district-licensed timber operators to the province. This suggests 
that the province should have the data on Kutai Barat's timber licenses and, of particular 
relevance to this chapter, data on the district's forestry royalty contribution for timber issued 
under district licenses (see above). The same provincial official, however, acknowledged that 
the handling of the administration of districts' reports at the Provincial Forestry Service was 
messy; for instance, it was not uncommon to lose or misplace reports. 
The reconciliation process at the provincial level appears to be anything but meticulous. 
An interview with the provincial forestry official in charge of the reconcilement process 
revealed that instead of actually reconciling these two sources of data, the process has only 
involved the checking and reconfirmation of MOF's data with provincial data, to determine 
where (which province, which district) these companies (who submitted the payments) 
operate. 190 Ministry of Forestry offic ials largely worked on their own in checking data provided 
by the province. 
Among the district, provincial and Central governments, it is the districts that are most 
concerned about the accuracy of the records of PSDH and DR contributions. Provincial 
governments are only concerned about the total fees originating from the entire province, 
because provinces are guaranteed a specified percentage of the total PSDH payments submitted 
by companies operating in each of the producing districts and municipalities in that particular 
province (Table 4.1 ), irrespective of the district of origin of the timber and its corresponding 
1
" Interview with P-G-9, an provincial District Forestry Service official involved in the 
reconcilement process 
190 Interview with P-G-9 
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fees. Similarly, the Central Government's share of forestry fees and royalties depend on the 
total payment of all regions, irrespective of their origin. However, with the exception of districts 
that were involved in the decentralisation pilot project, like Kutai Barat, it is the province, 
through its district level units (UPTD), that controls and maintains records of PSDH and DR 
payments. Districts like Bulungan always have to depend on their UPTD counterparts to 
provide them with these data. The administrative structure therefore does not allow for districts 
to be involved in the process of forestry revenue allocation, nor to be able to systematically 
monitor, their forestry royalty contribution. This in tum affects their capacity to monitor their 
forestry revenue share. 
The complex and detailed process of determining how much payment originated from 
which area has resulted not only in the tardiness in the allocation of PSDH and DAK-DR, which 
occurred well towards the end of each budget year, but also provided room for inaccuracy in the 
calculations. The Ministry of Forestry had begun to implement a computerized system to 
identify the origins of DR payments. However, as of March 2004, the system was still new. 191 
Furthermore, according to the Ministry official in charge of the collection of forestry fees and 
royalties, the Ministry of Forestry expected that the reconciliation of PSDH payments would 
continue to be handled manually in the future, as these payments are made to the Ministry's 
account in Bank Indonesia. Bank Indonesia as the Central Bank does not have an online or cash 
management system, preventing the establishment of a computerized, on-line system similar to 
that established for DR payments in Bank Mandiri. 192 
Denied access to formal involvement in the process of allocating forest revenue share, 
districts decided to take an informal approach, and went straight to the national level. This is 
discussed next. 
4.4.2 Districts' strategies in "going after" the money 
The three district agencies most involved with forestry revenue transfer, the district 
Revenue, Finance, and Economic Offices, work closely with the District Forestry Service in 
estimating their forest revenue allocation. More importantly, however, district government 
officials interact, mostly informally, with officials of relevant agencies in Jakarta, with UPTD 
units, and with neighbouring districts. District officials were confident that such interactions 
would assist them in obtaining a more accurate allocation of forestry-derived revenues and/or 
information about the allocation. 
'" Interview with N-G-2, a senior Ministry of Forestry official in the unit administering forestry 
fees and royalties 
"' Interview with N-G-2 
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Networking with national level actors 
Rather than relying on the Ministry of Forestry or the provincial data, district officials 
made special trips to Jakarta to "check" on these allocations, with the two departments 
concerned - the Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Finance. 
According to key officials in district finance, the bottleneck for the distribution of central 
funds, particularly with regard to districts' share of forest revenues lies more with the Ministry 
of Forestry than with the Ministry of Finance. 193 There has been a common strategy among 
forest-rich districts of Kalimantan to lobby relevant Ministry of Forestry officials individually, 
to try to ensure that the districts' data on which the redistribution of forestry-derived revenues 
are based, are accurately recorded by the Ministry. District officials make regular visits to 
Jakarta to carry out their own, informal, "data reconciliation and negotiations" with relevant 
officials at the Ministry of Forestry. A senior official at the revenue office of Kutai Barat 
disclosed: 
"There are individuals that open up avenues for us in the Ministry of 
Forestry. These people assist us in calculating our share." (interview with K-
G-14a) 
Interviews revealed that this sort of informal "data reconciliation and negotiations" has 
involved a form of "struggle" (perjuangan) on the part of district governments. Certain 
expressions were used in the interviews to explain that these "reconciliation and negotiations" 
usually took place in a spirit of informal, mutual cooperation (kekeluargaan) and were 
accompanied by informal transactions. ••• The degree of difficulty in carrying out the 
"reconciliation and negotiations" was " like obtaining an identity card" (seperti mengurus 
KTP). '95 In the Indonesian context this refers to having certain services administered/rendered 
through an easier, speedier process by giving modest informal "tokens" as an incentive to the 
service provider. 
Often, sources used subtle expressions to describe the involvement of informal exchanges 
requiring an understanding of the Indonesian ways of referring to situations in an indirect or 
oblique way. For instance, the following was explained by a senior official of Kutai Barat 
Revenue Office: 
"' Interviews with a senior official of Bulungan's economic unit, B-G-17 and a senior official of 
Kutai Baral Revenue Office, K-G-14a, K-G-14b 
"' For instance, interviews with a senior official of Bulungan District Forestry Service, B-G-16 
and with a senior official of Kutai Baral Revenue Office, K-G-14a 
"' Interview with a senior official of Bulungan District Forestry Service, B-G-16 
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"Including those in the Ministry of Forestry, if we ask for our data to be 
processed and examined, s/he is motivated to do it and there is an 
assumption here that ifs/he is not given the motivation then s/he will not be 
motivated. And if the data have already been processed then s/he will contact 
us again and tell us that maybe the figures will soon be submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance." (interview with K-G-14b) 196 
Districts also lobbied the Ministry of Forestry to obtain information on the districts' 
allocations in advance of the Ministry of Finance's official allocation of districts' share. The 
motivation for districts to find out about these figures as early as possible was to assist them in 
planning the district budget, as these transfers were always made after mid year or even later. 
During an interview, a senior official of the economic unit of Bulungan showed copies of a set 
of letters from the Ministry of Forestry addressed to the Ministry of Finance and cc-ed to the 
Provincial Forestry Service, detailing the Ministry of Forestry's data on the total PSDH and DR 
payments made by timber companies from each district across Indonesia during a particular 
year. District offices were not among the addressees of these letters, clearly showing that 
districts were not meant to be the recipients of such letters. Bulungan, however, managed to 
obtain copies through intensive lobbying and "friendship" nurtured with certain officials at the 
Ministry of Forestry. As a senior official in Bulungan Economic Office pointed out: 
"District governments must have friends in the department." [my emphasis] 
(interview with B-G-17) 
Besides the Ministry of Forestry, one other key actor in the allocation and the distribution 
process of forest revenue transfer is the Ministry of Finance. Districts therefore, also have had to 
set up their networks with this department. A senior official of the Revenue Office of Kutai 
Barat explained that sometime in 2004 his office found out through its informal channels that 
there were about 2.5 billion rupiah (280 thousand USD) of the district's share of PSDH for year 
2003 that had remained in the Central Treasury. This amounted to 7% of the total PSDH 
transfer actually received by the district in 2003. Yet the Ministry of Finance neither formally 
informed the district of the existence or status of this money, nor had transferred the money to 
the district. Gaining such information, he admitted, was only possible through the district's 
informal network that he had built up with certain personnel at the Ministry of Finance. The 
senior official admitted: 
196The original statement, in Indonesian, captures the "exchanges" more aptly: "Termasuk orang 
di Oepartemen Kehutanan, kalau kita minta data kita untuk diproses dan dite/iti, dia semangat 
untuk mengerjakan dan ada anggapan bahwa kalau tidak disemangati maka tidak semangat. 
Dan kalau datanya sudah diproses dia akan menghubungi /agi dan bilang mungkin dalam waktu 
dekat ini akan masuk ke Departemen Keuangan." (interview with K-G-14b) 
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"In the Ministry of Finance we have a "friend" who usually gives us 
informal information, his [her] name is [ ]. We know that information is 
expensive and important. Although only through SMS we should understand 
...... although it is actually his [her] routine task.'97 Usually the person only 
gives the digit, there is no limit."(interview K-G-14b) 
A similar case reported in the media shows consistencies with Kutai Barat's experience. A 
large sum of PSDH share of 2000-2001 for the East Kalimantan provincial and local 
governments was reportedly retained by the Central Government until as late as September 
2005 (Kaltim Post, 1 September, 2005c). East Kalimantan provincial officials had to lobby 
members of the parliament handling national budget issues and officials at the Ministry of 
Finance for its disbursement, which was promised following revisions of year 2005 national 
budget. 198 
District and national level officials interviewed admitted that such informal negotiations 
did occur and that they have involved "informal exchanges", but they expressed different 
opinions on their outcomes. Officials in the two districts were convinced that the informal 
reconciliation process of their data with that of the Ministry of Forestry resulted in districts' 
increased (or more accurate) allocation of shared forest revenues and in a more rapid process of 
the ir transfer. 199 National level officials within or engaged directly with these two ministries, 
however, held a different view on the former. These "brokering" trends, although they could not 
be confirmed with the Ministry of Finance, were acknowledged by a Jakarta academic who is an 
expert in the Ministry of Finance and is familiar with how things work in the Ministry."'° This 
source, however, understood that such transactions could result in the speedie r disbursement of 
transfers, but was sceptical about the perception that they actually increased the share of 
districts. Similarly, a senior Ministry of Forestry official admitted that these "brokering" 
arrangements did indeed occur within his Ministry, but they were individual exchanges and 
were by no means endorsed by the Ministryw ' According to this official, some individuals 
involved were demoted to lower positions as a result. Similar to the expert in the Ministry of 
Finance, this official asserted that these transactions would not affect the size of forest revenue 
allocation to districts, as they were determined based on the Ministry' s data. 
1
" Once the network is established, there is thus less necessity for district government officials 
to visit Jakarta in person as communicating by telephone or through short text messaging is 
then sufficient (interview with K-G-15a). 
,., As natural resource revenues are now administered as part of the national budget, the 
parliamentary commission in charge of the national budgeting has to endorse the regions' 
allocations (that is, they must be within the national budget). 
"
9 For instance, interviews with K-G-14a and with B-G-17 
'
00 Interview with N-A-8, an advisor to the Ministry of Finance 
201 Interview with N-G-9, a senior official of the Ministry of Forestry 
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4.4.3 Fiscal decentralisation and Central grip: the power of 
money and information 
Under decentralisation, districts not only had to struggle to retain a hold on their short-
lived forestry authority (Chapter 3), but also felt that they had to (and did) make conscious 
efforts to pursue their - albeit legally guaranteed - forestry revenue share. Whether or not these 
efforts at the end resulted in an increased or more accurate share is largely irrelevant, as well as 
difficult to determine, as it would involve compiling forestry payments from all districts and 
municipalities within the province. In the eyes of the districts, obtaining the rightful share, 
commensurate with payments made for timber produced within their jurisdictions and as 
specified by Law 25 of 1999, has itself involved yet another form of "struggle". 
For local governments, this "struggle" has included efforts to 1) obtain data for forestry 
royalties on timber produced in the district from provincial units handling the data at the district 
level and from the neighbouring district government; 2) ensure that districts' forestry payments 
are accurately taken into account in the calculations of for~estry revenue allocation by the 
Ministry of Forestry; and 3) obtain information on the allocation of districts' forestry revenue 
share from the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Finance. 
For the Ministry of Forestry, the process has involved difficulties over access to or in 
securing information on timber production, origins, and associated forestry royalty payments. 
These difficulties are inextricably linked to the structure of forestry institutions administering 
forestry data and to the locus of and struggle over forestry authority. The absence of 
administrative links between forestry units at various levels of government eroded Central 
Government's control over districts' actions (in this case, in districts' failure to report district 
timber activities). Assigning provincially-appointed officials with the task of issuing the 
SKSHH documents would address this problem, as provincial officials in carrying out 
deconcentration functions act as the arm of the Central Government and because the set of 
SKSHH documents specifies the origin of the timber, its type and volume, and attaches proof of 
the PSDH and DR payments. However, the manual reconciliation process has opened up the 
potential for inaccuracy. Second, the shift in the locus of fores try authority from the Centre and 
then back to the Centre for a period of time resulted in uncertainty over the legality of district 
logging licenses and consequently, timber produced under these licenses, hence a disincentive 
on the part of district governments to report them. 
In the two districts studied, the contestation of power around forestry revenue sharing 
processes has been peripheral, and has been mostly limited to failure to report their data. There 
were, however, more extreme cases where other districts openly challenged the Centre's 
authority over the distribution of forestry revenues. Two districts in West Kalimantan seized the 
PSDH and DR fees by instructing logging companies to submit their payments directly to 
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district accounts, instead of to the specified Central Government accounts (Komite Anti Korupsi 
Rakyat Borneo, 2005).202 These districts instead retained the entire portion and included it in 
their budgets. The severity of this "challenge" was such that the Ministry of Forestry had to 
send strong warnings to all Bupatis, Mayors and Governors across the country to remind them 
that by law, these payments were required to be made directly to Central Government 
accounts.2°' The Bupati of Berau District in East Kalimantan at one point had exempted district-
licensed logging companies from paying PSDH and DR fees. This policy was scrutinized by the 
district attorney and the Bupati was subsequently investigated with corruption (Kompas, 2 1 
October, 2004d; Gatra, 18 November, 2004). This Bupati's policy was in effect challenging the 
Centre's fiscal authority to impose forestry fees and taxes. While neither the Bupati of Bulungan 
nor Kutai Barat made similar extreme decisions, these other cases illustrate vividly the struggle 
over forestry-revenues and authority between local governments and the Centre in the forestry 
sector. The Bupatis of Bulungan and Kutai Baral Districts appear to have been more cautious 
about decisions that overtly contravene Central policies, and have instead chosen more covert 
strategies (Chapter 3). 
It is therefore argued that, although the Ministry of Forestry has lost much of its power 
over the uses and distribution of nationally-pooled forestry-derived revenues, it has nevertheless 
managed to maintain some of its leverage vis-a-vis local governments, by playing a critical role 
in the process of forest revenue sharing. Prior to 1997, PSDH and DR revenues were not 
included in the national budget and were administered solely by the Ministry of Forestry 
(section 4.2). The uses of these revenues, including the portion to be shared to regional 
governments, during almost the entire New Order period were not transparent and were mostly 
determined through Presidential Decrees. This has often resulted in their ad hoc use (section 
4.2). The inclusion of forestry-derived revenues since 1997 in the national budget means that 
the Ministry of Forestry has lost much of its control over the uses and redistribution of forestry 
revenue to the Ministry of Finance. Despite this reduced power and the difficulties involved in 
the collection of forestry data under decentralisation, however, the Ministry of Forestry still 
retains some control over the redistribution of forestry revenues. As a technical department, the 
Ministry of Forestry has positioned itself as an important actor in determining the share of 
regions. The non-transparent mechanisms in the calculation of forest revenue sharing 
allocations have resulted in the districts' share, as districts have perceived it, being dependent 
on the manner in which the Ministry of Forestry actually carries it out. Thus from the 
"" Districts of Sintang and Kapuas Hulu in West Kalimantan. Law 20 of 1997 on Non-Tax 
Government Revenues and Government Regulation 51 of 1998 on PSDH require that they are 
paid directly to Central Government accounts. 
20
' Ministry of Forestry's Circular No. 1776/Menhut-Vl/2002 regarding the payments of PSDH 
and DR 
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perspective of control over the processes of forest-revenue sharing, the Ministry of Forestry has 
been able to continue to maintain at least some leverage over local governments. 204 
Districts are not only (very) dependent on the Central Government for the forestry resource 
revenue transfer itself, as they represent a substantial portion of districts' budgets depicted in 
Table 4.2 but are also dependent on certain individuals in Central Ministries to make the 
transfers occur under more favourable circumstances. Individuals in the Ministry of Forestry 
and the Ministry of Finance "assisted" district governments in at least three ways: 1) receiving 
their transfers in a timelier manner; 2) receiving more accurate transfers (as perceived by district 
governments) by having districts' supplied data accommodated in their calculations; and 3) 
providing information about these transfers. These "central brokers" clearly expected and 
received material rewards in exchange for these favours. Hence, for districts, obtaining 
information regarding their share of (formal) forestry rents and obtaining the actual (formal) 
forestry rents under more beneficial circumstances have involved informal rents. 
From the national level perspective, the processes associated with the structure of fiscal 
decentralisation in the Indonesian context as represented by the two case study districts have 
involved rent-seeking by individuals at influential Central ministries. From the district level 
perspective, fiscal decentralisation has necessitated informal networking with individuals at the 
Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Finance to both submit and obtain fiscal information 
district officials ' perceive will lead towards forestry revenue share commensurate with the level 
of forest extraction within their jurisdiction as specified by Law 25 of 1999. Fiscal 
decentralisation as it has proceeded in the Indonesian context and specifically in the forestry 
domain, therefore, has opened up opportunities for the abuse of public power by exploiting 
privileged access to information to gain personal benefits at the level where power was 
relinquished (that is, the national level). 
4.5 Locally Generated Revenues (PAD) from forest 
extraction 
As described in Chapter 3, the need to raise revenues for the district budget to finance its 
development, and at the same time the increased opportunity for generating PAD, have 
motivated forest-rich districts to formulate and implement extractive forestry policies and 
decisions largely geared towards short-term economic rewards. Bulungan and Kutai Baral along 
with many other districts in the Outer Islands are characterized by a lack of established 
infrastructure and manufacturing industries. Thus, by default there are not many development or 
economic options other than the exploitation of their natural resources, including those 
'"' Similar issues in the critical role of technical departments in the redistribution of natural-
resource revenue sharing have been found in the case of oil, gas and mineral sectors 
(Anonymous, 2006). 
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facilitated by the issuance of district logging licenses. This section focuses on the significance 
of PAD in district finances and how they have been used by districts. 
Unlike Central transfers such as shared forest revenues whose size and time of distribution 
have often been uncertain, the PAD is handled and controlled directly by local governments 
without any interference from the Central Government. Because of this advantage, the PAD is 
much preferred over Central transfers. The PAD in the forestry sector generally consists of 
levies and charges applied to timber activities, notably Third Party Contribution (Sumbangan 
Pihak Ketiga, SPK), which arc area-based charges on timber concessions and retribusi, which 
are volume-based fees. 
PAD did not make up a large percentage of the total district budget in either of the case 
study districts (Table 4.2). In terms of the percentage of Bulungan's overall budget, the 
contribution of forestry-derived PAD was relatively small, namely 4%, 0.4%, and 0.6% in 2001, 
2002, 2003, respectively. Similarly, the contribution of forestry PAD for Kutai Barat's budget in 
2001, 2002, and 2003 were 0.5%, 3%, and 0.8%, respectively. Nevertheless, they translated to 
16, 1.6, and 3 billion rupiah (about 1.8 million USO, 180,000 USD, and 333,000 USD, 
respectively) for Bulungan and 1.8, 16, and 5.7 billion rupiah (about 200,000 USD, 1.8 million 
USO, and 633, 000 USD, respectively) for Kutai Barat. 
PAD derived from forestry, however, made up a substantial proportion of the total PAD 
for each district, thus explaining the emphasis on the districts' extractive forestry polic ies in 
supporting the district budget (Table 4.2). These figures were probably lower than the actual 
figures because they were masked by the fact that some were unidentifiable, as they were 
lumped together in a category called "other miscellaneous income". Because they were 
considered non-permanent income, they were not assigned a specific category. wi 
Much of the forestry PAD was derived from district logging licenses and their operations. 
However, the two districts also found ways to raise significant amounts from other sources, 
including from HPHs. For Bulungan, forestry PAD in 2001 was much higher than in the two 
following years; it constituted three-quarters of the entire PAD of the district. Much of this was 
raised from log export charges accumulated during the first ten months of that year, the short 
stint when Bulungan could get away with the direct exportation of Jogs before it ceased 
following a Central Government subsequent policy (section 3.2.2). For Kutai Barat, forestry 
PAD in 2002 contributed to nearly half (46%) of its total PAD, much higher compared to both 
the previous and following years. Retribusi on district-licensed small scale-logging activities 
represented one single largest source (99%). In 2003, 15 percent of the forestry PAD of Kutai 
Barat comprised direct Third Party Contributions (Sumbangan Pihak Ketiga, SPK) made by two 
20
' lnteNiew with an official at the Revenue Office of Bulungan District, B-G-20 
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HPHs. This "contribution" was as a result of the direct demand by the Bupati.106 The Bupati 
contended that the contribution of HPHs to district development was minimal and pressured 
them to submit a significant amount directly to the district's treasury (see also section 6.3.1). 
The money raised was ostensibly planned to finance a segment of a road often utilized by the 
HPHs. The Bupati also applied pressures to a centrally licensed, foreign-based gold mining 
company to make substantial direct "contributions" to the district budget. 
Districts' total fores try revenues (that is, districts' share of PSDH and DR payments in the 
form of forestry revenue transfer from the Central Government plus district forestry PAD) show 
the significance of the overall contribution of forestry activities to the district (Table 4.2). For 
Bulungan they represented 8.7%, 5.4%, and 12.7% of its total 2001, 2002, and 2003 revenues, 
respectively. For Kutai Barat, they constituted 11.3%, 6.7%, and 14.4% of its 2001, 2002, and 
2003 revenues, respectively. 
The revocation of districts' authority to issue logging licenses, therefore, meant the loss of 
a significant portion of these revenues, as districts could now only accumulate forestry revenues 
derived from the payments made mostly by HPH holders or by other remaining timber 
activities. 207 This has been one of the reasons why Jogging-licensing was extremely important to 
the districts, hence the tension between the districts and the Ministry of Forestry. 
4.6 District uses of forestry revenues 
The second theme of this chapter is how the funds originating from the rapid forest 
exploitation have been used in the districts. The bulk of forestry revenues redistributed back 
from the Centre, PSDH specifically, and other fores try-related revenues generated as PAD have 
mostly been used to finance non-forestry development expenditures. Only a small proportion 
was earmarked to support forestry activities. 
For instance, in the case of Bulungan, in year 2003, out of the 292 billion rupiahs (about 32 
million USD) of development funds, only 5.35 billion rupiah or 1.8%, was allocated for forestry 
activities. This was much smaller than the 12.7% of the overall contribution of forestry to the 
district total revenue (Table 4.2). Furthermore, 4.9 billion rupiah or nearly all of it was DAK-
DR Fund earmarked specifically for the nationally-imposed forest and land rehabilitation 
activities (the RHL Project, Chapter 5). This is equivalent to 1.7% of district's total 
development expenditure. The uses of DAK-DR funds are restricted to reforestation and 
rehabilitation activities, which must conform to Central Government guidelines and arc 
monitored by provincial governments (Chapter 5). Only I SO million rupiah (about 17 thousand 
'
06 Interviews with K-G-15a, a senior official of Kutai Barat Revenue Office and with K-P-5, the 
director of a mining company operating in Kutai Barat; Kutai Baral District Revenue Reports for 
2001, 2002, and 2003 
2
°' The data on the two districts' budgets post-2003 were not available during the major field 
work. 
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USD) was used for other forestry development activities as the district's own initiative. This 
translated to a mere 0.05 percent of unrestricted development funds. Compare this to the 
contribution of forestry revenue outside the DAK-DR for the same year, which was 4.7% of the 
total district revenue for that year. 201 
This trend of placing a low priority on forestry projects continued in the following year. In 
the 2004 budget, only 0.07 percent of development funds outside the DAK-DR Fund was 
allocated for forestry development. Yet this allocation was to be used to fund supporting 
activities associated with the RHL Project (Chapter 5). This means that for this year, forestry 
development activities in the district were entirely nationally-imposed. The districts did not 
allocate any funds to carry out their own initiatives in the forestry sector. 
Similar to Bulungan , Kutai Baral hardly reinvested any of its forestry-derived income in its 
forests. In 2001, only 0.2% of the total development funds were used to finance the district's 
forestry development program. Although the RHL Project was to begin in that year, the delay of 
the DAK-DR Fund's distribution until well towards the end of the year prevented it from being 
implemented in the same year (Chapter 5). Thus the DAK-DR allocation for 2001 was used to 
fund forest and land rehabilitation activities in the following year. In 2002 the district invested 3 
billion rupiah or l % of the total development expenditure in forestry activities other than the 
DAK-DR funded RHL Project. By comparison, forestry-derived revenue not including the 
DAK-DR Fund for that particular year contributed 5.3% of the total district revenue. The 
district's DAK-DR funded RHL Project constituted 9.3% of the total development expenditure. 
In 2003, this reforestation and rehabilitation Project was the only project directly targeted in the 
forestry sector that was funded by the district budget. For that year, the DAK-DR revenue 
constituted 7.4% of the total development expenditure targeted in the district budget (but only 
2.5% was actually realized). The district allocated only 0.05% of its development budget to 
support the RHL project. In comparison, outside the OAK-DR, the contribution of the forestry 
sector to the total district revenue for that year was 6.1 %. 
The description above shows that the two districts used much of the revenue derived from 
forestry activities to finance other development. It shows the importance of forestry in financing 
the districts' needs, thus signifies the districts' dependence on forestry-derived funding. In terms 
of the management of the resource base, it reflects the extent to which district governments 
consider forestry development or activities that support it unimportant relative to other 
development initiatives. Districts' modest forestry-related expenditures clearly indicate that they 
consider fores try development in their areas a low priority and that they give other, non-forestry 
development much closer attention. 
The intensive pursuit of fores try-derived revenue and its use largely for purposes other 
than forestry during the early years of decentralisation, as illustrated by the districts' revenue 
"'' Calculated from data supplied by the Bulungan District Revenue Office 
118 
and budget in 2001-2003, suggest that forestry was used as a cash cow for districts' 
development. This parallels the situation during the early years of the New Order period, where 
the Central Government intensively extracted national forest resources and used their proceeds 
to finance national development (section 3.1.1 and Appendix 2). 
Indonesia's fiscal decentralisation measures have given districts substantial discretion in 
expenditure and some discretion on the income side (Alm et al., 2001; Lewis 2005). Data from 
the two districts studied indicate that districts' discretion in income generation and their broader 
discretion in expenditure did not motivate decisions that sought to maintain the sustainability of 
their forestry resources. Districts appear to be more focused towards generating revenues via 
resource extractive policies, and less on reinvesting the revenues generated to ensure 
sustainability of the resource. 
The above description not only demonstrates the lack of commitment and willingness of 
the districts to design and implement initiatives in forestry-related development activities, but 
notably, that the nationally-imposed Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project (the DAK-DR 
funded RHL Project) constituted the only major forestry activity financed by the district budget. 
In fact, in 2003, the RHL Project was the only forestry project in Kutai Barat financed through 
the district's budget. Other forestry development initiatives such as the establishment of legal 
instruments and technical guidelines for the district's community forestry project were 
supported by donor funding (section 6.1.1). Similarly, in 2004, the RHL Project was the only 
forestry project financed through Bulungan's budget. 
4. 7 Conclusions 
Generating state revenue is one of the most important objectives of commercial forestry 
activities in Indonesia, both prior to and under decentralisation. Before decentralisation, the 
Central Government levied national forestry fees and royalties, which has continued under 
decentralisation. Under decentralisation, timber produced under district licenses has also had the 
same national forestry fees and royalties applied, in addition to district-imposed fees and 
charges. 209 
As part of fiscal decentralisation, a larger percentage of forestry revenues derived from 
these national fees and royalties is now allocated and distributed to local governments. Because 
the districts' share of forestry revenue makes up a significant proportion of districts' budgets, 
their actual lransfer, in terms of both size and timing, is important to the districts. Thus, it is not 
only the size of the financial transfers that is important to districts; the process of the allocation 
and distribution is no Jess important. 
'O'JKutai Barat's IUPHHK that have not been withdrawn or cancelled presumably are still in 
operation to date. 
119 
The major problem with the implementation of forestry revenue transfers has been the non-
transparency of the allocation process. This has occurred despite Law 25 of 1999 (and its 
subsequent superseding revised version, Law 33 of 2004, Appendix 5) guaranteeing that local 
governments obtain a higher portion of forest revenue share. The resulting forest revenue 
transfers were often disbursed late in the budget year, and more importantly, local governments 
have perceived that these transfers were inaccurate. The two local governments studied were 
convinced that allocations were lower than they should have been or that part of their share had 
been withheld by the Centre. 
Practical technical difficulties with determining the origins of forestry payments have 
contributed to the problem. These difficulties have been associated with the deterioration of the 
systematic collection of data on forestry payments. This breakdown has been attributed to I) the 
duality of forestry administration at the district level, 2) the severance of direct linkages 
between forestry units at different levels of government, and 3) district forestry regimes, notably 
district logging licenses, operating mostly independently from other levels of governments. 
The operation of two separate forestry units at the district level - the District Forestry 
Service and the forestry unit working under the provincial government - as in Bulungan, has 
meant that data on timber-related activities are scattered between the two units. Most 
importantly, and affecting the process of forestry revenue transfers, it is the forestry unit 
working for the provincial government, rather than the district forestry unit, that is in effect the 
repository for the data on forestry royalty payments at the district level. Yet as this provincial 
forestry unit has no line of formal responsibility to the district government, it is not obliged to 
provide these data to district agencies. The provincial unit supplied such data to the district 
merely as a friendly gesture that relies upon established informal or personal relationships 
between officials working for the unit and district officials. There is no systematic means of 
relaying these data to relevant district offices. 
The abolition of a hierarchical administrative relationship (section 3.1.2 and Appendix 2) 
between districts and provinces has resulted in a disconnect in forestry administration between 
the district and provincial levels. Similarly, the lack of administrative linkages between districts 
and the Ministry of Forestry has led to a lack of direct links between forestry administration at 
the district and national levels. The absence of these direct linkages has caused gaps in the flow 
of forestry data between and among levels of government. 
The issuance of district timber licenses and their operations, during the period when 
districts could issue logging licenses - legal or otherwise - was largely independent of other 
levels of government. Consequently, for districts without a UPTD such as Kutai Barat, unless 
districts reported these activities, other levels of government would not maintain the relevant 
data on timber products and forestry fees and royalties. Even if districts sent their data to the 
provincial level, whether or not their data would be taken into account in the calculation of their 
revenue share was largely beyond districts' control. This in turn led to complications in the 
identification of the origins of timber produced and associated forestry payments. 
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The largely non-transparent process led to the districts' perception that they could 
influence the process of forest revenue transfer allocations. That process has encouraged 
informal forms of "intervention" to be perpetuated by local governments. Local governments 
perceived that they needed to actively affect the process to obtain the higher allocations that 
they perceived were more accurate, to find out about the allocations prior to disbursement, or to 
make sure that they actually received what had been allocated to them. District governments 
thus made a conscious effort to approach relevant actors, to have their data accommodated in 
the calculations or to obtain information about the districts' forestry revenue share, at the 
national level. This opened up opportunities for the abuse of power by officials in the two 
departments that determine the process of the allocation and distribution of forestry revenues to 
regions, the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Finance. 
While one of the often-assumed pitfalls of decentralisation has been the increase of local 
corruption (section 2.2 and Appendix I), this chapter has shown that both the structure and the 
processes of fiscal transfers under Indonesia's decentralisation in the two case study districts 
have opened up opportunities for informal exchange between sub-national level government 
officials and bureaucrats at the national level. 
Thus the process of forestry revenue transfer has involved yet another form of "struggle" 
on the part of district governments. Central control is conspicuous in the process of fiscal 
transfers. On the one hand, the Ministry of Forestry has encountered difficulties in obtaining 
complete and accurate timber production-related data, including the origins of payments of 
forestry royalties critical to the determination of regions' allocation of their share of forestry 
revenue. These difficulties have been attributed to the changes in the forestry organisational 
structure under decentralisation and to the districts' increased autonomy which has led to 
districts failing to report their timber-related activities. On the other hand, however, the Ministry 
of Forestry continues to maintain leverage vis-a-vis local governments. As a technical 
department, it is responsible for identifying the origins of forestry payments and for determining 
the share of revenue to be paid to local governments. The Ministry of Finance acts as the main 
agent in disbursing the money. Thus these two ministries, from the perspective of forestry 
revenue sharing, are the two most powerful central agencies. 
Consistent with the findings discussed in Chapter 3 about the power struggle between and 
among levels of governments over forestry authority, the findings of this chapter heighten the 
significance of the power relations between governments in shaping forestry-related dynamics 
under decentralisation. Power relations between levels of governments have, to a certain extent, 
shaped the processes of forestry revenue sharing. Specifically, the tension between and among 
levels of governments essentially boils down to, or at the very least is associated with, the 
squabbles over the share of forestry rent. 
The struggle for power over forestry administration between governments has serious 
implications for the resource base. One indirect consequence of the contestation over forestry 
powers under decentralisation, between district governments as the loci to which powers were 
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transferred and the Ministry of Forestry that relinquished powers, has been the breakdown of the 
system of data collection with consequent deterioration in the quality of forestry data, including 
that associated with timber harvesting activities. Although the difficulty of obtaining accurate 
forestry data was also generally true during the pre-decentralisation period (for instance, 
FWI/GFW, 2002), the weakening of the structures for forestry data collection and recording 
under decentralisation has meant that informed policy making towards SFM is made even more 
difficult. 
Forestry revenues for the districts both in the form of shared revenues and in those 
generated through local initiatives (PAD) have constituted a significant proportion of the 
districts' budgets. However, the two district governments have so far expended much of their 
efforts on securing "profits" from timber, and much less on sustaining the resource. Both 
districts have spent very little of the monies derived from forestry activities on district forestry 
initiatives or development. In fact, the major forestry project in both districts has been a national 
initiative, the OAK-DR Forest and Land Rehabilitation (RHL) Project. 
Because the OAK-DR Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project was the major, if not the 
only, forestry project financed through the districts' budget, the Project is very important in 
terms of timber replenishment and ecological improvement. The ways in which the Project was 
implemented in the districts therefore are of particular interest, and are described in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Regreening or Green 
Landcruisers? Implementation of the 
OAK-DR Forest and Land Rehabilitation 
Project 
"The DAK-DR Fund is used by districts for regreening, for green 
landcruisers and for anything else that' s green, but not for regreening critical 
lands." (interview with N-G-5) 
During my 2004 fieldwork in Indonesia, the frenzy of logging activities under small-scale 
district licenses had formally subsided. From that year on, the Forest and Land Rehabilitation 
Project, funded by the DAK-DR Fund, began to dominate forestry activities in the two case 
study districts. 
The previous chapter described the significance of the OAK-DR Fund in terms of the 
magnitude of the Fund compared to districts' overall budgets and in terms of the size of the 
rehabilitation project it financed. For three consecutive years (2002-2004 implementation 
years), the DAK-DR Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project was the largest in terms of budget 
allocation in both Bulungan and Kutai Barat Districts, outside the transportation sector and the 
construction of district offices. Furthermore, the Project is the principal vehicle being used both 
to rectify the adverse environmental consequences of timber exploitation and to sustain the 
forest resource over the longer term. The ways in which the OAK-DR Fund was allocated to, 
and how the RHL Project was implemented by, the districts are thus important for both the 
district economy and environment, and are described in this chapter. 
Under the national Reforestation Fund (DR) 60% is allocated to Gerakan Nasional 
Rehabilitasi Hutan dan Lahan (National Movement for the Rehabilitation of Forest~ and Lands 
- GNRHL) managed by the Ministry of Forestry, and 40% to the DAK-DR Fund managed by 
local governments (section 4.3.1). The latter is only to be used for reforestation activities, 
known as the OAK-DR Rehabilitasi Lahan dan Hutan (Rehabilitation of Land and Forests -
RHL) Project, henceforth the RHL Project. Although both the GNRHL and RHL are national 
initiatives, the two projects are managed very differently. Implementation of the GNRHL is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Forestry, and is outside the scope of this thesis. In contrast, 
while the RHL Project is imposed by the national government, its activities and financial 
management are handled directly by district governments, and thus is the focus of this chapter. 
The chapter pursues two major themes: the allocation and distribution of the DAK-DR 
Fund under fiscal decentralisation, and the implementation of the RHL Project under that Fund. 
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5. 1 The allocation and distribution of the Specific 
Allocation Fund-Reforestation Fund (DAK-DR) to 
districts 
Four national legal instruments determined the allocation of the DAK-DR Fund to districts, 
the mechanism for the allocation, and the use of the DAK-DR Fund up until the period of this 
study. They were Law 25 of 1999 on Fiscal Balancing, Government Regulation 104 of 2000 on 
Balancing Fund, Government Regulation 35 of 2002 on Reforestation Fund, and the General 
Guidelines for the Management of the DAK-DR for the Implementation of the Rehabilitation of 
Forest and Land of 2001.21° For simplicity, the last of these will be referred to throughout the 
remainder of the thesis as the General Guidelines. 
Similar issues to those discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, in the context of authority transferred 
to districts under decentralisation, also arose in the DAK-DR allocations to districts. Notably, 
the ambiguity or lack of specificity in the language of the relevant legislation and legal 
instruments resulted in different interpretations and, consequently, discontent among district 
governments. Unlike the PSDH (Chapter 4), the percentage of the district's share of DAK-DR 
was not specified clearly in the governing legislation. Both Law 25 of 1999 and its 
implementing regulation, Government Regulation 104 of 2000, specified only that 40% of the 
DR collected was to be returned to producing regions. The remaining 60% was to be allocated 
to the national government. The term "producing regions" was not clearly defined in either of 
the legal instruments. As noted in Chapters l and 4, however, Law 22 of 1999 did define 
" regions", to mean provinces, districts, or municipalities. 
In June 2002, the Government passed Government Regulation 35 of 2002 on the 
Reforestation Fund; this set up the guidelines for the uses and allocation of the Reforestation 
Fund. As in Government Regulation 104 of 2000, this regulation merely restated that 40% of 
the Reforestation Fund was to flow to producing regions and the remainder to the Central 
Government, but once again did not specify explicitly what was meant by "producing 
210 These General Guidelines were prepared by four central departments and were promulgated 
through Joint Circulars No. SE-59/A/2001 (Minister of Finance circular); No. SE-720/MENHUT-
11/2001 (Minister of Forestry circular); NO. 2035/D.IV/05/2001 (Head of the National Planning 
and Development Agency, BAPPENAS); and No. SE-522.4/947N/BANGDA (Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy Circulars). Similar to the Ministry of Forestry which underwent a 
change in name during the initial process of regional autonomy, the Ministry of Home Affairs for 
a short period also became the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy, and was 
subsequently became the Ministry of Home Affairs again. Although a draft of a revised version 
was available by mid 2004, the 2001 version of these General Guidelines continued to be used 
at least up until 2004. 
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regions". 211 It specified that provincial governments were to coordinate the 40% share among 
the local governments within their jurisdiction. 2 12 
The process of allocation and final distribution of the DAK-DR Fund differed from that of 
the PSDH. The latter, after allocation, was distributed directly to district coffers. The allocation 
and distribution of the DAK-DR Fund, however, was to follow a two-stage process. The 
Ministry of Finance first determined the allocation of DAK-DR for each province. In each 
province, another process was then followed to determine the actual share of each district or 
municipality. 
In practice, "producing regions" has not been translated as producing districts, but has 
referred to all local governments (districts and municipalities) within a particular province. 
Table 5.3 summarises the allocation of DR among districts and municipalities in East 
Kalimantan Province. The way in which this 40% share was allocated to each 
district/municipality within the province could, in fact, disadvantage "producing" (in the literal 
sense) districts. District governments, on the other hand, interpreted that the 40% share should 
go only to the districts actually producing the timber, rather than to all the districts and 
municipalities in the province. 2 13 This lack of clarity has thus sparked discontent among 
producing districts, including the two case study districts. 
5.1.1 Allocation of the OAK-DR Fund to provinces and the case 
study districts 
A/location to provinces 
Based on the Ministry of Forestry's allocations 214 (Chapter 4), the Ministry of Finance 
determined the amount of DAK-DR allocations for each producing province through a 
Ministerial Decree. Based on this Ministerial Decree, the Budget Director General of Ministry 
of Finance informed each province of its allocation. Allocations for the 2001-2003 budget years 
are shown in Table 5. I 
211 Article 1 O subsection 1 
212 Article 11 only stated that "each year the provincial government coordinates districts' RHL 
proposals for the Ministry of Finance to obtain the forty percent portion as stated in article 10 
subsection 1" 
rn For instance, interviews with senior officials of Bulungan and Kutai Barat, B-G-22, B-G-9b, K-
G-14 
11
' The role of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Head of the National Planning Agency in the 
allocations were not as critical as the two other Central Agencies. The role of MOHA was to 
endorse the status of the districts/municipalities, while the Head of the BAPPENAS was to 
ensure that the allocations were included in national priorities. 
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T bl 5 1 N r I OAK DR All r f 2001 2003 b d t a e . a1ona . oca ion or . u 1ge years 
Jn million rupiahs 
Province 2001 2002 2003 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 22,834 2,506 697 
North Sumatra 26,369 13,213 3,171 
West Sumatra 14,293 19,664 13,509 
Riau 81,673 113,200 100,495 
Jam bi 16,768 25,691 10,108 
Bengkulu 4,073 228 292 
South Sumatra 6,508 217 346 
Bangka Belitung 384 0 278 
Ban ten ------ 16 0 
West Kalimantan 21,038 11 ,869 5,227 
Central Kalimantan 174,306 123,255 82,701 
South Kalimantan 10,355 6,977 13,630 
East Kalimantan 190,737 220,628 163,753 
Gorontalo 3,048 630 603 
North Sulawesi 2, 153 1,294 241 
Central Sulawesi 14,272 4, 122 3,61 6 
Southeast Sulawesi 3,012 1,134 1,303 
South Sulawesi 9,798 4,243 3,578 
Bali 21 0 
West Nusa Tenggara 376 3, 134 1,914 
East Nusa Tenggara 4 0 
Maluku 11,735 11 ,629 22,083 
North Maluku 18,084 18,046 12,320 
Papua 68,747 38,958 22,962 
Total 700,562 620,679 462,826 
Source: The Decree ot the Ministry of Finance No. 49 l/KMK.02/2001; The Decree of the 
Ministry of Finance No. l 82/KMK.02/2003; Joint Circulars of The Ministry of Finance No. 
SE-11 O/MK.2/2003 and the Ministry of Forestry No. SE-572/Menhut-ll/Ren/2003; the 
Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 480/KMK.02/2003; the Decree of the Ministry of 
Finance No. 536/KMK.02/2003 
The amount of DAK-DR monies allocated to the regions each year so far has been 
significant. Over 700 billion rupiahs (80 million USD), 620 billion rupiahs (69 million USD), 
and 460 billion rupiah (51 mil lion USD) were allocated to 2 1 provinces for 200 I, 2002, and 
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2003 budget years, respectively. Among the provinces, for three consecutive years East 
Kalimantan received the largest amount: 190 billion rupiah (21 million USO) for 2001; 220 
billion rupiah (24 million USO) for 2002; and 163 billion (18 million USD) for 2003. These 
figures demonstrate that during this period East Kalimantan was the highest contributor to the 
Reforestation Fund, and accordingly, was the largest producer of officially recorded logs in 
Indonesia. 
Allocation within East Kalimantan province 
The provincial government, in turn, determined the allocation of DAK-OR for each 
district/municipality within the province. This process was carried out by a team of four (tim 
empat), made up of representatives of the Provincial Office of the Directorate General of 
Budget (Kanwil Ditjen Anggaran),215 the Provincial Development Planning Agency (provincial 
BAPPEDA), the Provincial Forestry Service, and the BPOAS. 216 
The allocation of the DAK-DR for each district or municipality within East Kalimantan 
province followed a set of criteria as specified by the General Guidelines: I) The level of 
projected DR receipts of each district/municipality: the higher the projected receipts, the higher 
the percentage weighting; 2) The area of degraded forests and critical lands in priority 
watersheds/sub-watersheds: the larger the degraded area, the higher the weighting; 3) The level 
of degraded watershed/sub-watershed ecosystem: the higher the level of degradation, the higher 
the weighting, and 4) Continuity of RHL activities in the preceding year: the better the 
continuity, the higher the weighting. 217 Following the Ministry of Forestry' s definition, "critical 
lands" refers to "severely degraded lands due to their loss of vegetative cover, to the extent that 
their functions have completely been lost or declined in terms of water retention, erosion 
control, nutrient cycling, micro climate regulator, and carbon sequestration" (Ministry of 
Forestry, 2006a: l). Critical lands can be located within the Forest Estate (Kawasan Hutan) 
category or outside the Forest Estate. 
For East Kalimantan province, the above cri teria for the 2001 allocation were weighted as 
50%, 20%, 20%, and 10%, respectively. The second criterion, the area of degraded forests and 
critical lands, became critical lands. 218 Beginning in the 2002 allocation, because the average 
w Monetary affairs is one of the few Government responsibilities not devolved to local 
governments. Therefore, unlike Regional Forestry Offices (Kanwil Kehutanan) that were 
abolished after decentralisation (Appendix 2), the Kanwil Diljen Anggaran or the offices of the 
Directorate General of Budget at the provincial level, continue to operate. 
11
• The BPDAS, Badan Pengelo/a-Oaerah Aliran Sungai, is the agency responsible for the 
management of a particular watershed. The BP-DAS is one of the Ministry of Forestry's 
technical implementation units located in the regions reporting directly to the Ministry of Forestry 
(see Figure A2.3 in Appendix 2). In East Kalimantan, the BP DAS is responsible for the 
management of the Mahakam Berau watershed that span across both Bulungan and Kutai 
Baral Districts. 
"' Based on the General Guidelines 
211 The definition of degraded forests as used in the General Guidelines is not specified. 
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utilisation of the 2001 DAK-DR Fund was far below the amount of money allocated for each 
district, the province added another criterion: performance. Here performance was measured in 
terms of activities completed and represented by the amount of funds spent. The weighting for 
the calculation of DAK-DR allocation to districts and municipalities beginning in 2002 then 
became: projected DR revenues 48%; critical lands 20%; the level of degraded watershed/sub-
watershed ecosystem 20%; the continuity of activities 10%; and performance 2% (Table 5.2). 
The governor then issued a Decree on the allocation of DAK-DR for each district and 
municipality in the province. 219 
Table 5.2 Calculation of East Kalimantan district allocations of OAK-DR for 2002 
Weighting of Parameters(%) 
Districtl Projected Critical Degraded Continuity Performance DAK-DR 
Municipality DR Lands Water- of A cti vi ties /Funds spent Total Allocation 
Receipts shed I (millions 
Institutional Rupiah) 
Capacity 
Weighting 48 20 20 10 2 100 
Pasir 5.83 2.42 1.23 1.88 0.24 I l.6 2 1,189 
Balikpapan 0 0.16 0.45 1.25 0.04 1.9 2,090 
Penajam 2.52 0.3 0.1 0.63 0 3.55 6,48 1 
Pasir Utara 
Tarakan 0 0.05 0 1.25 0.03 1.33 2,966 
Bulungan 6.03 0.62 I 1.25 0.18 9.08 16,586 
Malinau 3.57 3.25 1.85 0.63 0.19 9.49 17,324 
Nunukan 9.87 0.21 0.28 0.63 0.23 11.22 20,499 
Ber au 6.92 0.93 2.78 0.63 0.23 11.49 20,992 
Kutai 2.29 3.38 4.1 8 0.63 0.21 10.69 19,529 
Kertanegara 
Kutai Timur 5.92 4.2 3.49 0 0.28 13.89 25,372 
Kutai Baral 5.04 4.08 4.22 0 0.32 13.66 24,963 
Samarinda 0 0.21 0.15 0.63 0.02 1.01 2,145 
Bon tang 0 0. 19 0.27 0.63 0.02 I. I I 2,569 
Total 47.99 20 20 10.04 1.99 100.02 182,705 
Source: East Kalimantan Governor's Letter No. 522.51714-HK/2002 
Although the criteria for districts' allocations of the DAK-DR had to follow the General 
Guidelines, the province had flexibility in determining the scoring/weighting of the criteria used 
to allocate funding. East Kalimantan placed substantial emphasis on the weighting of projected 
DR receipts (50 percent in 2001, 48% in 2002). In comparison, the province of South Sulawesi 
21
• A copy of the decree was sent to the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, BAPPENAS, the Provincial Monitoring Agency (Badan Pengawas Propinsi-
Bawasprop), all district heads/mayors within the province, the provincial BAPPEDA, the Kanwil 
Ditjen Anggaran, the Provincial Forestry Service, and the BP-DAS. 
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weighted these criteria as follows: projected DR receipts 30%, critical lands 25%, degraded 
watershed level 30%, and continuity of activities 15% (Ngakan and William 2004). In this 
regard, the producing districts in East Kalimantan enjoyed a larger proportion of the DR 
payments made by companies operating within their districts than the producing districts in 
South Sulawesi. Nevertheless, producing districts were not guaranteed 40% of DR payments for 
timber produced within their jurisdiction, as they had previously assumed based on their 
interpretation of Law 25 of 1999. 
It is also important to note that districts' allocations were determined based on the 
projected receipts of DR payments. These allocations were usually adjusted later in the year 
according to the actual receipts. The actual allocations for budget years 2001-2003 are listed in 
Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 DAK·DR Allocation for Districts within East Kalimantan Province 
District/municipality/province In million rupiahs 
2001 2002 2003 
Pasir 23,085 25,587 16,327 
Balikpapan 3,725 2,524 3,749 
Penajam Pasir Utara 7,826 6,1 05 
Tarakan 2,631 3,582 3, 158 
Bulungan 17,607 20,029 15,273 
Malinau 18,082 20,920 13,717 
Nunukan 21,829 24,754 14,039 
Berau 22, 121 25,349 16,663 
Kutai Kertanega ra 20,255 23,582 17,656 
Kutai Timur 26,432 30,638 25,447 
Kutai Barat 30,865 30,144 25,447 
Samarinda 1,957 2,590 2,364 
Bontang 2,147 3,102 2, 177 
East Kalimantan Province 1,63 1 
Total East Kalimantan 190,737 220,628 163,753 
Source: Ministry of Forestry data and East Kalimantan Governor Decrees (2001 -2003) 
Notes: The OAK-DR allocation for budget year 2002 underwent severe revisions: the 
total amount actually allocated in year 2002 was 54.022 billion rupiahs (with Bulungan 
and Kutai Barat' s corresponding allocations of 4.904 and 7 .381 billion rupiahs, 
respectively). The remaining 166,606 billion rupiahs (with Bulungan and Kutai Barat's 
corresponding allocations of 15. 125 and 22.763 billion rupiahs, respectively) were 
actually distributed in 2003. Pena jam Pasir Utara District was only established in 200 I; 
hence zero allocation for that year. 
For both Bulungan and Kutai Baral, the OAK-DR funds were significant. For Bulungan, 
DAK-DR was 17 billion rupiah in 200 l, 20 billion in 2002, and 15 billion in 2003, or 52 billion 
rupiah (5.8 million USD) in the first three years of regional autonomy. These figures represent 
11 , l 0, and 7 percent of the total provincial natural resource transfer in 2001, 2002, 2003 
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respectively, and 4, 4.6, and 3 percent of the total district revenue for each of those years. For 
Kutai Barat, the corresponding amounts were 30 billion rupiah in 200 l , 30 billion in 2002, and 
25 billion in 2003, totally 85 billion rupiah (9.4 million USD), and corresponding to 8%, 5%, 
and 4% of total district realized budget for years 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. 
The East Kalimantan provincial government made use of its coordinating authority in the 
process of DAK-DR allocation to districts to take a share of these funds. In 2003, the province 
allocated l 0% of the DAK-DR funds allocated to the province ( 1.6 billion rupiahs or 180 
thousand USD) to itself. This occurred despite there being no national-level legal instrument or 
decrees stipulating that the province was to obtain a share of the DAK-DR. A senior provincial 
official, however, vehemently argued that this allocation was needed to finance "coordination 
activities and supervision".220 Districts in East Kalimantan, including Bulungan, protested, but 
recognized that they had to accept it because of the province's power in the process.221 
Disbursement of allocated funding 
After being informed of the allocation of DAK-DR, districts were to submit a proposal and 
a Definitive Plan, Rencana Definitif (RD) outlining the activities they wished to fund through 
the DAK-DR, to the Governor, copied to the provincial office of the Directorate General of 
Budget and the BPDAS. This proposal contained the aims and objectives, target locations (the 
area of degraded forests and critical lands, priority watersheds or sub-watersheds), physical and 
cost plans, institutional plans, time plan, and expected results. The tim empat then held a 
meeting with all district representatives (usually the district BAPPEDA official and the project 
leader of the RHL) to assess the proposal and the RD. Details of the RD included, for example, 
how much was to be allocated for reforestation activities (reboisasi - section 5.2. 1) and how 
much for regreening/afforestation (penghijauan - section 5.2.1). The discussion and assessment 
of proposals were carried out based on the allocation of OAK-DR for each district/municipality 
stipulated in the Governor's decree, the feasibility of unit costs of activities, the general pattern 
(pola umum) and standard and RHL criteria stipulated in Minister of Forestry Decree 20 of 
2001, the provincial forestry development plan and the BPDAS plan. 
RDs that had been successfully assessed by the tim empat were then submitted to the 
Governor. The governor then submitted the RDs to the Ministry of Finance. 222 Following the 
assessment, the Ministry of Finance published the list of DAK-DR allocations and sent it to 
each district and municipality. After another series of administrative processes where the list of 
districts' proposed activities (Daftar lsian Proyek) was checked for consistency by the 
Directorate General of Budget, the Ministry of Finance transferred the OAK-DR Fund to the 
"
0 Interview with P-G-8a 
'" Interview with a senior official of Bulungan, B-G-9b 
121 The Director General of Budget, copied to the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, BAPPENAS. These four central government agencies then were to assess the RDs 
submitted by the governor. 
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regional offices of the State Treasury. The money was then disbursed to the districts' accounts 
specifically maintained for DAK-DR. 
The province's coordinating role m the determination of DAK-DR Fund allocation to 
districts has increased the provincial government's power vis-a-vis the districts and 
municipalities and, at least until the DAK-DR Fund was actually disbursed to district 
governments, should not be underestimated. Provincial officials constantly complained about 
the uncooperative behaviour of districts that had occurred as a consequence of decentralisation, 
over the province's requests to follow administrative procedures. However, for obvious reasons, 
districts were all cooperative in following the procedures for the allocation of the DAK-DR 
Fund to districts. 
5.2 Implementation of the RHL Project in Bulungan and 
Kutai Barat 
Because the RHL Project is a national initiative imposed on districts, its implementation 
has to follow national guidelines. Of the four national legal instruments regulating the DAK-DR 
described in section 5.1 above, the General Guidelines specify detailed guidelines for the 
management of the OAK-DR Fund which were to be used to implement the RHL. 2u These are 
discussed below. 
5.2.1 National Guidelines for use of the OAK-DR Fund 
The General Guidelines for the RHL Project (section 5.1 and footnote 210) do not 
explicitly state the objectives of the Project, nor do they prioritize its goals. However, three 
objectives can be extracted from the document: first, the rehabil itation of fores ts; second, the 
rehabilitation of lands; and third, the empowerment of communities. 
The General Guidelines specifically emphasize the active role of community and 
community institutions in the RHL Project, through several provisions: I) DAK-DR is to be 
used as a stimulus for the rehabilitation of degraded forests and critical lands through the 
empowerment of the capacity and capability of community institutions; 2) the implementation 
of RHL activities should be self-managed by communities or swakelola, with the exception of 
RHL activities in the Forest Estate (Kawasan Hutan), that is, reboisasi; community self-
management of reboisasi through swakelola is deemed not suitable; 3) districts and 
municipalities are to act as facilitators, and communities as the initiators and managers, of the 
activities. 
"' Rehabilitation of critical lands began in 1976 through the Presidential Instruction Program 
(INPRES) for reboisasi (reforestation) and penghijauan (regreening). Beginning 1994/95 
rehabilitation was carried out under the Second-tier Government Development Project Schemes 
(Daftar lsian Proyek Tingkat I~. This section is concerned with the current rehabilitation project 
funded through the OAK-DR only. 
131 
The implementation of RHL activities must be carried out in line with the provincial 
forestry and watershed development plans. Implementation also needs to follow the general 
pattern, standard, and criteria of RHL stipulated by the Ministry of Forestry Decree 20 of 200 I . 
The General Guidelines specify that the RHL Project is to rehabilitate degraded forests and 
critical lands. The most recent available data on the area of land classified as critical lands in 
East Kalimantan were 2000 data and are shown in Table 5.4 
Table 5.4 Critical Lands in East Kalimantan, 2000 
District Forest Outside the Total (Ha) % of total Target 
Estate Forest Estate land area for 
(Ha) (Ha) rehabilita 
tion 2004-
2008 (Ha) 
Pasir 50,875 11 8,303 169,178 11.28 13,750 
Balikpapan 7250 14625 21,875 25.44 3,850 
Tarakan 1,813 4,375 6,187 12.20 1,675 
Bulungan 54,351 32,744 87,275 4.96 5,550 
Malinau 406,408 50,118 456,526 L0.71 8,750 
Nunukan 9,500 20,568 30,068 2.22 8,000 
Berau 56,375 74,424 130,799 5.36 7,750 
Kutai 233,843 348,374 582,217 20.20 22,500 
Kertanegara 
Kutai Timur 335,219 254,937 590,156 17.21 20,750 
Kutai Barnt 169,496 376,024 545,519 16.18 20,000 
Samarinda 0 27,563 27,563 32.78 1,550 
Bon tang 18,938 6,062 25,000 61.47 25,000 
Source: calculated from data supplied by BPDAS Mahakam Berau, 2000 
Note: Data prior to the partitioning of the district of Pasir into Pasir and Penajam Pasir 
Utara Districts 
RHL activities are divided into two broad categories: reforestation, known as reboisasi, 
and afforestation, known as penghijauan (regreening) 224 • Reboisasi refers to rehabilitation 
activities through the planting of timber species carried out within the Forest Estate (Kawasan 
Hulan), that is, in forests classified as Production Forests, Protected Forests or Conservation 
Forests. 225 This means that reboisasi is carried out on state lands or lahan negara. Penghijauan 
(regreening) refers to the rehabilitation of degraded community lands, lahan masyarakat (that 
is. on non-state lands), and/or activities related to forest sustainability and watershed 
conservation. 226 
' " Government Regulation 35 of 2000, article 17 
"' With the exception of Nature Reserves and core zones of National Parks; Government 
Regulation 35 of 2000, articles 1 and 17 
22
• Government Regulation No. 35 of 2000, articles 1 and 17 
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The General Guidelines also specify very precisely the ways in which the DAK-DR funds 
are to be used and not used. Notably, they restrict the use of DAK-DR to financing direct 
physical activities of reforestation and regreening, including planning activities. They 
specifically prohibit the use of DAK-DR monies for support activities, including administration 
of the Project, Project preparation, training, extension, travel, and other general costs. They also 
prohibit the use of the DAK-DR funds for financing RHL activities in Production Forests with 
concession rights. 
5.2.2 Implementation of AHL Project in the study Districts 
"Apparently, the measure for success of a rehabilitation activity is perceived 
differently in each area. In Java, rehabilitation is deemed successful only if 
the trees bear fruit. In Kalimantan, plants merely showing signs of growth 
are already called a success. In Irian, just having the courage to attempt to 
plant is perceived as a success. Sometimes we follow regulations rigidly, 
sometimes we do not." (interview with B-G-9b) 
At the time of fieldwork, the RHL Project in Bulungan was a highly sensitive issue; this 
affected the gathering of data and information on this subject. The period of fieldwork coincided 
wi th the height of the formal investigation of one of the previous Project leaders of the RHL for 
the abuse of the DAK-DR Fund. Although both districts had established their own District 
Forestry Service in 2001, in Bulungan the unit became functional only in 2002. Thus, in the 
interim, the implementation of the first year of RHL in Bulungan was distributed among several 
district units, including the District Agricultural Service and the District Fishery Service. 227 A 
Project leader from the District Fishery Service had been arrested for the misuse of the 2001 
allocation of the DAK-DR Fund (section 7.2.4); that particular part of the Fund had been 
earmarked for the rehabilitation of the district's mangrove forests along its east coast. 
The former RHL Project leader of Kutai Barat was also being investigated at the time of 
my fieldwork about alleged misuse of funds; the investigation process was at an earlier stage. 
Unlike the situation in Bulungan, gathering of information and data about the Project in Kutai 
Barat was not affected by the investigation process; officials in Kutai Baral were generally more 
open about the Project compared to their Bulungan counterparts. 
Two strands of issues have been identified in the implementation of the RHL Project in the 
two districts. The first strand of issues relates to the challenge of achieving simu ltaneously the 
triple objectives of the Project - viz reforestation, rehabilitation of critical lands and community 
participation. While resource rep lenishment, ecological objectives, and community 
empowerment outcomes may not necessarily conflict wi th each other, the two district 
"' lnteNiews with B-G-22; B-N-1a 
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governments have not put these three priorities on equal footing. The second strand of issues is 
primarily associated with the challenge of administering such large amounts of funds. While, on 
the one hand, the inflow of funds is always welcomed by districts, on the other, the substantial 
restrictions on the large funds flowing into district coffer have in themselves posed difficulties 
for districts. 
Challenges in achieving the multiple objectives of reforestation, 
rehabilitation of critical lands and community participation 
Although the RHL Project is aimed at rehabilitating degraded forests and critical lands, the 
two case study districts have implemented RHL activities focusing more on the latter. For 
reasons discussed below, reforestation activities to "replenish" the timber resource were, in 
reality, carried out half-heartedly due to practical difficulties as well as the perceived 
uncertainty over who would benefit from future harvest opportunities. 
Reboisasi (reforestation) versus penghij'auan (regreening, afforestation) 
Kutai Barat has emphasized prime local species for timber species, such as ulin 
(Eusideroxylon sp.), in addition to keruing (Dipterocarp sp.), meranti and bengkirai (Shorea 
sp.). Bulungan, however, did not have the same emphasis and has welcomed exotic species such 
as jati emas (Tectona sp.) and Acacia mangium. 
There are four main types of penghijauan carried out in the districts: Hutan Rakyat Murni 
(pure community forests, where timber species are planted on community lands/forests); Hutan 
Rakyat Pola Kebun (community forest gardens, usually comprising fruit tree species); Hutan 
Rakyat Pola Tumpangsari (Taungya), that is, the planting of perennials or other plants among 
timber species; and Aneka Usaha Kehutanan (the planting of non-timber species, such as 
rattan). 
In practice, in both districts, rehabilitation activities have focused more on penghijauan 
activities, while much less reboisasi has been done. This means that only a very small area of 
the Forest Estate (Kawasan Hulan) has been rehabilitated using the DAK-DR Fund. Therefore, 
very little of the logged-over production forests and protected forest areas are being 
rehabilitated; instead, much of the planting activity has been done on community lands and 
gardens. 
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Table 5.5 Reboisasi and Penghijauan activities in Bulungan and Kutai Barat 
(2002-2004) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 
R p R p R p 
IBulungan New planting 550 1721 800 1851 200 2160 
(Ha) 
Maintaining 
550 1346 0 0 previous year's 
planting (Ha) 
New planting 
(Ha) 1000* 5660* 200* 2307* 200 5505 
IKutai Barat Maintaining 
previous year's 425* 4653* 0 1360 
planting (Ha) 
Source: extracted data from East Kahmantan Province Forestry Service (2004) and Kuta1 
Barat Forestry Service (2004) 
Notes: R = reboisasi (reforestation, Forest Estate); P = penghijauan (afforestation, other 
than Forest Estate) 
No symbol = target or planned; * = realized 
Reboisasi is not attractive to communities because it is carried out on state lands. 
Consequently, communities planting such lands are most likely not entitled to harvest those 
trees in the future. However, according to a Kutai Barat forestry official involved in the RHL 
Project, the difficulties for reboisasi primarily lie in identifying the area to be rehabilitated, as it 
is difficult to differentiate between a piece of land that has been claimed by masyarakat as 
theirs, and which has not. As this official explained: 
"When wc look at the map, sure, administratively we can see the lines that 
delineate state forests from non-state lands, but when we visit the location, it 
is difficult to determine" (interview with K-G- l 7a). 
Although much of the forest area in the two districts, as in other parts of the Outer Islands, 
have been delineated as Forest Estate, in practice many communities have claimed these forests 
as historically theirs (Barber et al., 1994; Lynch and Harwell, 2002). Consequently, there are 
very few areas of state lands with no claims over them. District officials also wanted to avoid 
conflict with communities, to the extent possible, posing a further constraint for reboisasi. m 
Another difficulty has been in identifying Production Forests over which there are no 
concession rights. 
"' Interviews with K-G-1c, K-G-17b, K-G-17c, K-G-18a 
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In both dist1icts, the RHL activities have involved the planting of more fruit trees and non-
timber species than timber species (kayu-kayuan). In Bulungan, the preferred species have been 
fruit trees and cocoa. The current fruit production from Bulungan is marketed in the 
neighbouring Tarakan municipality and exported to Tawau, Malaysia. In addition, a new road to 
Tanjung Redeb, the capital of the neighbouring district of Berau south of Bulungan has opened 
up new market opportunities for products from Bulungan. This development has made the 
planting of fruit trees more attractive to communities. In Kutai Barat, the cultivation of rattan 
has had a long history and has been one of the major non-timber forest products of the district. 
The cultivation of rattan thus has been a popular type of RHL activity in the district. 
Figure 5.1 Livelihood dependence on forests and its promise 
Two women processing rattan, a valuable non-timber forest product in Kutai Barat. 
The RHL Project, if implemented successfully, can continue to secure this 
source of livelihood in the longer term. Photo by Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, 2004 
The planting of timber species is not attractive to communities for several reasons. First, 
the period between planting and harvest is too long. The long time interval before timber can be 
harvested poses a disincentive to planting timber species compared with fast producing, non-
timber species. In Bulungan, for instance, cocoa was one of the chosen species because the 
harvest can begin as early as four years after planting. In comparison, Dipterocarps would take 
at least 30 years before reaching a diameter suitable for commercial harvest. Second, 
communities are reluctant to plant timber species because there is no guarantee that they will be 
able to actually harvest or benefit from those trees in the future. Learning from historical 
experience, the community generally perceived that there is no guarantee that government 
policy at the time of harvest will allow them to benefit from their planting, even if the trees had 
been planted on what they claimed to be their own lands. The insecu1ity of tenure and the 
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frequent changes in Central policy, which were often more favourable to cominercial timber 
companies than to local communities, have discouraged communities from planting trees for 
timber; rather, they prefer to plant non-timber species such as fruit trees or cocoa. 229 In addition, 
timber species have generally been less popular than other commodity species because the 
marketing of timber from legally recognized private lands is also burdened with administrative 
documentation in order for the timber to be recognized as legal. The rampant illegal logging in 
timber producing areas across Indonesia has made the provision of legal documentation for any 
timber, important. 
Improving critical lands versus community participation 
The second and third purposes of the RHL are the enhancement of degraded lands and the 
empowerment of communities through their active involvement in RHL activities. While these 
ecological and community participation outcomes may not necessarily conflict with each other, 
the two district governments clearly have found it difficult to put these two priorities on equal 
footing: districts have tended to prioritize the community aspect. 
Community participation 
According to the General Guidelines, the DAK-DR funded RHL Project must involve the 
active participation of the community and community institutions. In principle, the two districts 
have both attempted to apply this notion of community participation. Jn practice, however, a 
number of issues have arisen in its implementation. 
Procedures for community participation 
Reboisasi and regreening both involve the participation of communities but in different 
ways. Typically, members of a community form a farmer group or Kelompok Tani. Each group 
usually consists of 25 to 50 members and has a leader. Regreening activities are usually carried 
out through swakelola, that is, they are self-managed by communities. 
One of the challenges of the districts in the first years of the Project was to promote the 
establishment of the farmer groups that would participate in the Project. Kutai Barat attempted 
to improve the process and administration of the RHL Project, including the process for 
communities to participate in the Project. First, communities were encouraged to form farmer 
groups or Kelompok Tani. The Kelompok Tani then submitted a proposal to the District Forestry 
Service. 
Because it was costly for members of the Kelompok Tani to administer these in the district 
capital , usually a few members were selected to represent the Kelompok Tani in handling 
administrative matters, including receiving the Project's monies. These representatives were 
"' For instance, interview with a village administrator in Bulungan, B-C-1 
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commonly referred to as the pengurus, usually comprising the leader and one or two other 
members of the Kelompok Tani. 
After proposals were received by the District Forestry Service, they sent a team to conduct 
sosialisasi and prakondisi (often commonly referred to as sospra) to the villages. Sosialisasi 
and prakondisi activities were carried out by a team from the District Forestry Service; they 
checked the administrative consistencies between the proposals submitted and the reality on the 
ground. This included checking the existence of the farmer groups, the preparedness of the 
groups, and the availability of support from the relevant village and adat institutions. 230 Thus, 
sospra was carried out both to disseminate information about the Project to villages and to 
assess the feasibility of villagers' involvement in the Project and its conformity with 
requirements. 
Provided that a Kelompok Tani had passed the administrative and institutional checks done 
through sospra, the District Forestry Service then prepared a technical plan for each Kelompok 
Tani. The primary objective of preparing this plan was to gather data on the proposed location 
and to plan physical activities. Through this process it would be determined whether the area 
proposed for rehabilitation met the criteria for the type of activity proposed (either penghijauan 
or reboisasi) and whether the plant types or species proposed would be accepted by the Project. 
These proposals and the technical plans laying out the feasibility of their implementation 
together provide the basis on which the Project leader of RHL (usually jointly with a 
BAPPEDA official), prepared the district RHL proposal for negotiation with the provincial team 
of four to obtain the district's DAK-DR allocation (section 5.1.1 ). 
Upon initiation of Project activities, the partnership arrangement between the District 
Forestry Service and the Kelompok Tani was finalized with the signing of a Cooperation 
Agreement (Surat Perjanjian Kerjasama, SPK); the RHL Project leader represented the District 
and the leader or the pengurus of the Kelompok Tani represented the Kelompok Tani. The SPK 
specified the responsibilities of the Kelompok Tani, the amount of funds allocated to carry out 
those responsibilities, the process of disbursement of the funds, as well as the procurement of 
seedlings, fertilizers, herbicides and equipment. 
The District Forestry Service disbursed the money with which to finance the activities 
directly to the Kelompok Tani, according to a predetermined schedule specified in the SPK. 
Usually, the monies were disbursed in stages, corresponding to the progress of activities 
completed. 
>JO Analyzed from Kutai Barat's documents (including the 2004 Dokumen Anggaran Satuan Kerja 
Oinas Kehutanan) and interview with a district forestry otticial involved in the RHL Project (K-G-
17c) 
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Specifically for reboisasi, the management of the activities was assigned to a business 
entity with a corporate status, usually a CV 231 , rather than to communities. The CV then usually 
hired villagers or workers, also grouped as a Kelompok Tani to do the planting and other field 
activities. This was in line with the General Guidelines as because of their nature, reboisasi 
activities were perceived to be too difficult to be carried out by communities; thus community 
self-management (swakelola) was deemed not feasible (section 5.2. 1 ). 
The procurement of seedlings, fertilizers, herbicides, and sometimes equipment for both 
reboisasi and penghijauan were typically assigned to a third party (contractors/businesses). 
Provided that they had the capacity, Kutai Barat allowed the participating Kelompok Tani to 
prepare the seedlings themselves. The appointment of a third party to provide the seedlings had 
been meant to ensure both the availability and quality of seedlings. As this was a large-scale 
Project, a large quantity of seedlings was required. The third party, however, rather than 
providing the seedlings themselves, often bought seedlings from farmers - farmers participating 
in the RHL Project in the Kelompok Tani or·non-participating farmers. Although this activity 
provided another source of income for communities, the provision of seedlings by communities 
has been critic ised as having resulted in the use of seedlings of not only uneven quality but in 
particular, inferior to the required standard, leading to inferior quality of plants or their lower 
rate of survival. 232 The head of Kutai Barat Forestry Service, however, was strongly of the view 
that local communities were capable of supplying good quality seedlings. m 
Similar procedures for community-district partnership arrangements, with some variations 
or different emphasis, were applied in Bulungan. Variations on the procedure of Kutai Barat, 
however, were found in Bulungan, including in the formation of the Kelompok Tani and the 
extent of sosialisasi. The ways in which Kelompok Tani were formed and the extent of actual 
sosialisasi activities have affected or contributed to the two major issues surrounding the notion 
of participation of communities identified in the Project: the benefits of the Project accruing to 
district or community-level elites and conflicts among community members. These are 
discussed next. 
Issues concerning community participation in RHL 
While Project funds can be substantial, the significant unit cost for RHL activities 
nevertheless does not allow for the participation of all members of the district rural community 
in the Project. Equally limiting are the financial and human resources of the District Forestry 
Servit:e to manage Project activities, as the administrative procedures that must be managed by 
this office to effectively achieve the Project's objectives are tedious and time consuming. For 
'
3
' CV, from the Dutch term Commanditaire Vennootschap, a partnership firm with one or more 
silent partners who only contribute capital. 
"' For instance, interviews with B-L-1 b; B-L-2; B-G-11 b ; B-N-1 a: K-L(M/A)-2 
m Interview with K-G-' 
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instance, checking the Kelompok Tani requirements, the location, type of vegetation, monitoring 
progress of activities and disbursing the monies all require detailed work. Thus, only a 
proportion of community members can form Kelompok Tani and become involved in the 
Project. In Kutai Barat, 83 and 173 Kelompok Tani participated in the RHL project in 2002 and 
2003 implementation years, respectively. 
Benefit capture from the RHL Project 
In the first year of the Project (implemented in 2002 but under the 2001 DAK-DR Fund), 
information regarding the Project in both study districts was disseminated through subdistricts 
and further down through village heads. In practice, information regarding the Project was 
largely captured by village elites. These elites were able to secure information on the Project 
because they had the means to find out such information, due to their position, or their 
connection with officials in the district capital. They consequently often seized the opportunities 
themselves and mobilized relatives to form Kelompok Tani (section 6.2.4). The reach of the 
implementation of the RHL Project was therefore often limited to these elite circles. 
Consequently, many members of the community were excluded and did not enjoy any benefit 
from the Project. Kutai Barat, however, subsequently attempted to improve this situation 
through active dissemination of information through sospra, as described above. 
In Bulungan, the formation of the Kelompok Tani notably involved the appointment of 
contractors by the Project leader. These contractors were usually vi llage heads, adat leaders, 
local entrepreneurs, or outsiders who had the information about the Project and/or had access to 
the Project leader. The contractors were responsible for recruiting villagers to establish the 
Kelompok Tani. This recruitment process resulted in two types of beneficiaries: particular 
segments of the community had more opportunity to participate than others, and those 
participating did not necessarily have the capacity. Thus, as noted above, those with the right 
network or connections had more opportunities to participate in the Project; they were not 
always the people who needed it or were capable of doing it. 
There is also an underlying issue related to labour availability, which constrains many 
community members' capacity to participate in and thus derive direct benefit from the Project. 
The rural communities in both of the districts are mostly swidden farmers who meet their 
subsistence needs for staple food through dry land rice agriculture. In these areas, as in many of 
the Outer Islands, labour is the limiting factor. 234 The planting season in both the ladang 
(swidden plots) and in the RHL Project is short, normally from August through October. Thus, 
the period when farmers need to focus their labour to tend to their swidden coincides with 
rehabilitation activities. This has been one of the difficulties in attracting farmers to participate 
2
" See for instance, Sunderlin et al. (2000) and Angelsen and Resosudarmo (1999) 
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in the Project235 and has been among the justifications for using contractors in their 
recruitment. 236 Because tending to their ladang, understandably, remains a priority for many 
farmers, ensuring that participating farmers exert an adequate effort and time to tend to the 
rehabilitation activities, including maintaining the previous year's planting, continues to be a 
challenge for Project officials.237 In such circumstances, the limited capacity of the district 
governments in terms of both personnel and operational resources poses not only administrative 
constraints, but also very real practical obstacles in maximizing the probability of success of the 
rehabilitation activities. 
Limited sosialisasi of the Project among communities reinforces the tendency to 
concentrate beneficiaries into a limited circle of individuals or certain segments of the district 
community. Bulungan conducted limited sosialisasi (see also Financial Issues below), which 
continued at least through the period of fieldwork. However, even though the RHL Project was 
well into its third year of implementation when the major fieldwork was conducted, Bulungan, 
unlike Kutai Barat, neither provided nor disseminated written guidelines for participation in the 
RHL Project. 238 This was confirmed in interviews with village leaders, who had to "seek 
information for and about the Project themselves".239 According to village leaders, however, this 
is less of an issue now, because after a few years of implementation, the communities are more 
familiar with the Project and are thus more interested in participating. 
Horizontal conflicts among and within communities 
At least partly related to the first issue, the second problem associated with community 
involvement in the Project has been conflicts among members within a Kelompok Tani, and 
between community members not included in the Kelompok Tani with those in the Kelompok 
Tani (see also section 6.2.4 ). 
The simple requirement to participate in the Project has led to problems, including the 
people supposedly representing the Kelompok Tani (the pengurus) not actually residing in the 
village where the Kelompok Tani was located; listed members of Kelompok Tani did not 
actually exist; members of the Kelompok Tani only provided signatures but did not know what 
the Project was all about, nor knew what their responsibilities and rights were with regard to the 
Project; conflicts over claims on the land/area where the rehabilitation activities were supposed 
to be carried out; and the pengurus supposedly representing the Kelompok Tani kept the Project 
money for themselves and not sharing it with the other members of the Kelompok Tani. 2' 0 To 
21
s Interview with 8-P-8 
"' Interview with 8-G-26 
"' Interview with 8-G-21 a; 8-G-22; 8-G-26 
"' Interview with a 8ulungan forestry official involved in the RHL Project, 8-G-25 
'" Interviews with 8-C-4 and B-P-8 
"° For instance, the pengurus of the farmer groups in the subdistricts of MP, D, and J, were 
alleged to have siphoned off a large portion of the funds disbursed by the District Forestry 
Service for reforestation activities. Interviews with three members of the farmer group from the 
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address the problems encountered during 2002 that had led to conflicts among and within 
communities, Kutai Barat has since improved the procedures for the formation of Kelompok 
Tani. 
The rehabilitation of critical lands 
As described in section 5.2. l , the triple objectives of the RHL Project are the rehabilitation 
of forests, the rehabilitation of lands, and the empowerment of communities. To achieve the first 
two objectives, degraded forests and critical lands (that is, degraded lands, see section 5.1. l ) is 
specified as one of the criteria for implementing RHL activities. However, in practice, 
rehabilitation of critical lands did not emerge as a high priority for districts, for reasons outlined 
below. 
At the district level, the District Forestry Service prepared a masterplan for RHL in the 
district, based on data and a map of critical lands in the district. This masterplan should be 
consistent with the provincial masterplan of RHL. However, in Kutai Barnt, the emphasis of the 
Project was on the third objective, the participation of communities. The objectives of the 
rehabilitation of forests and the rehabilitation of lands appear to become only a secondary 
consideration. As a senior district fores try official put it: 
"It is not important whether the Project is successful or not, it is not 
important whether or not the money is embezzled by the communities. The 
important thing is that communities have access." (interview with K-G-1 a) 
When asked whether the critical lands criterion was important in the implementation of the 
Project in the district, this officer's response was: 
"Well, we do have a map of critical lands in the district ... we use the map to 
allocate RHL activities. But the locations are only a guide. If there are huge 
areas of critical lands in an area, but no farmer groups have submitted a 
proposal to work in that area, then what is the point? So for the time being, 
firstly, RHL activities are carried out in areas identified in the proposals 
submitted. Secondly, we prioritize areas with a high probability of success 
rate and little conflict. Now we prioritize communities, rather than placing 
emphasis on critical lands. We actually have the data on critical lands, 
though they are incomplete. But we follow parts of it; our approach 
emphasises community." (interview with K-G-la) 
Indeed, although the implementation of RHL began in 2002, the provincial Master Plan for 
Rehabilitation was only completed in 2004. Furthermore, according to a provincial BAPPEDA 
village of Tl, the sub district of J, Kutai Barat, K-C-5, K-C-6 and K-C-7; Ka/tim Post, 29 
September, 2003d, Kaltim Post, 5 January, 2004a. 
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senior official who was a member of the rim empat, the map on which the master plan is based 
may not necessarily reflect the real conditions in the field. 241 
The emphasis on the community aspect rather than on the natural resource to be remedied 
or enhanced is also reflected in the criterion used by both districts in selecting Kelompok Tani or 
determining the RHL areas. This criterion has been equity of access: regardless of the locations 
of degraded lands, the activities were to be distributed ·across each and every subdistrict. 242 The 
argument for ensuring RHL is carried out across all subdistiicts is political, as the RHL is seen 
as (and is) a government Project, and thus its benefits should be distributed evenly across the 
districts.w However, recognizing the disappointing outcomes, in 2004 the Bupati of Kutai Barat 
reconsidered this priority; subsequently, locations were primarily based on the probability of 
success. In Bulungan, priority on the wide distribution of Project money across the district 
continued at least into 2004. 
Figure 5.2 The challenges of the Forest and Land Rehat)ilitation Project 
A reboisasi (reforestation) site, Kutai Barat. Is reforestation necessary in such naturally 
occurring secondary growth? Photo by Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, 2004 
My field observations of several locations of reboisasi and penghijauan in both dist1icts 
confirmed that, at least in some locations, RHL activities were carried out in areas where 
secondary forest growth was naturally occurring or in already matured gardens. A senior 
241 Interview with P-G-6 
lAl Interviews with B-G-9b; K-G-1 e 
243 Interview with K-G-1 e 
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forestry official of Kutai Barat admitted that the district carried out reboisasi in forest areas or 
penghijauan in mature gardens where it would not have been necessary in terms of 
forest/vegetative cover, but argued that it would nevertheless make sense to plant commercially 
marketable commodity species in such areas.244 In Bulungan, the mature garden visited, which 
was part of the RHL Project, belonged to a family member of the village head. Seedlings were 
planted among I 0-12 year old fruit trees. 
In addition to being strongly network-based, as discussed above, the recruitment process of 
Kelompok Tani in Bulungan has also been heavily target-oriented. Rather than targeting those 
most appropriate to be involved in the Project, however, the district has used contractors to 
recruit as many Kelompok Tani as possible because of the large amount of money in the DAK-
DR Fund. Consequently, the recruitment process has frequently resulted in the establishment of 
Kelompok Tani whose members were not farmers, but non-farmers including business actors 
such as traders. These people had no agricultural or forestry skills, but have participated in the 
Project only because they had connections to the contractors, the Project leader, or other 
influential officials, and did so just for the sake of obtaining the Project's money. 245 Even in 
Kutai Barat, whose government had clearly put much effort into reaching a wider segment of 
community-based participants through more effective sospra, the participation of "farmers 
wearing a tie" (petani berdasi) has been an issue in the RHL Project. This term denotes 
technocrats (that, is, non-farmers) who are close to higher-level people in the district 
govemment.246 The recruitment of Kelompok Tani whose members comprise "farmers" without 
the capability of actually carrying out the rehabilitation activities can adversely affect its 
effectiveness. In this way, the outcome of the Project, in terms of the objectives of reforestation 
and rehabilitation of critical lands, has been prejudiced. 
Going through contractors rather than directly working with Kelompok Tani has also meant 
that the value of funds spent on the actual planting activities was lower than would appear on 
the books as rehabi litation costs, as some of the money would have gone to these contractors. 
This potentially lowers the rehabilitation outcome in terms of quality and/or quantity even 
further. Therefore, the use of contractors has not only turned a significant portion of the benefits 
away from communities, but also siphoned off part of the Project money that otherwise could be 
used for direct rehabilitation activities, and thus has implications for resource rehabilitation 
outcomes. 
Both districts have thus focused on the most direct and short term benefits o f the Project -
by focusing on the community participation aspect, or ostensibly so - rather than on the longer-
term rehabilitation outcomes. There is an attitude emphasizing use of the money in the districts; 
'" Interview with K-G-1 b 
,., Interview with 8-N-1 b 
,.. Interview with K-G-3b 
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resource replenishment and ecological improvement a secondary consideration. As a senior 
district forestry official of Kutai Barat recalled: 
"The chairman of the DPRD said, rather than having to return the money to 
the Centre, we just squander that 30 billion rupiah to communities in the 
district." (interview with K-G-1 b) 
Some of the participating farmers interviewed have shown genuine understanding and 
interest in rehabilitation and in the long-term livelihood opportunity of penghijauan activities 247 , 
whereas others have shown a "project attitude", focusing more on the government handouts, 
rather than on the rehabilitation activities.248 District functiona1ies recognized that some farmers 
participated merely for short term cash. 249 In Kutai Barat, there were cases where fires burned 
out RHL areas, one of which occurred dming the time of fieldwork. A DPRD member was 
suspicious that the fires were lit deliberately to enable the use of the Project funds, originally 
allocated for maintenance, for personal use. When I enquired about this with one of the district 
forestry officials handling the RHL Project, the official only responded that the District Forestry 
Service was looking into the case. 250 
Figure 5.3 The challenges of the Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project 
One failed site of the RHL Project, Kutai Barat. Photo by Ida Aju Pradnja 
Resosudarmo, 2004 
2
•
1 For instance, shown through focus group discussion with K-C-5 
24
& Interviews with K-C-6; K-C-7; K-C-8; K-C-9 
249 Interviews with K-G-3b; K-L-1 
250 Interview with K-G-17c 
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Financial issues in the implementation of the RHL Project 
While, on the one hand, the size of the DAK-DR Fund is a blessing for the districts, on the 
other hand, its appropriate management has been a challenge. The difficulties have included the 
untimely disbursement of the funds, their abuse, and restrictions on their uses. 
Timing of the disbursement of funds versus Project implementation 
When interviewed on the topic of the inflow of the OAK-DR Fund, district officials, 
particularly those responsible for the districts' finances, made much of the timing of its 
disbursement to the districts. Since 2001 its allocation to districts has always come very late in 
the budget year, as late as November (Chapter 4). The larger portion of the 2002 allocation was 
actually disbursed by the Ministry of Forestry in 2003 (see notes in Table 5.3). 
In re.ality, the Project is a rolling multi-year Project, rather than an annual Project: the 2001 
DAK-DR allocation was used to finance activities in 2002; the 2002 allocation was used to 
finance activities in 2003; and the 2003 allocation was used to support activities implemented in 
2004. Consequently, districts would have sufficient time to plan their activities. Therefore, the 
timing of the disbursement of the funds well into a particular year, while it complicates the 
districts' annual budget estimates, should not significantly affect the process and the way the 
Fund is used. 251 
On the contrary, the significant amount of DAK-DR monies allocated each year to both 
districts posed a difficulty in a different direction: the under-utilisation of the Fund. Because of 
the restrictions on what it can be used for, spending the large sums of the DAK-DR Fund has 
been a problem for districts. For example, Kutai Barat could not spend the entire amount of the 
2002 allocation (for RHL implementation in 2003). By early 2004, the district had accumulated 
55 billion rupiahs (6 million USD) in its DAK-DR account.m Apparently, underspending has 
been an issue for each and all thirteen districts/municipalities in East Kalimantan right through 
2007. As of July 2007, the unspent DAK-DR Fund in these East Kalimantan 
districts/municipalities' bank accounts reached I trillion rupiah (about 111 million USD) 
(Tempo!nteraktif, 21July,2007b). 
According to a senior Kutai Baral forestry official, the main reason for the "failures" to use 
up the DAK-DR Fund allocated for year 2003 implementation was that the (then new) Project 
leader was too cautious in managing the DAK-DR Fund and the RHL activities. This was 
largely influenced by the investigation of the previous Project leader for alleged 
mismanagement of the Fund. Similarly, the 2002 OAK-DR Project leader in Bulungan was 
arrested in early 2004 and charged with the mismanagement of the Fund (see also Issues 
"' Both districts have also found ways to address this issue. Since 2003, the OAK-DR monies 
were no longer included in the districts' budget estimates, instead, they were recorded in the 
district budgets only after they were actually realized (that is, transferred to district accounts) 
which usually takes place in the following year. 
"' Kutai Barat's Bupati accountability report, 2004 
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concerning community participation in RHL, above, and Chapter 7). Not surprisingly in the 
light of these investigations, the RHL Project leader of Bulungan during the course of my 
fieldwork showed not only caution in implementing the Project, but also a reluctance to take on 
the responsibility of being the RHL Project leader (Chapter 7). 
The opportunity for the abuse of the DAK-DR Fund 
Despite the control and supervisory responsibility of the Provincial Forestry Service, once 
these funds are transferred into the districts' accounts, their actual use is entirely under the 
control of district governments. The Ministry of Forestry and provincial forestry officials have 
expressed the suspicion that the OAK-DR had been used for purposes other than reforestation 
activities and/or abused by district officials for personal gain. 253 According to a senior forestry 
official of Kutai Baral, abuse of the Fund was possible because "while the administration of the 
Project, both in terms of the finances and the activities, is stringent, the implementation is lax." 
(interview with K-G-3b) 
Provincial control and supervision over the Project have been limited largely to 
administrative aspects. Any deviations in the actual implementation, however, are not easy to 
detect by mere ly evaluating the administrative aspects. In Bulungan, the RHL Project activities 
were often given to and carried out by contractors prior to the actual allocation of the OAK-DR 
monies from the Centre, or prior to the disbursement of the funds as part of the district's 
expenditure in the district budget. This was done through the signing of undated contracts. ' 5' In 
such cases, the contractors pre-funded the activities, or sought a third party, a backer, to fund 
them. In return, officials who had a role in the granting of the contracts obtained a "fee". >ss In 
Bulungan, such cases were often revealed when the activities were completed but the funding 
was not yet disbursed by the district government, for whatever reasons; the backers would then 
demand payment. 256 
Other alleged abuses have included the mark-up of the costs of seedlings, planting, or 
maintenance. For instance, the price of seedlings was often inflated; they were actually procured 
for much less from the original farmers. 257 The difference in price went to the contractor/the 
supplier of the seedlings, district officials who were influential in giving the contractor the 
"' Interviews with N-G-2, N-G-5, N-G-9, P-G-5; P-G-7; P-G-8a 
"' Interviews with 8-L-1 b; B-L-2 
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25
• The pre-funding of districts' projects by a backer or a contractor has been common in both of 
the s tudy districts, particularly in infrastructure development and the development of physical 
structures. This is commonly referred as voor financiering. In both districts voor financiering 
arrangements were made over very large sums of money (interviews with K-G-14b; 8-L-1 a); in 
8ulungan in 2004 the amount reached nearly half of the entire district budget (interview with 8-
L-1 a). Formally, this was done to ensure continuing economic (that is, development) activities in 
the districts, however, informally, to secure projects for certain contractors, again, in return for a 
fee for relevant district officials. 
"' Interviews with B-N-1 a; K-L-1 
147 
Project, and other actors (such as middle-men and the pengurus of the Kelompok Tani) . The 
main implication of the mark-up has been for the quality of the seedlings, which has been lower 
than the standard required for the quoted price. 
Similarly, the quoted costs for planting and soil preparation were often inflated, and were 
higher than the money the fanners in the Kelompok Tani actually received, with the difference 
siphoned away through the chain of bureaucracy, contractors and the backers. 258 Officials of 
both districts and members of Bulungan's legislature admitted that there were higher powers in 
the district hierarchy above the Project leader, including within the legislature, who played a 
role (and presumably also benefited) from these deviations or were influential in the granting of 
contracts (section 7 .2.4 ). 2s9 
More generally, the RHL and GNRHL Projects have ensured that the provision of 
seedlings for reforestation has become a big business .260 Companies supplying one of the 
popular exotic species in East Kalimantan, jati emas (Tectona sp), have allegedly used 
"incentives" to persuade District Forestry Service officials to use their seedlings in their 
respective districts.261 
Given its rubric of community empowerment through the active participation of 
community members, the RHL Project has also been an easy target for abuse. Among those 
noted by interviewees in Bulungan was the abuse of the Partnership Agreement concerning 
regreening activities, between the district government and the Kelompok Tani (the SPK). 262 The 
modus operandi has included the signing, supposedly by the representative of the Kelompok 
Tani, of an agreement which can then be manipulated: either a blank agreement, an agreement 
in which the area to be rehabilitated was not specified, an agreement without any specifications 
of the unit costs of tasks, or an undated agreement. 26l Similar suspect agreements occurred in 
reboisasi. 264 The terms of the agreements thus were easily orchestrated to allow for the mark-up 
of costs or other deviations, including imaginary activities. These sorts of abuses clearly 
prejudice the outcomes of the RHL Project in terms of each of its objectives - rehabilitation of 
forests, rehabilitation of lands, and community benefits from the Project. 
Restrictive uses of the DAK-DR Fund versus districts' needs 
The districts' other explanation for the difficulty of "using up" funds in time relates to the 
strict restrictions on the uses of the DAK-DR Fund allocated to regions. That is, it is restricted 
to actual rehabilitation activities and may not be used for support activities. ft can only be used 
2
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1 1nterviews with B-L-1b; B-L-2; B-N-1a 
m Interview with B-L-1b; K-G-17b; B-G-21a; B-G-22b 
'"" Interviews with N-A-2 
"' Interview with N-A-2 
"' Interviews with B-L-1b; B-L-2; B-N-21 
263 Interviews with B-L-1 b; B-L-2 
"' Interviews with B-L-1b; B-L-2 
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for planting activities, including the clearing and preparation of the land, provision of seedlings, 
planting, and fertilizers. It is not to be used for activities such as administration of the Project or 
physical structures, let alone for other, non-forestry development expenditure. For Kutai Barat, 
supporting activities consist of sosialisasi and prakondisi, the provision of technical guidance 
(bimbingan teknis), and evaluation and monitoring. However, as described in section 5.2. 1, 
these supporting activities must be financed through the distric t budget from non DAK-DR 
sources. 
District forestry o fficials argued that the restriction on RHL support activities being 
financed from the DAK-DR Fund was one of the main obstacles to carrying out Project 
activities.265 On the one hand, the amount of supporting funds allocated by both of the study 
districts was small compared to the amount of funds allocated for the core activities. Bulungan 
provided 3.6%, 6%, and 1.6% for 2002, 2003, and 2004 activities, respectively ; Kutai Barat 
allocated 2% and 3.4% for 2003 and 2004 activities, respectively. Both the Governor and 
deputy Governor of East Kalimantan had several times instructed the Bupatis to increase the 
RHL supporting funds commensurate with the core DAK-DR Fund, but these directives had 
largely fallen on deaf ears. 266 On the other hand, the nature of the Project which heavily 
emphasises the involvement and active participation of communities makes support processes 
such as sosialisasi and prakondisi to which the monies from the DAK-DR Fund are not to be 
channelled, critical to the success of the Project. Consequently, in Bulungan, sosialisasi and 
prakondisi of the Project was not only inadequate, as acknowledged by district officials267 , but 
in some villages, totally absent. 263 
The limited supporting funds restricted the ability of district forestry officials to carry out 
sosialisasi and prakondisi activities appropriately, in particular in the more remote villages. In 
Bulungan, for activity year 2004 (the implementation of the 2003 DAK-DR allocation), the 
supporting funds were not allocated within the budget of the District Forestry Service as the 
Project's implementing agency, but in that of the District Secretariat. 269 This affected the 
implementation of the Project. 
Although the separation of the repository of the supporting funds from the authority of the 
RHL Project can function as a control mechanism, district forestry officials claimed that the 
Jack of autl10rity of the implementing unit (the District Forestry Service) over these funds has 
complicated the operations of the Project.210 Lack of coordination between the two units has 
been blamed for causing delays in Project activities. 211 For instance, according to district 
'" Interviews with B-G-21 a; B-G-22 
266 Interviews with P-G-6; P-G-8a 
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forestry officials, officials from the district secretariat would only disburse the funds if their 
"demands" that the latter take part in the sosialisasi and prakondisi visits to villages - although 
these visits were not included in their tasks - were met. Officials on business trips, such as these 
sosialisasi and prakondisi visits, are entitled to a travel allowance. Albeit not large, the travel 
allowance has provided district officials with a source of formal and thus legitimate, additional 
income. 
This case highlights the issue of competition for authority over scarce district resources 
(that is, district's funds outside the DAK-DR) between district units. In both districts, the 
District Forestry Service is often perceived as a "rich unit'', both formally and informally (see 
also section 6.3.2). This perception is associated with the characteristics of the "goods" under 
the unit's responsibility: forestry is seen as a revenue and income generating sector, rather than 
a sector that largely incurs costs. such as health and education (Appendix 1). Formally, as 
discussed in section 4.6, in terms of funding, the RHL Project has been one of the largest 
projects in the districts for three consecutive years. Informally, forestry provides many 
possibilities for rent-seeking and informal benefit capture through various types of abuses, in 
the administration and implementation of both the RHL Project and logging activities (section 
6.3.2). The District Forestry Service is thus perceived as being capable of "seeking its own 
funding" (that is, informally) to support its activities. Because of the perception that the District 
Forestry Service is showered with both formal and informal funds, the general perception 
among other district units has been that the limited, but more flexible, balance of districts' 
resources should be directed to other units. 
In Kutai Baral, the trend had been the opposite of that of Bulungan with regard to the locus 
of the RHL supporting funds. In 2002 this fund was handled by the BAPPEDA (the district 
planning unit), while in 2003 and 2004 the supporting funds were handled directly by the 
forestry service. 212 The change has speeded up the sosialisasi and prakondisi process. In 2004, 
the District Forestry Service established 15 teams, each consisting of 3-5 forestry officials, to 
carry out the sosialisasi and prakondisi process in all 15 sub-districts. 213 
The general lack of supporting funds made available from the district budget outside the 
DAK-DR Fund has, however, critically affected the ways in which the rehabilitation activities 
were carried out. For instance, the capacity of the local governments to monitor the actual 
planting or maintenance of the activities is extremely limited, in particular in terms of the 
number of personnel and in the monies allocated to make field visits. To overcome this 
problem, Kutai Barat hired foremen (mandor), usually residing in the same village as the 
villagers forming the Kelompok Tani, to ensure that the latter carried out the activities. The 
"' Interview with Kutai Barat's RHL project leader for 2003 and 2004, 26 July 2004, K-G-• 
"' The district now has 21 sub-districts (section 1.5.4); some of the original sub-districts 
were partitioned into new sub-districts 
150 
activities of the foremen are considered part of the core rehabilitation activities; thus, their fees 
are paid through the core RHL budget, rather than from the support funds. 
Bulungan at one point approached the Ministry of Forestry and attempted, but failed, to 
negotiate the use of the DAK-DR Fund for other purposes.214 Senior district officials both in the 
office of the Bupati and in the District Forestry Service were adamant that they should have 
been given the autonomy to use the Fund as they saw fit, according to the needs of the district. 
In particular, senior district officials argued that, as it belongs to the districts, the use of the 
districts' portion of the OAK-DR Fund should not have been limited to RHL activities, but 
could be used for infrastructure dcvelopment.275 In both districts, infrastructure development has 
been high on the district governments' priority list. 
A senior official of Kutai Barat Finance Office vehemently denied the DAK-DR Fund had 
been used for (official) purposes other than RHL. He insisted that the DAK-DR Fund was put in 
an account specifically maintained for the Fund and, only used for RHL, and thus was not 
possible to be used for other development purposes. The actual use of money in the districts' 
budget, however, is largely within the discretion of the district government, although the district 
government must be accountable to the legislature for their actions (Chapter 7). The possibility 
of using the DAK-DR Fund for other purposes was substantiated by a senior Bulungan official, 
who admitted that while the DAK-DR Fund is restricted for RHL, district government's 
exclusive control over the use of its budget has meant that it can borrow the Fund for other 
purposes when needed. He did, however, emphasize that any use of the Fund other than for 
RHL would eventually have to be replaced.276 
Despite the Centre's strict restrictions, however, Bulungan managed to use a significant 
portion of the DAK-DR Fund to finance the fencing structure around the 86-hectare town forest 
without any legal consequences. 277 This use of DAK-DR Fund that deviated from the General 
Guidelines was endorsed by the DPRD (legislature), with the major purpose of preventing 
encroachment on the forest. 271 
The Provincial Forestry Service has been assigned the responsibility of monitoring the 
districts' overall implementation of the DAK-DR funded RHL Project, including the districts' 
adherence to the requirement that the Fund be utilised strictly for activities directly associated 
with reforestation and rehabilitation. Despite higher-level government monitoring of the Project, 
Bulungan apparently got away with us ing the DAK-DR Fund to build a physical structure. 
Indeed, on one occasion, a senior Bulungan official played down the capacity of agencies at 
higher levels of government to enforce the Centre's guidelines, pointing out that regardless of 
"' Interview with B-G-9d 
"' Interviews with B-G-4a; B-G-23 
,,. Interview with B-G-9c 
"' At least one district in East Kalimantan, the district of Kutai Timur, admitted that it used its 
OAK-DR monies for purposes other than forestry (Kaltim Post, 30 October 2003e). 
"' interview with B-L-1 b 
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how districts have fared in the implementation of the RHL Project, districts nevertheless 
continue, unhindered, to obtain their annual DAK-DR allocation.279 
5.3 Conclusions 
Several issues characterize the first theme of this chapter, the allocation of the DAK-DR 
Fund, to timber producing districts. They include the significant role of the province, 
complicated procedures, and initiatives to ensure that a certain proportion of the Fund is 
allocated to districts with substantial degraded lands. 
The method of allocation and disbursement of the DAK-DR Fund determined the relations 
between the districts and the province. As districts' allocations were coordinated by the 
province, districts had to follow the due procedures and provincial implementation of national 
criteria. In this way, the provincial government continued to have some important leverage over 
district governments, under decentralisation. 
As both case study districts are timber-producing districts, their Reforestation Fund 
contributions arc substantial. The magnitude of their DR contribution in 2001-2003 was 
reflected in the proportion of the DAK-DR they received during the same period. However, as 
with other districts' increased power under decentralisation (Chapter 3), the implementation of 
districts' increased fiscal powers, specifically in terms of the allocation and disbursement of 
districts' DAK-DR share, has not been particularly smooth and straightforward. Timber-
producing districts had expected DAK-DR allocation according to their interpretation of the 
relevant legislation and implementing regulations, but in practice could receive lower than they 
expected. Lack of specificity of the wording of the relevant legal instruments has been a source 
of ambiguity over districts' actual rights/allocations. 
The inclusion of ecological criteria in the determination of the districts' share of the DAK-
DR ensured that a portion of the funds was secured for the purpose of improving degraded lands 
in the province. While the monies originated within the boundaries of the districts, it was meant 
to be used to improve degraded lands beyond the boundaries of the timber-producing districts, 
to other districts in the same province. While this method of allocation is tailored to benefit the 
forest and land resources, it can pose a disincentive for producing districts to ensure that the 
Reforestation Fund payments arc met. Similarly, the criteria of the size of critical lands and the 
level of degradation of watershed in the allocation of DAK-DR to districts can also pose as a 
disincentive for districts to improve these degraded resources, and act as an incentive to retain 
their (degraded) condition. 
The second topic of this chapter was the implementation of the RHL Project, the sole use 
of the DAK-DR Fund in the districts. Two major issues emerged: difficulties in placing the 
"' interview with B-G-9c 
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three objectives of the RHL Project on an equal footing and the challenge to administer the 
large sums of money. 
As the RHL Project has been a national initiative, districts have had to implement the 
rehabilitation activities according to national guidelines. While the details of its implementation 
varied, some common threads from the Project can be drawn from the two case study districts. 
They were in particular, the challenges in implementing the Project to achieve the aims of 
forests and lands rehabilitation and the empowerment of communities. 
Between reforestation (reboisasi) and regreening (penghijauan), both districts focused 
more on the latter. Reboisasi has been both difficult and unattractive to carry out. It was difficult 
to identify an area in the category of Forest Estate that had not been allocated to concessionaires 
or that was clear of community claims. Communities' lack of legal tenure over areas under the 
Forest Estate category and the uncertainty about who would be granted the rights over future 
harvests made the planting of timber species unattractive. On the other hand, penghijauan has 
been much more attractive because it is carried out on community lands. In addition, 
participating farmers can select the desired species from a wider range of options. Even in 
penghijauan, however, timber species have generally been Jess popular than other commodity 
species because of the insecurity of tenure, the frequent changes in government policy on 
commercial timber production, and the tedious administrative documentation necessary for the 
marke ting of timber to be recognized as legal. Thus, both the minimal reboisasi and the 
replanting of timber species have had implications for the replenishment of the timber resource. 
The objective of rehabilitating critical lands, however, in practice has not been high on the 
agenda of the districts, ei ther. The criterion of size of critical lands was mainly used to obtain 
the districts' DAK-DR allocation, but not in actually guiding RHL activities. Rather, more 
equitable community access to the OAK-DR Fund, community interests, and the probability of 
success have largely determined where RHL activities have been carried out. 
The rehabilitation outcome itself has been a secondary consideration, both for the districts 
and for the communities. For communities, it has been a source of "free monies" from the 
Government. In essence, penghijauan has been the source of "government freebies" to improve 
both the ecological condition and the productivity of community lands. For the district 
governments, the emphasis of the Project has been on providing economic opportunities, thus 
activities have been oriented towards the "people" aspect, rather than towards the resource and 
the ecological aspects. 
This does not mean that both Kutai Barat and Bulungan governments have completely 
succeeded in advancing the "people orientation" of the Project. Those with connections, capital 
or information were more likely to engage in the Project and benefi t from it, particularly in its 
first years. Obstacles to disseminating information and the requirements of the Project were part 
of the problem, but the opportunity for abuse of power to allocate contracts or determine which 
farmer groups participated, also contributed significantly to the problem. 
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The Project has involved a large sum of money and managing it appropriately has been a 
particular challenge for both districts. Various forms of abuse of the Project's monies for 
personal benefit have allegedly occurred; some have been proven in court (Bulungan). Other 
alleged forms of abuse of the Fund (one of which was admitted in Bulungan - on the use of the 
Fund for fencing structures) have been in the deviations of the use of the Fund for purposes 
other than reforestation and rehabilitation activities as specified by national regulations and 
guidelines. The stepping up of enforcement to prevent the abuse of the Fund for personal benefit 
has prompted district government officials to be more cautious in implementing RHL, but this 
has also resulted in districts' leaving large sums of DAK-DR money lying idle in their bank 
accounts, but drawing large interest. 
Supervision and monitoring of the Project have been very limited. Accountability 
mechanisms have largely also been ineffective (Chapter 7); only financial accountability has 
been implemented. While this is important, other aspects of the Project are no less important in 
improving its effectiveness. For instance, there is a need to ensure that rehabilitation activities 
are carried out in areas that need to be rehabilitated, rather than in forests with natural secondary 
growth already well underway or in community gardens that are already "green" and require no 
further regreening. In addition, there is a need to ensure that once the seedlings are planted, they 
are tended, with or without subsequent injection of government "freebies". These largely non-
administrative aspects arc more difficult to enforce, other than raising awareness of the 
importance of the Project in the long term, both in terms of the resource, the ecology, and the 
livelihoods. 
The chapter has shown clearly that there are immense obstacles to achieving the objectives 
of the Project. The earlier quote from Bulungan's government official: " ... plants merely 
showing signs of growth are already called a success" reflects the real difficulties facing district 
governments. Among the difficulties are the appeal of and opportunity for the abuse of the large 
amounts of money in the Fund. As the quote of the Ministry of Forestry Official in the 
beginning of the chapter aptly described, district governments often have to make choices 
between green land cruisers or regrecning critical lands. 
These choices illustrate the challenges that district governments face in their forestry 
decision-making. The next chapter observes the dynamics of forestry decision-making in the 
study districts, particularly through the interactions of various actors operating in the districts 
with district governments, as well as among themselves. 
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Chapter 6: Juggling the Acts: the Dynamics 
of District Decision-making under 
Decentralisation 
Chapters three and four analysed the vertical power relations component of the research 
framework (Chapter 2), and confirmed that vertical governmental relations (Figure 2.1) are an 
important component in local government decision-making under Indonesia's decentralized 
regime. This chapter focuses on the second component of the research framework described in 
Chapter two: the interactions of district governments - as the loci of decentralized power - with 
other actors at the district level. The "horizontal relationship" between district governments and 
other actors in the district is illustrated in the schematic diagram of the research framework 
(Figure 2.2). 
This chapter describes how the decision-making powers formally acquired by district 
governments were actually played out at the district level in the period under study, particularly 
1999-2004. Power relations between actors have been suggested as one of the decisive factors in 
understanding the local decision-making arena (Chapter 2 and Appendix 2). Therefore, this 
chapter analyzes the interactions of the primary set of actors, district officials, with other, non-
state, sets of actors operating at the district level. It looks at the roles these non-state actors have 
played, and the extent to which they have influenced district decision-making. 
The thesis concentrates its analysis on specific, predetermined sets of actors that have been 
suggested as significant in district decision-making in the natural resource realm under 
decentralized contexts (Chapter 2). These sets of actors arc I) international agencies, civi l 
society groups (NGOs), and academics; 2) district communities at the village level or 
masyarakat; 3) the forestry business community; and 4) a specific group identified as 
particularly relevant in the case of Kutai Barat - gangsters or preman. The media and the district 
legislative body (DPRD) are directly relevant to the discussion on accountability and are 
therefore described in the next chapter. Other important actors, including the military and 
police, are described in the context of the relations between the district governments and the 
major actors specified above. 
6. 1 International organisations, NGOs280, and academics 
in district forestry decisions 
Reformasi and then decentralisation have provided the opportunity for these actors to work 
closely with local governments. All of these three types of actors have had or have been 
involved in forestry-related activities in both of the study districts during the period of study. 
"~ NGOs here and throughout the thesis refer to domestic NGOs 
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The number of these three sets of actors, types , as well as the extent and emphasis of their 
involvement in the two case study districts, varies. The section begins with a discussion about 
the role of these organisations in Kutai Barat forestry decision-making. 
6.1.1 Kutai Barat District 
Numerous international organisations, NGOs, and academics have worked in Kutai Barat. 
International organisations 
International organisations supporting Kutai Barat have included the USAlD-NRMP, the 
Ford Foundation, CIFOR, DFID, ICRAF, IGES, BMZ, and GTZ. Other development-oriented 
organisations, such as IFAD, have also carried out activities in the district. 
The USAID-NRMP provided financial and technical assistance for the development of 
Kutai Barat's Forest Management Program. As a newly established district with new 
decentralized authority, and recognizing the complexities inherent in forest management, the 
district government was anxious to determine the direction of forest management in the district. 
In 2000, in a bid to improve forest management, the district government established the Local 
Forestry Program Working Group or Kelompok Kerja Program Kehutanan Daerah (KKPKD). 
The USAID-NRMP facilitated the establishment of KKPKD and supported its operations. 
Members of this working group comprise a diversity of local forest-sector stakeholders 
including local government officials, customary (adat) leaders, community representatives, 
NGOs, academics, and the private sector. 
The main task of this working group was to identify forest management issues in the 
district and then to develop a realistic forest management plan. With the financial and technical 
assistance of the USAID-NRMP, at the end of 2001 , after a year-long and financially draining 
process of policy-making through a multi stakeholder approach which had involved workshops, 
seminar, and public consultations, KKPKD completed the identification of forest management 
issues in the district. This included the documentation of escalating conflicts associated with the 
district' s small-scale logging licenses. The outputs were two reports on the district forestry 
portrait and the district forest management. KKPKD was also the major ac tor in the formulation 
of the district's comprehensive pro-community and pro-adat regulation on forestry (PERDA 18 
of 2002, section 3.3), signed by the Bupati and endorsed by the DPRD in 2002. 
One year later, also through multi-stakeholder processes, Kutai Baral began to pass a series 
of policies to implement Community Forestry Program or Kehutanan Masyarakat (KHM). 
These included a District Regulation on KHM (PERDA 12 of 2003), a Bupati Decree, and 
technical guidelines for the implementation of KHM. These processes were supported by the 
Ford Foundation. 
Other inte rnational institutions provided assistance with the more technical aspects of 
forestry. These institutions included CIFOR, which assisted the District Forestry Service in the 
establishment of its Geographic Information System (GIS). CIFOR, in partnership with the 
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Samarinda-based, Mulawarman University, also conducted research on non timber forest 
products and marketing, on modelling livelihood-forest interactions, and with the Ministry of 
Forestry, on forest rehabilitation in the district. More recently, CIFOR and BMZ have 
conducted research focusing on the linkages between poverty and forests. ICRAF focused on 
research into the empowerment of adat communities. GTZ was active in the formation of 
village-level fire control groups in twenty villages, as well as in a local government capacity 
building project. DFID supported Sistim Hutan Kerakyatan (SHK), an East Kalimantan-based 
NGO which was active in promoting a community-based eco-forestry approach in a pilot village 
in the district. IGES, in collaboration with academics at Mulawarman University, developed 
guidelines for improving the role and participation of communities in forest management. 
The presence of the wide range of international agencies in Kutai Barat was partly 
attributed to the personal network and the background of the individuals running the district. For 
instance, the Bupati leading the district in 1999-2004 had worked for the Provincial Planning 
Agency (BAPPEDA) prior to becoming Bupati. In his prior position, he had been involved in a 
GTZ project, and had nurtured a close personal relationship with the Head of the GTZ project 
based in Jakarta. Upon the establishment of the district and the subsequent appointment of the 
caretaker Bupati in 1999 (and his subsequent election in 2001 as the definitive Bupati), this 
relationship led to GTZ's assistance to the district government. 
Both the head of the Kutai Barat Forestry Service in the 2001-2004 and 2004-present were 
researchers in Mulawarman University; the previous official trained in Japan and the current 
one trained in Germany. Both officials therefore had built networks with Japanese and German-
based institutions. Furthermore, prior to his appointment, the head of the District Forestry 
Service was involved in CIFOR's research and thus had built close ties with this organisation. 
The previously established network opened the door for the above international 
oragnisations to assist the district when these individuals became district decision-makers. 
These organisations were thus able to actively participate in the formal district forestry policy 
development. 
Academics 
Several academics from the Mulawarman University were involved in the forestry policy 
processes of Kutai Barat. These academics were mostly based in the Center for Social Forestry 
of the University. One academic served as a forestry expert in the KKPKD. Another respected 
academic in the field of social forestry was the key expert in the formulation of the series of 
district decisions on Community Forestry (KHM). The involvement of these academics 
influenced the thrusts of both the District Regulation on Forestry, PERDA 18 of 2002 (section 
3.3) and the District Regulation on KHM, PERDA 12 of 2003, which were heavily oriented 
towards adat (customary) communities and community-based forestry. 
The appointment of two Mulawarman University researchers consecutively as heads of the 
District Forestry Service shows that academics have not only participated in district forestry 
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decision-making externally, but more importantly, have also been directly and internally 
involved in district forestry by becoming key district decision-makers. 
In addition to these regionally-based academics, Kutai Barat 's government has also used 
the expertise of a team of academics from Gadjahmada University based in Yogyakarta, Central 
Java, to assist the district government in identifying and addressing development issues in the 
district. Led by an economist who was well known for promoting people-based economy 
(ekonomi kerakyatan), the team also examined the effects of small-scale district logging licenses 
on the income and livelihood of the communities. The appointment of a team with such an 
orientation to assist the district is an example of Kutai Barat administrators' efforts to highlight 
their approach as one that benefits local communities. 
NG Os 
Non Governmental Organisations have also become increasingly important in local 
government decision-making. Many environmental and development-oriented NGOs based in 
Samarinda worked or are working in Kutai Barat. They are not new actors in the district and 
were already active in the localities prior to decentralisation. For instance, NGOs which are 
currently active in the district include Lembaga Benua Puti Jaji, a legal and human rights NGO 
whose work has focused on the legal empowerment of communities; SHK Kaltim, active in 
promoting community based forest management systems including in the marketing of rattan 
from community gardens; Bioma, whose work has emphasized biophysical aspects of research 
of forestry. Because they have been active for some time, they are known to the public and have 
gained trust from communities. 
During the first few years of Kutai Barat's establishment, it was reported that the Bupati, at 
the time a caretaker, was more "down to earth" in terms of interactions with the population . In 
particular, the Bupati was very accessible to NGOs (Casson, 200 l a), which was highly 
uncommon prior to reformasi. The head of the District Forestry Service who led the unit 
between 2001 and July 2004 was also known for his closeness and openness with NGOs. 
By 2004, however, forestry was clearly a complex issue (Chapter 3) for the district, and 
district officials placed a higher expectation on their role. By this time, the Bupati's perception 
of the usefulness of NGOs appeared to have shifted. In particular, while acknowledging NGOs' 
active role in the formulation of district forestry regulations, he wanted more meaningful and 
concrete actions to assist the district in addressing forestry issues. The Bupati pointed out, for 
example, that NGOs' enthusiasms were confined to the level of abstractions, limited to 
discussions in workshops and seminars, but fell short of concrete solutions to the practical 
problems encountered in the forestry sector.281 Similarly, the new head of the District Forestry 
'" Interview with the Bupati of Kutai Barat, K-G-· 
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Service (July 2004 to date) was perceived to be more reticent towards NGOs.282 A district 
official involved in the RHL Project (Chapter 5) lamented these NGOs' emphasis on advocacy, 
saying they only scrutinized and pointed out the faults or shortcomings of district projects. He 
insisted that the district required assistance from NGOs that focus more on facilitation, rather 
than on advocacy. m 
Other actors interviewed, however, were much more sceptical with respect to the role of 
NG Os in the district. For instance, a local entrepreneur complained: 
"There are many NGOs in this district, but they are now contaminated with 
financial needs. Nobody is willing to be a hero here." (interview with K-P-1) 
6.1.2 Bulungan District 
In contrast to Kutai Barat, a more limited number of international organisations and NGOs 
have worked or are working in Bulungan. Of those which had worked in Bulungan, some had 
moved to the newly-partitioned districts, and only a few remained working in the original 
Bulungan, the study district. 
International organisations 
While Kutai Baral is a newly established district (Chapter 2), the area of what is known as 
Bulungan District today encompasses the remaining "mother" or original district from which 
three other districts were partitioned (section 2.4.2). Before decentralisation, two international 
institutions working on forestry had a major presence in the original district: WWF in the area 
of conservation, and CIFOR, emphasizing social, ecqnomic, and biophysical research. After the 
partitioning of the district, the area in which these two international organisations were engaged 
became Malinau District. Subsequently, only one international organisation, CIFOR, has had a 
major forest-related activity there. The activities were conducted in partnership with Pionir, a 
locally-based NGO. The emphasis of the activities was on research, none of which involved the 
direct participation of the local government. 
Academics 
The influence of academics in Bulungan's forestry decision-making appears to have been 
much less significant than in Kutai Barat. In contrast to Kutai Baral, district forestry decision-
makers had no previous history of working in an academic environment. Similarly, the district 
did not involve academics in the formulation of district forestry or forestry-related policies. The 
"'Interview with an East Kalimantan NGO member, P-l/N-3 
"' Interview with a district official involved in the OAK-DR RH L Project Kutai Ba rat, K-G-17 
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DPRD, however, did outsource a study to the Samarinda-based University of Mulawarman and 
a locally-based NGO. 
NG Os 
As in Kutai Barat, the activities of NGOs in Bulungan have also become increasingly 
visible. However, the types and characteristics of the environmental and development NGOs 
working in this district are different in some respects to those working in Kutai Barat. The 
NGOs working in Bulungan arc more local in character and operate with more limited funding 
and personnel. 
Jn contrast to the NGOs focusing on environment and natural resource issues operating in 
Kutai Barat, which are Samarinda-based (but have offices or major activities in the district), 
NGOs in Bulungan are based in the district. 
There is only one NGO, Pionir, which specifically focuses on environmental issues in the 
district. Pionir is one of the more "established" NGOs compared to other NGOs operating in the 
district, in the sense that Pionir is reasonably secure in terms of financial resources with which it 
operates, compared to other NGOs who are essentially operating "with difficulties" (see below). 
In contrast to NGOs working in Kutai Barat, up to the time of fieldwork in 2004, Pionir had 
mainly focused on forestry-related research with the results intended to support district policies, 
rather than emphasizing advocacy or community empowerment. Even though it was the 
relatively "established" NGO in the district, Pionir was small; at the time of the major fieldwork 
in 2004, it was operating with only four staff. This included the director, the only individual 
with the capacity to do research independently, while the remaining three were support staff. 
Bulungan's local government is now giving more attention to NGOs, for what appear to be 
at least three distinct reasons. The fi rst motive is associated with external funding agencies' 
requirement to include NGO participation in externally-funded government projects. For 
instance, in mid 2004, Pionir was contracted to carry out a socio-economic study on fishery 
communities as part 'of a national fishery project undertaken by the District Fishery Service. The 
involvement of NGOs was one of the requirements imposed by the funding agency. Second, the 
local government is overwhelmed with the complexities of forestry issues and felt that societal 
actors such as NGOs, who often work at the grass root level, could assist them. 284 For instance, 
NGOs could assist the local government in inter and intra-community conflicts as the 
unintended consequences of the issuance of district's small-scale licenses (section 6.2), which 
were absorbing the district government's resources and energy."' Deviations surrounding the 
RHL Project also emerge as an important issue (Chapter 5). NGOs are thus recognized to be 
potential facilitators and watchdogs in these issues. 2"• The third reason has to do with the district 
"' Interview with a BAPPEDA official, B-G-11 a 
"' For instance, interviews B-G-9a, B-G-9b, and B-G-4a 
216 Interview with a BAPPEDA official, B-G-11 a 
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government's realization that NGOs, in this particular case Pionir, can assist the local 
government in "bridging" the gap between the district government and external institutions. m 
This gap has arisen partly as a consequence of the current trend in most parts of the world, 
including Indonesia, of international donors focusing on environmental issues increasingly 
preferring to work directly with NGOs, rather than with governmental actors. 
The DPRD had also made use of the expertise of Pionir and academics from Mulawarman 
University, by contracting out a study on district small-scale Jogging licenses to these parties 
(section 7 .2.3). 
Although the local government appears to have shown some appreciation of the role of 
NGOs, there are still stumbling blocks to their engagement and influence. Bulungan 
government's commitment to NGO participation in district decision-making still shows a degree 
of rhetoric. NGOs' presence or participation is solicited out of necessity, such as either to satisfy 
a certain requirement or public expectation. This is illustrated through the following examples. 
In late 2003, Pionir initiated the establishment of a Working Group on Forest and Land 
Rehabilitation or Kelompok Kerja Rehabilitasi Lahan dan Hutan (KKRHL) with the objective 
of formulating a long-term plan for the management of Bulungan's forests. The group 
comprises various stakeholders in the district, including civil society organisations, the district 
forestry, mining, and agricultural units, and community representatives. As with KKPKD in 
Kutai Baral, KKRHL had the formal support of and was financially supported by the district 
govemment.288 As of July 2004, the district government's financing of KKRHL had not 
materialized.289 As of October 2005, the working group was at a standstill and could not carry 
out significant activities due to the lack of support from the local government and its agencies 
(Kaltim Post, 23 October, 2005f). 
Another example was demonstrated during a spatial planning consultation process of four 
sub-districts in which I was able to participate directly. The consultation process was attended 
by various representatives of district agencies, a DPRD member, a team of Samarinda-based 
consultants responsible for the spatial planning study, two NGOs (including Pionir), and the 
District Planning Office (BAPPEDA) as the unit in charge of the project. At the time, seemingly 
useful comments and critiques were put forward by participants, including the NGOs present. 
However, a DPRD member later explained that the consultation process was merely "window 
dressing". The spatial plan had actually already been drawn up and decided by the district 
government and the consultants without sufficient field checks, and inputs were only requested 
to justify the process, to qualify it as a "participatory" process through public consultations. 290 
"' For instance, interview with 8-G-9d. 
"' Decree of the Bupati of Bulungan 386 of 2003 on the Establishment of the Working Group on 
the Forest and Land Rehabilitat ion in Bulungan, issued August 5, 2003 
,.. Interview with B-U(N)-4a 
'"' Interview with 8-L-1 a 
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The "window dressing" process above reflected not only the limited role and influence of 
NGOs in the actual formal district decision-making processes, but also the limited role of other 
participants more generally. Instead of utilizing NGOs to improve district decisions or policies, 
Bulungan government "used" the "participation" of NGOs to legitimate the process of district 
decision-making. 
In addition to the "window dressing" issue, one serious issue associated with the role of 
NGOs in district forestry has been the lack of funding. After reformasi, restrictions on the media 
and freedom of association were relaxed, resulting in the mushrooming of new NGOs. In this 
district, most if not all of these NGOs are young, founded after the onset of reformasi, and 
without established networks .or support. 
Jn terms of funding, NGOs working in Bulungan are less secure compared to their 
counterparts in Kutai Barat. The Samarinda-based NGOs working in Kutai Barat were mostly 
established in the mid or late 1990s. The advent of reformasi saw international donor funds 
pouring into domestic NGOs, and these Samarinda-based NGOs were among those able to 
capitalize on their established networks to gain financial support. Many NGOs in Bulungan, on 
the other hand, arc newly established and did not have the channels to tap into this source. 
Pionir, founded in 2001, had survived financially through partnership arrangements with CIFOR 
and Conservation International (the latter worked in the neighbouring district of Berau), and had 
also worked on local government and DPRD projects. Unlike other NGOs working in 
Bulungan, Pionir has a network in Samarinda and among international organisations because its 
founders were previously students at Mulawarman University and were also activitists in the 
Samarinda circle. 
Thus, in terms of funding sources, most of the NGOs in Bulungan operate "with 
difficulties". As in other countries, funding has been a serious and very real constraint for local 
NGOs to carry out their activities. 291 In general these NGOs did not have a continuous and 
guaranteed source of funding, and therefore are often dependent on district government's 
assistance (bantuan), even to cover the basic expenses in their activities such as transportation 
costs. This constraint could easily compromise the objectivity of their actions. 292 
While most NGOs were established with the noble objective to serve the public, at least 
one NGO operating in Bulungan was openly accused - by district state actors and fellow NGOs 
- of having compromised its objectives due to the lack of secure funding. NGOs of this type 
would identify irregularities or breaches of regulations by certain actors, and would threaten to 
report the deviations to the authorities, unless they were given some form of "compensation". 291 
In an interview, a member of the "accused" NGO, which focuses on advocacy of development 
"' See for instance, Schwartz (2004) for a discussion on the limitations of funding availability 
with respect to environmental NGOs in China. 
292 Interviews with B-N-5, B-N-1d, and B-N-6 
"' Interview with B-N-' 
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issues, revealed that his NGO had just been offered a bribe to not report illegal logging activities 
it had pursued earlier. This NGO was offered "the fruits" or "the tree": "fruits" referred to cash, 
while "the tree" referred to timber, meaning that the NGO was offered cash or timber as 
payment in kind, if it were to keep quiet over its findings. 294 He did not disclose how the NGO 
responded to the offer. 
A member of the NGO in question admitted bluntly that his organisation was a "grey" 
NGO. Because funding was a real problem for this NGO, as it did not have any particular or 
continuous funding sources, it had to find other means to finance its operations. These "ways" 
have included extortion from companies who flout regulations, making noises only when the 
companies do not give in to the NGO's demands. He asserted, however, that in the pursuit of 
securing funds through "non-traditional means", his organisation would never harm or take 
advantage of communities (masyarakat). 295 Other NGOs confirmed the ways in which this 
particular NGO has operated and adamantly claimed that they have not operated in the same 
way (tidak sekiblat).296 
Apparently, despite some NGOs' ambitious objectives, the difficulties of remaining in 
operation and the lure of other available and more attractive opportunities, have attracted 
members of NGOs to remove their NGO attributes. Two of the founders of Pionir have now 
detached themselves from the day-to-day activities of the organisation and have each jumped 
ship to other important organisations in the district. One joined the District Forestry Service and 
has since become the confidante of its head. The other founder became one of the 20 DPRD 
members for 2005-2009. These two individuals therefore have now penetrated the formal 
decision-making circle itself. 
By January 2006, substantial changes had occurred in the district with regard to the 
activities of Pionir. These changes were particularly related to the different types and increasing 
number of activities undertaken by Pionir and its members. Since 2005, the director of Pionir 
has become directly involved in politics. In 2005, an election year for the new Bupati, the 
director of Pionir became a member of the "success" team for the then candidate Bupati. This 
candidate won the election and formally took office as Bupati in September 2005. 
As a result, Pionir now has direct access to the new Bupati. Within a few months in office, 
the Bupati had already granted Pionir, through the District Forestry Service, a conservation 
project in the district. Pionir was confident that now it has more opportunities to influence the 
Bupati 's environmental policies. 297 
By early 2006, Pionir members were involved in activities or projects that often had 
nothing to do with the main objectives of the organisation, that is, to monitor and provide inputs 
, .. Interview with a member of the NGO, B-N-* 
'" Interview with a member of the NGO, B-N-* 
,,. Interviews with two other NGOs, B-N-* and B-N-* 
'" Interview with B-N-1 g 
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for the local governments ' environmental decisions. For instance, the director and key member 
of Pionir joined a political organisation, the National Indonesian Youth Committee (Komite 
Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI). 298 The director of Pionir also became one of the 
administrators of a Cooperative focusing on borrowing and lending activities. As of September 
2006, the director and members of Pionir were actively seeking other opportunities to meet 
personal financial needs. 299 As a result, less time was committed to carrying out the core 
environmental-related tasks of the organisation. Although the director of Pionir remained as the 
coordinator of the KKRHL, it is becoming increasingly clear that these other activities could 
easily compromise Pionir' s core tasks in one way or another. 
Although the level of involvement of NGOs in formal district decision-making processes 
pertaining to forestry appears to be growing, more so in Kutai Barat than in Bulungan, NGOs 
still have a Jong way to go in influencing actual forestry activities in districts. Even in the case 
of Kutai Barat, where the three types of actors (international organisations, NGOs, and 
academics) were active in influencing district forestry decis ion-making processes, district 
regulations produced from such processes were non-implementable, not followed, or not 
optimal in their implementation. The incoherence between district policies and the actual 
forestry operations were attributed to both conflict between district policies and the policies of 
higher level of governments (Chapter 3) and the reality of power dynamics in the district. It is to 
the latter issue that this chapter now turns. 
6.2 Local people in district forestry: "bringing the 
government closer to the people"? 
This section centres on local communities. Communities are the local people, referred to as 
masyarakat in Indonesian, living within the jurisdiction of the district, usually at the village 
level (Chapter 2). 
"The source of district's policies is the direct aspirations of masyarakat. 
Masyarakat come to see me, and as much as possible I also visit masyarakat. 
I am also masyarakat. I also reflect on my own situation, I reflect on what I 
have experienced. And only upon reflection I consult with competent parties, 
or the potential beneficiaries." (interview with the Bupati of Kutai Barat, K-
G-*) 
This quote from the Bupati of Kutai Barat aptly illustrates the four themes constituting the 
central ro le of communitie!i in district forestry decision-making: community - policymakers 
interactions, community participation, community influence, and community benefits. 
"' Interviews with members of Pionir, B-N-1g B-N-6 
m Personal communication with SM, a member of Pionir, 19 September 2006 
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6.2.1 Direct interactions between local communities and district 
functionaries 
In theory, decentralisation should "bring the state closer to the people" (World Bank, 
1997:110). However, the following analysis suggests that in the two districts studied, this 
assumption, even in its simplest form and in the actual meaning of the words, has not been easy 
to realize. There are practical and cultural issues even in the simplest manifestation of "bringing 
government closer to the people", that is, in the direct physical interactions between the 
masyarakat and district functionaries. 
The most notable trend in the two districts post reformasi, and different from the past, is 
the opening of the Bupatis' office regularly to the local population, allowing for direct 
interactions between the community members and the person at the highest level of district 
leadership. However, there are practical as well as social and cultural hurdles that prevent the 
system from working effectively. 
Commoners face practical challenges if they wish to interact with district government 
officials in the district capital. Material and physical obstacles are associated with the districts' 
large area of jurisdiction, and the dispersed as well as remote nature of some villages. For most 
villagers, getting to the district capital is not easy and is expensive, making a trip to the office of 
the Bupati not a feasible option for many community members. 300 Like in other "undeveloped" 
Outer Island areas, fuel prices and consequently transportation costs are much higher than in 
Java. For instance, in October 2005, the retail price for gasoline in the sub-district closest to 
Samarinda was 5,050 rupiah per litre. But in the most remote sub-district of Long Apari, 
farthest from Samarinda and closest to the border with Malaysia, the cost of gasoline was 7 ,000 
per litre (Kaltim Post, 11 October 2005c) or 1.5 times the price of gasoline in Jakarta. 301 The 
cost to get to one of the villages visited during fieldwork in Bulungan from the district capital, 
which had involved a boat ride to the nearby island municipality, Tarakan, and continued with 
an outboard motor boat inland along one of the major rivers, was about 50 USD per person. 
This sum is well beyond the spending capability of most ordinary villagers. This difficulty is 
made worse by the rudimentary infrastructure, in particular roads, which forces a continuing 
reliance on the river systems as the major, and for some villages, the only mode of 
transportation. Consequently, only the better-off community members can make visits to the 
district capital. 
When one finally reaches the Bupati' s office, there are other deterrents that render this 
system of direct communication with the Bupati ineffective. There are protocols and Jong 
queues, and the time slot devoted to this purpose is limited. Often because of the Bupati's busy 
'"" Interviews with villagers of Bulungan, B-C-5a; B-C-5b; villagers of Kutai Baral, K-C-1, K-C-2, 
and K-C-5 
'°' As of October 1, 2005, the Government increased the price of gasoline from 2,400 to 4,500 
per litre. 
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schedule, this slot is not always open for its stated purpose, and when it is, the queue is not 
always followed in order: guests are essentially "filtered" by his assistants. Ultimately, these 
"layers" of individuals between the Bupati and community members determine whether one can 
actually meet with the Bupati or is rejected. One's chances of meeting the Bupati are higher if 
s/he can persuade these "guards" or "gatekeepers" to let her/him in. This seemingly simple 
matter thus sidelines commoners without the right network, position, or influence. 
There arc also cultural impediments to commoners having their voices heard on district 
decisions. Access to the Bupati' s office and to meet the Bupati personally - something that was 
rare prior to reformasi - gives masyarakat a sense of pride. However, out of respec t towards an 
authority or leader, people are often hesitant, as they were in the New Order period, to openly 
criticize local governments.302 Under the New Order, most wong cilik (literally, "little people") 
had been, out of respect, obedient and accepting of established local and national leaders 
(Liddle, 1996). 
To enhance interactions, officials and the legislature of both districts now make visits to 
villages. Visits are made for a variety of purposes, including dissemination of district decisions 
and projects, project surveys, inspection of projects, and ceremonies. 
A research survey (2005) documented the Bupati of Kutai Barat's visits to have included 
some of the most remote and inaccessible parts in the district, and which were consequently 
difficult to reach. 3°3 In addition to these documented visits, the local media reported the failure 
of the Bupati's visits to some areas due to the difficult route, which forced the Bupati to return 
to the district capital (Kaltim Post, 4 April 2005a). This shows the Bupati's effort to reach his 
constituents even under the most difficult circumstances. 
In addition to fulfilling their responsibilities, district functionaries also gain material 
benefits, albeit not substantial, from conducting visits to villages. Duty travel, particularly those 
involving overnight trips also means some - not substantial, but useful - formal extra income, in 
the form of travel allowance, SP J (Surat Perintah Jalan - literally, "letter of assignment to 
travel"). 
Senior officials of both districts believed that regional autonomy has enabled a more 
effective bottom-up process of decision making. 30' During an interview, the Bupati of Kutai 
Baral confided that his background - coming from a poor family in the district - has helped him 
understand the needs and desires of the people by positioning himself as one of the poor 
community members in the distric t. This understanding was then built into his consideration 
when formulating district policies. Mastery of the local language - a skill that most non-local, 
'
0
' Interview with a senior official of Kutai Barat. K-G-5 
'
0
' Center for International Forestry Research, 2005, unpublished data 
"" For instance, interviews with senior officials of Bulungan and Kutai Bara! 8-G-4a, B-G-9a, K-
G-2b 
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centrally-installed Bupatis during the New Order Period had lacked - was also identified as an 
important tool in enabling effective communication with community members. 
One of the most common issues observed under regional autonomy across Indonesia was 
the prevalence of a strong feeling towards putera daerah or "local sons'', whereby key positions 
in the districts all the way up to the Bupati were filled by indigenous people of that district 
(Usman, 2002; Turner and Podger, 2003). The potential disadvantage of this tendency includes 
the exclusion of non-indigenous people from the district bureaucracy, resulting in the placement 
of some officials with limited or inadequate capacity in certain positions. 305 Despite these 
potential shortcomings, in the case of Kutai Baral, at least with respect to the Bupati and the 
Deputy Bupati, the election of "local sons" has tended to show potential benefits: as indigenous 
district leaders, they were knowledgeable of local conditions and were able to communicate 
more effectively with the local population in the local language. 
A different situation occurred in Bulungan with regard to the issue of putera daerah. In 
this district, the Bupati who led the district during 1999-2005 had his roots in one of the three 
indigenous groups in Bulungan. 306 He was perceived to have less support for the majority of the 
population, the indigenous Dayaks, to take up a position in the district's office. This was 
reflected in the transfer of many of the Dayaks holding positions in the original Bulungan 
offices to the new districts, like Malinau, upon partitioning in 1999. 307 To gain support from the 
majority of the population, however, the Deputy Bupati was a Dayak. 
The interactions between forestry officials and the public in general appear to be 
significantly determined by the personalities holding positions in the District Forestry Services. 
My observations suggest that the former head of the District Forestry Service of Kutai Baral 
(who held the position between 2001 and July 2004), for instance, was very accessible to the 
public. His replacement, however, was less accessible. The head of the District Forestry Service 
of Bulungan was also not as accessible as the previous head of the District Forestry Service of 
Kutai Baral. 
6.2.2 Community participation in district forestry-related 
decision-making 
In terms of the process, the level of involvement of community or community 
representatives in the districts' decision-making has tended to be mixed. Both district 
governments have made efforts to include some involvement by communities in formal 
'°' Interview with a senior official at the Ministry of Home Affairs, N-G-9a 
'
06 This Bupati of Bulungan was half Tidung, one of the three indigenous ethnic groups in the 
district, and half Banjarese, an ethnic group originally from South Kalimantan. The Banjarese, 
though they do not comprise a large proportion of the population of Bulungan, dominate the 
bureaucracy. This Bupatiwas replaced by a new Bupatiin 2005, who is Tidung. The Bupatiof 
Kutai Baral during 1999-2001 and 2001-2006, was Dayak. His successor (from 2006 to date) is 
also Dayak. 
'"' Interview with B-N-1h 
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forestry-related district decision-making processes. Communities, represented by village heads 
and customary leaders, took part in the consultative processes of the formulation of Kutai 
Barat's PERDA 18 of 2002 and PERDA 12 of 2003 (section 6.1.1). Bulungan had initially 
invited village representatives to sit in on its spatial planning meetings, but later abandoned this 
initiative because it perceived the effort as fruitless. 
There are clearly obstacles to involving representatives of local communities directly in the 
process. One difficulty concerns districts' limited resources including funds and human 
resources, and the mere fact that consultative processes are necessarily time-consuming. To 
include the participation of a wide range of stakeholders, the formulation of both Kutai Barat' s 
PERDA 18 of 2002 and PERDA 12 of 2003 involved a Jong process, a lot of money, and 
substantial external support. Kutai Barat government was only able to do this with the financial 
support of international projects, the facilitative support of East-Kalimantan and Jakarta-based 
NGOs, and the expert assistance of Samarinda-based academics. For instance, the formulation 
of PERDA 18 of 2002 took almost 2 years to complete and cost about 200 thousand USD. 
Hence, without external interest and support, Kutai Barat government may not have been able to 
do this. Similarly, the promulgation of Kutai Barat's set of regulations on KHM, including its 
technical guidelines, took more than one year, and was also actively supported by donors, 
NGOs, and academics (section 6.1.1). 
While the process of the formulation of Kutai Baral' s forestry regulations has involved 
community and vi llage level representatives, it docs not obscure the fact that those sitting in the 
process as community representatives may not actually or fully represent the particular 
communities represented. This problem is recognized as a common and important issue (for 
instance, Agrawal and Gibson, 1999); however, it is outside the scope of this study and is not 
pursued further. 
A more serious and "rooted" impediment to communities' involvement m district 
decision-making was local governments' perception of community representatives' as lacking 
capacity; this was often used as a justification for not involving community representatives 
meaningfully in district decision-making processes. This is illustrated in the spatial planning 
process of Bulungan District. 
Bulungan government had initially invited village heads to sit in on the consultation 
processes of the sub-district spatial plan. However, according to the BAPPEDA official 
involved in the process, the level of participation of village leaders had been disappointing. In 
one of the first of a series of "consultation" meetings, these representatives were inactive: they 
did not provide inputs and remained quiet. This district official subsequently discontinued his 
efforts to include village representatives in the "consultation" meetings that followed and 
maintained that he had no plans to involve them in the future. Justifying his perspective on the 
issue: 
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"In a consultation meeting to identify issues relevant to sub-district Tanjung 
Palas Timur spatial planning, we invited village heads and adat leaders. But 
they did not give any inputs. Community representatives do not understand 
and do not know what they want either."308 [my emphasis] (interview with B-
G-I la) 
The absence of village-level representatives in Bulungan's subsequent spatial planning 
processes was confirmed during a consultation meeting of Bulungan' s spatial planning 
presentation of three sub-districts which I attended. In this process, not a single village 
representative was present. The sub-district heads (camat), however, did participate in the 
meeting. This was despite the fact that two of the sub-districts being discussed were those 
located closest to the district capital, thereby eliminating transportation costs as the likely reason 
for the absence of village representatives. 
The denial of any meaningful village-level participation in Bulungan's spatial planning 
exercises was also shown by the ways in which the consultants in charge of the project carried 
out the work. Bulungan's sub-district spatial planning was contracted out to Jakarta and 
Samarinda-based consultant companies. In a four month-long project, the team of consultants 
hired to develop the spatial planning of three sub-districts (kecamatan) which encompassed 18 
villages and over 350,000 hectares, spent only a total of I 0 days in the area. Rather than 
soliciting and verifying data and information at the village level, the team had instead relied on 
information provided by sub-district heads (camac) . No effort was made to solicit inputs or 
views from villagers or even village heads. This approach was adopted despite the fact that 
under regional autonomy, the authority of sub-district heads had been substantially reduced to a 
mere coordinating role of villages. Village heads now no longer formally report to sub-district 
heads as they did in the past. The team of consultants, however, simply assumed that all the 
relevant data could be provided by the camats, and accordingly, could adequately capture the 
aspirations of communities in the subdistricts within these camats' jurisdiction. 309 Omitting 
village-level inputs from the process of data collection was a conscious and deliberate decision 
based on considerations of time and cost. 
Bulungan's spatial planning exercises therefore clearly did not involve any meaningful 
community participation. The process, as in the past, remained largely top-down and without 
effective public consultation. As in the past, the process was essentially done "backwards". The 
output was largely decided in the district government's and the consultants' offices at the outset 
(see also section 6.1.2). On-the-ground checks with regard to the physical and social aspects 
(conditions) of the area to complete the process were done superficially and sparingly, and after 
the spatial plans had been drawn up. Furthermore, the use of external consultants unfamiliar 
'
0
' Interview with a Bulungan BAPPEDA official involved in the sub-district spatial planning 
process, B-G-11 a 
'
09 Interview with the consultants for the district spatial planning, B-P-3, B-P-4 
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with the area increased the potential of a district spatial plan to be irrelevant to the communities' 
needs and incompatible with the physical conditions of the area. 
It was also revealed that the consultancy company appointed to carry out the spatial plan of 
the three sub-districts above had had a previous close relationship with a senior official in the 
BAPPEDA. 1io The BAPPEDA, the planning agency of the district, is the unit responsible for the 
compilation of the district spatial plan. In the 1980s, this senior BAPPEDA official had worked 
for this consultancy company. This raises questions about the nature of the relationship between 
the company and the BAPPEDA official; it also increases the potential for informal transactions 
taking place, and for compromising the integrity of the plan. 
Thus, Bulungan's government made little effo1t to involve local people in the processes of 
decisions on a matter that was key - if not crncial - to people's lives. Because most of 
Bulungan's population are farmers in the forest frontiers (section 1.5.4), how the lands and 
forests and their uses are determined (through the district's spatial plan) have significant 
implications for the lives of most people in the district. 
Figure 6.1 Livelihood dependence on forests 
A Dayak woman returning home from her swidden (ladang) on the 
forest frontier of Bulungan. Photo by Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, 2004 
The district spatial plan shows that a significant proportion of the district area was 
allocated for plantation development (section 3.4). Bulungan's major motivation, to pursue 
economic development and improve people's livelihoods through plantation-based agriculture 
(mainly oil palm plantations - section 3.4), was not accompanied by significant effmts to 
110 Interview with the consultants, B-P-3 and B-P-4 
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involve and seek peoples' perspectives on the planned development. Moreover, the district 
government washed its hands of the responsibility for ensuring that these developments would 
not engender future conflicts (section 6.2.3). 
One observation with regard to Kutai Barat government's effort to include local 
communities in district decisions, however, suggests that, in some circumstances, direct 
participation was not what local communities wanted. One of my visits to a remote village 
coincided with a sosialisasi visit by two officials handling Kutai Barat's plan to partition the 
village from the existing sub-district into a new sub-district. Meetings were held to hear what 
the villagers had to say about the district's plan of the partitioning. There had been and still 
were serious disagreements among the community members with regard to the issue. While in 
that particular instance no agreement was reached on the matter, ordinary villagers made their 
preferences known to the officials. At the time, even though this case had involved an extended 
process, the resolution of the disagreement was not imminent. Many of the attendees showed 
frustration and insisted that, rather than attempting to find a resolution through a participatory 
process, the district government should decide for them. 31 1 
The partitioning of this village may seem irrelevant to forestry decision-making. On the 
contrary, however, as in other villages, it cuts right to the heart of forestry issues. Many 
conflicts surrounding logging operations under district licenses were among communities 
associated with conflict over villages' jurisdiction and consequently, village boundaries. 3 12 As 
timber fees or compensation were paid for timber extraction or development activities 
pertaining to village or community lands or forests, the issue of village boundaries became 
increasingly important. This is discussed further in section 6.2.3. 
6.2.3 Local people's increasing influence on district forestry 
operations 
Under reformasi and through regional autonomy, local communities in the two districts 
were able to exert influence in forestry operations through the increasing number of land claims, 
negotiations with companies, and demands for compensation. 
During the New Order, forestry maps (Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan, TGHK - Forest 
Land Use by Consensus) were drawn in Jakarta largely without consideration of the community 
territories that had been recognized in localities. 313 As a result, in many cases these maps were 
'
11 Observation in a village meeting with two Kutai Baral officials handling administrative affairs, 
Village L, 22 February 2004. For a discussion on village boundary disputes as a consequence 
of district small-scale logging licenses, see Rujehan et al. (2004). 
31
' Interviews with a senior official of the Community Empowerment Office of Kutai Baral, K-G-
1 O; with a native of the area and a logging entrepreneur, K-P-2; with an NGO activist and 
indigeneous Dayak from Kutai Bara!, K-N/1-3; with a native of village SB of Bulungan and a 
development NGO activist, B-N-5. For a study on similar community conflicts in Bulungan's 
neighbouring district of Malinau, see Rhee (2003) 
'
1
' For instance, see Peluso (1995) and McCarthy (2006) 
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superimposed on community lands to make way for a national policy that promoted large-scale 
forest exploitation. In this period, many communities' or adat lands were appropriated and 
distributed to large-scale concessionaires by the Central State (for instance, Potter 1991 ; 
Appendix 2). 
The post New Order period has been characterized by freedom of speech, freedom of 
association, and in general, a less powerful state. These features have also penetrated to the 
local level, and the two districts studied were no exception. In these districts, as in others, this 
freedom was marked by communities' resurgence in asserting their rights. 3 " In the Outer 
Islands and in particular in Kalimantan, the assertion of community rights has taken the form of 
increasing claims over land or forest area as their adat territories. Under the New Order period 
these had been controlled by the State over which centrally-licensed HPH concessions had been 
issued. In some cases, claims were also made over areas where state structures had been 
established. m 
While claims of rights to land and forests did occur sporadically in localized areas of the 
Outer Islands during the New Order, reformasi saw a significant increase in their frequency, 
scope and intensity. 316 In some cases, communities have resorted to violence that has taken 
various forms, ranging from demonstrations, to blockades of logging operations, to the taking 
over of logging equipment, or the burning of logging camps. 
To a significant extent, the opportunity to assert communities' rights over local lands due 
to the weakening of state control and the generally freer environment was amplified by 
economic motivations. The first economic motive was associated with district logging licenses 
(Chapter 3). Claims over a particular forest area either as a community, adat or village territory 
would enable the relevant community to apply for a district license over the area. Communities 
could then negotiate with potential partners and/or capital providers for an agreed compensation 
package in return for the right to harvest timber in the area. 
A second economic motive was provoked by provincial government policy sympathetic to 
communities. In June 2000, the Governor of East Kalimantan issued a decree requiring all forest 
concessions to compensate communities living in and around the concession areas. 317 The 
decision was applied retroactively: timber concessions were required to compensate the affected 
communities for timber produced from 1 April 1995; until the date of writing, this decision was 
'" Interviews with villagers, village heads, district government officials, NGOs, and timber 
company staff. For documentation of communities insurgence in asserting their rights to land or 
forest areas associated with reformasi in various areas in, see Nanang and Devung (2004). 
Pionir et al. (2001) reported the increasing community claims in Bulungan District. 
3
's For example, six communities of Kutai Barat have made claims to an air force facility. 
"• For instance, in 1992, facilitated by a Samarinda-based NGO, Puti Jaji, the people of village 
M in Kutai Baral began to assert their rights over their adat forest which had earlier been 
specified as a HPH concession area (see lmang et al. 2004a). 
m Governor of East Kalimantan Decree 20 of 2000 on Compensation Funds for Communities 
Living in and around Forests in the Province of East Kalimantan, issued June 9, 2000 
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still in effect. Referring to the Governor's Decree, the Bupati of Kutai Barat subsequently issued 
a decision specifying which villages within and around HPH timber concessions were eligible 
for compensation. 318 These policies thus entitled successful claimants of a particular area 
affected by the operations of a timber concession to compensation payments. 
The Governor's Decree specified the rate of compensation as 1,500 rupiahs per cubic 
meter of timber for those harvested prior to 2000, and 3,000 rupiahs per cubic meter of timber 
for those harvested from 2000 onwards. However, the rate of compensation applied in districts 
was much higher than the amount specified in the Governor's Decree. This shows the level of 
influence of communities on HPH-bascd timber operations as well as the desperation of timber 
companies to remain in operation. 319 
Communities' economic motives to claim lands and/or forests were also bolstered by 
Bulungan' s and Kutai Barat's Bupatis' Decrees on the rate of compensation to be paid for trees 
and plants on community land affected by a particular development activity. 320 
Forestry businesses and other investors operating in the two districts could now only carry 
out their activities with the consent of communities. Their consent was not only necessary for 
centrally-licensed HPH companies, but also for logging operators under district licenses and for 
investors in other sectors. For instance, operating without the communities' endorsement often 
resulted in the companies having to face communities ' open protests or blockades. 321 In 
September 2005, some 200 Kutai Barat villagers carried out a demonstration demanding 
compensation for the use of their lands by two coal mining companies, threatening to block the 
companies' road if their demands were not fulfilled (Kaltim Post, 23 September 2005d). 
Communities' increased power necessitated continuous negotiations between the private sector 
and community representatives."' 
Referring to communities' claims that "these forests arc ours", district officials and HPH 
timber operators considered that communities' exercise of power at the operational level was 
often excessive and inappropriate. 323 Bulungan officials were frustrated with communities' 
increasing claims over lands and/or forests, pointing out that these claims were 
'" Bupati of Kutai Baral 's decree 283 of 2000 specifying which villages within and around HPH 
areas in the jurisdiction of Kutai Baral were eligible for compensation from forestry companies 
319 Interviews with B-G-8a and P-8-1 
"
0 Bupati of Kutai Barat 's Decree 590/K.43/2003 on the base prices for land and plants in the 
jurisdiction of Kutai Baral District; Bupati of Bulungan's Decree 430 of 2003 on the 
Compensation Rates for Plants (tanam tumbuh). Potter (1991) reported of instances where 
HPH concessionaires paid compensation to villagers whose tree crops had to make way for 
logging roads or camp construction areas during the New Order period. It was not explained, 
however, whether this compensation was formally institutionalized into a district's policy or 
merely based on informal tokens. 
3
" For example, interviews with a senior official of the Bulungan District Forestry Sservice, B-G-
16.) and staff of PT lk, a HPH operating in Bulungan, B-P-7 
"' Interviews with member of Pionir, B-N-1 a; a timber operator in Bulungan, B-P-6; a villager 
and NGO activist, B-N-5 
"'"Hutan ini hutan kaml' (interviews with various actors in Bulungan and Kutai Baral Districts). 
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counterproductive to the district government's efforts to attract investors to the area. 324 As 
explained by a senior BAPPEDA official of Bulungan: 
"As soon as news of the arrival of a potential investor broke, immediately 
communities would make a claim over the area in question." (interview with 
B-G-9a) 
District logging licenses (when they were in operation), coupled with increasing interest in 
developing plantations (Bulungan) and in coal mining (Kutai Barnt) have raised the value of 
lands that had not been actively utilised by communities in the past. One way to assert a claim 
over a piece of land or forest is to demonstrate evidence of agricultural activities or cultivation 
on that area. For instance, during the 1997-1998 economic crises, planting tree crops was not 
only attractive due to favourable prices and exchange rates, but because it would strengthen 
claims over tenurial rights (Sunderlin et al., 2000). District policy requiring compensation for 
agricultural crops or timber trees on areas affected by a development project, has added to 
communities' incentives to plant up previously idle or seemingly idle lands.125 However, 
because community claims surfaced with each investment plan, some district officials believed 
that the crops were planted only after masyarakat found out that the area was going to be 
developed. In such cases, they suspected that planting was done primarily for the purpose of 
claiming compensation. District government officials, however, suggested that in some cases 
agents provocateurs had influenced communities in their actions. 326 
District officials thus perceived achieving a balance between responding to the 
communities' desires and the development objectives of the district as a whole, as an enormous 
challenge. As elaborated by the BAPPEDA official quoted above: 
"On the one hand, we need io ask the people what they desire, but on the 
other hand, they should not obstruct development either. The challenge is 
how to make the people feel that they have ownership of a project, as owned 
by the entire district community, not only owned by the Dayak adat 
community, not only owned by a community comprising of a particular 
ethnic group, but owned by the entire district community." (interview with 
B-G-9a) 
i,. A district official with the Bulungan Revenue Office, however, also pointed out that lack of 
infrastructure and a variety of district taxes have also deterred investors away from the district, 
B-G-23. 
"' Because communities' swidden agricultural system necessarily involved several years of 
fallow, some areas at times appeared idle. 
116 For instance, interview with a senior official in the economic unit of Bulungan, B-G-17 
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Similarly, reflecting on his experience of communities blockading the operations of a 
HPH, a senior UPTD official pointed out the difficulties that can arise when state actors have to 
face communities. As he explained: 
"Even the police do not dare to go against communities, let alone UPTD 
staff. These situations are often made worse when they involve 
provocateurs." (interview with B-G-15) 
Consequently, preventing dissatisfactions that would potentially lead to unrest to maintain 
security and peace has been one of local governments' priorities in implementing forestry 
decisions. This was consistent with local governments' argument about continuing to provide 
services associated with district logging permits, at least for some time, despite the withdrawal 
of the districts' authority by the Central Government (Chapter 3). Although district governments 
clearly had other motives for prolonging logging operations under district licenses (including 
formal forestry revenue for district coffers and informal revenue accruing to district officials 
and organisations - see section 6.3 and Chapter 7), the fact that district governments were 
taking note of communities' actions if logging operations under district licenses were to be 
abruptly halted shows communities' leverage at the timber activity level. A senior Bulungan 
official in the office of the Bupati explained that the district's effort to accommodate 
communities' demands as long as they could, despite circumstances such as pressure from the 
Centre, had led to a positive outcome: 
"Fortunately. the local government has been able thus far to maintain 
security, so that the district is still conducive". 327 (interview with B-G-17) 
District government officials and timber companies often referred to the involvement of 
"provocateurs" in community actions. The use of the word "provocateurs" in these contexts, 
however, is sometimes blurred: there is often a thin line between "provoking" and "facilitating" 
or "empowering" communities. Several local NGOs in Bulungan, in describing their 
involvement in community-related incidences called themselves "provocateurs", but in fact 
were actually referring to their actions of facilitating and supporting communities to stand up 
for their rights in claiming compensation for the use and exploitation - without their consent -
of what communities perceived as their lands or fon:sts, by other parties."' Since 1990s, NGOs 
in Kutai Barat in particular have played an important role in raising awareness of communities' 
rights and in the empowerment of some communities. 
" ' From the Indonesian use of the word kondusit, condusive used in this way refers to providing 
an enabling environment. 
"' Interviews with NGO activitists, B-N-5, B-N-2b, B-N-2c 
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Working in an environment with multiple and often conflicting local interests has led the 
district government to hedge its bets and try to satisfy all parties, or at the very least, not to 
stand in the way of potentially conflicting parties. In the granting of district oil palm plantation 
licenses (Chapter 3), for instance, rather than making sure that affected communities were 
happy with a potential plantation development, Bulungan's government placed the 
responsibility for obtaining communities' consent for the development on the company/investor 
developing the plantation. This would safely allow the district to issue plantation licenses to 
investors, but would also allow the district to appear favourable in the eyes of the communities. 
In addition, the district government would not need to take responsibility over any emerging 
conflicts, an issue that both district governments inevitably had to address during the bonanza of 
district logging licenses. 329 
Centrally-licensed timber companies also perceived that communities often made 
inappropriate or extended claims over certain areas only to demand compensation from these 
companies. As timber operators saw it, the boundaries of areas claimed by communities 
virtually "followed" the activities or the operations of HPH, although their villages were located 
far from the area claimed. 330 
The strategy adopted by some communities, "moving and adjusting of community 
boundaries" to exert land claims, is confirmed by a community mapping study in East 
Kalimantan, where boundaries can be seen as "contemporary responses to outside pressures 
... These 'boundaries' were sometimes manifested physically on the landscape, for example by 
the clearing and cultivation of land, the blockading of logging roads, or flagging of trees" 
(Gibson, 2004:3). 
The UPTD official in charge of administering HPHs echoed this perception held by a HPH 
concession personnel: 
"The boundaries of communities' lands follow the operations of HPH 
companies. Their demands are unreasonable, they even ask for dust money." 
[my emphasis]. (interview with B-G-15) 
A HPH employee affirmed this trend of "dust compensation" demanded by communities, 
which was rife post reformasi. "Dust compensation" (uang debu) refers to the payments that 
timber operators had to make, to compensate villagers for the "dust" associated with their 
timber activities, dust that their trucks and other heavy logging-related equipment produced 
when passing through villages. The amount was usually equivalent to petty cash, between I 000 
and 2000 rupiahs per cubic meter. A truck of 50 cubic meters, which was conside red a big load, 
had to pay between 50 thousand and I 00 thousand rupiah. A small truck load, about 25 cubic 
,,. Interview with a BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-10 
"
0 Interview with staff of PT 11, a HPH operating in Bulungan, B-P-2 
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meter, had to pay 25 thousand to 50 thousand rupiah. rn However, in Kutai Barat, in one 
particular village, a one-off "dust compensation" amounting to 10 million rupiah (1000 USD) 
was documented. 332 In this particular case, the HPH subsequently had to pay compensation 
regularly to the village. These HPHs were willing to accommodate the demands of communities 
because it was the only way to continue their operations.m 
Other operational difficulties facing HPHs with regard to communities' actions have 
included communities conducting logging themselves in HPH concession areas (Chapter 3), 
which, from the perspective of HPH holders, is an illegal act. To overcome this problem, 
however, HPHs usually turned a blind eye to such activities. As a staff member of a HPH 
operating in Kutai Barat revealed: 
"As Jong as it does not disturb us too much, we let them, so we can each 
continue doing what we do". 334 [my emphasis] (interview with K-P-3) 
With the shift towards increased local community power, and at the same time, the reduced 
power of the organs of the state to protect HPH interests - the Ministry of forestry losing control 
at the local level and the reduced power of the Central apparatus like the police - HPH 
companies had to change their approach towards communities. HPH companies that during the 
New Order had mostly excluded local interests and ignored communities' activities or rights 
(for instance, Potter 1991 ), were now working their way with relevant communities and 
accommodating their interests - but were still able to benefit - by taking account of their wishes 
and paying more respect to their customary rights. m 
District governments, begrudging the existence of centrally-licensed HPHs in their 
jurisdiction over which they had no control - in particular when compared to logging operators 
under district licenses - did not put much effort into protecting the interests of these HPH 
companies vis-a-vis those of the communities. During the period when district had the authority 
to issue logging licenses, districts had little incentive to maintain the operations of HPH 
companies. Because districts could legally issue logging licenses, they had every incentive to 
replace HPHs with district-licensed companies. For instance, Bulungan officials repeatedly 
mentioned their wish that the Ministry of Forestry would hand over the area under a state-
owned HPH operating in Bulungan's jurisdiction, PT II, to the district. This would have 
removed the district's major obstacle to issuing its own Jogging licenses over the area. Even 
3
l' Interview with staff of PT lk. a HPH operating in Bulungan, B-P-7 
m For details, see Nanang and Devung (2004) 
"'Interviews with staff of PT lk, a HPH in Bulungan, B-P-7 and with a senior forestry official of 
Bulungan, B-G-8a 
11
' " .... supaya bisa jalan sama-sama." 
m Interview with staff of PT lk, B-P-7. Similarly, lmang et.al. (2004a), show a similar example of 
this shift in Kutai Baral. 
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under PT 11 's status at the time, as an active HPH concession, Bulungan had deliberately issued 
small-scale logging licenses over the HPH area (Chapter 3). 
During the bonanza of district licenses, the Bupati of Kutai Barat specifically issued letters 
to centrally-licensed HPHs "requesting" that they give their consent to communities to apply for 
a district license within these HPH concession areas. 336 Because the administration of forestry 
services in this district (Chapter 3) were exclusively handled by the District Forestry Service -
in contrast to Bulungan which had a UPTD whereby dual forestry administration prevailed -
the district could effectively apply pressure on HPHs to make way for communities' logging 
licenses within their concessions (see also section 6.3). 
To some extent, the shift in community power was reflected in the Bupatis' decision to 
issue district logging licenses in the first place. In some cases, communities used physical 
means to assert their demands to district functionaries. According to an adat leader in Bulungan, 
a district decision to issue logging licenses at the onset of reformasi was influenced by the 
action of communities. His community had mounted demonstrations and demanded from the 
DPRD lhat if masyarakat were not allowed to menggesek (fell timber), then the government 
should provide them money to buy rice. 337 According to this adat leader, the government began 
to be more accommodating after this incident and similar incidents across the district; as a 
result, cooperation between the government and communities has since improved. 318 
During a short period in 2001, the Bupati of Bulungan temporarily halted the issuance of 
IPPK logging licenses due to the burgeoning land conflicts and the overlap between KBK and 
K.BNK (Chapter 3). Many communities, however, forcefully protested and demanded that the 
district continue to issue these licenses. In one instance, communities made their demands by 
"occupying" the home of (at the time the District Forestry Service had not been established) the 
head of the Provincial Branch Forestry Service in Bulungan.'39 Despite the fact that licenses 
were issued by the Bupati's office, masyarakat regarded the forestry unit as the most relevant 
agency because it was the unit handling forestry matters. Responding to these demands, the 
Bupati began to issue licenses, as well as extensions and revisions, again in 2002. 
The increasing assertiveness of villagers with regard to claims over lands and their rights 
in general was affirmed by village heads and adat leaders. Villagers have become more critical 
and courageous (lebih berani) 111 articulating their demands, including through 
316 For instance, letter from the Bupati ol Kutai Baratto HPH HNI, 10 October 2001 and to TWB, 
30 January 2003; interview with a senior official in the unit handling socio-economic affairs at 
the office of the Bupati of Kutai Bara!, K-G-7 
"' Interview with an adat leader of Bulungan, B-C-8 
"' Note that this adat leader did not differentiate between district government and the Central 
government. To many communities, they did neither perceived nor cared that it made a 
difference. 
339 Interview with B-N-1d 
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demonstrations. 3' 0 According to a village head, they were influenced and encouraged by 
demonstrations held in Jakarta that were aired in TV programs.341 Compared to the pre-
reformasi period, villagers increasingly demand transparency in village-level decisions and 
management, including in the distribution and allocation of forestry fees or compensation and in 
the RHL Project. Consequently, in the eyes of these village figures, their people have 
increasingly become difficult to "handle".342 
The discussion above illustrates the changing power relationships between communities 
and the district government, between villagers and business actors, and between ordinary 
villagers and village functionaries. But did this shift affect the distribution of benefits at the 
community level? This issue will be discussed in the next section. 
6.2.4 The benefits of forestry activities to local people 
Since 1999, local communities in the two districts have been able to benefit directly from 
forestry activities. 343 Communities benefited from both district forestry initiatives (small-scale 
logging - Chapter 3) and centrally-imposed activities (RHL Project, Chapter 5). 
Direct benefits to communities: "previously we received only 
droplets of forestry benefits, now it is better'.i"" 
All types of actors interviewed - from district government officials, villagers, village 
heads and adat leaders, the legislature, staff of forestry businesses, and NGOs - were in 
agreement that one important consideration in the issuance of district small-scale logging 
licenses was communities' demands to have access to the benefit of commercial forestry 
activities. The argument " for communities" or " for the benefit of communities" was emphasized 
in local officials' arguments with respect to district decisions to revise and extend these permits, 
as well as to apply the SO strategy, to allow logging activities to continue beyond their legal 
period (Chapter 3 ). 
The range of district-level actors interviewed also gave a similar explanation that district 
logging licenses provided a much better opportunity to locals, compared to centrally-licensed 
HPH concessions. Masyarakat were adamant that they received more benefit from district 
logging licenses than from HPHs. 34' 
"
0 Interviews with village heads of Bulungan, B-C-4, B-C-7 
'" Interview with head of village A of Bulungan, B-C-7 
,., Interviews with village heads of SB and A in Bulungan, B-C-4, B-C-7, and adat leader of 
village A of Bulungan, B-C-8 
''' While district small-scale logging activities had subsided by the end of 2004, the Forest and 
land Rehabilitation Project has continued to date. 
, .. "Oulu daerah enjoy hanya menetes, sekarang sudah /ebih menikmati" as stated by a senior 
officia l of Bulungan Forestry SeNice, B-G-16 
'" See Barr et al. (2001 ), Limberg et al. (2004), and Engel and Palmer (2006) for discussions on 
the benefits of small-scale logging operations for communities in East Kalimantan. 
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HPHs were and are required (by the Central Government) to support communities in their 
concession areas through community empowerment programs known as Bina Desa which was 
later renamed as Pembinaan Masyarakat Desa Hutan (PMDH). Under these programs, 
companies typically provided material support for villages, such as building village halls or 
religious structures, providing farming equipment, and pesticides. The level of assistance, 
however, was mostly at the companies' discretion; forestry officials were hardly involved in the 
ways individual programs developed. As a consequence, although villagers did acknowledge 
HPHs' contributions, the general view was that communities received very limited benefits, 
negligible in comparison to the proceeds of the companies' timber operations. 146 District 
government officials also were highly critical of the actual implementation of PMDH. A senior 
official of Bulungan, for instance, was cynical about HPHs' seriousness in implementing 
PMDH, and suspected that they carried the program merely to satisfy the requirement to obtain 
their Annual Working Plan (RKT). 347 
Typically, logging operations under a district license were carried out through a 
partnership arrangement (kemitraan) between the community and a timber company and/or 
capital provider (see also Chapter 3). Communities provided forest areas for logging, whereas 
other parties, often local entrepreneurs, became the license holders. The license holder either 
became the contractor or merely acted as a broker, in which case he had to find another party to 
carry out the logging operations. The contractor financed the logging operations himself, if he 
had the capital, or was financed by capital providers, locally referred to as investors, who were 
often based in Tarakan, Samarinda, Jakarta, or Malaysia. In return for the right to harvest timber 
in the area under the license, the company (the contractor or the capital provider), wou ld agree 
to compensate the community. The compensation varied in degree and form, ranging from 
timber fees, assistance for village phy sical development (including the building of religious 
structures, village halls, and local roads), work opportunity, and at least on paper, the 
establishment of community gardens/plantations. The last one failed to happen, however, 
prompting many communities to renegotiate their agreements. 3• 8 
Timber fees varied from place to place and depended on who did what. In Bulungan, the 
fee ranged from 20,000 to 45,000 rupiah for a cubic meter of timber harvested. In Kutai Barat, 
the level of fees was higher: up to 65,000 to 75,000 rupiah a cubic meter was recorded in the 
villages of M and BM, respectively."' The fees in Kutai Barat were higher than in Bulungan 
''' For instance, according to an interview with a staff member of PT lk, the company allocated 
1,000 per cubic meter for PMDH; the money was used to build village structures and to provide 
villages with generators (interview with B-P-7). 
'" Interview with a senior Bulungan official, B-G-3 
"' Interviews with an ex-NGO turned district forestry official, B-G-8a; with the Deputy Bupati of 
Bulungan, 8-G-•; with a member of Pionir, B-N-1c 
,.,. The magnitude of the fees pertaining to Bulungan was obtained from Pionir, a local NGO. 
Pionir was hired by a foreign researcher to conduct a survey and interviews on the operations of 
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because the communities themselves were often involved in the process of obtaining the 
license. 350 In Bulungan, the partner timber company or contractor (mitra) was typically 
responsible for obtaining the license, thus resulting in lower compensation fees. 
The accumulated material benefit in the form of immediate cash associated with district 
logging licenses cannot be underestimated. In village A, of Bulungan, the total fees accumulated 
by the village community between 2000 and 2004 were estimated to exceed 2 billion rupiah 
(about 220 thousand USD). m To put this in perspective, this sum was much higher than the 
annual Development Fund allocation to the village. Each sub-district was allocated a 
Development Fund of 1 billion rupiah or 110 thousand USD per year. Being one of the seven 
villages in the sub-district of Tanjung Palas, this means that the village received roughly 15,000 
USD of Development Fund per year. m Thus, on average, between 2000 and 2004, the village 
received three times the amount of Development Fund from timber fees annually. This 
highlights the level of significance of timber fees derived from the operations of district logging 
licenses to the village as a whole. 
The fees that had accrued to communities, although significant by the communities ' 
standard, were only a proportion of a far larger amount. A local entrepreneur, whose company 
held the district license over the adat forest in village A above, and who was also an adat leader 
(Box 6.1) estimated that fees received by the communities comprised only about 20% of the 
total proceeds of the timber.353 The remaining 80% went to the capital providers who had 
financially supported the logging operations; those who acted as capital providers in Bulungan, 
as 'in Kutai Baral, were Malaysian or Samarinda or Jakarta-based investors (see also Chapter 3). 
Forestry activities, when they lasted, did provide economic improvements for villagers. In 
village A of Bulungan where both district-licensed logging activities and the RHL Project took 
place, the economic benefits could be observed readily. A household-goods shop owner in that 
village, a long-time inhabitant of the village, for instance, pointed out villagers ' renovated 
houses and the six newly opened shops that he now had to compete with, as a direct result of 
kerja kayu (timber activities) and the RHL Project. 35' He explained how timber activities now 
differed from those of the past: 
district small-scale logging licenses. Data pertaining to Kutai Baral were obtained from lmang et 
al. (2004a) and lmang et al. (2004b). 
,.., Interviews with a member of Pionir, B-N-1c 
"' Interview with the head of village A of Bulungan, B-C-7 
"' Dana Pembangunan Wilayah Kecamatan (PWK) 
"' Interview with an adat leader and a local entrepreneur of Bulungan, B-P-8 
"' Interview with a villager and shop owner selling household necessities in village A, Bulungan, 
8-C-2. Kerja kayu literally means "wood working", referring to felling timber and activities 
associated with t imber harvesting and transportation. 
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"These were a result of increased opportunities from the timber sector. Now 
people can cut timber in forest areas previously protected and forbidden by 
forestry officials." (interview with B-C-2) 
During fieldwork in 2004, the peak of district logging licenses had largely passed. 
However, villagers in both districts expressed their wishes that districts continue to allow 
district-based logging operations. These preferences thus affirmed the communities' perceptions 
of the (short term) economic benefits of district logging licenses. m 
In Kutai Barat, the benefits felt by communities were reflected by demands to continue 
district-based logging activities. In 2003 the district passed PERDA 12 of 2003 on Community 
Forestry or Kehutanan Masyarakat (KHM) and subsequently its administrative and technical 
guidelines (section 6.1.1 ). Although KHM encompassed various aspects of community-based 
forest management, the emphasis thus far has been on the aspect of timber harvesting. The 
demise of districts' authority to issue Jogging licenses on the one hand, and communities' 
demands to continue with timber activities on the other, led the Bupati to push towards issuing 
community-based forestry management licenses or !Jin Usaha Kehutanan Masyarakat 
(IUKHM). According to a district official, the Bupati had an interest in pushing for the issuance 
of IUKHM because at the time he had two years remaining in office before the upcoming 2006 
election and needed to demonstrate his favourable policies and tangible results to his 
constituents. 356 
This initiative had stumbled, however, for several reasons. First, the IUKHM were to be 
granted over community or adat-managed lands, while the determination of the status and 
functions of the Forest Estate lies with the Ministry of Forestry. Secondly, the right to issue 
logging licenses had already been taken back by the Centre. By July 2004, there were already 
some forty applications for IUKHM, all of which emphasised on logging activities. However, 
district forestry officials suspected that IUKHM would only resemble the previous district 
small-scale logging licenses, in the disguise of community forestry . 357 In May 2005, the Bupati 
finally did issue 11 agroforestry-based IUKHMs, reportedly in KBNK areas. As of January 
2007, however, only one has been able to actually start felling timber under the !Jin 
Pemanfaatan Kayu (lPK) - Timber Utilization License, which is a permit to clear-cut forests in 
a KBNK or forests targeted for conversion, ostensibly to open up agroforestry gardens. 358 The 
actual implementation of IUKHM is not as easy as the previous district licenses, as the authority 
to issue IPK licenses lies with the Governor. 
"' For instance, focus group discussion and interviews with community members of village LM, 
Kutai Baral, K-C-1; interview with villagers of SB of Bulungan, B-C-14, B-C-15; interview with an 
adat leader of Bulungan, B-C-8 
'"' Interview with a senior official of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, K-G-21 
m Interviews with senior forestry officials of Kutai Baral, K-G-3a and K-G-20 
"
1 Personal communication with FS, official of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, 16 January 2007 
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Communities had also gained intangible benefits from district licenses. One important 
benefit was communities' empowerment through negotiation processes with powerful actors . 
District logging licenses had necessitated that communities or community representatives 
negotiate directly wi th timber operators and/or capital providers to reach an agreement that 
provided better terms for the community. 359 Although in some cases logging operators had failed 
to meet the terms of the agreement, these direct negotiation processes nevertheless provided 
communities with a positive learning experience. 
One other intangible benefit that has not received much attention has been the 
improvement of demographic data collection and maintenance system at the village level. The 
timber compensation fees within a village were typically distributed according to individual 
family circumstances, for example, the number of individuals in a household, age, and 
occupation. It was the responsibility of the ketua RT (head of the Community Neighbourhood 
Group, Rukun Tetangga) to maintain data on his/her group and to request a commensurate 
distribution of the timber fees from village functionaries in charge of administering them. To 
prevent internal conflict, data at the Community Neighbourhood (RT) level, and subsequently 
compiled as village-level data, had to be recorded more accurately, in the monografi desa. 360 
No longer providing a legal income source for communities, the fading and subsequent 
demise of formal district-licensed timber operations had made the DAK-DR Forest RHL Project 
increasingly attractive as a new alternative. Although far fewer community members are 
participating in the Project and with a lower income accruing to individual members (Chapter 
5), thi s Project, if it were carried out appropriately, could provide a steady benefi t stream in the 
longer term through future harvesting of timber trees and other crops (rattan in K utai Barat and 
fruit trees in Bulungan). 
The strengthening of village-level elites 
Both case study districts have experienced a shift in community power versus other actors' 
power in terms of their increased influence in forestry operations. Communities' actions have 
significantly determined the ways in which timber operations are carried out on the ground and 
the attractiveness of other development initiatives. Villagers' sometimes violent actions have 
also increasingly become an important consideration for district governments' decisions over 
forestry to deviate from Central Government directives. This was one of the district 
governments' considerations in continuing as long as possible with district timber licenses, 
despite the withdrawal of districts' licensing authority (Chapter 5). 
159 For similar observations in the neighbouring district of Malinau, see Rhee (2001) and 
Wollenberg et al. (2006) and Palmer and Engel (2006) 
""' Interview with B-N-1 b 
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Within village management, villagers now articulate issues or problems that concern them 
to village leaders more overtly and expect increasing transparency in village decisions. 361 
Village heads complained that it was now much more difficult to " rule" compared with the New 
Order period. In the past, communities mostly showed acceptance and bowed to whatever was 
directed from "above", including decisions made by the village head, but now it was no longer 
the case. 362 
However, privileges of access to information and of networks have largely maintained the 
power of village elites, relative to ordinary villagers, allowing the former to benefit. Therefore, 
within communities, a larger part of the opportunities and the associated benefits presented by 
forestry activities have accrued to the village/community elite. 
By default, the position of village heads as the lowest level of formally institutionalized 
"administrator" has increased their power. As in the past, at the community level, village heads 
were the first to know about a government decision. Government information is formally 
distributed down the administrative chain: from the district level to sub-district heads (camat) to 
village heads and adat leaders, to ha.mlet heads (kepala dusun) and the head of the Community 
Neighbourhood Group (Rukun Tetangga or RT), and then conveyed to villagers. In the two 
districts, the informal position of adat leader was strong, and in some cases, also identica l to 
village head. Consequently, in this respect, in terms of formal access to government decisions 
and projects, regional autonomy has not brought any significant change to ordinary villagers. i,;i 
Village leaders or community figures also commonly have established networks in the 
district capital that allow them to access information or enjoy pri vilcgcs available only in the 
district capital. 364 These networks include family ties with individuals physically located in the 
district capital, individuals with positions in the local government or DPRD, or established 
relationships with d istrict function aries. 
Members of the e lite can thus use such opportunities better than ordinary community 
members. For instance, it was not unusual that district logging licenses were held by members 
of community elite such as the adat leader (Box 6.1 ), the sub-district head, or a DPRD 
member. 365 As in the case of local people 's direct interactions with the Bupati, obtaining 
information in the district capital is largely restricted to those who are wealthier and can afford 
the trip to the district capital. Commoners thus would have to depend on information 
dissemination through distric t officials' visits to the villages or through district circulars. 
"' Interviews with head of village SB, B-C-4 and head of village A, B-C-7 , of Bulungan 
"' Interview with head of village A of Bulungan , B-C-7 
"'Inte rview with one of village A's functionaries, Bulungan, B-C-1 
"" For a detailed documentation of similar issues in the district of Malinau, see Wollenbe rg et al. 
(2006). 
l6s For instance, interviews with a villagers from sub-district S , B-C-3; with member of a n NGO, 
B-N-2a; with an adat leader and entrepreneur of village A, 8-P-8; with OPRO members of 
Bulungan, B-L-1b and B-L-2 
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The direction of information flow, its distribution, and dissemination, determined who 
could use the opportunity to benefit from government projects. For example, the head of village 
A of Bulungan, being the first among villagers to learn of a clean water project in the village 
and having an adequate network of financial support, ended up carrying out the project under 
the banner of a small business company he had set up. 366 Similar cases abound in relation to the 
RHL Project. 
The village head of SB of Bulungan, for instance, affirmed that information about projects, 
such as the RHL Project, must be sought actively. Information included the existence of the 
Project itself, what the Project entailed, and the requirements for participation in the Project. 161 
He said that he sought information on projects like this out of pity for the people of his village 
who lacked the access and means to seek such information, and because many of the villagers 
complained of the limited opportunities for cash income when the inflow of the small-scale 
logging fees largely dried up. This particular village head had a nephew, the head of a local 
NGO, who resided in the district capital. The latter was also a member of a Sub-district 
Development Monitoring Program (Program Pengawasan Kecamatan), who also had a close 
personal and working relationship with Pionir, the local environmental NGO working on 
forestry issues (section 6.1 ). This nephew was therefore an effective source of information about 
development projects being carried out at the district level, including the RHL Project, for the 
village head. The village head was also a teacher (and a civil servant) in the local school, 
showing both his intellectual capacity and position relative to other villagers. 
The capacity to obtain certain information, particularly about projects, allowed the village 
elite a greater chance to benefit from them. The farmer group leaders participating in the RHL 
Project in the village of SB above, for instance, turned out to be either relatives of or have some 
sort of family ties with the village head. In addition, those in charge of providing seedlings and 
administering planting were also the village head's family members or relatives (Chapter 5). 
Similarly, in PS, another village of Bulungan, those participating in the RHL Project were 
families or relatives of the village head. 36 ' In Kutai Barat, the head of one farmer group 
participating in the RHL Project was a community figure who had just returned from residence 
in Java and had gained business experience. 369 Village figures (for instance, the ketua RTs) 
chose the members of the farmer groups participating in the RHL Project. 370 
Members of the village elite, however, insisted that they had to arbitrarily choose members 
of farmer groups because in the beginning it was not easy to get villagers to participate in the 
Project; villagers showed little interest. Only when the funds were actually distributed did they 
'"'Interview with an official of village A, B-C-1 
.i" Interview with head of village SB, Bulungan, B-C-4 
,., Interview with B-N-1a 
,., Interview with a community figure and entrepreneur in village MB, Kutai Barat, K-C-10 
"° Interview with an official of village A, Bulungan, B-C-1 
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begin to show enthusiasm and express an interest in participating in the Project. 37 1 The quota for 
each area, determined for each sub-district, and therefore also for each village, was limited 
(section 5.2.2). Therefore, to reduce the feeling of unfair treatment among villagers, village 
figures usually promised participation in the next year for those who could not be 
accommodated in the Project in the current year. 372 
"' Interview with head of village SB, Bulungan, B-C-4 and adat leader and entrepreneur of 
village A, Bulungan, B-P-8 
"' Interviews with an administrator of village A, Bulungan, B-C-1 and the secretary of Village SP, 
Bulungan, B-C-11 
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Box 6.1 Case study: the "double identity"· of an adat leader in Bulungan 
MM is an example of someone from the village- level elite in Bulungan District who 
was able to use the opportunities engendered by decentralization not only for his personal 
benefit but for his community. A 47 year old Dayak Kenyah adat leader, he represented 
one of the three ethnic groups in his village. Besides being an adat leader, MM was also a 
local businessman, who had collected and traded gaharu (aloeswood) resin, Aquilaria 
malaccensis, in the 1980s and had travelled extensively and worked in Sabah, Malaysia. 
These activities enabled him to establish a network with Malaysian investors. In 1997 he 
became a local contractor, among others for forestry projects 
MM's company, CV GA, was granted a district logging license (IPPK) in 2002 over 
an area of 400 hectares of adat land - that is, communal land - of village A. The license 
covering 200 hectares was extended in 2003. A Malaysian investor supplied the capital for 
the logging operations. 
From the point of view of the district government and local communities, the granting 
of the IPPK license to MM's company was an act of legitimation of district policies in 
favour of local communities. Because MM was the community' s adat leader and therefore 
a legitimate representative of the community, the granting of a district license over the 
community's land to CV GA was seen as a way for communities to benefit directly from 
the forests. During the period when district logging licenses were being issued (Chapter 5), 
the position of adat leaders was particularly important, as in this case, because the forest 
area covered under these licenses typically encompassed an adat territory. 
Unlike in other villages where IPPK licenses often led to internal conflicts associated 
with fees received, the community, including the adat leaders from the other two ethnic 
groups, respected MM and were satisfied with the negotiations led by MM in the name of 
the community with the partner investor. Neither the agreement reached with regard to the 
compensation - fees, contributions in kind - nor its implementation provoked conflict. 
MM was also actively engaged in the OAK-DR RHL Project as a contractor. 
Typically, a capital provider funded the Project prior to the actual disbursement of the 
funds {Chapter 7) because the funds were often transferred late in the year (Chapter 6). As 
a contractor, MM identified and recruited farmers, not only from his village but also from 
other villages, to join Farmer Groups and to participate in the Project. 
MM's experience in and observations of the implementation of the DAK-DR RHL 
Project led him to believe that the small-scale approach through the involvement of 
individual member farmers within Farmer Groups provided one major explanation for why 
the Project had largely failed. He argued that the Project would have a greater chance of 
success if it were conducted in a large-scale, plantation mode, and referred specifically to 
o il palm or vanilla. MM's earlier experience in Malaysia had convinced him that the 
Malaysian success with oil palm development could be applied in the district and that these 
developments would benefit the community. At the time of the interview, he specifically 
had in mind developing a plantation in a HPH concession area. It was in this context that, 
in his role as a local businessman, he introduced prospective investors to the office of the 
Bupati and to the DPRD. He thus enjoyed a level of access to the Bupati that was denied 
most community members. 
MM's plan was congruent with the district's overall plan to attract investors into the 
district, and was particularly in accord with the district's major economic-driven goal to 
develop plantations {Chapter 3). MM has since been working closely with the head of the 
economic unit of the Bupati's office. 
MM had also sought the support of the DPRD in his effort to establish a plantation in 
an area of what (at the time of the interview) was a large-scal e HPH concession. If this 
were to happen, it would only be legally possible in areas specified for non-forest uses 
(that is, an area that has been released from the Forest Estate). Only then, could a district 
permit for the plantation be issued over the area. In areas that were sti ll under the category 
of forest uses, this would involve a decision to convert to non-forest uses by the Ministry 
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of Forestry, which could be initiated by the recommendation or application of district 
governments. In this respect, as an adat leader, and one residing in the district capital, MM 
had access both physically and personally to members of the DPRD. He admitted that he 
had financially supported a new member of the DPRD, who was elected in 2004. 
This case demonstrates how an individual from village-level elite has not only been 
able to use the opportunity arising from district policies but also influence them. The 
"double identity", being an adat leader and at the same time also a businessman, with the 
right connections and adequate physical means, has helped paved the way for this 
particular village elite member to utilize the opportunity brought by decentralization 
through the district's forestry policies and projects. In the case of the IPPK license, the 
benefit, albeit short-term, had accrued to both this individual personally and his 
communities. 
From the perspective of this individual, his "double identity", supported by an 
established networking capacity in the district government domain and as importantly, in 
the investors' circle, had substantially affected the ways in which he could influence 
district forestry-related decisions to his own benefit and that of his community. From the 
perspective of the district government and communities, giving him this opportunity is an 
act of legitimation for policies favorable to communities. 
Source: Interviews with MM; administrator of village A, B-C-1; adat leader of a different 
ethnic group in village A, B-C-8; with an NGO activist, B-N-1 f, and district documents 
In both Kutai Barat and Bulungan Districts, internal conflicts within a community around 
the small-scale logging operations and the RHL Project often involve a non transparent and 
skewed distribution of fees or monies associated with these activities. In these cases, community 
or farmer groups' members claimed that those in charge - often members of the village-level 
elite - had usually seized the greater part of the monies. m 
In logging operations under district logging licenses, partner timber companies usually 
negotiated with village heads, adat leaders and other community representatives (such as the 
ketua RT) over compensation arrangements in exchange for the rights to harvest logs in the area 
under community licenses. In this task, they were often referred as the pengurus (literally "the 
ones who administered something"). The pengurus usually got a certain predetermined portion 
of the fees negotiated with the company. For instance, the two companies working in the area of 
village SB negotiated with a pengurus that consisted of 6 village representatives. For every 
35,000 rupiah fee for every cubic meter of timber harvested, the outcome of negotiations 
between the pengurus and the timber company over village compensation, 5,000 rupiah went to 
the pengurus. The remainder was distributed as contribution to the village treasury. the building 
of the village hall, individual villagers' allocations, and to village-level military (babinsa) and 
police (polsek) personnel. 314 In this particular case, the village head received a monthly fee from 
the company, the size of which was not disclosed. In the case of village A, the village 
administration consisting of the village head, the secretary of the village, and three other 
373 Interview with member of Pionir, B-N-1 b; with a senior official of Kutai Ba rat's BAPPEDA, K-
G-2b 
'" Interviews with a villager and the village head of village SB, Bulungan, B-C-5a and B-C-4, 
respectively 
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administrative heads (Kaur) received l million rupiah per month from the timber company 
operating in the village. The village head determined the amount to be allocated to each of the 
four members of the village administration."' 
Horizontal conflicts surrounding the operations of district logging licenses often occurred 
because in most cases both the deal with the partner company and the flow of money coming in 
from the partner company were not transparent. Unless a village community was very small, 
only the pengurus negotiated and directly communicated with representatives of the partner 
company. 376 Village heads or adat leaders played a significant role in this because the 
negotiations pertained to timber operations on village, adat or community lands. 377 In 
particular, companies typically approached these influential figures personally to pave the way, 
to ensure that logging could occur. Suspicions often arose within the community over the 
amount of fees actually received from partner companies and the amount that was actually 
passed on to members of the community. m 
For instance, during 2001-2002, the logging activities of an IPPK (district small-scale 
license) operator in a protected community forest in the village of SB of Bulungan had sparked 
a violent protest within the community involving the seizure of the operators' logging 
equipment. Apparently, the IPPK operator had earlier approached an adat figure and made an 
agreement with the latter without involving or informing the community. A local NGO member 
from the village had played a critical role in this community' s protest and uprising. The 
subsequent negotiations between the community and the IPPK operator ended with an 
agreement in which the latter agreed to compensate the community for the loss associated with 
the timber harvested. This agreement was reached, among others, to prevent the case being 
brought to court. 
In Kutai Barat, remote villagers took the trouble to visit the District Forestry Service and 
complained about DAK-DR monies allegedly embezzled by the head of the farmer group, who 
herself was a camat (see also Chapter 7).319 
6.3 District government and forestry business relations 
One of the key types of actors in district forestry has been forestry companies, both 
centrally-licensed HPHs and local or regional companies that acted as partners/contractors for 
district-licensed holders and as contractors for HPHs. This category of actors is particularly 
important in light of the districts' forestry activities which have emphasized forest extraction. 
'" Interview with an administrator of village A, Bulungan, B-C-1 
"' Interview with member of Pionir, B-N-1 b 
"' For instance, interview with a timber operator in Bulungan, B-P-6 
"' Interviews with among others, member of Pionir, B-N-1b; with a BAPPEDA official of 
Bulungan, B-G-11 b; DPRD members of Bulungan, B-L-1b and B-L-2. See Nanang and Devung 
{2004} for cases in Kutai Barat. For a similar pattern in Malinau District, see Limberg et al. 
(2004). 
'" Interviews with villagers of Tl, Kutai Barat, K-C-5, K-C-6, K-C-7 
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6.3.1 The erosion of HPH's power in district forestry 
The previous section discussed how district governments have treated HPH companies 
compared with communities under decentralisation. By siding with the latter, district 
governments not only expected to increase their chances of receiving a good "report card" in the 
eyes of communities but were also able to maintain peace, thus keep up a "conducive" 
environment in the district. Securing communities' support is particularly important because 
under regional autonomy Bupatis are in effect no longer appointed by the Centre, but are elected 
by the DPRD (prior to 2004) or directly by their constituents in the districts (2004 onwards) 
(Chapter 7). 
Under regional autonomy, district governments' increased formal power in general and in 
the issuance of district licenses in particular have indirectly increased their leverage over these 
companies. District governments have applied pressure, directly and indirectly, on HPH 
companies to allow for timber operations under district licenses to be carried out in HPH 
concession areas. Kutai Baral explicitly "requested" HPHs to allow communities to apply for 
district licenses in forest areas within their concessions (see also section 6.2.3). Bulungan 
indirectly pressured HPHs by issuing district licenses on their concession areas without the 
HPHs' knowledge or consent (see also Chapter 3). The district subsequently put the 
responsibility to coordinate with an affected HPH on the (district) license holders, after the 
licenses were issued. 
However, HPH companies were also pressured by higher levels of government in the other 
direction. For instance, exercising its function as the arm of the Central Government, the 
Provincial Forestry Service warned PT II, a state-owned HPH operating in Bulungan, to uphold 
its obligation to protect its concession area from the encroachment of district-licensed logging 
operations. PT I 1 was also prohibited from consenting to or from recommending the issuance of 
such licenses within its concession area. 380 
Pressures from PT 11 and higher levels of government, however, only resulted in the 
temporary suspension of the issuance of Bulungan's IPPK licenses in 2001. The district 
subsequently continued with the issuance of logging licenses in 2002 and revised the areas of 
district licenses which had overlapped with PT 11. However, the declining capacity of the HPH 
holder to defend its area and the lack of monitoring efforts on the part of district government 
hardly guaranteed that logging under district licenses did not encroach into the HPH' s area. 
In an environment in which the communities' position has become stronger, coupled with 
the district governments' unsupportive actions, HPHs have been forced to change the ways in 
which they operate. They have sought ways to cope, but at the same time, benefit, from the 
situation. In Kutai Barat, HPHs chose to work with communities. Rather than foregoing the 
"
0 Letter from the head of the East Kalimantan Provincial Forestry Service 522.101 /21 /4/DK-
11/2001, dated June 21 2001, to PT 11 , the parastatal HPH operating in the province 
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opportunity altogether by releasing their area and letting it be harvested by communities' 
(potential) partner companies, the HPHs instead became the communities' partners themselves. 
During the era of the small-scale district licenses, therefore, HPHs often became both the capital 
provider and the operator of timber harvesting activities under district licenses. This 
arrangement allowed HPHs to benefit in two ways. By acting as the communities' partner, 
HPHs not only averted potential conflicts with affected communities, but at the same time also 
obtained timber more cheaply than if the harvest had been carried out through normal HPH 
operations. Because technical obligations under district small-scale licenses were far less 
stringent than those under HPH licenses, the administrative and operational costs of harvesting 
under the former were lower than those under the latter. For instance, timber operations under 
small-scale district licenses were not required to adopt the selective felling method and did not 
have to go through the processes of obtaining an approved RKT prior to timber felling, as has 
been and continues to be imposed on timber operations under HPHs. An official from APHI 
affiliated with a HPH operating in Kutai Barat explained: 
"Because the logging is going to take place in our backyard anyway, better 
that we do it ourselves." (interview with P-B-1) 
The same individual however, defended HPHs' action arguing that a HPH partnership was 
better than a non-HPH partnership because the former harvested within the area under the 
license, while other partner companies often felled in areas outside those specified under the 
license. With District Forestry Service's lack of monitoring efforts, however, the ways in which 
HPHs harvesting operations were either different from or similar to the ways in which other 
partner companies operated would be difficult to substantiate. 's' 
HPHs in Bulungan applied a different strategy by working with local and regional 
operators. Because their concession areas were claimed by communities, HPHs had to negotiate 
with affected communities through their adat leaders and settled the compensation rate for 
harvesting in their claimed area. However, the logging operations were sub-contracted to local 
or regionally-based companies that are preferred and accepted by local communities. 382 This 
sub-contracting arrangement continues to date. As a consequence of this new arrangement, 
however, these HPHs have had to lay off many of their employees. m 
m Obidzinski (2005) and Obidzinski and Andrianto (2005) reported the involvement of HPHs in 
illegal timber harvesting activities in Berau and Kutai Timur Districts, also in East Kalimantan, 
under the decentralisation period. These illegal activities included cutting outside HPHs' 
authorized blocks and overcutting. 
m The practice of sub-contracting of logging operations was also common under the New Order 
period (see for instance, Resosudarmo 2002), but for different reasons. 
m Interviews with staff of PT lk of Bulungan, B-P-1; with staff of PT 11 of Bulungan, B-P-2 
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Bulungan has seen the rise of regional and/or local entrepreneurs/companies that were 
already operating in the forestry sector prior to reformasi, but have grown much stronger post-
reformasi and under decentralisation. 384 They are regional in terms of where they are based and 
in terms of the reach of their operations. They are local in the sense that the owners, although of 
Chinese descent, had been living in the original Bulungan District. Depending on the type of 
these companies, their operations extend from Bulungan to the neighbouring districts and to 
Papua. They control their operations from the neighbouring municipality of Tarakan. 
There are two types of these companies. The first type consists of companies that are 
financially very s trong and have extensive network. Two companies of this type have or had 
operations in Bulungan. One is owned by JL, but within a larger group of an umbrella company, 
owned by G. This group's operation includes a HPH with activities in Papua, and therefore is 
not only financially very strong but also politically, and is said to have a strong network all the 
way to Jakarta. The second company, which is JL' s competitor, belongs to an entrepreneur K. 
K works alone and is also strong in the construction and coal mining sectors. The other type 
includes smaller companies in terms of their financial base, but their operations also encompass 
neighbouring districts. These entrepreneurs were the ones who usually acted as brokers for 
community licenses; many of the communities' licenses were he ld under a smaller company's 
name, but the contractors or the capital providers were Malaysian or larger companies, 
including those from the first, larger type of regional companies above. 
These local and regional companies have the support of the affected district governments, 
including Bulungan and the neighbouring district of Malinau, which was part of the original 
Bulungan District prior to its partitioning. According to informants, these companies had 
financed or supported the election of the Bupati of Bulungan and Malinau. Bulungan 
government, therefore, has been supportive of these companies in their position as the 
communities' partners in district IPPK licenses. Communities have also preferred these 
companies over HPHs, because they were seen as assisting communities to benefit more from 
forest operations directly for the first time since the New Order. 38s Communities' acceptance of 
these local and regional actors is reflected in JL, a man of Chinese descent, being awarded an 
adat name and status in the vi llage of P, something that is a great honour.386 This has made local 
and regionally-based companies not only become even more financially sound, but also more 
'" The following accounts of these regional and local companies are based on interviews with 
an NGO activist turned a senior district forestry official, 8-G-Ba; an NGO activist turned DPRD 
member, 8-L-4a, B-L-4b; member of an NGO of Bulungan, B-N-2a; B-N-2b; staff of PT lk of 
Bulungan, B-P-7; a BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-11 a; member of Pionir, B-N-1 h; villager 
of village SB, B-C-5a; timber buyer for one of company, B-P-5; adat leader and local 
entrepreneur, B-P-8; various district and other documents. 
"' Interview with a senior official of Bulungan Forestry Service, B-G-8a 
,,. Can be s een as analogous to the granting of the "Sir" status by the British monarchy, albeit at 
the local level. 
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powerful vis-a-vis HPHs. The same local and regional companies were granted oil-palm 
plantation licenses by Bulungan' s government (section 3.4). 
The presence of these local and regional companies and their capacity to finance or attract 
financial sources to carry out forestry activities in the district has made the presence of HPH in 
the district even less attractive. The district government prefers local and regional operators 
over HPH companies because of a higher level of "mutual symbiosis" with the former. For 
instance, Bulungan facilitated the contracting agreement (Kerja Sama Operasi) of the state-
owned HPH PT II with the regionally-based timber company owned by JL, above. 317 
More importantly, however, district governments prefer local and regionally-based timber 
companies not because they are local or regional, but because it allows them to exert more 
influence over these local or regional entrepreneurs compared to HPHs. 388 In Kutai Barat, 
district licenses were held by local entrepreneurs or communities, but the investors who 
provided capital or operators were Samarinda and some even Jakarta-based . 389 This shows that 
the district government does not have a strong preference over who has activities and who can 
benefit from their decisions. What matters most to district government is who they can control, 
a question closely associated with the district government's authority over the issuance of 
licenses. As long as they are not centrally-licensed HPHs, that is, as long as district 
governments were the ones issuing the license, they can control the grantee. This consistently 
came up in the interviews and in the actions of the districts in the tug of war over the issuance of 
logging licenses between levels of government. Whoever has the power to issue logging 
licenses controls access to resources, and consequently, the associated rents. As explained by a 
senior official of Bulungan 's economic unit: 
"It is difficult to go after HPHs, because they belong to the Centre. IPPK is 
easy to go after because they are owned locally." (interview with B-G-17) 
District governments, however, because of their increased powers in general under 
decentralisation, do have some limited influence over HPHs. Whenever possible, districts seek 
other ways to extract formal direct benefit from HPHs operating in their jurisdiction. Districts 
have exerted such efforts despite the fact that districts in timber producing areas are allocated a 
significant forestry revenue share from the Central Government (Chapter 4 ). For instance, the 
Bupati of Kutai Barat at one point gathered HPH representatives and pressured them openly to 
contribute to the district' s road development.''° After bitter negotiations, in 2003 the district 
"' Interview with a senior official of Bulungan Forestry Service, B-G-8a 
'" For instance, interviews with a BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-1 O; a senior official in the 
economic unit of Bulungan, B-G-17; a senior official of Bulungan, B-G-4b 
,.. Interview with a senior official of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, K-G-1 f 
''° Interviews with CIFOR researchers, N-A-5 and N-A-6; with a senior official of the Revenue 
Office of Kutai Bara!, K-G-15c, K-G-15d 
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government successfully persuaded two HPHs to contribute an amount equivalent to 95,000 
USD to the district's budget. 391 Kutai Barat was also able to pressure a foreign mining company 
operating in the district to contribute substantially to its budget (section 4.5). m Bulungan, 
however, was apparently unable to apply pressure on HPHs operating in its jurisdiction in the 
same way. It had attempted to apply volume-based local charges (retribusi) to HPHs, but this 
charge was strongly rejected by HPHs. 393 In the case of Bulungan, the presence of the UPTD 
handling HPH administrative affairs, has significantly limited the district's manoeuvres on 
HPHs in the area. Thus, the instability of the social and business environment in localities since 
reformasi has caused problems to HPHs and their downstream industry. 
In addition . to compensation for communities, the volatile social and political situation 
under reformasi and in the early period of regional autonomy has increased the security costs of 
HPHs. 394 During the heyday of district logging licenses, these centrally-licensed timber 
companies were forced to employ a higher number of security personnel, who were usually 
members of the police or military. This was necessary for the HPHs to demonstrate force to 
assert their legal rights over their concessions. 395 Because it is now more difficult to maintain 
order and security, the remuneration associated with the hiring of security personnel has 
increased. For instance, at one point, PT IK had to request police personnel from the national 
headquarters in Jakarta to protect their operations. Since the demise of district licenses, 
communities have continued to assert claims to HPHs, albeit over smaller matters. These have 
included, for instance, compensation for areas used as log yards. 
The instability at the beginning of reformasi and decentralisation that arose from acts 
rooted in local abhorrence of HPHs clearly impacted greatly on their operations. The effects 
were so great that in 2000-2001 , APHI needed to conduct a roadshow in forest-rich regions. The 
roadshow was aimed to show HPHs' good intentions of contributing to communities, but at the 
same time to show that they expect their operations to be "protected" from communities. The 
roadshow did not achieve its objective; on the contrary, the HPHs were accused of requesting 
Bupatis to take sides over communities. 3% 
The HPHs' main objective to date has been merely to survive. In East Kalimantan, the 
local media frequently report the closing of timber industries and the laying off of their 
'" Interviews with a senior official of the Revenue Office of Kutai Baral, K-G-15c and K-G-15d; 
Report on the target and realization of Kutai Barat's revenues for year 2000-2003. 
392 Interview with the company's manager, K-P-5. After a long and bitter negotiation process, the 
company contributed 2 billion rupiah or 220,000 USD to the district government. The 
negotiations not only revolved around the amount but around how the money was going to be 
used. 
"' Interview with a senior official in the economic unit of Bulungan, B-G-17 
'" Interview with staff of PT lk, a HPH company operating in Bulungan, B-P-7 
,,, Interview with staff of PT lk, B-P-7 
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thousands of workers. 397 HPHs operating in Bulungan, for instance, have slowly but surely 
reduced the number of their employees in stages. 398 In general, at the time of fieldwork, the aim 
of HPHs in the districts was to maintain enough cash flow to allow them to remain in operation, 
to work in parallel accommodating communities and other actors who could influence their 
operations, while at the same time hoping that both national and local policies wou ld shift in a 
more favourable direction.399 
Notably, however, the HPH-based timber industry's difficulties have led to its involvement 
in the current web of illegal logging. Illegal logging for the purpose of this thesis is defined as 
logging activities that contravene or are in breach of state and local regulations or local 
government decisions. Under this definition, HPHs were known to have been involved in illegal 
logging activities even under the New Order (for instance, Resosudarmo 2002; Obidzinski 
2004). A HPH representative however, has argued that HPH involvement in the current web of 
illegal logging has been limited only to the purchase of illegal logs.400 By purchasing timber 
produced illegally, the timber industry (that is, the HPH and its downstream industry) achieves 
three simultaneous objectives: the fulfilment of the supplies of raw material for the downstream 
industry, obtaining logs at a cheaper price, and avoiding risks involved in conducting illegal 
harvest themselves. ' 0' 
Illegal logging is a conspicuous characteristic of forestry activities in the two districts, as in 
other localities and regions across the country.'02 Although il legal logging is not the focus of this 
thesis, its prevalence and the effect it has had on district forestry decisions and on forestry actors 
at the district level have made this issue relevant to the thesis. On the one hand, by omitting 
discussion of this issue, the thesis would only capture an incomplete if not a d istorted picture of 
district forestry decision-making dynamics. On the other hand , however, dedicating two 
sections on this intertwining and highly complex activity would not do justice to the issue. The 
discussion of illegal logging in the remainder of this section and in the section to follow, 
therefore, takes an approach consistent with the research framework presented in Chapter 2: the 
emphasis is put on the actor dimension and the relations between and among the actors 
involved. Illegal logging is discussed when and where it concerns the actors being discussed. 
"' Kompas, 1 July 2004c; Kaltim Post, 3 Desember 2005i; Purnomo (2006) 
'" Interviews with staff of PT lk of Bulungan, B-P-1 and staff of PT 11 of Bulungan, B-P-2 
"' Interview with a APHI senior official affiliated with a HPH operating in Kutai Baral, P-B-1 
""' Interview with a APHI senior official affiliated with a HPH operating in Kutai Baral, P-8-1 
'
0
' Interview with a timber buyer of illegal logs for a downstream timber industry in Tarakan, 
through which most of Bulungan's logs must pass, B-P-5 
'°' For documentation of illegal logging in Indonesia, see among others, Casson and Obidzinski 
(2002); Smith et al. (2003), Tacconi et al. (2004), Obidzinski (2004, 2005); EIAffelapak (2004), 
Tacconi (2007), 
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6.3.2 Money talks: the forestry business community's influence 
on district decision-making through extra-legal exchanges 
with local state actors 
The mutual symbiosis between Bulungan government and locally and regionally-based 
timber companies has shown that there are other factors not readily observable at play in district 
forestry decision-making. The dynamics that have shaped district decision-making therefore are 
often subtle and not explicitly revealed by an examination of local actors' formal powers 
obtained from the decentralisation process. Thus, looking at these decentralized powers and 
how they formally manifest themselves at the district level is inadequate to explain and 
understand how certain district decisions are shaped and how they and their implementation 
may affect the management of forests. The powers at play in the decision making processes are 
much more subtle and covert, and thus much more difficult to observe and penetrate. 
Around business actors, district forestry decision-making appears to have involved 
informal or extra-legal financial transactions of various magnitudes. Robbins (2000) asserts that, 
both in developing and developed countries, processes involving extra-legal exchanges allowing 
access to natural resources are common and often the rule rather than the exception. 
One of the most important series of district forestry decisions under Indonesia's 
decentralization has been associated with logging. Under regional autonomy, district decision 
making in forestry has covered the entire spectrum of the administration of logging activities: 
the issuance of the licenses, the technical monitoring of logging operations, and, in Kutai Baral, 
the provision of administrative documents required for transporting timber out of the district. 
A business actor applying for a district logging license had to follow a certain process, 
necessitating him/her to interact with at least three different district offices. The first required 
set of documentation was the recommendation letter issued by the District Forestry Service. 
This set of documents provided the technical considerations for the proposed area of logging. 
These technical considerations were based on an assessment of the area, which included maps, 
the classification of the area (that is, state forest designated for production, private or 
community forests) , and an assessment of the timber potential. The next step was to submit the 
proposal for a permit, now completed by the set of technical documents provided by the 
Forestry Service, to the social economic unit of the Bupati's office. The social economic unit 
then assessed the application, and forwarded it to the Bupati for "a permit in principle" or ijin 
prinsip. For areas over 5,000 ha, the license was not yet legal at this stage, and had to go 
through another step, an environmental impact assessment which was undertaken by the District 
Environment Office. The process was completed with the Bupati issuing the license through a 
Bupati Decree. 
The formal process of obtaining a district logging license highlights important nodes of 
powerful functions at various district offices. Significantly, the process shows that power over 
the forestry business community was not exclusive to forestry officials. Other officials, notably 
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in the office of the Bupati, due to their positions and associated tasks, were also essentially 
influential in terms of how their decisions affected the forestry business community. 
Interviews suggested that, in addition to the required official costs associated with these 
processes, "informal transactions" were not uncommon in each step of the process for obtaining 
a district license, in the day-to-day forestry administrative processes and at the field level. These 
"informal transactions" take various forms and names, depending on when they happened in 
relation to a process and the direct purpose of the transaction. 403 There are exchanges of uang 
pelicin (literally means "grease money") with the intention of assisting in " lubricating" an 
administrative process, including in the process of the issuance of district logging licenses, 
obtaining the approval of an RKT for medium to large-scale licenses, or the issuance of SKSHH 
documents. These are usually made during the process to be affected. There is also uang 
terimakasih (literally means " thank you money"). This is a thank you gesture as a token of 
appreciation for the assistance given by bureaucrats to business operators, in the hope that there 
will be another future opportunity or that the next process will be made easier. 
For instance, a local businessman holding a IUPHHK (Chapter 3) in Kutai Barat revealed 
that the total amount of administrative costs incurred to process his license, covering an area of 
16,000 ha, reached 1.2 billion rupiah (130,000 USD). While he denied that there were any 
" invisible costs" associated with the process of obtaining his license, the details of the specific 
categories of costs associated with obtaining the license suggest that a high proportion of the 
cost was used to cover "other expenses". Out of the total 1.2 billion total cost incurred, the cost 
covering the technical/forestry aspects at the Forestry Service, including boundary checking, 
inventory, and maps, amounted to 150 million rupiah (17,000 USD), while the cost for 
environmental impact assessment at the District Environment Office was about 100 million 
rupiah (1 I ,000 USD):°' Because of the technical nature involved, the process to obtain the 
technical recommendations from these two district units should have incurred the biggest 
expenses, compared to the remaining administrative processes. However, the breakdown 
suggests that some 950 million rupiah (100,000 USD) or 80 percent of the total costs are left 
unaccounted for. After these technical recommendations, the process had to go through one 
more stage, the scrutiny of the socio-economic unit in the office of the Bupati, prior to the 
signing of the license. The discrepancy suggests that some of this money must have been "lost" 
in this stage of the process. 
Several interviews confirmed the common and consistent perceptions that the office of the 
Bupati, notably but not limited to the socio-economic unit, was involved in informal 
transactions. People in both districts pointed out that the lifestyles of certain indi victuals in the 
.,, For a detailed documentation on various forms of bribes provided by the business community 
to public officials in East Java under regional autonomy, see Pramusinto (2005). 
<G< Interview with an IUPHHK holder of Kutai Baral, K-P-2 
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socio-economic unit were out of the ordinary and would cost much more than someone on a 
normal official salary. 
The same businessman particularly wanted to emphasize, however, that there were no 
pressures whatsoever (that is, pressures "to give") during the process of the issuance of his 
license. However, he admitted that he "gave" some undisclosed amount of money after the 
license was issued to the office of the Bupati, as a "thank you gesture", asserting that such a 
" thank you" payment (uang terimakasih) was common and appropriate. He did not disclose 
however, to which officials or units the uang terimakasih was distributed. 
One local businessman of Bulungan, however, referring to the informal costs associated 
with the issuance of logging licenses, suggested that uang pelicin to smoothen the process of the 
issuance of district licenses was common. He admitted: 
"Grease money? That is customary ... those sitting in those seats sit there 
because they want something ... As long as i-t is not excessive, it's all right. .. " 
(interview with B-P-8). 
The above statement not only substantiates the prevalence of extra-legal transactions, but 
also shows that they are widely known and accepted as the norm, rather than the exception. 
In addition to "informal costs" associated with the process of issuing logging licenses, 
there were similar costs associated with the provision of the required administrative services, 
with the safety or sustenance of the logging operations, or the transport of logs. Companies 
often refer to these costs as "Special Costs" or Biaya Khusus, often referred to simply as "BK". 
At the district level, according to how often they were made, there were two types of "BK", 
referred as either routine "BKs" or temporary "BKs". Included as temporary "BKs" were the 
payments made to the District Forestry Service, to smooth the process of issuing the district 
recommendation necessary to obtain an approved RKT at the Provincial Forestry Service 
(section 3.5.2). In Bulungan, routine "BKs" have included payments made every 15 days to the 
UPTD to assist in the process of obtaining Temporary Timber Production Report, ULHP 
(Usulan Laporan Hasil Produksi), and in the final Timber Production Report, LHP (Laporan 
Hasil Produksi), which determined the amount of forestry royalties due (Chapter 4). Monthly 
payments made to the local military and police offices, Koramil and Polsek, respectively, were 
also categorized as routine "BKs".4°'' 406 This was ostensibly to help both secure the timber 
•os The military's territorial commands duplicate government hierarchy. These are the military 
headquarters at the central level, followed by Kodam (regional military command) in the 
provinces, Korem (resort military command) and Kodim (district military command) in districts 
and municipalities; Koramil (Rayon Military Command) in subdistricts and Bintara Pembina 
Desa (Babinsa or Village Military Supervision) at the village level. The police line of hierarchy 
consists of the police headquarters (Mabes Polri), provincial office (Polda) , district office 
(Po/res), subdistrict office (Polsek) and police posts (Pospol) as the smallest unit. 
'
06 Interview with staff of PT lk, a HPH timber company operating in Bulungan, B-P-7 
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harvesting operations and the transportation of timber. In the case of Kutai Barat, however, 
these security guards have been co-opted by more powerful forces, so the hiring of military and 
police personnel by timber companies to secure timber operations and transportation did not 
entirely achieve its purpose (section 6.4). 
In order to obtain the required log transportation document, SKSHH, a certain amount, 
referred to as "coffee money" was paid to the forestry unit to ·lubricate the process.'07 In 
Bulungan this would be the UPTD. As described in Chapters 3 and 4, the SKSHH is a critical 
document required to legally transport timber from its place of origin in a particular 
administrative jurisdiction to its destination, usually in another jurisdiction. 
The amount of these payments was determined by the volume of timber involved: the 
higher the volume the greater the payment. "Coffee money" literally means money for the 
officials to buy coffee, implying they are not of great magnitude. However, they turned out to be 
not insignificant: they were seven, eight, and ten million rupiah (800, 900, and 1100 USD) for 
timber loads of 2000, 3000, and 4000 cubic meters, respectively. Pointing out that both the 
forestry units, the UPTD and the Bulungan Forestry Service, had the worst office buildings in 
the district, despite the common perception that they were considered the "richest offices" in the 
district, an entrepreneur interviewed suspected that much of the money flowing in must have 
been used for other, individual purposes, rather than for official nceds.'08 
The informal payment associated with SKSHH is not limited to the time of its issuance. 
Similar to the beginning of the life cycle of the document, informal payments are associated 
with the end of its life (section 3.5.2) - that is, to smooth the process of its invalidity. A timber 
business figure disclosed that it was always necessary to provide an "envelope" containing at 
least 2.5 million rnpiah (270 USD) to lubricate the process of SKSHH invalidation. ' 09 As 
SKSHH invalidation is done at the destination of the timber which is usually outside the district, 
this admission indicates that "informal" transactions are not limited within the district but also 
occur in other jurisdictions, demonstrating the level of pervasiveness of such transactions. 
The multitude of forms and the extent of "extortions" by the district offices were 
confirmed by officials at the District Forestry Service of Kutai Barat. However, they rejected 
the notion that these forms of payments had compromised their decisions or actions. For 
instance, while admitting that he accepted money for himself, a senior district forestry official 
claimed that it did not influence his decisions: 
"I can say I am 90% clean, the remaining 10% .... I will accept. .. but only 
after I signed the document. And this is if they offered it to me, I do not 
make such requests." [my emphasis) (interview with K-G-21) 
'"' Interview with a local businessman and adat leader of Bulungan, .B-P-8 
'
0
' Interview with B-P-8 
'
09 Interview with P-B-1 
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However, the motivation for such transactions is quite clear: timber operators were aware 
that they were not strictly following certain rules, regulations, or other requirements, and 
wanted to get away with it. A holder of a district logging license of Bulungan revealed that 
logging outside the areas specified in the license was common: 
"All forestry operations here . .. violate ... the areas being logged are wrong." 
(interview with B-P-8) 
Thus, rather than taking necessary actions to uphold the regulations, district officials 
instead take advantage of the fact that operators were flouting the regulations. As a senior Kutai 
Baral forestry official admitted: 
"Because, from my perspective, not a single contractor who works in those 
forests does his work appropriately. There are always violations and 
deliberate mistakes. That is why forestry officials can choke them, they can 
extort them, and they can meddle in their operations. In the forests they must 
make some errors. Any contractors, big and small, even HPHs. No one 
actually maintains or sticks to their cutting blocks, their logging roads, their 
allowable cut. No one follows the rules 100%. There must be mistakes. Even 
the smallest mistakes ... if forestry officials want to make a big thing out of 
them, they can become big." (interview with K-G-ld) 
A senior district forestry official of Kutai Barat admitted that at one point he had requested 
a "thank you gesture" from a district license holder."0 This was associated with the technical 
recommendation that the District Fores try Service had issued earlier in the process of the license 
application. The entrepreneur responded by giving him a large sum of money.411 
Because in recent years the Government has stepped up efforts to bring public officials to 
court for corruption (Chapter 7), the ways in which such transactions are carried out have 
changed somewhat. According to this forestry official, these monies are no longer transferred to 
a specified bank account of the recei ver, but payments arc now usually made in cash, in simple, 
non-obvious plastic shopping bags, as was applied in his case. This method of payment in cash, 
even up to billions of rupiahs, to prevent any evidence of illegal behaviour, was also 
substantiated by a timber business figurc.4'z Recently, substantial sums of cash found in the 
410 Interview with a senior official of the District Forestry Service (name and date of interview 
remain with the researcher) 
411 The amount of money was not disclosed. 
'
11 Interview with a senior APHI figure affiliated with a HPH operating in Kutai Barat, P-B-1 
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home of an allegedly corrupt high official of the Logistics Office in Jakarta suggest that this 
new "method" has not been limited to under-the-table transactions in the timber sector.' 13 
In terms of purpose, informal payments made by the private sector are of three kinds: 1) 
payments that accrue to individuals as just discussed; 2) payments that are used to support the 
operational needs of the forestry unit, often referred as "tactical funds" or dana taktis; and 3) 
payments actually requested for specific needs or events held in the d istrict. 
The second type of informal payments, that is, payments used as " tactical funds", are 
collected to cover the District Forestry Service's budget constraints and are used to support the 
day-to-day operations of the office. As common in many developing countries, the budget is 
always limited, across sectors and at all levels of governments. Forestry and other district 
officials in both districts maintained that there were widespread perce ptions within the 
bureaucracy that the forestry sector was considered a "rich" sector. This common perception has 
been based on the assumption that activities in the forestry sector can generate informal funds. 
Consequently, the District Forestry Service has always been given a particularly small 
operational budget compared to other sectors (section 5.2.2). Such a limited budget significantly 
affects the way these offices operate. 
To carry out activities under these budget constraints, in addition to prudent (and frugal) 
budget management, Kutai Barat Forestry Service has adopted a number of strategies. The first 
has been to seek contributions from or through partnership arrangements with donor agencies. 
In Kutai Barat these types of support were used to finance activities such as the multi 
stakeholder consultation processes in the formulation of district forestry regu lations (sec tion 
6.1.1 ). The Forestry Service would then only incur a relatively small cost compared to the 
magnitude of its activities. Donor funds were even used to support the office ' s telephone and 
fax bills."' 
The second and third strategies relate to the business sector directly. The second strategy 
has been to extract small "contributions" from the business sector. 415 These are used for office 
improvements, to buy equipment for the o ffice, such as air conditioning units and computers, 
and to cover other operational costs. 
In addition to payments collected for operational needs of the forestry unit itself, the 
Forestry Service also collects funds for the district's off-budget needs (as oppose to the needs of 
the Forestry Service). One example given was the funds collected from forestry companies to 
cover the cost of Independence Day celebrations in the district. The amount, surprisingly, was 
not insignificant. Over the course of four years (2001-2004) a senior official of Kutai Barat 
Forestry Service claimed to have generated about 2 billion rupiah (220,000 USD) for such 
' " Pikiran Rakyat, 25 March, 2007 
" ' Interview with a senior official of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, K-G-1 d 
"'Interview with a senior official of Kutai Barat Forestry Service, K-G-1d, and Baskoro et al., 
2007. 
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purposes. Even so, according to this official, the Bupati was not satisfied with this amount, and 
conveyed his suspicions that the senior official had accumulated significantly more for 
himself.416 While it is impossible to know whether the estimate was roughly accurate or highly 
inflated, it does show that the Forestry Service, a perceived "rich" district unit, has been 
expected to serve as the "ATM", the Automated Teller Machine, for the district. 
The "ATM" to a significant extent appears to be the underlying motivation of local 
governments determining forest resource governance under decentralisation. 4 17 This term was 
used by a district government official to denote "money-making machines", articulating in two 
words how the forestry sector has been regarded. The "ATM factor" may take any of three 
forms: district government revenue (Chapters 3 and 4), income for the local population (Chapter 
3 and section 6.2.4), or informal incomes for local government actors and organisations. 
The third strategy has been to use the equipment or transport vehicles and other facilities 
belonging to forestry operators to support the Forestry Service's operations. This was 
unavoidable, as the office has only a limited number of vehicles, yet has a vast area to cover 
under its responsibility. They include field vehicles and speed-boats needed to carry out field-
re lated tasks associated with logging and reforestation activities. This last strategy in particular 
has direct implications for how forestry activities are carried out, since it restricts the capability 
of the office to monitor activities in the field objectively. 
The District Forestry Service is responsible for the day-to-day monitoring and in the case 
of Kutai Barat, also the provision of the administrative services supporting logging operations. 
However, the capacity of this office to enforce the rules and regulations at the operational level, 
even with good intent, is low. As described in Chapter 4, the two case study districts invested 
very little in forestry initiatives. This lack of attention included limited budget for the districts' 
Forestry Services to support their operations. Consequently, at the operational field level - both 
in logging and RHL activities - forestry officials were very dependent on the very same 
companies or actors being monitored. Forestry officials relied on the companies to provide them 
with transportation and other facilities to reach the areas where the activities were carried out. 
The timing of inspections often coincided with when the vehicles were made available for use 
by the officials. In addition, it was not unusual that the companies were more familiar with the 
area or in possession of more accurate data of the area, than the District Forestry Service. Thus, 
they were able to be fully "prepared" when the inspection was carried out - rendering it 
ineffective. Senior forestry officials, both in Kutai Baral and Bulungan districts, rarely made 
field checks on these companies. 418 • Consequently, in the actual timber operations there are 
many opportunities for violations of rules and regulations, including the various forms of illegal 
logging. 
416 Interview with a senior official of Kutai Barat Forestry Service, K-G-1 d 
"' Interview with an official of Kutai Barat Forestry Service, K-G-19 
•
11 Interviews with K-G-1d and B-N-5 
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Illegal logging activities in the two districts take various forms. One form involves logging 
outside the area specified for harvest, that is, outside the approved RKT for medium and large 
scale-licenses or in the case of small-scale licenses, outside the area specified in the licenses. 
Another form involves deviations in the data reported in the set of SKSHH documents. This 
includes the underreporting of the volume of timber, the inaccurate reporting of the types of 
timber, and the incorrect origin as well as the destination of timber. A third form of illegal 
logging activities involves the multiple uses of the same set of SKSHH documents for different 
loads of timber, the use of the "flying SKSHH" (SKSHH terbang), or the use of "original but 
fake" SKSHHs (SKSHH aspal or asli tapi palsu). The former refers to the presentation of these 
documents only when the timber reaches the point of destination. Jn this case, the transportation 
documents "fly" after the timber is being transported, meaning that it is able to avoid any 
inspections or monitoring of the legality or the circumstances of the timber during transport. At 
the destination, the SKSHH document is necessary because that is the point where the timber is 
marketed, and will be harder to sell if it does not appear legal. The SKSHH aspal refers to non-
authentic SKSHH, but is used, illegally, as a legal SKSHH. 
6.4 "Premanism" in district forestry: from gangsters to 
the legislature 
In addition to the types of actors described in the preceding sections that have exerted 
influence, to varying degrees, in shaping forestry decisions and their implementation at the 
district level, in Kutai Barat there is one other - perhaps less expected - type of actor that has 
"over-powered" the local government all the way up to the Bupati. This set of actors is made up 
of preman or gangsters, and in this case, members of the Pancasila Patriot Party (PPP). 
Patriot Pancasila Party (PPP), one of the 24 parties contesting the 2004 election, was 
established in July 200 l. The birth of this party was initiated by the cadres of a political 
organisation, Pancasila Youth. Although Patriot Pancasila Party (PPP) and Pancasila Youth 
should be seen as two separate and independent organisations, the leadership of both 
organisations is held by the same individuals. This is because many members of Pancasila 
Youth became members of PPP. 
Pancasila Youth has attracted a reputation as an association of thugs and petty criminals 
who did the dfrty work for the New Order Regime, including attacks on pro-democracy activists 
and workers' rights groups. As an organisation that had supported Golkar, the ruling party 
during the New Order, they were known for provoking violence, have been closely linked to 
activities such as racketeering and extortion, and reportedly have close ties with the military and 
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the police (for instance, Randall, 1998; Ryter, 1998). Members of this organisation are often 
referred to as preman, Indonesian for gangsters, hoodlums, or thugs.419 
Under regional autonomy, these same actors have not only survived, but have prospered 
through strengthening their power base, particularly in certain provinces:20 In East Kalimantan, 
this group, in its re incarnation as a new political party, has become a powerful organisation. 
Moreover, relevant to this thesis, its power base has been built primarily from inappropriate or 
illegal timber-related activities.411 
The explanation given by a police officer in Kutai Baral summed up the role of preman, 
gangsters organized as members of PPP, in district forestry: 
"In this district, Pancasila Patriot Party is powerful. In East Kalimantan, this 
party is the most powerful. They go to villages and communities and seek 
timber. They obtain their money from timber." [my emphasis] (interview 
with K-V-2).422 
In Kutai Barat, the Pancasi la Patriot Party is Jed by SM, nicknamed Od, who originated 
from the district but is of Arabic descent. Therefore, ethnic-wise, he does not represent the 
majority of the district population, who are Dayak (section 1.5.4). PPP has also built support 
consisting largely of non-indigenous or migrant constituents. The leader of the PPP in East 
Kalimantan province, SA, is also Arabic and has a close relationship with Od. This relationship 
links Od to a powerful network in East Kalimantan. As discussed later in this section, at the 
point where conflicts associated with the actions of this preman group reached its climax, the 
ethnicity of this preman leader and the non-indigenous base of his constituents have affected the 
ways in which the district government had chosen to act. 
The role and power of preman and their activities in the forestry sector in Kutai Baral were 
consistently emphasized in many conversations and interviews with informants. Almost all the 
people in the district involved in discussions or interviews alluded to the fact that the major 
issue of forestry in this district has been illegal logging which has been inextricably linked to 
the preman. 
Prior to regional autonomy, Od was already involved in acts of extortion of timber 
companies, but such activ ities were then limited and did not seem to have been regarded as a 
'"Originally, preman (from the Dutch vrijman, or free man) had meant off-duty officers or those 
in civilian dress. However, by 1980s, the word has acquired a double meaning, to include 
people associated with criminal acts and violence (see Randall , 1998; Ryter, 2005). 
"
0 See Hadiz (2003) and Hadiz (2005) for his case study of the role and power of preman 
associated with Pancasila Youth in North Sumatera post New Order; and Wilson (2005) for the 
changing role of preman under decentralisation. 
"' Various interviews with Kutai Baral informants 
"' Intensive logging activities have been taking place in this sub-district 
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particularly big problem by other district actors.423 HPHs at the time had powerful backing and 
networks that extended all the way to the Centre. 
Under decentralisation, "premanism" in Kutai Barat has taken a range of forms. It 
included intimidation or threats to parties obstructing or opposing the preman's activities; 
physical assault or force on those who stood against their activities; illegal logging; extortion of 
timber businesses; timber theft; and manipulation of the communities' share of timber fees. 
One form of the preman 's involvement in the timber sector in Kutai Barat was as a broker 
between communities or segments of communities, who had claimed the rights to the forest area 
specified in the district license, and the contractors or capital providers who acted as the timber 
operators. The preman acted on behalf of communities in identifying and securing investors 
who carried out the logging operations. Fees due to the communities were usually also paid 
through the preman, as the middleman. 
These arrangements resulted in the amount received by communities often being less than 
had been agreed. At times no payments were made at all, as if the preman were the party that 
had rights over the forests/lands. Sometimes payments only reached a certain segment or 
individuals of the affected communities, usually those who dealt directly with the preman; this 
has often led to internal conflicts within a community. These activities subsequently led to 
community demands for the full payment of the fees and conflicts between the community and 
the preman. 
Od and the PPP were also behind the operation of a HPH highly contested by the 
community. The concession license was given to a cooperative in 2000, by the Minister 
Mus Ii min Nasution, over 21,000 hectares that encompasses the area of four villages .•" From the 
beginning when the plan for this HPH to enter the area was made known to the communities 
(2001 ), the affected communities were against this exploitation, but it nevertheless began its 
operations without the communities' consent (2003). The affected communities then had to 
attempt to obtain the appropriate compensation for the timber harvested. However, no 
agreement was reached regarding the volume of the timber harvested and the compensation. 
The subsequent effort undertaken .by the District Forestry Service to clarify the volume of 
timber harvested was also unsatisfactory to the communities, which resulted in the communities 
staging a four-day protest at the office of the Bupati. After the Bupati fina lly became involved, 
an agreement was reached in which Od was willing to pay a significantly less amount compared 
to the amount demanded by communities. However, in the end, the communities obtained even 
less than the agreed amount. 
m Interview with a senior official of Kutai Ba rat Forestry Service, K-G-1 f 
424 The issuance of logging licenses to cooperatives in the beginning of reformasi was Minister 
Nasution's policy, ostensibly a policy favouring masyarakat (section 3.2.1 ). 
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So powerful has this group been in this district, that timber operators have had no choice 
but to cooperate with them. As one entrepreneur explained: 
"The only way to participate in the timber business in this area is if one is 
wi lling to follow the preman way of doing things. This ensures that licenses 
that can not be used, can be used. Business actors join hands with preman. 
Who wants to die? Better turn a blind eye and share the fortunes." (interview 
with K-P-1) 
This statement carries the message that the preman' s ways of doing things have made 
district licenses that were otherwise not operable for legal reasons, become operable. This was 
achieved by using expired licenses, logging in an area outside the licenses, and using expired 
SOs (see section 3.2.3 and below). 
It also illustrates the level of pressure that these preman were able to exert on timber 
operators, including HPHs and other operators who were not associated direct ly with the 
preman. Timber operators whose activities were not linked directly to these gangsters' activities 
were also affected. To get their timber out safely, operators often had to pay certain fees to these 
gangsters, ostensibly as "securi ty fees" or uang keamanan.425 This has included making 
payments to the preman and allowed the preman and their associated timber operators to log in 
the former' s concession areas. If the timber operators who were not associated with the preman 
had refused to pay, they would be intimidated and threatened, and would ri sk losing their logs 
during transport through theft or coercive measures. " 6 According to a Kutai Barat forestry 
official, at least one entrepreneur was forced to quit the distric t because of pressures applied by 
the prernan and because that particular entrepreneur did not want to accede to the terms set by 
the former. m 
In East Kalimantan, the river system is the major means of transporting logs. Most logs in 
the district are harvested in the hinterland upstream and transported downstream to Samarinda 
via the river. Timber species that usually sink are transported on barges, while species that float 
are usually tied together as rafts and floated downstream (Figure 6.2). One of the preman's 
modes of operations has included the dismantling of the rafts by slashing the ropes tying the 
logs together, while they are being floated downstream . The logs stolen from the dismantled 
rafts are then collected and given the "legal" transport document, the SKSHH, by the District 
Forestry Service (see below), prior to their transportation and sale in the Samarinda timber 
market. 
' " Interviews with a senior APHI official affiliated with a HPH operating in Kutai Baral, P-B-1 , and 
with a senior official of Kutai Ba rat District Forestry Service, K-G-1 d 
.,. Interview with a senior APHI official affi liated with a HPH operating in Kutai Baral, P-B-1 
"' Interview with a senior official of Kutai Barat District Forestry Service, K-G-1 d 
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Figure 6.2 Semblance of legality 
Logs-rafts floating down the Mahakam River, Kutai Barat. The preman 
was known to have slashed the ropes tying the logs, reconstituted them 
and acquired new documents, before selling them in the market as legal 
timber. Photo by Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, 2004 
PPP's role and activities in the forestry sector in the district have not been limited to being 
brokers between communities holding district logging licenses and their commercial partners 
who actually carried out the logging, or as actors in timber theft of logs harvested legally by 
logging companies, but most critically, as key actors in illegal logging activities. 
The following case presents an example illustrating the actions of PPP preman in Kutai 
Barat. rn It illuminates the power of pre man in relation to other actors in the district and the 
complexities of illegal logging. 
Community members of Klw and LD villages holding a number of district IPHHK 
licenses, twenty five and eighteen licenses, respectively, were lured to authorize Od, the 
chairman of the PPP in Kutai Barat, to administer and make all the necessary arrangements for 
logging operations, including identifying partners or contractors to do the job. 429 In this 
particular case, a company called PT ABU carried out the operations. It was agreed that 
villagers would receive a fee of 52,000 rupiah for every cubic meter of logs harvested. 
428 The following accounts of the case were drawn from district documents, through interviews, 
observations of actual events and actions occurring during fieldwork and complemented by 
media reports. 
42
• Od and PPP commonly obtained communities' authorization to administer their lands for 
logging operations through either sugary promises, through "divide et impera" tactics among 
members of the community (which had occurred in another village), or through forms of 
intimidation and coercion. 
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Each of these licenses was issued by the office of the Bupati in December 200 I , and each 
had a target production of around 5,000 cubic meters of timber. These licenses were only valid 
for one year, thus should have expired by the end of 2002. However, at the end of the year or 
towards the end of the expiry date of the licenses, the District Forestry Service conducted a 
stock inventory of logs (Stock Opname or SO), to assess how much timber had already been 
felled but had not been taken out of the area, or which remained stacked up at the log pond 
(section 3.2.3). For district small-scale logging permits with a duration of one year, the 
unders tanding of stocks included timber already cut, but not yet transported out of the area by 
the end of the year or at the time the license expired. As long as the Jogs were cut within or 
during the period covered in the license and in areas covered by the permit, these logs would be 
considered legal and should be provided with legal SKSHH documents by the District Forestry 
Service. According to available documents, the Stock Opname for the entire amount of logs cut 
under the 43 licenses owned by the two communities was carried out in February 2003. Thus 
presumably, these logs were legally cut during the period covered by the licenses (January to 
December 2002) and their provisions of SKSHH documents should be considered legal. 
While the processes surrounding SO at first glance seem merely technical, they have 
actually shaped the ways in which forest activities have been carried out in Kutai Barat. The SO 
documents enabled the provision of SKSHH documents after the expiry date of the logging 
license, but should be limited to logs already felled during the life of that license (section 3.2.3). 
In practice, the SO concept has been abused, to include logs harvested after the license reached 
its expiry date as we ll as logs felled in areas outside the area covered under the license. " 0 This 
occurred particularly in the period after district authority to grant logging licenses was revoked 
by the Central Governme nt, in pursuit of a way to allow logging acti vities to continue (section 
3 .2.3). This was however, at leas t officially, a policy of the District Forestry Service, rather than 
the office of the Bupati. 
Disputes began when the two communities suspected discrepancies in the data of timber 
produced by Od's group with the communities' records, and which resulted in the discrepancies 
between the fees that should have been paid with the actual payments reaching the communities. 
Furthermore, while these licenses had expired by end of 2002, the communities reported that 
logging activities continued at least up until mid-2004. Neither Od nor his group responded to 
the communities' demands, prompting the communi ties to turn to the district government and 
the DPRD to facilitate a resolution. On June 22, 2004 community representatives began to stage 
a protest and erected a te nt in front of the Bupati's office; this demonstration las ted for a month. 
They d emanded that the alleged data manipulation be in vestigated , and that the district 
"
0 It is also widely known that the provisions of logging licenses were often abused, both by 
timber operators linked to Od and PPP, and by those who were not. 
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government, in particular the District Forestry Service, stop all of Od's activities and to 
discontinue issuing SKSHH documents to the preman. 
On July 9, 2004, the DPRD met with the representatives of the two villages, which resulted 
in the communities submitting a formal letter to the district government requesting data from 
the District Forestry Service. The District Forestry Service then provided the communities with 
their data on log production and logs that had been issued SKSHH. According to the available 
documents, there were discrepancies in the data for logs produced and transported out under the 
43 licenses recorded by the District Forestry Service and the figures supplied by Od. The 
proceeds from 63 thousand cubic meters, equivalent to 3.2 billion rupiah (350,000 USD) of 
fees, had not been paid by Od to the communities holding the licenses. 
Through a formal letter dated 12 July 2004, the two communities demanded that the DPRD 
take the following actions: 1) admonish the district government, in particular the Forestry 
Service as the technical unit responsible for forestry affairs, for their slow response in 
addressing the issue, and for the impression that they wanted to wash their hands of the 
matter431 ; 2) request the district government to revoke all logging licenses and not provide any 
timber produced in forests within these villages' jurisdiction with the legal transport documents; 
3) request the police and the judiciary to investigate the data manipulation and breach of the 
period of the licenses; and 4) coordinate the reorganisation of logging licenses in the district for 
the benefit of the community. 
This episode occurred at a time when all district small-scale logging licenses had expired 
and districts no longer had the authority to issue any commercial logging licenses of any scale. 
As described in Chapter 3, a June 2002 Government Regulation had decisively withdrawn 
districts' authority to issue commercial logging licenses. As district small-scale logging licenses 
had the duration of I year, these communities' protest affirmed that timber operations under 
district licenses had continued to operate far beyond the date of the expiry of district timber 
licenses. 
Meanwhile, in the midst of these commotions, on July 8, 2004, the head of the District 
Forestry Service was sacked by the Bupati. The re lationship between these two individuals, 
revealed in the interviews with both of them and also reported in the local daily ,'n had not been 
at its best for some time. The issues surrounding the RHL Project and the prevalence of illegal 
logging and the resulting excesses made the already deteriorating relationship reach its climax. 
The local newspaper reported the Bupati's admission that the reason for his decision to replace 
'
3
' Although this case was not merely a case of conflict between communities and Odor PPP, 
but was also a case of illegal logging activities, district forestry officials at first appeared to be 
unconcerned and relaxed about the case. Arguing that this case was about conflict between the 
communities as the license holders and their broker and business partner, district officials felt 
that it was not their responsibility because they had not been involved in the agreement 
between the two parties in the first place. 
"' Kaltim Post, 10 March, 2004b and Kaltim Post, 11 September, 2004e 
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the head of the District Forestry Service was because the Bupati had perceived the latter to have 
failed to address illegal logging effectively (Kaltim Post, 11 September, 2004e). 
On July 19, 2004 following an urgent instruction from the Bupati's office, the District 
Forestry Service sent a team to carry out field checks on the alleged sites within the two 
villages. According to district documents, they found active forest exploitation activities, 
without any supporting legal licenses and found more than 5,000 cubic meters of timber as 
evidence. The documents also stated that these activities were conducted by PT ABU under the 
coordination of Od. 
On July 23, 2004, the Bupati wrote a letter to the National Police chief and the Attorney 
General in Jakarta, reporting the widespread incidence of illegal logging activities carried out 
through "premanism" practices in the district. It presented the case of Klw and LO villagers 
versus Od above as one specific example, outlining the chronology of events beginning from the 
communities staging a protest at the Bupati' s office through the Forestry Service's findings in 
the field, and explicitly mentioned Od as the primary culprit. It further explained that the 
situation had been occurring for sometime, and the tension and frustration had now accumulated 
to the extent that if no further action was taken the issue could get out of hand and could lead to 
unrest. The letter also included the Bupati's admission that the Kutai Barat government was not 
capable of taking further action on its own without the commitment and support of the law 
enforcement agencies. It requested that the National Police Chief and the Attomey General take 
further action as soon as possible. 
This letter was copied to the Ministry of Forestry, the chairman of the national legislative 
body (DPR), the Regional Military Commander or Panglima Komando District Militer 
(PANGDAM) responsible for the jurisdiction of Kutai Barat, the Governor of East Kalimantan, 
and the chairpersons of the provincial and district DPRD. A separate report on the findings in 
Klw and LD villages of illegal logging activities was simultaneously made to the Kapolsek, the 
sub-district police chief whose jurisdiction include the two villages. 
The ultimate action taken by the Bupati to handle the issue, in this particular case, reflected 
the power of the Bupati vis-a-vis the power of the actor or set of actors that were involved. It is 
particularly striking that the Bupati did not report or take the case to the police chief at the next 
level, the Kapolda in charge of policing in the East Kalimantan province, and the district 
attorney (jaksa) in the district. Instead, the Bupati went straight all the way up to the police 
headquarters and the Attorney General in Jakarta. One of the reasons might have been that raids 
on illegal logging activities have usually been carried out under the direct coordination of the 
national police headquarters. However, based on confidential interviews, a more plausible 
explanation for the direct report and request for assistance to the top executive of these 
enforcement agencies was the fact that these preman have a strong network further up the ladder 
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and chain of command in this enforcement agency. A district forestry official revealed that the 
particular case was reported directly to Jakarta, precisely because the Bupati was aware that Od 
and PPP had a strong network, a network that included the Kapolda.'33 
Barker (1999) described the relationship of the preman and the arm of the state that formed 
the basis of their operation. This relationship was based on a system of reciprocity, by which the 
preman, having extracted tribute from citizens, in turn had to submit rents (setoran) to state 
actors, often members of the Armed Forces, in return for the right to operate. In a similar vein, 
confidential interviews suggested that Od had the support of the district attorney, which was 
established based on "informal transactions". However, staff at the District Attorney Office 
defended his boss, explaining that the district attorney had received death threats from this 
group of preman, and he was simply not powerful enough to face the group.43• 
The (by then) former head of the District Forestry Service acknowledged that the SO 
documents were abused by a number of people, citing Od and his accomplices in particular. 
While according to this official, SOs are completely legal, he acknowledged that SO documents 
should not be used for timber stock still standing. Od and company, he admitted, not only used 
SOs for timber left standing, but also used his SOs to cut timber outside the area covered by the 
liccnse.'35 Thus, the highest level of district official in charge of forestry admitted that these 
activities were illegal, and that he knew about it, but could not stop it. This admission was given 
in an interview after he was sacked by the Bupati. 
Earlier in the year, however, the same district forestry official had defended his action in 
continuing to provide administrative services (among the most important, the granting of 
SKSHH documents) also for timber from SOs associated with stocks left standing, in the name 
of communities (section 6.2.4). District governments' upholding pro-community policies, on the 
one hand, and their rent-seeking activities as well their succumbing to premanism on the other, 
show the multiple forces at the district level that motivate district government forestry 
decisions. 
In early 2004, Oct and his group had requested, from the District Forestry Service, SKSHH 
documents based on expired SOs. However, following the specific instructions of the Bupati to 
be more restrictive in the issuance of SOs, the District Forestry Service was not willing to 
process this request, and insisted that a new Stock Opname process be carried out in order to 
issue a valid SO. His power challenged, on March 17, 2004, Od brought PPP followers en 
"' Along the same lines, the local daily Kaltim Post reported that the Bupati claimed that he had 
no choice but to report illegal logging directly to the police headquarters in Jakarta and the 
Attorney General because the response of enforcement agencies at the provincial level was 
minimal. "We hope that enforcement agencies will give more attention to these cases if we 
report them directly to the top. The enforcement agencies here already knew about these illegal 
logging activities anyway, but did nothing." (Ka/tim Post, 11 September 2004e). 
"'Interview with staff of the District Attorney Office of Kutai Baral, K-V-1 
' " Interview with the former head of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, K-G-* 
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masse and intimidated the head of the District Forestry Service at his office. While the thugs 
vandalized the forestry office, Od and two other members of PPP, who apparently had never 
encountered significant problems in obtaining "illegal" SKSHH documents before, physically 
threatened the head of the Forestry Service with a pistol. ' 36 
That evening, a crowd of around 1000 members of a Dayak youth organisation, the 
Sendawar Sakti, who were "supporters" of the head of the Forestry Service, gathered at the 
police station. The intention was a show of force against Od and his PPP supporters. The Bupati 
was in Jakarta, and according to the head of the District Forestry Service, when notified of the 
incident, had asked him to calm down his supporters and to maintain peace in the district. It was 
very important to control the situation, because the PPP basically comprises Pancasila Youth 
members, who are gangsters. In addition, many of the members were outsiders and did not 
originate from the district and Od himself, although born in the district, is, not an indigenous 
Dayak. The Bupati was ·very aware of the potential for the conflict to escalate into unrest and 
serious ethnic violence, similar to that occurring in West and Central Kalimantan.'37 The head of 
the District Forestry Service followed his advice and the situation was brought under control. 
The fear of inter-ethnic violence was an important consideration for the district 
government in addressing the continuing conflict between communities and the preman. 
Communities had threatened that there could be "Sampit number 2", if they were pushed further 
without any resolution to the problem.43' 
The head of the District Forestry Service reported the incident to the police headquarters 
located in the neighbouring district of Kutai Kertanegara. At the time Kutai Barat did not have 
its own district-level police unit (Polres)."" Sometime in July 2004, Oct was prosecuted and was 
given a lenient one month sentence. Lenient as it was, Oct was not pleased with the verdict, and 
reportedly threatened the district attorney and the Deputy Attorney General for Special Criminal 
Actions (jampidsus) responsible for the case. The provincial level district attorney and the 
Attorney General in Jakarta were informed of the situation, and Jakarta dispatched an officer 
from the elite military unit (Kop~ssus) to protect the district attorney."0 The Office of the 
Attorney General in Jakarta also promised to the District Attorney Office in Kutai Barat that it 
0
• Interview with the former head of Kutai Barat Forest ry Service, K-G-* and various interviews 
with other Kutai Barat forestry officials; Kaltim Post 18 March 2004d; Kompas, 19 March 2004a 
437 In 1998 and 2001, two violent ethnic incidences occurred in West Kalimantan and Central 
Kalimantan, respectively. These incidences resulted in casualties and instability in the 
respective areas and have had a long term effect of distrust and hatred among the two ethnic 
groups. For instance, the head of one farmer group participating in the RHL Project in Kutai 
Baral, a Dayak, had to return to the district from his previous residence in Java, because 
Madurese were still avenging Oayaks in areas where the numbers of the latter e thnic group 
were fewer (interview with K-C-10). 
4
·" The inter-ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan occurred in Sampit. 
"' In October 2004, a Po/res was established in Kutai Barat. 
"
0 Interview with staff of the district attorney of Kutai Barat, K-V-1 
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was committed to protecting its staff in the district, and would immediately take action against 
Od and his gang if the latter laid a hand on any District Attorney Office staff in the district. 
In the months following the incident, to continue with his day-to-day office tasks, the head 
of the District Forestry Service had to seek protection by hiring police personnel. 
The head of the District Forestry Service admitted that, prior to the March incident, he had 
"assisted" Od with documents because he had had no choice. This clearly has meant that on 
previous occasions the District Forestry Service, apparently under a great deal of pressure, had 
provided Od with forestry documents for logs harvested or obtained illegally. This "assistance" 
was confirmed by an APHl official associated with a HPH timber company operating in Kutai 
Barat, who stated that the District Forestry Service did provide SKSHH documents to timber 
snatched by Oct and his gang from timber companies.441 
Nowhere near on the same level of the playing field with Od and his gang, the head of the 
District Forestry Service apparently had earlier hoped that when all the target production of the 
licenses associated with Od had been met, he would not have to issue any more SOs for him, 
and that Od' s logging activities would then naturally subside. He argued that leading the district 
forestry uni t under these circumstances was a very hard task (berat) and that implementing a 
near-perfect and healthy forest administration in the district was virtually a "mission 
impossible". 442 
Forestry staff often work in difficult, often threatening, situations. A senior fores try official 
confided: 
"If we carry out field checks, especially when it has to do with Od's 
company or activities, we could be attacked. The police guarding the logging 
operations are owned by him, the military arc owned by him." [my 
emphasis) (interview with K-G- Jd).443 
The same official further explained the role of the police and the military in Od and PPP' s 
acti vitics: 
"And other companies ... the police and the military supposedly guarding the 
timber and logging operations of these companies arc his. Even though they 
have nothing to do whatsoever with Od or his activities, these timber 
operators are forced to make payments to Od. These fees are ostensibly so 
called security payments." (interview with K-G-ld) 
"
1 Interview with P-B-1 
"' Interview with the head of Kutai Baral Forestry Service , K-G-• 
" ' These difficulties were confirmed by other district forestry offic ials. For instance, a senior 
district forest ry official told of one occasion where he and his family had to leave his house and 
seek refuge because their lives were being threatened by illegal loggers (interview with K-G-3a) . 
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The above description suggests that the police, all the way from the lowest rank in the 
villages up to, at least , the top position at the provincial capital, were part of the network. It also 
indicates the weakness of the police, the very institution that, when necessary, should have been 
able to act against this set of actors, instead of supporting it. During the New Order, many 
reports have emphasized the role of the military in forestry businesses (Barber, 1994; Ross, 
2001 ). However, the military here did not distinguish between the army - those in "green 
uniforms" and the police - those in "brown uniforms". During this period, the Indonesian police 
force was part of the military (Tentara National Indonesia or TNI). After the 1998 reforms, the 
police force was separated from the military and has since become more powerful than before. 
In the current situation, in Kutai Barat and up the chain of command in the hierarchy, the 
police appear to be playing an increasingly powerful role in forestry businesses. The role of the 
military - those that people refer to as "in green uniforms" - also appears to have changed in 
this context. During fieldwork, both in Bulungan and Kutai Barat Districts, it was the chief of 
the provincial-level police unit, the Kapolda, who was often rumoured to be the "protector" of 
the various timber barons operating in the districts, rather than the Regional Military 
Commander (PANGDAM).4·" The Kapolda, for instance, was described as having been backing 
the network of the regionally-based timber barons of JL in the timber group owned by G 
(section 6.3. 1). It was the Kapolda who had made calls to forestry offices that resulted in the 
"flying SKSHHs" (section 6.3.2).'4s However, according to a confidential interview with a 
timber business figure, these networks do not end at the provincial level, but extend well into 
Jakarta. Rather than the "green uniforms" - as was the case during the New Order period - it 
appears that now it is the "brown uniforms" that deal directly with forestry businesses. 446 
The power of regional timber groups in this area that extends to Bulungan perhaps explains 
why PPP, unlike in Kutai Baral, has not been dominant in timber operations there. Pancasila 
Youth, however, has been perceived as more arrogant than other political organisations 
operating in the district and has also used its bravado to exert influence in the district. 447 
Although much lower in intensity and smaller in scope than what PPP was able to do in Kutai 
Barat, Pancasila Youth in Bulungan was nevertheless able to extract dues from timber 
. 443 
compames. 
Thus it seems that the power of the military in the timber sector, at least in the two case 
study districts and in the province of East Kali rnantan, has somewhat receded, while the power 
of the police has amplified. Comparing the power of these actors in the forestry business, an 
entrepreneur operating at the district provided an analogy: 
'" Note that the Bupati of Kutai Barat did not address the illegal logging report to the Kapolda, 
but did copy it to the PANGDAM. 
" ' Interview with a timber buyer, B-P-4 
446 Various interviews in Bulungan and Kutai Baral , tor instance with B-G-8a, 8-N-2b, K-P-1 
"' Interview with 8-N-2b 
"' Interview with staff of PT lk, a HPH operating in Bulungan, B-P-7 
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"TNI is still considered by business actors. However, if the TNI now are 
represented by two fingers, the police are now represented by five fingers." 
[my emphasis]. (interview with K-P-1) 
Despite the competition from the increasingly powerful "brown uniforms", those in "green 
uniforms" however, continue to depend on forestry operations for their income. A district 
military commander (Dandim) overseeing a district in East Kalimantan, for instance, was 
estimated to have accumulated 200 million per month from "protecting" timber operations.""9 
Within the military, informal forestry benefits have also been more distributed. Under the 
New Order, it was the higher ranks of the armed forces in Samarinda and Jakarta that had 
gained the greater portion of the rents (for instance Ross, 2001 ). Now these "green and brown 
uniforms" not only continued to be involved in the "protection" of forestry operations, but those 
at the operational/ground level have been more active and have been able to extract rents 
themselves. •i-0 
In the meantime, during the same period when the conflict between the Klw and LD 
communities and Od reached its peak, PPP won 12% of the DPRD seats. As a result, Od, along 
with two other PPP members, was successfully elected as one of the 25 new DPRD members of 
Kutai Barat for the 2004-2009 period. They formally took oath of office in October 2004.45' Oct 
in particular, did not stop there: he was also elected, by members of the DPRD, as one of the 
two vice-chairmen of the DPRD. Therefore, these gangsters not only have "de facto" power, in 
most cases wielded in the form of physical force, which was applied, maintained, and protected 
through their extensive and powerful network, but have also penetrated into the formal 
institution that characterizes and constitutes the symbol of democratic governance. Through 
their seats in the DPRD, not only has their power been formally institutionalized, but Od and 
two other members of this gangsters' party now supposedly act as the representatives of the 
population. This highlights the issue of accountable representation in democratic 
decentralisation, as suggested by Ribot (2002, 2004, 2005, Appendix 2). 
It is also important to note that funds secured from the forestry sector, much of it through 
illegal means, have played a significant part in the PPP's success in the DPRD election. 452 
"' Initial of the informant and the date of interview remain with the author. 
"
0 Interview with a senior forestry official of Bulungan, B-G-8a and an academic of Mulawarman 
University, P-A-1 
"' Kutai Baral 's results on the election of legislative members was determined by early May 
2004, but the inauguration of the new members did not take place until Oct 8, 2004. The 
formality was reportedly delayed because two members of the newly elected DPRD, one of 
whom was Od, allegedly falsified his secondary education certificate. One of the requirements 
to be a candidate for the legislature was a highschool (year 12) diploma. 
"' The details in the way in which Od and PPP could win sufficient number of votes, despite 
their actions, is outside the scope of this study. Interviews with district actors, however, suggest 
that money politics occurred, where people were given money to elect the party. A more 
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With only a few district logging licenses in operation (that is, the remainder of Kutai 
Barat's IUPHHK not withdrawn by the Ministry of Forestry or the Bupati himself - section 
3.2.4), PPP has now shifted its financial sourcing to another natural resource sector currently 
flourishing in the district: coal mining. •si 
6.5 Conclusions 
The chapter observes how actors have influenced forestry at the district level. Each 
category of district actor influences district forestry policies, forestry decisions, and forestry or 
forestry-related operations in different ways: directly through direct interactions with district 
government officials or indirectly through interactions with other district actors. 
6.5.1 The role of international organisations, NGOs and 
academics in district forestry: limits and potential 
In both study districts, international organisations, academics, and NGOs have taken part 
in district forestry decision-making. The level of their participation, how they attempted to 
influence district decisions, and the extent to which these actors could influence decisions in 
each of the two districts, however, have varied. In Kutai Barat, the three types of actors 
participated actively in the formulation of the district's forestry policies. The substance of the 
two Kutai Barat's regulations on forestry and on community forestry, which are heavily adat-
and community-oriented, suggests that their influence has been strong. 
In Bulungan, the involvement of international organisations and academics in formal 
forestry-related policies/decisions has been at best, limited and indirect. Their lack of direct 
participation, including in the financing of district policy processes, did not allow them to use 
the opportunity to influence district formal policies relevant to forestry. The direct impact of the 
research activities conducted by these two types of actors - in partnership with an 
environmental NGO - on district policies was not clear and decisive for the district. 
International organisations and academics have had some indirect and longer term effects 
on the capacity of the District Forestry Service and NGOs. For instance, Kutai Barat Forestry 
Service now has the capability to run a GIS unit on its own. In Bulungan, research partnership 
with a local environmental NGO who lacks the capacity - in terms of human and funding 
resources - to critically assess district's policies, gave the NGO exposure to research 
methodologies and information that otherwise would have been beyond their reach. In turn, 
such increase exposure can lead to increased effectiveness in influencing district forestry 
decisions. 
obvious observation made during fieldwork was PP P's otter of free painting of vehicles in the 
period close to election. 
'"Interview with a senior district official of Kutai Baral, K-G-1 f 
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The effectiveness of NGOs in their role of providing checks and balances in the 
implementation of district forestry decisions, even within one district, is more difficult to 
generalize. At least one particular environmental NGO in Bulungan, despite its continuing 
serious limitations, has shown an increasingly important role in district forestry activities. 
However, there are serious questions with the ways in which other NGOs have operated in the 
district, which are associated with funding inadequacy, and consequently, the effectiveness of 
their role in providing checks in district forestry decisions and implementation. These NGOs' 
objectivity towards district government's policies may have been easily compromised because 
their operations were aided by the district government. In this case it shows the leverage of the 
district government over NGOs. 
Lack of funding and its consequences also raise the issue of NGOs ' accountability. In the 
Philippines, the opportunities to benefit from financial windfall have generated an industry of 
rent-seeking forest conservation NGOs (Contreras, 2003). By contrast, lack of funds has led to 
at least one NGO in Bulungan extracting tributes from forestry companies. These practices of 
extracting dues from forestry companies flouting rules and regulations in return for keeping 
quiet about illegal actions brings the question of NGOs' downward accountability to their 
beneficiaries (Kilby, 2006). Notably, such practices may jeopardize the credibility, and thus the 
effectiveness, of other NGOs who do not operate in this way and who are truly committed to 
their cause (see Chapter 7). 
The disjunct between district forestry policies that these types of actors were able to 
influence and the actual forestry operations under decentralisation suggests that the influence of 
these actors was mostly limited to the level of abstraction. NGOs that have concentrated their 
work on the empowerment of communities and awareness raising, however, have had some 
indirect influence on forestry operations at the district level through facilitating the increasing 
capacity of communities to claim their rights. 
6.5.2 Increasing community influence in district forestry and its 
pitfalls 
The section focusing on communities shows the changing dynamics of local people's 
(masyarakat) involvement in district forestry under decentralisation, as well as the dynamics 
that have largely continued to operate in the same ways as in the past. During the New Order 
period, forestry decisions had been largely imposed by the Centre, with very little involvement 
of the local population. Similarly, forestry benefits had disproportionately accrued to the Centre 
and actors politically close to the Centre, while local communities only enjoyed "droplets" of 
benefits. 
The discussion has examined both the changing and continuing dynamics in the light of the 
principal assumptions of decentralisation measures. These are that the rationales for 
decentral isation were not only buil t around the assumption that greater participation in public 
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decision-making might produce better governance and natural resource management outcomes, 
but that increased participation is "a positive good in itself' (Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 475). 
Local people' s direct participation in district decision-making in both of the case study 
districts has varied in both form and degree. They have ranged from the simplest form of direct 
interaction with the highest level of decision-makers in the districts, the Bupati, to more 
complex types of formal participation in public consultation about district policies, informally 
and indirectly influencing district decisions, and determining the ways in which district 
decisions have shaped and have been implemented at the operational level. 
The opportunities for direct interactions between the local community and the Bupati and 
other district functionaries have increased under decentralisation. The Bupatis of both districts 
have provided direct access for commoners to meet with them personally. Despite the practical 
challenges and social as well as cultural barriers to effective communications between district 
functionaries and commoners, these efforts nevertheless represent a major departure from past 
practice. By being a putera daerah and proficient in the local language, the Bupatis and other 
officials, more so in Kutai Barat than in Bulungan, have aided communication between these 
two parties. The Bupati and many other district functionaries are thus "one of us and vice 
versa". Even though these qualities do not guarantee that district policies would be responsive to 
the communities' desires, such qualities arc useful aids to district decision-makers in 
formulating potentially responsive decisions. 
District governments' commitment to formal forms of participation of community 
representatives through their inclusion in public consultations has been rather tokcnistic. While 
both districts made some gestures towards local people's participation, the districts put different 
degrees of effort into embracing community representatives in their decision-making processes. 
Kutai Barat has been more accommodating of the inclusion of community representatives in its 
public consultation processes compared to Bulungan. Authorities in many developing country 
circumstances often used the argument of communities' Jack of capacity to exclude them from 
local public decision-making (for example, Ribot 2005). The very same argument was used by 
Bulungan's bureaucrats in abandoning their initial efforts to include the direct participation of 
community representatives in the district's spatial planning processes. 
In certain circumstances, as shown by a case in Kutai Barat, participatory decision-making 
may not be desired by some communities. Such situations arose when a quick outcome was 
required, while the issue in question was difficult and contested within the community. This 
suggests that the concept of accountable representation may be relevant here (Ribot, 2002, 
2004, 2005). However, for the two case study districts , the cases of pengurus (community 
representatives) making their own deals and conducting non-transparent negotiations with 
partner logging companies, and of village leaders "monopolizing" district projects for their own 
benefit, suggest that there are challenges in the application of this concept. 
In general , however, communities have exerted increasing influence in forestry and other 
forest-related developments at the operational level. Through increasing numbers of land 
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claims, negotiations, and forms of grievances that sometimes led to violence, communities now 
have more power to determine whether forestry operations and other developments can proceed 
in their areas, and to some extent, on what terms. This has been a very significant change from 
the New Order period. During this period, some communities in forest areas, in particular where 
state presence and authority were weak, had been able to adopt strategies to maximize their 
benefit or minimize their loss from the imposition of Central policies at the local level 
(Obidzinski, 2004; McCarthy 2006). Decentralisation on the other hand, has seen the advent of 
progress in terms of the role of communities: the increasing power of communities has shaped 
whether and how state policies, both central and local, can actually be implemented. 
This increased power of masyarakat, more as a result of reformasi in general and not so 
much attributed to regional autonomy per se, has shifted the power relations between actors at 
the ground level. Communities in the two districts no longer acquiesce to interventions by 
outsiders, but have instead challenged the latter by various means. Communities have forced 
other actors, in particular forestry companies and other investors, to take account of their 
presence and demands. In this regard, the powers of actors who had been normally strong and 
unchallenged began to erode and destabilize, to some extent. 
Communities' emerging power at the ground level has made it imprudent for the district 
governments to ignore the consequences of their decisions about communities or to ignore the 
reactions of communities. On the one hand, communities demanded that the district government 
continue with district logging licenses, but on the other hand, district governments were 
pressured by the Ministry of Forestry to halt this practice. Because they sit in the middle 
between the two sets of actors, pressures from both sides have prompted district governments to 
allow timber operations of district logging licenses to continue for as long as they could. 
Balancing the two objectives of pursuing district economic development on the one hand, and 
maintaining policies supportive of communities on the other, Bulungan government sought 
ways to allow for the inflow of external investments but al the same time keep up favourable 
appearances to communities. As a consequence, the Bulungan government has been promoting 
oil palm plantation development, but requiring these companies to settle the land-related issues 
with the communities. 
Under decentralisation, a more direct flow of forestry benefits has accrued to local 
communities. Compared to the New Order period, local people are now able to enjoy significant 
material and tangible benefits both at the individual and at the community/village scale. These 
benefits, however, have been largely transitory and short term. Longer term benefits have been 
largely absent; in fact, there may be significant longer term costs as a result of the rush to 
exploit natural resources. There have been some systemic benefi ts, however, in the form of 
communities ' increasing negotiation skills in determining the terms of the uses of their lands 
and/or forests and in more attention being paid to the maintenance and accuracy of local data. 
Although local people did benefit from forestry activities, the proportion accruing to them 
was trivial compared to what others were able to captu re. The benefits from forestry activities 
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were disproportionately distributed: those with financial power, comprising investors or capital 
providers, locally, regionally, Jakarta, or Malaysia-based, have largely reaped a bigger share of 
the benefits, compared with communities. 
Moreover, particular individuals within communities have been able to substantially 
capitalize on the opportunities presented by decentralisation much better than other members. 
The former include village and adat leaders and other members of the village-level e lite. This 
observation of local elite capture is consistent with one of the potential shortcomings identified 
in the transfer of power to the local level (Carney, 1995). 
Under decentralisation, more actors have been able to enjoy the proceeds of forestry 
activities compared to the New Order period. Remote elites in Jakarta, to whom the benefits 
have largely accrued under the New Order, now, to some extent, have to share the pie with 
emerging local elites. 
6.5.3 The repositioning of the powers of timber companies and 
rent-seeking activities in district forestry 
The social and political changes under reformasi and decentralisation have to a certain 
extent destabilized the previously largely unchallenged power of HPHs at the district level and 
consequently the ways in which they operate. These centrally-licensed, large-scale 
concessionaries have been caught between other actors in the district: communities, district 
government, higher levels of governments, local and regional forestry companies, and another 
specific category of actors called preman. In order to remain in operation, HPHs have had to 
reposition themselves among these actors. 
HPHs have had to accommodate communities' demands, in particular their land claims 
over HPH concession areas, because all local and regional actors who previously had to accept 
and work wi th them, have turned away from HPHs to other more acceptable, and thus 
beneficial, timber players at the district level. Their "protector", the Ministry of Forestry, is too 
far away physically and has no direct reporting units at that level. The arm of the Provincial 
Forestry Service placed at the district level (in the case of Bulungan) has no powers to 
intervene. Higher levels of government, themselves experiencing an erosion of power at the 
district level, have increasingly relied on HPHs to protect their concession areas. However, 
HPHs' own protection means has not been effective either, as the past practices of repressive 
methods by the instruments of the state to enforce HPHs' de facto rights over state forests arc no 
longer legi timate. Enforcement agencies (the police or military) that used to carry out the 
protection for these HPHs, while still being employed by HPHs, are now looking to other actors 
who are promising new sources of rents (that is, local and regional companies). District 
governments are more favourable or, at the very least, have to appear favourable, to 
communities, and therefore have no incentives to protect the interests of HPHs. 
The rise and the strengthening of a competitor in timber activities, the local and regional 
timber entrepreneurs, have in particular played a role in the waning of IIPHs' inOuence. Their 
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local or regional characteristics have promoted more interactions with and acceptance from the 
local people and local government actors. Local communities prefer these local and regional 
companies because they see them as an alternative to the HPHs that had disappointed them in 
the past; in particular, the involvement of local and regional companies is perceived as 
benefiting the communities. The locality of these companies has enabled them to actively take 
part in the political dynamics of the district - a role that was not taken by HPHs - promoting 
local governments' greater degree of acceptance towards these companies than to HPHs. 
District governments' increasing attention to local and regional companies, however, has 
been motivated by their own interests, rather than by the objectives of advancing local actors 
per se. This is evident in the involvement of Jakarta-based businesses in Kutai Barat, and in 
both districts, Malaysian capital providers. What matters most to district governments has been 
whether they have had control over these businesses. This control has been direc tly and closely 
linked to their authority, or lack of authority, of issuing licenses. Because district governments 
were not the ones who had issued the HPH licenses, they have little control over the HPHs. By 
contrast, because district governments were the ones who had given the right to harvest timber 
to non-HPH companies - albeit in the name of communities - the former had greater control 
over the latter. In turn, control is associated with district governments' ability to extract rents 
from these companies. 
Districts did not have many formal powers over HPHs, particularly with respect to formal 
access to forest areas under HPHs. District governments could not tinker with areas of the 
Forest Estate that had been allocated by the Centre to these HPHs. This is demonstrated by the 
Centre's revoking Kutai Barat's license that overlapped with a HPH, and by Bulungan having to 
revised its licenses that overlapped with a HPH (Chapter 3). However, districts' increased 
power in other areas under decentralisation has given them some limited influence over HPHs. 
Bulungan played a role in the operational working arrangement between HPHs and a regional 
timber company. Kutai Baral could impose a substantial official "contribution" from HPHs. 
Thus, under decentralisation, the unsettling of HPHs' powers - the actor who had a strong 
influence pre-decentralisation - was associated not only with increased formal forestry powers 
of district governments over HPHs, but indirectly through district governments' increased non-
forestry powers and through the increasing influence of other actors. 
The business community now has to adapt to the situation and has to take into account the 
new power of local governments (in contrast with pre-reforms where it was the Central 
Government that they had to establish a strong relationship with) to begin or continue operating 
within the districts' jurisdictions. 
Within the case study context, the devolution of authority to district governments has 
apparently provided the condition for kickbacks, in various forms and magnitudes, to flourish. 
The relationship between local government and the business community is characterized, to a 
certain extent, by informal transactions in exchange for favours related to certain decisions or 
actions. Local government decisions can be influenced or easily compromised through a pattern 
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of relationships based on these informal or extra-legal exchanges (that is, rent-seeking type of 
activities as the foundation of the relationship) between the local government and the business 
community. 
Literature on political, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation initiatives features 
arguments for both increased and reduced incidence or opportunity for local corruption.454 Those 
arguing that decentralisation brings down corruption - based on decentralisation's increased 
accountability, responsiveness, or transparency - include, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), 
Crook and Manor (2000) and Gurgur and Shah (2005). Those perceiving that decentralisation 
increases local corruption - based on arguments of greater influence of interest groups or 
increased personal interactions between local officials and citizens - include Prud'homme 
(1995) and Tanzi (1995). This chapter shows that decentralized governance as it has shaped in 
the two districts has provided the opportunity for increased local corruption in the forestry 
sector. This observation is the opposite of Henderson and Kuncoro (2006)'s findings, based on 
quantitative analyses of firm behaviour in districts across Java. They cautiously concluded that 
the first three years of local democratization in Indonesia (2001-2004) reduced the level of 
corruption at the district level. Observation of the two case study districts, however, is 
consistent with the finding reported by Pramusinto (2005), who found in his study of the 
business sector in the district of Sidoarjo, Java, that Indonesia ' s current decentralisation has not 
reduced the level of local corruption. 
The capacity of local governments in terms of operational resources is a very real issue, 
presenting a real constraint to any effective monitoring of timber operations. This is not to say 
that a guaranteed availability of resources will be adequate for effective monitoring, as it will 
only be effective if there i s also sufficient will and commitment; it is more to highlight that the 
availability of one without the other will make it unlikely to work. 
In this case, the lack of resources has been exacerbated by a general lack of political will 
and commitment in all levels of the bureaucracy at the district level to monitor and enforce 
appropriate harvesting procedures. On the contrary, the tendency has been to use violations of 
legal requirements and technical procedures in timber operations to extract rents. 
The overall common attitudes of actors - district governments, forestry businesses, 
communities - towards district forests has been to utilize district forests as the "ATM" for the 
district. Every actor has specific inlerests and has been using the forests to achieve their 
objectives. 
Thus, the influence of the business community, coupled with the local governments' lack 
of capacity and will to apply control over forest activities and to enforce regulations, have 
.,. See Gurgur and Shah (2005) and Fjeldstad (2004) for two reviews of the literature on 
decentralisation and corruption. 
222 
created the opportunity for unrestrained forest exploitation. From this perspective, the resulting 
situation is not conducive to improved NRM. 
6.5.4 The rise of "premanism" and the fragility of district 
government's power 
The section on "premanism" shows the strengthening of a particular set of actors operating 
at the district level whose power base was built from the district's timber resources. Not only 
have they been able to gain power from timber, but they have done so through largely illegal 
means, and got away with it. 
The methods employed in their operations, including intimidation, terror, and coercion, 
have forced other forestry actors to abide by the unspoken rules laid down by this actor. Timber 
operators either had to work with them under the latter's terms, pay the money demanded or risk 
losing their timber, or, if unwilling to choose between these options, to exit from the district. 
The district government chose to play it safe by ignoring the actor' s activities and staying out of 
their way, as well as "assisting" in the provision of their timber documents. By providing timber 
documents, however, the district government in effect " legalized" the activities of this actor and 
its timber. This actor has also clearly flouted district forestry decisions. 
The true power of the preman, however, does not lie in this actor's bravado, but in being 
effectively "untouchable" by legal sanctions (see also Lindsey 200 I). This immunity is 
associated with the ability of the preman to secure political backing from higher authorities. 
Their link with the "remnants" of the constellation of power under the New Order has enabled 
this local actor to penetrate into levels and institutions with which its "mother" organisation 
(that is, Pancasila Youth) had close association during that period. This has provided the actor 
with extensive networks that have included those with key positions in the enforcement 
agencies positioned above the district level. Consequently, it has been able to co-opt 
enforcement agencies, such as the police and the military. 
The true power of the preman has made the district government, as the formal holder of 
power and authority, virtually powerless vis-a-vis this actor. This power has been manifested in 
the preman 's ability to effectively impose "premanism" in district forestry. Importantly, this has 
also suggests that under decentralisation, the "remnants" of the constellation of power under the · 
New Order has not only remained entrenched and strong, but has also percolated into the local 
arena, and most notably, in rural areas and in the forestry sector.455 
While other actors have chosen to avoid direct confrontation with this actor, the district 
government allowed their activities to continue unhindered and forestry companies bowed to 
their terms. It has been communities on the other hand, who have attempted to challenge the 
' " Lindsey (2001) noted that under the New Order, premanism was largely an urban 
phenomenon. 
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preman, albeit indirectly. This is a notable phenomenon, since communities are often 
considered as one group of "weak" actors.456 Among the three actors - forestry companies, 
district government, and communities - the last has been the one that stands to lose the most. 
Forestry companies can always find another area in which to do their business and district 
officials would stand to lose if they were prosecuted for allowing illegal logging to continue, 
which is unlikely. Communities however, stand to lose their major asset, their forests, without 
receiving a commensurate level of benefit. In at least some of these cases, communities' actions 
have been faci litated by NGOs, showing that perhaps this is the main route through which 
NGOs can influence fores try. 
6.5.5 The effectiveness of district decision-making powers 
under decentralisation: the four powers of decision-
making and local power relations 
This section revisits the framework of the four types of broad decision-making powers as 
proposed by Agrawal and Ribot: the power to make new rules or modify old rules; the power to 
make decisions regarding resource use; the power to implement those decisions; and the power 
to adjudicate problems arising from the decisions. The central actor to whom formal powers 
were transferred under Indonesia's decentralisation was the district governments. How have 
district governments articulated their powers under decentralisation, in relations to actors 
operating at the district level? How have these formal powers been manifested in the local 
arena? 
Pre-reforma:Si, powers centered around two actors, the HPHs and arms of the state, the 
latter notably forestry units performing the Ministry of Forestry's delegated functions at the 
local level. During this period, the influence of other actors in forestry , including district 
governments, communities, and local entrepreneurs, was peripheral. This docs not mean that 
these other actors had no space to manoeuvre to advance their interests, as far as possible, 
wi thin limitations. Even under the New Order, the Central State was not able to wield 
"absolute" power at the local level (Hidayat, 2005; McCarthy, 2006). 
During reformasi, the transition period, and continuing into the first few years of regional 
autonomy, the power balance at the district level was volatile and unstable. During this period, 
district governments assumed a central significance. Gaining political, administrative, and fiscal 
powers, they also established significant authority in forestry. District governments articulated 
their interests by exercising their newly found powers which resulted in communities increased 
engagement in forestry through district Jogging licenses. This occurred in conjunction with the 
rise and the increasing role of local entrepreneurs and regional timber operators, as well as 
central and Malaysian financing. During this period, centrally-licensed HPH companies were 
·•• Hence, "Weapons of the Weak" (Scott, 1985). 
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co-opted to follow the districts ' pattern of forestry operations. District governments could 
effectively articulate their powers of rule-making, their powers to make decisions on resource 
use, and implementing their forestry decisions. Communities had also put district governments' 
powers to the test to adjudicate conflicts arising from the implementation of their decisions. 
By mid 2002, formal powers had swung back to the Centre. By the end of 2004, 
reassertion of Central authority began to reach a new equilibrium of power relations at the 
district level. The Ministry of Forestry and HPHs regained their firm influence in district 
forestry decisions. The revised decentralisation laws also shifted some of district governments' 
powers to the provincial level. District governments , however, devised strategies and managed 
de facto to hang on to their powers until about mid 2004. By the end of 2004, district 
governments were now exercising their powers in other natural resource sectors, sectors which 
also have enormous implications for forests. Meanwhile, communities continued to assert their 
influence in district development initiatives associated with local lands. Local and regional 
timber companies that gained acceptance and preference from both local governments and 
communities continued their operations in other, non-forestry, but still forestry-related or 
forestry-affecting, investments. 
In one district, however, a particular set of actors, the preman, has over-shadowed powers 
of all other actors - the district government, local and non-local timber companies, 
communities, and Central state apparatus. Here lies a niche for NGOs to play a behind-the-
scenes role by facilitating and "provoking" communities to stand up for their rights against this 
actor, as has appeared to occur in some of the cases that were pursued by the communities. The 
new equilibrium of power relations has also affected the preman. They have been able to 
penetrate the formal institutions that are supposed to represent the local population and have 
shifted to other natural resource sectors to continue extracting dues from district- level activities. 
The chapter affirms that local power relations are critical under decentralized governance 
of natural resources (Larson, 2003b, Chapter 2 and Appendix 1 ). It shows that district decisions 
are not only determined by district governments' formal authority as a result of decentralisation, 
but also by the power relationship between local state actors and other actors. Power relations 
between and among actors are complicated and in most cases, subtle. While the ultimate formal 
power in decision-making lies with the Bupati, the actual implementation of district policies and 
decisions with regards fores try are often negotiated, challenged, compromised, and abused by 
other actors. As a consequence, there is a disjuncture between formal forestry decisions and 
how they are actually implemented. District governments often have no power to enforce their 
decisions, and have no control over actors with the authority responsible for enforcement. 
Moreover, enforcement agencies are co-opted by business interests. T he resulting si tuation 
provides an enabling environment for corruption to flourish unchecked and a disabling 
environment for improved NRM. 
This chapter concludes with the case of the preman who had been able to wield virtually 
unchallenged de facto power in timber operations. They could overtly encroach on legal 
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boundaries with impunity, and have been able to walk away untouched by the existing legal 
system. The judiciary at the district level has also been weak in its actions taken against this 
actor, thereby compromising formal accountability mechanisms. The next theme and the third 
dimension in the research framework, accountability, is addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Holding Accountability to 
Account: Accountability Relations 
Relevant to Bulungan and Kutai Barat 
Districts 
Empirical observations of the dynamics of decentralisation in the forestry sector in the two 
study districts discussed in Chapters 3 to 6 reveal a serious disjuncture between the stated aims 
of decentralisation and what has occurred in practice. The four chapters delineate a consistent 
and distinct pattern of forestry decisions and operations that have disregarded the sustainability 
of forests or downgraded the importance of the resource in favour of financial gains, rents, or 
political powers accruing from their exploitation. The sustainability of the resource has not been 
the central consideration in forestry governance in the two districts, or in the tug-of-war 
between and among levels of government. All actors involved have contributed to this trend, or 
at the very least, failed to halt it. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Agrawal and Ribot ( 1999) propose that the effectiveness of 
decentralisation - improved forest resource management - rests on accountability. 
Accountability is exercised as a countervail ing power, that is, any power that puts a check on 
the power of other power holders (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2005). 
Their framework observes the re lational nature of accountability and the mechanisms by 
which actors holding powers are held accountable. Specifically, the framework underlines the 
importance to their constituencies of the accountability of public actors to whom powers are 
devolved. This "downward accountability" (Chapter 2 and Appendix 1) is central to 
decentralized governance as it hinges on the underlying rationale of decentralisation, that is, 
greater participation in public decision making (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
7. 1 The approach to analyzing accountability relations 
and mechanisms in the context of the two study 
districts 
This chapter presents empirical evidence of the structures of accountability as they are 
manifested in the study districL~. As discussed briefly in Chapter 2 and comprehensively in 
Appendix 1, there are different perspectives on the concept of accountability relevant to this 
thesis, involving either state-sanctioned accountability mechanisms or social institutions. 
Depending on the criteria used, there are also various perspectives on the types of 
accountability. In some cases, analysts refer to a particular type of accountability but relate it to 
a very different meaning in terms of the agent being held accountable (the accountor), the 
principal (the account holder), or the issue being checked. For instance, horizontal 
accountability can refer to intrastate relations, but can also include other actors outside the state. 
To avoid confusion, this chapter discusses accountability relations and mechanisms through 
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four sets of questions: who is accountable, to whom, for what, and how? Where relevant, it also 
refers, in parallel, to the types of accountability suggested by analysts (Appendix 1 ). 
As discussed in Chapter I, . this thesis focuses on district government decision-making 
within the context of the processes of devolution of decision-making authority from the Central 
Government. Thus, the analysis in this chapter focuses on district governments as the actors 
who are being called and held to account for their exercise of power. 
Rather than limiting the analysis to the accountability relations between the district 
government (the accountor) and district citizens (the account-holder), which Agrawal and Ribot 
( 1999) refer to as downward accountability, this chapter examines other relations of 
accountability, particularly between the district government and the Central Government or its 
vertical agencies. Because Indonesia's decentralisation is part of an early phase of a 
democratization process,, the concept of downward accountability as adopted by Agrawal and 
Ribot' s framework is likely to be in a parallel, early stage. In this context of an early phase of 
democratization, this chapter explores the potential usefulness of an analysis of other 
accountability relations. 
Actors could be individual district public officials responsible for a specific task, acting on 
behalf of a district unit or organisation, or an entire organisation. The same applies to other 
actors, including actors at other levels of government or other organisational or social actors 
outside governments. As described in Chapter 2, this method of analyzing the dynamics at both 
the micro and systemic levels is possible through the adoption and application of Layder's 
research methodology (1998). 
The types of accountability discussed are those which re late to district governments, in the 
form of elected or appointed officials' performance, or in terms of finances, decisions, and 
compliance with rules and regulations, in the forestry context. 
To simplify the discussion, two types of accountability are recognized. The first pertains to 
state mechanisms, which I refer to as formal accountability mechanisms. These include 
processes of formal accountability involving the legislative body and legal proceedings by the 
judiciary. The second involves non-state actors or social institutions, which I refer to as 
informal accountability mechanisms. These include monitoring by citizens, NGOs, and the 
media. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of formal accountability processes. This section first 
discusses the formal accountability processes at the district level, and then examines how these 
processes have actually been manifested in practice; it also analyses the factors that have 
affected how these processes have shaped up. The section then discusses formal accountability 
processes involving vertical government agencies (the judiciary) and other levels of 
government, and the implications of these processes for district decisions or district 
governments' accountability to their constituents. The next section focuses on informal 
accountability relations and mechanisms, involving social institutions, notably communities, 
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NGOs, and in particular, the media. The last section draws the implications of these 
accountability processes for the districts' forestry regimes. 
7.2 Formal accountability structures and processes 
Although experiences pre-decentralisation showed that legal and formal requirements were 
often not strictly followed, were carried out merely to satisfy formal requirements, or remained 
largely rhetorical (Bell, 2001), this section nevertheless evaluates what accountability processes 
should have officially entailed (section 7.2.1) and what they have actually entailed in practice 
(section 7.2.2). This is done in light of recent trends across Indonesia where legal proceedings 
have increasingly gained more prominencc.'5' 
The following examines the legal-regulatory framework by which local authorities gained 
their formal power (and responsibilities), as well as the ways in which their powers are 
circumscribed or denied, and by which the local legislative body (the DPRD) gained its 
"countervailing powers". 
7.2.1 Legal-regulatory framework for accountability relations at 
the district level 
Law 22 of 1999 surrendered the Central Government's previous right to choose district 
heads, or Bupati, and mayors (Appendix 2). With the exception of a very short period in the late 
1950s, these officials were effectively appointed by Jakarta; they had served as the Central 
Government's local representatives, and therefore were primarily accountable to the Central 
Government. With the passage of the I 999 decentralisation law, local chief executives were no 
longer c ivil servants accountable to the national government, but local politicians answerable to 
the local legislature (DPRD) and the electorates they represent. 
As described in Appendix 2, this decentralisation law outlined the duties of the DPRD, 
which included: 1) to elect the Bupati and the deputy Bupati; 2) to propose the appointment and 
dismissal of the Bupati and deputy Bupati; 3) together with the Bupati, stipulate district 
regulations and determine the district budget; and 4) to facilitate and follow up the aspirations of 
localities and communities. In addition, the DPRD had supervisory tasks and responsibilities 
over the following matters: 1) the implementation of local regulations and other laws and 
regulations; 2) the implementation of the decisions of the Bupatis; and 3) the implementation of 
the district budget and district policies. Under the provisions of this law, in terms of 
accountability relations with the district executive, the DPRD was entitled to hold the Bupati 
accountable, to request information, to conduct investigations, to make amendments to drafts of 
district regulations, to express opinions, and to submit drafts of district regulations. 
"'Court cases involving alleged corruption of public officials are now reported almost everyday 
in national and local newspapers. As of July 2007, the Governor of East Kalimantan is being 
detained for alleged corruption in the issuance of an IPK logging permit. 
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Among the duties of the DPRD set out above, the revision of Law 22 of 1999, Law 32 of 
2004 (see Appendix 5: Postscript) only changed the first of those outlined: the Bupati and the 
deputy Bupati are now elected directly by citizens. The DPRD's other responsibilities remain 
the same. 
Table 7.1 Changes in the Instalment Processes of the Chief Executive and the 
L . I . M b h o· . L I r e!::11s at1ve em ers at t e 1strict eve over 1me 
Institution New Order Period 1999 to 2004 Post 2004 
Bupati as the chief Appointed by the Elected by DPRD Direct election 
executive/district Central Government 
head 
DPRD as the The population Closed-list Open-list 
legislative body elected 1 out of 3 Proportional Proportional 
parties; seats Representation; Representation; 
allocated based on many parties seating depending on 
proportional (> 100); seating the number of votes 
representation according to party the party obtained 
list and their order in the 
party list 
Source: Law 22 of 1999 and Law 32 of 2004 on Reg10nal Government; Malley (2003). 
In the context of this study, Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) perspective of downward 
accountability focuses on the relations between the citizens of the district, as the account holder 
(the principal), and the district government, as the accountor (the agent). In principle, district 
governments are assumed to act in accordance with the preferences or interes ts of the citizens 
they represent. Thus, in these terms, the Bupati, as the head of the executive, is accountable to 
the DPRD, as the citizens' representative and local legislative body; in turn, the DPRD, as the 
elected body under Law 22 of 1999, is accountable to the district population (Figure 2.2).4'" The 
DPRD thus acts as the formal institution of accountability (Appendix I) . 
The most common formal downward accountability mechanism is an election. Until 2004, 
district heads (Bupati) were elected by the local legislative body (DPRD). Subsequently, as 
shown in Table 7 .1, the Bupati is now directly elected every five years. Other formal 
accountability processes exist between the Bupati and the DPRD. They take three forms: an 
annual accountability report in which the Bupati accounts for his performance in a specific year; 
an accountability report at the end of a Bupati's term of office, in which he accounts for his 
performance during his term; and accountability for specific issues as required by the DPRD. 
"' Law 32 of 2004 has changed the election process of the Bupati to direct election by citizens. 
The residents of Bulungan directly elected their new Bupati in mid 2005; Kutai Baral in 2006. 
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Unless requested by the DPRD, there are no formal accountability processes in place 
specifically on forestry-related matters. Districts' programs and governance in forestry are 
formally accounted for only as part of the annual accountability process that takes place at the 
beginning of each year, a process through which the Bupati, as the chief executive, is held 
accountable for the district government's overall performance in the preceding year. The 
emphasis of the annual accountability process is on the spending of the district budget and the 
implementation of the district's programs. This process takes place through the submission of 
an Annual Accountability Report from the Bupati to the DPRD. 
7.2.2 The execution of the Bupatis' formal accountability 
process 
This section focuses on the actual processes of the first and third forms of formal 
accountability mechanisms identified above: the Bupati's annual accountability report and 
accountability pertaining to specific issues to the DPRD.'s9 
The Bupati's annual accountability process 
The Bupati' s annual accountability process consists of a series of four plenary meetings 
between the Bupati and all the DPRD members; the meetings take place several days apart and 
are not open to the general public. Invitees include district government officials, subdistric t and 
village heads, customary (adat) leaders, representatives of community organisations, as well as 
the media.'60 In the first meeting the Bupati reads his accountability report to the DPRD; in the 
second meeting all the factions address the Bupati' s report, providing comments and questions 
on the report. In the third meeting the Bupati gives his responses to the fact ions' comments and 
questions. The fourth meeting is "judgment day" when it is determined whether the Bupati 's 
accountability report is formally accepted or rejected. 
The process of Kutai Barat's Bupati 's accountability report in early 2004 (for governing 
year 2003) was smooth and straightforward. Most inquiries centred on issues related to the 
implementation of development programs and public services, and only a few questions arose 
on forestry-related matters. Issues raised to do with forestry were district forestry income, illegal 
logging, and the implementation of the RHL Project (Chapter 5). 
Although these questions were related to serious issues, the Bupati had no trouble 
responding to the satisfaction of the DPRD members. The Bupati did not specifically respond to 
the issue of forestry income, which the DPRD perceived as being lower than it should have 
"' The second form of the accountability process, the Bupati's accountability report at the end of 
his term, is outside the scope of this research because these reports were not delivered until 
after major fieldwork was completed, in mid 2005 in Bulungan and early 2006 in Kutai Baral. 
C60 I was allowed to follow three of the four meetings as a guest of the head of the Forestry 
Service who had been invited. 
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been. '61 Inquiries to do with illegal logging activities pointed to the fact that the Forestry Service 
continued to provide administrative services associated with logs felled under district logging 
licenses that had expired (and were therefore illegal) and the provision of their transport 
documents, SKSHH (Chapters 3 and 6). The Bupati responded that out of all illegal logging 
cases in East Kalimantan for 2003, no further action was taken on any of the cases in Kutai 
Barat, so none had reached the stage of investigation (penyidikan).'62 He merely stated that 
illegal logging should be recognized as a complex social and cultural issue that requires 
concerted action by government, businesses, enforcement officers, and masyarakat. 
The DPRD also voiced concerns over the implementation of the RHL Project and its 
outcome. Questions were raised about the Project activities' low success rate, about the 
perception that these rehabilitation activities have not brought as much benefit as expected to 
communities, and on why these activities have not effectively reduced the extent of critical 
lands in the district. There was also an inquiry into a reportedly "problematic" reforestation 
activity in a particular village. 
On the first point, the low success rate of the Project, the Bupati responded by merely 
quoting the findings of the inspection team that had earlier investigated the implementation of 
the Project. This team consisted of the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Forestry, the 
Agency for the Monitoring of Finances and Development (BPKP), the Provincial Monitoring 
Agency (Bawasprop), the Provincial Forestry Service, and BPDAS (the arm of the Ministry of 
Forestry in charge of watershed management in the province). They found that the success rate 
of the RHL Project activities in the district was above the general determined standard of 
55%.463 The rate of success in Kutai Baral based on this assessment was reported to be 60-
70%. '64 This was explained as being based on the percentage of seedlings successfully planted 
(that is, growing), a lthough it is not clear how these fi gures were actually determined. In 
addressing the other two issues, the Bupati simply responded that the district shou ld expect a lag 
between the implementation of the Project and its benefits. 
The responses to the fores try questions were prepared by the District Forestry Service. 
Immediately after the second plenary session during which factions had conveyed their 
••
1 District Government's Response to General Views of DPRD's Factions on the Bupati of Kutai 
Barat's Annual Accountability Report for Budget Year 2003 (Jawaban Pemerintah terhadap 
Pemandangan Umum Fraksi-fraksi DPRD K tentang Laporan Pertanggung-jawaban Bupati 
Kutai Barat Tahun Anggaran 2003 pada sidang paripurna ke 1 masa sidang ke 3 DPRD Kutai 
Barat, 26 February 2004). 
,., The usual processes of alleged cases involve two stages of investigations. The first stage 
involves in itial investigation or penyelidikan, whether there is sufficient evidence to make a case. 
When there is sufficient evidence to make a case, the investigation becomes penyidikan; this 
stage is the beginning of a legal proceeding. If there is no sufficient evidence, the case is 
dropped . 
•• , Kutai Baral District Government Response to General Views of Factions (of the legislature) 
on the Bupatts Accountabil ity Report for Fiscal Year 2003, 26 February 2004 
'°' Interview with a senior official of Kutai Barat District Forestry Service, K-G-1 b, and Kaltim 
Post, 25 August 2003c 
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questions and comments to the Bupati, the head of the Forestry Service and the RHL project 
leader made a visit to the location which earlier had been pointed out as problematic by the 
DPRD factions. In this particular case, the village in question was conveniently located close to 
the capital of the district, making it possible for the District Forestry Service to carry out an 
immediate field check, and to prepare a response to the Bupati within the short period. It is not 
known if the matter would be treated differently had the village in question had been located in 
a more remote location from the district capital, as are many of the villages of Kutai Barat, or 
whether it would be ground-truthed at all to support the Bupati's response to satisfy the DPRD 
members. 
Similarly, the annual accountability processes of the Bupati of Kutai Barat in the previous 
year, to account for the 2002 fiscal year, showed that the RHL Project had been considered 
problematic and contained irregularities. Factions highlighted these issues mostly based on 
communities' reports (Bupati's Annual Accountability Report 2003; Kaltim Post 20 April 
2003a). For example, there were reports of fictitious reforestation activities, while funds 
allocated for those activities were used up elsewhere. The Bupati' s responses, however, satisfied 
the DPRD members. The accountabili ty reports for both the 2002 and 2003 budget years were 
accepted unanimously without serious objections. 
Similar to the case of Kutai Barat, the 2004 Annual Accountability Report of the Bupati of 
Bulungan (to account for the Bupati's performance in 2003) was unanimously accepted by the 
DPRD. With respect to forestry issues, one faction merely noted that the implementation of the 
RHL Project should be improved (Kaltim Post, 11 March 2004c). 
Within an analysis of accountability using the metaphor of spatial direction, the above 
processes would be class ified as formal processes of downward accountability. However, 
following Schedler ( 1999), Mulgan (2003), and Grant and Keohane (2005), they are incomplete 
accountability processes, as they lack an enforcement or rectification component. In addition, 
these accountability processes focused more on resu lts or outcomes, which can be considered as 
performance accountability. With respect to the allegation of inappropriate uses of the 
Reforestation Fund in the RHL Project, the case referred to above would also be classified as 
financial accountability. 
Accountability processes for specific issues 
In Bulungan during the Bupati's term in office, no accountability processes were ever held 
that specifically addressed forestry iss ucs.'6s In the case of Kutai Barat, the head of the District 
Forestry Service recalled, during his three year appointment (2001-2004), only two instances 
'"' Interviews with OPRO members of Bulungan, B-L-1b and B-L-2. The term of office of the 
Bupati of both districts during which the first and second field work was conducted ended as of 
March 2005 (Bulungan) and June 2006 (Kutai Barat). The districts were led by interim Bupatis 
appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs until a new Bupati was elected. 
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when he was asked to attend a hearing session with the DPRD. These sessions were held to 
respond to inquiries about a) a conflict over an area for which a logging license had been 
granted; b) the administration of SKSHH documents, and c) illegal logging activities. These 
inquiries were largely instigated by newspaper reports and were mainly held to clarify the 
reports. Apparently satisfied with the District Forestry Service's explanations, there were no 
follow-ups or further steps undertaken through these accountability processes. Thus, these 
inquiries were limited to the information and verification aspects of the accountability 
dimensions. According to the head of the District Forestry Service, the hearings took place 
merely to "set matters right".'66 
Despite forestry problems in both study districts, problems which were clearly and readily 
recognized by district functionaries (the executive and legislative) during the interviews, the 
DRPD of both districts smoothly accepted the Bupatis ' annual accountability reports. The 
DPRD of Bulungan never called the Bupati to account specifically in forestry issues. The only 
two instances of hearings between the DPRD and the Kutai Barat Forestry Service went easily 
and without requiring further actions for improvement. Thus, there is a disjuncture between the 
actual district governments ' performance and the formal accountability processes. This indicates 
that the DPRD has not been able to carry out its functions, providing checks on forestry 
implementation in the districts, effectively. The following sub-section discusses some of the 
factors that have contributed to the DPRD's ineffectiveness. 
7.2.3 Limitations of the DPRD 
Observations and interv iews point to serious obstacles preventing the DPRD in both study 
districts, as the representative of districts' constituents, from functioning according to its 
mandate as specified by Law 22 of 1999. In holding the Bupati or district officials to account, 
the DPRD faces obstacles associated with l) its lack of financial independence; 2) difficulties in 
obtaining information; 3) low capacity of its members; 4) strictures associated with the DPRD's 
internal processes; 5) accusations of bureaucratic arrogance; and 6) conflicts of interest. 
One serious issue affecting the accountability relations between the Bupati and the DPRD 
has been the latter's lack of independence from the Bupati 's office in terms of its budget 
allocation. The DPRD's budget is part of the district's budget, and its size is determined 
through negotiations with the Bupati. At the same time, the district budget has to be agreed and 
endorsed by the DPRD. District officials noted that the latter is in fact DPRD's leverage in 
negotiating its own budgct.'6' The disbursement of the DPRD' s budget, however, once it is 
... "Hanya untuk meluruskan persepsl', personal communication with the former head of Kutai 
Baral District Forestry Service, 19 May 2005. 
"' Interviews with a senior official of the finance unit of Kutai Baral District, K-G-9; a senior 
BAPPEDA official of Kutai Barat,K-G-2a; with a senior forestry official of Bulungan District 
Forestry Service, 8-G-Sa; with a senior BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-9b 
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determined, is under the authority of the Bupati.468 Moreover, unlike public servants who are 
financed through routine expenditures largely sourced from Central transfers, the burden of the 
DPRD members' salaries is placed on PAD (Locally Generated Revenue, Chapter 4). As a 
greater proportion of the district's PAD is raised from natural resource sectors like forests 
(Chapter 4), the DPRD has an incentive not only to keep quiet with regard to district policies 
that emphasize resource extraction, but also to encourage them.469 Thus, the DPRD' s financial 
dependence on the executive and the institution's financial interests in forestry activities have 
undermined the DPRD's objectivity in its assessment of the district's forestry policies. 
Moreover, the DPRD has often found it difficult to obtain the information necessary to 
assess the district government's performance. Any data that would provide evidence of 
deviations within a certain project or other issues are retained by the district government 
office(s). For instance, the DPRD of Bulungan did not even have data on the number of district 
licenses that had been issued by the Bupati; it had instead obtained the information from other 
parties. 470 The inaccessibility of the district government's data was perceived as a deliberate 
intent on the part of the district government. As a DPRD member explains: 
"So there is definitely a barrier here. Of course they hide what they do ... 
meanwhile we look for them. Obtaining these data becomes difficult." 
(interview with B-L-lb) 
Another issue hindering district government's accountability processes has been the lack of 
a direct and formal accountability relationship between the DPRD and the district bureaucracy. 
One of the DPRD's roles is to provide checks on the exercise of authority of the district' s 
officials in carrying out forestry programmes or projects. These checks have involved the 
DPRD calling upon the bureaucracy to inquire into the running of the projects. District officials 
however, are responsible to the Bupati and not to the DPRD. The head of the District Forestry 
Service, therefore, works under the direction of the Bupati; he is directly ("upwardly") 
accountable only to his superior, the Bupati, and not to the DPRD. Law 22 of 199947 ' gave the 
right to the DPRD to call the bureaucracy to account, that is, to provide explanation for an issue. 
Nevertheless, this bureaucratic structure in practice has been perceived as one of the obstacles 
undermining the DPRD's power to call district officials to account.412 
The internal organisational structure of the DPRD and the way it operates also present 
obstacles to findings and reports getting out (and being subsequently followed up by the 
" ' Interview with a member of the DPRD of Bulungan, B-L-1 b 
""'' Interview with members of DPRD of Bulungan, B-L-1b and 8-L-2 
''
0 The data were obtained from the results of research contracted out to Mulawarman University 
and an NGO, see Chapter 6; interview with member of the DPRD of Bulungan, 8-L-1b . 
"' Article 20 
"'Interview with a OPRD member of Kutai Baral in charge of forestry affairs, K-L-1 
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executive). The adoption of a majority-based decision process effectively filters the issues 
conveyed to the executive for follow-up. DPRD members in charge of forestry affairs, for 
instance, believed that their tasks were limited to merely monitoring district forestry policies 
and their implementation. 413 However, it is not up to them whether these findings and reports are 
followed up. Findings and reports are conveyed to the chairman of the DPRD, and decisions on 
how and what should be followed up to the executive are not primarily up to the individual 
member who reported the findings but are decided on a majority vote in a forum, or decided by 
the chairman of the DPRD. In this way, commissions in charge of other affairs (that is, non-
forestry affairs) can interfere with forestry assessments which may undermine the effectiveness 
of the original assessments. A DPRD member° explains: 
"I often disagree with other members over many issues. I am often vocal. 
But my voice is only heard within these walls. Like it or not, I have to accept 
majority decisions." (interview with B-L- 1 b) 
The filtering of issues for subsequent follow up has undermined the commitment of DPRD 
members who were otherwise genuinely concerned about certain issues. Moreover, members 
periodically rotate responsibilities (in terms of sectors they handle) during the course of the 
DPRD' s five-year term. This rotation results in virtually no one following any particular sector 
continuously; thus, no one is specifically knowledgeable about or remains attentive to any 
particular sector, including forestry, during the course of the five year period. 
In addition to the DPRD's inability to maintain continuity in monitoring the district's 
forestry programs, the capacity of the DPRD in terms of human resources has been generally 
lower than that of the executive. 474 This incapacity has been associated with, firstly, the formal 
educational requirement for a DPRD member, which has been low (minimum junior high 
school graduate for 1999-2004 and subsequently raised to senior high school graduate for 2004-
2009). Secondly, the DPRD members were elected following a party list system. Thus, DPRD 
members were elected based more on the party's commitment or promises; those who made it 
on the party list to finally take the seats may not be those with the most ability. In contrast, it is 
more likely that the Bupati is supported by staff whose appointments are based, or ostensibly so, 
on their capability to fulfil their positions.475 
Another issue affecting the accountability relations between the executive and the 
legislative relate to the latter's interest and motivations. Individual members of the DPRD, 
parties represented in the institution, or the DPRD as an institution itself, often have hidden 
m Interviews with members of the DPRD of Bulungan,B-L-1b and B-L-2, and a member of the 
DPRD of Kutai Baral, K-l -1 
"' For instance, interviews with a senior Bulungan forestry official, B-G-8a; with DPRD members 
of Bulungan, B-L-1b and B-L-2 
"' Interview with an official of the Bulungan District Forestry Service, B-G-8a 
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interests or objectives associated with the issues over which the performance of the local 
government is being assessed. Some DPRD members, for instance, had a specific interest in 
district-initiated logging activities and the RHL Project. A DPRD member admitted that a 
mutual relationship existed between the DPRD and timber businesses. For example, DRPD 
members often "assisted" timber entrepreneurs by facilitating the process of obtaining the 
latter's logging licenses, in return for dues to support the running of their party's branch (Dewan 
Pengurus Cabang). 476 Another DPRD member explained that certain "negotiations" with timber 
companies were only done by "higher levels", implying that these levels include the Bupati, the 
deputy Bupati, the chairman and vice-chairmen of the DPRD. The details of these negotiations 
were not entirely clear; however, they have been suggested to entail personal and/or 
organisational exchanges. 
Certain DPRD members were also directly associated with or had a stake in district 
logging licenses and in district projects themselves, including the RHL Project.477 Some DPRD 
members were referred to by fellow members as oknum (rogue district functionaries). Rather 
than acting in the interests of the masyarakat, these oknum act in the interests of timber 
operators. A DPRD member of Bulungan, however, insisted that the prevalence of oknum 
within the institution should not be overstated, as it was not a general trend and was only limited 
to a few individuals."' In contrast, an entrepreneur in Kutai Barat perceived that this practice 
was pervasive, and DPRD members who had been vocal at first in voicing forestry issues were 
later "muted" by timber interests . " 9 
DPRD members - at least some of them - were not only associated with timber interests 
once they had become members of the legislature, but had already been supported financially by 
timber interests during the process of their election. A timber entrepreneur in Bulungan, for 
instance, revealed that he supported a (then) newly elected DPRD member (for the 2004-2009 
period), who was previously an NGO activist in the district (Box 6.1 ). Upon obtaining a seat in 
the DPRD, this kind of support could easily jeopardize the particular DPRD member's 
objectivity in assessing issues associated with the timber sector or issues that affect the 
entrepreneur providing support 
Immediately after winning a scat in the DPRD, even prior to his official inauguration, this 
individual who as an NGO had been previously vocal in raising forestry issues, already showed 
hesitation when challenged by a fellow activist to change the ways the DPRD had handled 
issues. "0 The fellow activist requested that the Bupati 's annual accountabi lity report be 
published in the media, rather than only made available in a series of closed deliberations, as 
.,. Interview with a DPRD member of Kutai Baral, K-L-1 
"' Confidential interviews, names of interviewees and dates of interviews remain with the 
researcher 
478 lnterview with a DPRD member of Bulungan, B-L-1b 
"' Interview with an entrepreneur in Kutai Baral, K-P-1 
''
0 Observation in a discussion between a new DPRD member and a NGO activist, 15 July 2004 
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has been common practice. The new DPRD member rejected this suggestion arguing that it 
would be too difficult to change this process, and was sure that he would be recalled if he were 
to suggest it. 
In a more pugnacious and direct manner, the Patriot Pancasila Party utilized timber 
resources to support the election of their party members to the DPRD of Kutai Barat. It was 
obvious that the Patriot Pancasila Party had used timber-derived money to establish a 
constituency in the district (section 6.4), and hence secure their three seats in the DPRD for 
2004-2009 period. The preman - who had been openly involved in violence and illegal logging 
- became DPRD members, supposedly representing the people in the district. The election of 
the preman to the DPRD thus raised very serious questions about whether or not formal 
accountability mechanisms through this institution would work at all in the district's 
decentralized regime, and particularly, in the context of the district's natural resource 
management. 
Just prior to the election of a new Bupati of Kutai Baral in mid 2006, the Bupati issued an 
IPK (license to clear-cut forests), ostensibly to make way for a road in one of the most remote, 
and heavily forested, sub-districts (Kaltim Post, 1 April 2006a). Thus, forests have not only 
been used to generate revenue for the local government, income for masyarakat, and informal 
income for district functionaries, but also to support candidates, directly and indirectly, in the 
local election processes. 
Power imbalances between the Bupati and the DPRD 
Although the legal framework for decentralisation granted the executive and the legislative 
body parallel powers in the governing of districts, the Bupatis in both districts appear to he more 
powerful than the DPRD.'81 This actual imbalance of power affects their accountability 
relations. Members of the forestry commission of Bulungan's DPRD revealed that the DPRD 
would not interfere with the Bupati's policies unless there were grave concerns from the 
communities. Only when people formally lodge grievances, or convey their concerns to the 
DPRD regarding a Bupati's policy or its implementation, would the DPRD accommodate these 
concerns and make inquiries or follow up. As a DPRD member explained: 
"Unless there are reactions from the masyarakat, we would not dare to 
directly interfere with the Bupati' s policies. No matter what, these are his 
policies." [my emphasis] (interview with B-L-1 b) 
The above statement provides insights into the actual power relations between the Bupati 
and the DPRD. The latter's reluctance to question district policies, unless it is faced with strong 
"' For instance, interview with a senior forestry official of Bulungan, B-G-8a, and an 
entrepreneur in Kutai Baral, K-P-1 
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demands from communities, influences the ways in which the DPRD carries out its 
responsibility to provide checks on district policies, as outlined in Law 22 of 1999 (and its 
amended version, Appendix 5: Postscript). The imbalance in the actual power relations between 
the Bupati and the DPRD of Bulungan was revealed through the DPRD's failed attempt to 
initiate an accountability process specifically in forestry associated with district small-scale 
Jogging licenses, the IPPKs. At first, the legal instrument providing the basis for the issuance of 
the IPPK licenses was, rather than a District Regulation (PERDA), a Bupati's Decree. A 
PERDA has higher legal standing than a Bupati's Decree, and district governments have 
perceived PERDAs to have a higher legal standing than a Ministerial Decree (Chapter 3). 
Realizing that there were problems in the implementation of these licenses and the legal 
instrument on which their issuance was based, in 2000-2001 the DPRD contracted a study on 
JPPKs to assess their social and environmental implications. The purpose of the study, 
contracted out to Mulawarman University and a local environmental NGO ( section 6 .1.2), was 
to assist the DPRD in evaluating this district policy and in providing recommendations for 
further actions to resolve the issue.'~2 The results were intended to back up the Bupati 's policy 
by upgrading the legal instrument on which the policy was based, into a form that had a higher 
legal standing than a Bupati 's Decree, and as perceived by district functionaries, had a higher 
legal standing than a Ministerial Decree. From the perspective of the Bulungan Government, 
this meant that once the district passed a PERDA authorizing the Bupati to issue logging 
licenses, the authority could not be overridden by a Ministerial Decree. 
However, the Bupati was not happy with this research, accusing the DPRD of carrying out 
the project, rather, to scrutinize the Bupati's policy and to pinpoint wrongdoing on the part of 
the Bupati. The research report was completed but there was no further action or follow-up, on 
the part of the DPRD, as was initially intended. Towards the end of 2000, however, Bulungan 
did pass a PERDA officially specifying district charges on small-scale logging licenses . .., This 
PERDA did not strengthen the legal instrument on which the issuance of district logging 
licenses was based, as the DPRD had intended. The PERDA, however, did provide a strong 
legal basis for the application of district charges associated with timber operations under district 
licenses, and therefore further encouraged district-licensed logging operations. 
The DPRD might have had other, covert objectives behind its intention to formulate a 
PERDA legalizing the Bupati 's authority in the issuance of district licenses. In contrast to a 
Bupati's Decree, a PERDA required the formal endorsement of the DPRD. However, the case 
nevertheless illustrates the obstacles facing the DPRD in its attempt to utilise legitimate third-
party assessments to gain more objective and substantive perspectives over a district 's policy. 
The DPRD's failure to continue with its attempt to modify the Bupati 's policies or the legal 
,.., Interviews with DPRD members of Bulungan, B-L-1 b and B-L-2 
"' Bulungan District Regulation (PE RDA) 17 of 2000 on the Charges of IPPK in Private or 
Community Forests, enacted 2 November 2000 
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basis on which the Bupati's policies were made, reveals the power relation between the Bupati 
and the DPRD. 
Obstacles to the effective use of the DPRD's increased formal power vis-a-vis the 
executive are not only true with respect to the DPRD's monitoring tasks over district policies 
and their implementation, but also in its authority to jointly prepare PERDAs with the Bupati. 
The DPRD's involvement in the formulation of PERDAs has been mostly limited to providing 
input into the consultation processes, if and when members were invited to be involved in the 
process. The DPRD's involvement in the preparation of PERDA was more meaningful once the 
draft PERDA reached the DPRD office for deliberation. DPRD members interviewed 
acknowledged that they lack the capacity to formulate and/or assess PERDAs."' For instance, a 
PERDA is a legal instrument, whereas DPRD personnel with a law background were few in 
number. Furthermore, those with formal training in law may not necessarily be involved in the 
working groups discussing the draft of the PERDA. 435 
In contrast to mandates given to the DPRD by Law 22 of 1999, all of the above constraints 
have rendered the DPRD less powerful in its relationship with the Bupati. This has resulted not 
only in the ineffectiveness of the formal accountability processes, but also in the abuse of the 
DPRD's formal powers. For instance, the executive and the legislature often enter into 
negotiations and reach back-room deals prior to DPRD's formal endorsement of the district's 
budget and projects.'86 The DPRD's reluctance to exercise its powers to put a check on the 
districts' inappropriate policies, that is, not doing something when it is supposed to, in effect is a 
form of abuse of its law-mandated powers. 
7.2.4 Other relations or types of accountability affecting district 
forestry 
The ineffectiveness of formal downward accountability mechanisms (that is, between the 
Bupati and the DPRD) within the district suggests the need for other accountability 
mechanisms. The following discusses accountability processes where state actors at other levels 
of government have called and held district officials to account for their performance. 
Accountability of district officials to state-actors at other levels of 
government 
Other accountability processes were applied to public officials in districts. This was 
illustrated by the RHL Project cases. Irregularities in the implementation of the RHL Project, 
though they did not result in the enforcement or rectification in terms of the formal 
accountability of the Bupati to his constituencies (that is, in the Bupati 's Annual Accountability 
'" Interview with DPRD members of Bulungan, B-L 1 band B-L-2 
.., Interview with a DPRD member of Bulungan, B-L-1 b 
"' Confidential interview with a senior official of Kutai Baral 
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Report to the DPRD, the latter as the citizens' representatives), did result in judicial processes. 
Both Kutai Barat and Bulungan's RHL Project leaders utilizing the 2001 DAK-DR Fund (for 
implementation in 2002) were investigated by the District Attorney's Office. The investigation 
resulted in Bulungan's Project leader spending a term in a local jail. By January 2006, the 
individual was out of jail; he returned to the civil service but was demoted. 
Investigations carried out by the judiciary were based on findings made by a team 
consisting of the Provincial Monitoring Agency (Bawasprop ), the Agency for the Monitoring of 
Finances and Development (BPKP), the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Forestry, the 
District Attorney Office and the Provincial Forestry Service. Both Project leaders were 
investigated for embezzlement of the DAK-DR Fund. This type of accountability can also be 
classified as financial, legal or horizantal accountability. lt can be classified as horizantal 
accountability as it involved the court, an independent agency within the state, which called and 
held these Project leaders to account (Appendix 1 ). 
During 2004-2005, five out of the 13 districts and municipalities of East Kalimantan were 
being or had been investigated by the judiciary on the alleged inappropriate use of the DAK-DR 
Fund. The irregularities concerning the use of the DAK-DR Fund and cases being investigated 
suggest that bureaucratic control and supervision have not been effective. The governor is 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the RHL Project carried out by 
district/municipality governments in the province, while each Bupatilmayor is fully responsible 
for the Project's implementation in their respective jurisdictions. 
Several issues associated with this provincial supervision or monitoring have been 
identified. One issue has been associated with provincial government's financial capacity to 
carry out its supervisory role. Until 2003, the East Kalimantan Provincial Forestry Service was 
not allocated financial support to carry out its responsibility from the DAK-DR Fund, as all the 
DAK-DR funds distributed to the province (from the Centre) were allocated to the districts or 
municipalities within the province (section 5.1.1 ). Beginning with the 2003 allocation, the East 
Kalimantan Provincial Government decided to set aside some of the DAK-DR money allocated 
to the districts/municipalities within the province for supervisory activities (section 5.1. I). 
Another issue has been the absence of a link between the performance of the districts in 
conducting RHL activities (what is termed "success" rate) and reward or punishment. The 
province-wide average performance was assessed as between 30-40%. Despite low performance 
in the rehabilitation activities and the mismanagement of the Fund (see below), districts 
continued to receive DAK-DR monies. A senior district official stated that, although Bulungan 
did not submit any reports on the implementation of the RHL Project to the provincial 
government or the Ministry of Forestry, the district nevertheless continued to receive the DAK-
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DR monjes. 487 Kutai Barat submitted reports to the provincial government but not to the 
Ministry of Forestry, yet also continued to receive their allocation of OAK-DR from the Centre. 
The lack of a formal performance accountability process linking the inflow of DAK-DR funds 
with the districts' implementation of the RHL Project acts as a disincentive for district 
governments to implement the Project appropriately. 
Fear of scrutiny and sanctions as part of the accountability processes applied to previous 
RHL Project leaders, however, appears to have affected the way the Project was being managed 
post-sanctions in both study districts. The Project leader responsible for Kutai Barat's RHL at 
the time of fieldwork emphasized that he needed to be extra careful in managing the Project and 
in addressing RHL related matters, including conflicts within communities. This Project 
involved a lot of money (for instance, 4% of Kutai Baral District' s 2003 entire budget - section 
5. I. I), thus was often subject to intervention by those higher in the hierarchy (see below) 
and drew public attention and scrutiny. The responsibility and the judicial processes 
surrounding the previous Project leader have compelled him to withdraw from the Project leader 
position. Unfortunately, no one else in the District Forestry Service was willing to take over the 
task and as of January 2006 he remained the Project leader. 
In Bulungan, the Project leader responsible for the 2003 DAK-DR funded RHL 
(implementation year 2004) was clearly very uncomfortable with his position. In the interview, 
he left many questions unanswered and kept referring to his colleagues or superior to answer 
questions. By early September 2004, he withdrew from the Project leader position. He was 
replaced by an environmental NGO activist-turned district forestry official, who continues to 
have strong ties with and influence in the NGO. 
After the change in Project leadership, however, issues similar to those found in the past 
were encountered. By 2006 the RHL Project continues to involve a significant amount of money 
and continues to be utilised as a source of personal enrichment. Among the notable issues was 
the involvement of district officials close to the Project leader, in the Project, arousing jealousy 
on the part of those who did not "participate". This forestry official was perceived to "have used 
the opportunities arising from the Project mostly for himself'. •ss 
According to Mulgan (2003), where accountability can be seen to influence the future as 
much as judge the past, the prospect of sanctions has an important deterrent effect on those held 
accountable. For Kutai Barat, the prospect of sanctions for the misuse of the DAK-DR Fund in 
the management of the RHL Project has turned out to be an effective form of control 
mechanism. Similar outcome has also initially been demonstrated for Bulungan. 
In the case of the RHL Project, formal performance accountability to higher levels of 
government appears to be non-existent. Legal/financial/horizontal accountabil ity (see Appendix 
"' Interview with a senior BAPPEDA official of Bulungan, B-G-9c 
"'"Proyek dimakan sendiri" (literally "he himself eats the Project"); interview with B-N-1 h 
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1) has been more effective in efforts to improve the performance of the Project. In the case of 
Bulungan, however, the effects appear to be temporary. 
The improvement of the RHL Project performance was demanded by citizens, articulated 
formally by the DPRD (as the citizens' representatives) during the formal annual accountability 
process of the Bupatis of Bulungan and Kutai Barat (that is, downward accountabil ity). Thus, 
legal/ financial/horizontal accountabi lity - depending on how one calls it (Appendix I) - has had 
an indirect effect on downward accountability (between the Bupati and district citizens). 
Accountability of district governments to the Ministry of Forestry 
The accountability rel ations between district governments and the Central Government in 
the context of forestry decisions are not straightforward. According to Law 22 of 1999, district 
governments report to the Ministry of Home Affai rs. There is no specific hierarchical 
relationship between the district government and the Ministry of Forestry. To complicate 
matters, Law 41of1999 on Forestry contradicts Law 22 of 1999 in terms of the authority over 
forestry; the former basically stipulates that authority of forestry affairs reside with the Ministry 
of Forestry, the latter assigns the authority to district governments (Appendix 2). 
As a consequence, to hold di strict governments accountable for their forestry policies, the 
Ministry of Forestry has to rely on the Ministry of Home Affairs. For instance, the Ministry of 
Forestry requested that the Ministry of Home Affairs take action against Kutai Barat's 
controversial PERDA on forestry, as the stipulations in this district regulation contravene those 
of the Ministry of Forestry and the forestry law (section 3.3 ). However, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs took no further action, since they based their considerations on Law 22 of 1999, which 
is basically their own product (because the law was initiated and submitted to the national 
legislature by this ministry). As long as the district regulation did not contravene Law 22 of 
1999, the district was told to go ahead (sec tion 3.3).419 
In reality, however, the Bupati of Kutai Baral was cautious in making policies in forestry 
for fear of legal consequences. Because some Bupatis did not heed the Ministry of Forestry's 
directions in making or implementing their decisions, the Ministry of Forestry has begun to 
build legal cases against them. The Ministry of Forestry, through its Inspectorate General, did 
this by coordinating with various government agencies, notably the office of the District 
Attorney General, to scrutinize the local governments' actions. The Bupatis of Bulungan and 
Kutai Barat, for instance, eventually had to halt the issuance of district logging permits, 
therefore legally bowing to national regulations (Chapter 3). 
The Ministry of Forestry, therefore, he ld d istrict governments to account for their policies 
and decisions mostly through legal accountability mechanisms, by attempting to ensure that 
legal rules were observed. The Inspectorate General of Forestry was a key official in the 
"' Interview with K-G-1 a 
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investigations of the two districts' RHL Project leaders over corruption and the inappropriate 
use of the DAK-DR Fund. The Bupati of Berau, another district in East Kalimantan, was 
investigated for retention of forestry fees and Reforestation Fund. These fees were supposed to 
be transferred directly to the Central Government's account. Again, the Inspectorate General of 
Forestry played a critical role in this legal accountability process. 
Thus, the fear for legal sanctions has been particularly prominent and effective. This is 
consistent with Schedler ( l 999), who argues that: 
Exercises of accountability that expose misdeeds but do not impose material 
consequences will usually appear as weak, diminished forms of 
accountability, and regarded as acts or window dressing rather than real 
restraints on power. (Schedler, 1999: 15-16). 
Accountability of district officials to the Bupati and to high-level 
district functionaries 
The Bupati of Kutai Barat was dissatisfied with the ways in which the RHL Project was 
implemented and had on several occasions instructed the Forestry Service to improve its 
performance ... 0 These directives, along with fear of scrutiny and sanctions for inappropriate 
financial management, have brought about positive changes in the way the Project is managed 
in the district. The head of the District Forestry Service admitted that there were many 
deficiencies and shortcomings during the first years of the RHL Project implementation and the 
Project is a continuous learning curve for his office. For instance, the process of the distribution 
of the funds has been continuously improved to minimize the prospect of the funds not reaching 
the relevant farmers, the intended recipients. In addition, the requ irement for participation by 
farmer groups has been tightened to ensure that the money is actually used for rehabilitation 
activities on their lands. 
The Bupati calling forestry officials to account for the implementation of the RHL Project, 
and the investigation of the ex-Project leader by the judiciary, have led to efforts for better 
management of the Project. This thus responds to the demands of district citi zens for the 
appropriate management of the Project and fulfilling the public trust (Appendix I) 
The illustration above has shown that financial accountability was demanded from the 
previous Project leaders who had led the implementation of the RHL Project. Interviews and 
observations in Kutai Barat suggested, however, that there were many "interventions" by higher 
level district functionaries (that is, district officials and DPRD members) that influenced 
decisions in the implementation of the Proj ect. For instance, it was often the case that "memos" 
from higher-ranking district officials were attached to a proposal requesting participation in the 
' "' Interview with the Bupati of Kutai Baral (K-G-*) 
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Project. The wording of these memos ranged from polite and subtle requests such as "please 
assist and process according to the rules and regulations or normal procedures" to strong 
directives such as "carry out!" These memos usually requested the Project leader to "assist" the 
proposal/proposing party in the process of the selection of Project participants. Although the 
Project leader insisted that all proposals were processed according to rules and regulations, he 
nevertheless acknowledged the "pressures" that these memos exert on his decision-making. 
Similarly, a senior official in Bulungan District Forestry Service admitted that "it is not easy to 
be a Project leader as there are pressures from all sides"."' 
District forestry officials admitted that pressures from higher ranking district functionaries 
were not confined to the RHL Project, but were also frequently felt in the processes associated 
with the issuance of district logging licenses and timber administration. These pressures were 
applied in various ways and on officials of various levels in the District Forestry Service, from 
relatively junior officials to the head of the Forestry Service.'9 ' Although district forestry 
officials often acted in their own interests (section 6.3), pressures from higher levels in the 
district hierarchy have meant that they also had to accommodate the interests of their superiors. 
For instance, it was often "suggested" that district forestry officials smoothen the process of 
administrative requirements of timber operators associated with senior district functionaries. 
Besides direct and overt pressures, loyalty to one's superiors has been a factor shaping 
bureaucratic accountability. This was illustrated in the case of district logging licenses. One of 
the district governments' arguments for allowing district-licensed timber operations to continue 
for a prolonged period despite the Centre's warnings (Chapter 3), was the fear that the Bupati or 
the district government would be taken to an administrative court - by entrepreneurs or 
community partners' holding the licenses or obtaining the right to log - for cancelling district 
licenses or terminating their operations prior to expiry date or exhausted quota. '93 As one district 
forestry official explained: 
"Basically, we want to protect our superiors, because we are afraid that the 
issue will be taken to the administrative court. Sometimes we have to be 
loyal, we have to protect the leadership, even if this means over our 
idealism, and we ourselves become frustrated." (interview with K-G-24) 
The Bupati of Kutai Barat was unhappy with the performance of the Forestry Service in 
the RHL Project'" and considered that the District Forestry Service had failed to curb illegal 
logging activities (section 6.4). The Bupati accused the head of the District Forestry Service of 
issuing forestry documents based on inappropriate SOs and stated that the latter was "too close 
"' Interview with a senior official of Bulungan Forestry Service, B-G-21 b 
"' Confidential interviews with various district forestry officials. 
"' Interview with an official of Kutai Baral Forestry Service, K-G-24 
" ' Interview with the Bupati and Kaltim Post, 1 O March 2004b 
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to timber interests". After a period of disharmony between the Bupati and the head of the 
Forestry Service, in July 2004, the Bupati sacked the latter (section 6.4). This classifies as 
performance and bureaucratic accountability (Appendix 1 ). 
The head of the District Forestry Service had his own explanation for his sacking, 
including accusing the Bupati of being unhappy with him not letting the District Forestry 
Service serve as the "A TM" for the Bupati, despite pressure to do so. Although the details 
remained vague and hard evidence was hard to come by, these open accusations from both sides 
and "memos" from powerful district functionaries show the interest of key district actors in the 
informal funds generated by the forestry sector. 
Informal revenues extracted from timber interests were commonly shared among district 
officials and with junior officials who payed "tributes" to more senior officials or their 
superiors. These chains of "tributes" occur up the ladder, in all sizes, to the highest in the 
hierarchy.49i In such situations where corruption is pervasive, the usefulness of district-level 
bureaucratic accountability (that is, accountability to superiors) is questionable. 
After only two weeks in the job, the new head of Kutai Barat District Forestry Service 
already admitted that district functionaries high in the hierarchy were pressuring him to follow 
through with timber administration involving a particular timber company, despite the fact that 
this collided with the Centre's directives. After a serious discussion with three of his senior 
officials, the head of the Forestry Service decided to go ahead with the processing of that timber 
company's administration. As he explained: 
"This is not our fault. We are only following instructions, although this is 
against our conscience. This is but one example, whoever is sitting in this 
seat can not remain idealistic, can not be rational, because of politics. I am 
like ... one foot in hot cinders, the other in hot charcoal." (interview with K-
G-*) 
The dilemma confronting this senior district official provides a good illustration of 
Schedler's statement ( 1999:20): 
Accountability concerns agents not subjects. It concerns who exercise 
power, not those who are subordinate to it. More precisely, it concerns 
subjects only as far as we ascribe some degree of freedom to them. In an 
analogous way, it concerns public employees only as far as we envision 
administrative organisation not as mechanical conveyor belts of decisions 
from top to bottom, but rather as loci of decision-making at all hierarchical 
levels. 
'"' Confidential interview with a senior district official of Kutai Barat, who admitted he accepted 
small "tributes" from his subordinate, but was also expected to pay "tributes" to his superior. He 
also suggested the pervasiveness of such actions among his peers . 
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Linking to Schedler' s statement, although the RHL Project leader and the head of the 
District Forestry Service are treated as the loci of decision-making in the implementation of the 
RHL Project and district forestry decisions, respectively, their decision making-powers are, in 
practice, limited and often easily compromised. The RHL Project leader is still subordinate to 
higher ranks in the district government. Similarly, the head of the District Forestry Service is 
subordinate to the Bupati. Yet, although the ultimate responsibility lies with the Bupati, the 
Project leader is the one who would be held directly accountable if things went wrong. 
Similarly, the head of the District Forestry Service was held responsible (by the Bupati) for the 
proliferation of illegal logging in the district. The Bupatis of both districts, on the other hand, 
have not been implicated in either the alleged (Kutai Barat) or proven (Bulungan) 
mismanagement of the RHL Project monies and neither has been scrutinized for the prevalence 
of illegal logging in the districts. 
Intervention from higher ranks in the district has meant the imposition of the interest of 
these higher-positioned officials on lower-level district officials' decisions. According to 
Schedler: 
Without power, without the capacity to make decisions and the 
corresponding capacity to attribute decisions, it does not make any sense to 
talk about accountability. Nobody can hold anybody accountable for the 
things beyond that person's control. (Schedler, 1999: 18-19) 
In the study districts, however, bureaucrats were held accountable for decisions that were 
often made because of pressures on them beyond their control. 
Both distric ts installed a unit called the Bawaskab (Badan Pengawas Kabupaten), which is 
the district office in charge of monitoring the implementation of district projects, policies, or 
programs. The head of the Bawaskab reports directly to the Bupati and is posi tioned at the same 
level as the heads of other district offices in the district administrative structure. The Bawaskab, 
similar to other district units, also faces operational budget limitations to carry out its tasks, 
including the monitoring of forestry operations on the ground . Because the Bawaskab is 
responsible to the Bupati, and due to its limited operational capacity, it can not provide unbiased 
perspectives on bureaucratic accountability processes. For instance, in cases of bureaucratic 
accountability involving the Bupati and his subordinates, such as the sacking of the head of the 
District Forestry Service of Kutai Barat, or in cases where a district official is made to account 
for decisions that were actually imposed by the official's superior, the Bawaskab could not 
provide independent inputs into the process, or provide relevant hard evidence. 
7.3 Informal accountability mechanisms 
Section 7 .2 has shown that the formal accountability mechanisms at the district level 
involving the DPRD as the representative of the citizens have not been effective. It shows, 
however, in some cases, the effectiveness of accountability processes where district officials are 
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called and held to account by vertical or Central Government agencies (upward or horizontal 
accountability, Appendix 1). Having discussed the severe limitations in the implementation of 
formal accountability mechanisms in both districts, the chapter now turns to the broadened 
concept of accountability (Peters, 1984; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999) involving social institutions. 
The kinds of informal accountability mechanisms are discussed, and whether or not they have 
been effective. 
7.3.1 The community demanding district government's 
accountability 
Despite the limitations of the DPRD in terms of providing institutionalized checks and 
balances over district policies and decisions, citizens have certain expectations of the DPRD as 
their representative, in particular as a formal channel through which to convey their concerns or 
grievances. The DPRD members notably raised issues about district forestry activities based on 
citizens ' demands or reports. Community representatives convey their concerns or grievances 
by writing formal letters, by requesting formal meetings with the DPRD, by approaching 
individual DPRD members, and by staging demonstrations at the DPRD's or the Bupati's 
offices. DPRD members also make limited visits to some areas and communities (section 
6.2.1). 
In this sense, communities (citizens) understand that they have representatives sitting in the 
DPRD through whom they may articulate their demands and concerns. With regard to forestry-
related issues, communities have often communicated their concerns to the Forestry Service, to 
the Bupati, to the DPRD, and to the media.4911 The most common concerns have involved 1) 
activities that have trespassed or encroached onto the community's forest lands; 2) the 
harvesting of timber by parties who communities' perceive to lack rights over the lands; 3) 
conflicts within and between communities over the distribution of fees associated with district-
licensed small-scale logging activities; 4) conflicts among communities associated with the 
RHL Project activities; as well as 5) the perceived inappropriate implementation of the RHL 
Project. 
The various concerns conveyed through these channels were both direct and indirect 
results of district government decisions. In the case of small-scale logging licenses, concerns 
were related to the perceived. unfair and non transparent distribution of fees by community 
leaders or representatives (pengurus) , and disputes over village boundaries. These boundaries 
determine who holds rights over specific forest areas, over which district small-scale Jogging 
permits were granted. Negotiations over fees and partnership arrangements with timber 
operators were, however, largely carried out independent of the district government. Such 
, .. Interviews with various people in the district and researcher's observations at the offices of 
the Bupati, the media representative, and the District Forestry Service on several different 
occasions. 
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horizontal conflicts therefore were the indirect results of the local governments' decision to 
issue these licenses. 
Concerns about the implementation of RHL Project included horizontal conflicts within 
farmer groups (Kelompok Tani) and allegations that the activities were managed by external 
parties outside the communities (in other words, other parties other than the relevant 
communities had benefited), although the Project was supposed to be carried out by a particular 
group of communities in the area (Chapter 5).497 
Even if the conflicts did not emerge as a direct consequence of a local government's 
decision, however, communities nevertheless would turn to the district government, the DPRD, 
or the media in their efforts to resolve them. District officials, notably the Bupati and his office 
and the DPRD often had no choice but to facilitate or adjudicate these conflicts. These 
undertakings were mainly invoked by fear of open conflict and social unrest.491 In the conflict 
between communities and the preman (section 6.4), the Bupati and the DPRD were drawn in to 
mediate, not only to prevent social unrest, but also to avert ethnic conflict. 
Because many of these issues involved internal conflicts within communities or conflicts 
between communities and their partner timber operators, the DPRD and district officials often 
regarded their resolution as being outside their responsibility .499 A Bulungan DPRD member, for 
instance, explained that he was willing to negotiate in these confl icts, but emphasized that the 
communities in conflict needed to understand that a DPRD member had no legal authority to 
decide on the issue. Communities, however, perceived that the DPRD members were their 
representatives, and thus continued to resort to them. However, instances where oknum (rogue 
district functionaries) within the institution have sided on timber interests have nevertheless 
begun to erode communities' trust towards the DPRD.500 
One of the most overt. examples of people's demanding district government accountability 
has been surrounding the implementation of the RHL Project. Throughout the year, in between 
formal accountability processes, citizens convey their dissatisfactions and complaints regarding 
the Project, requiring other avenues for resolution and accountability. As described in sections 
5.2.2 and 6.2.4, similar to the case of small-scale logging related activities which had spurred 
conflicts with regard to the distribution of fees, the money allocated for activities associated 
with the Project have often incited conflicts among members of communities. These included 
allegations that the funds disbursed by the District Forestry Service were swindled by the leader 
or the pengurus of the recipient farmer group (and therefore did not reach its members) and 
manipulations in the rehabilitation activities (section 6.2.4). 
''' Interview with a Kutai Barat DPRD member, K-L-1 
"" For instance, interviews with Bulungan DPRD members, B-L-1 b, B-L-1 a and with a senior 
official of Kutai Baral, K-G-8 
... Interviews with a Bulungan DPRD member, B-L-1b, and a DPRD member of Kutai Barat, K-L-
1 
""' Interviews with a Bulungan DPRD member, B-L-1 b, and an NGO activist of Bulungan, B-N-5 
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In some cases, community reports of alleged inappropriate implementation or misuse of 
the DAK-DR monies in the RHL Project, have been facilitated by NGOs and the media. NGOs 
have also raised these issues themselves. However, as discussed in section 6.1.2, there are 
severe limitations on the ways in which some NGOs work or are perceived to work, 
undermining those NGOs with untainted commitments and methods. 
7 .3.2 The Media 
As with NGOs, the media has played a critical role as a means of informal check and 
balance mechanisms, but has its own limitations. Communities have increasingly resorted to the 
media to convey their concerns. However, the media itself is not without problems in terms of 
reach and what gets printed. At the time of fieldwork, only one Samarinda-based daily 
newspaper, Kaltim Post, had distribution in the capital of Kutai Barat. The distribution of this 
paper in the district was limited. The daily has a small branch office and one journalist as its 
representative based in the district capital. The Kutai Baral government, similar to the other 
districts in the province, pays a substantial amount of annual fees to reserve columns dedicated 
for stories about the district. This would have been useful if the articles were of the type that 
could assist in promoting the district to attract investors or to disseminate information about the 
district' s programs. Unfortunately, stories have often tended to cover ceremonial events rather 
than substantive issues. In terms of reach, the dispersed geographic distribution of villages, 
remoteness, the vastness of the area and the rudimentary infrastructure to most of these vi llages 
have prevented the paper from reaching the population evenly. Consequently, as of 2004, the 
distribution of this paper was limited in four out of the 2 1 subdistricts. 5°1 However, although the 
reach of the daily newspaper in terms of its actual distribution to the population may be low, the 
c lose-knit informal means of verbal communication among members of the communities who 
have similar interests, eventually help these issues reach a greater number of the population. 502 
The remoteness and the dispersed population over such a vast area also contribute to the 
lack of ground-truth checking and investigation on issues. Because the entire area of Kutai Baral 
is covered only by one journalist (the district is about the size of Belgium or the state of 
Maryland in the United States), and further aggravated by the lack of inadequate infrastructure, 
the chances for an issue or story to get printed relies more on communities finding the journalist 
rather than the other way around. The fact that many communities go out of their way to report 
issues and concerns so that they can be printed means that either there is a perception that the 
media is an effective means to convey people's concerns or demands, or that other means such 
as reporting through the people 's representatives sitting in the DPRD as less effective or 
inadequate. 
soi Interview with the representative of Kallim Post based in Kutai Baral, K-M-1 . Due to high 
costs involved, distribution proves to be one of the major challenges for the print media to reach 
the population. 
'
0
' Interview with a Kaltim Post representative in Kutai Baral District, K-M-1 
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Similarly, in Bulungan, up to at the time of the major fieldwork (2004), only one local 
daily, Radar Tarakan, had an office located in the district. This newspaper is based in Tarakan, 
the nearest municipality to Tanjung Selor, the capital of Bulungan district. With its size about 
half that of Kutai Barat, Jack of infrastructure, dispersed population, and, as of January 2006, 
only two journalists covering the entire district, Radar Tarakan has faced similar issues in terms 
of how news gets printed and in terms of its reach in the district. As in Kutai Baral, the 
Bulungan government also "buys space" in the paper, utilising it as a means for public relations 
and to some extent determining what actually gets printed. soJ Consequently, news from 
Bulungan published in Radar Tarakan , like that of Kutai Barat in Kaltim Post, often tends to be 
about ceremonies.s04 The activist who had suggested to a newly elected DPRD member that the 
Bupati's Annual Accountability report be published in Radar Tarakan (section 7.2.3) 
recognized that this suggestion, even if it were followed, may not have been effective because 
the district government has some control over what gets printed through the district' s 
"purchase" of space in this daily. sos 
Although there are limitations on what gets printed and who reads it, the media has in 
some cases been influential in pressuring the district government to handle forestry issues. 
However, Kutai Barat District Forestry Service has not been appreciative of the fact. A news 
article titled "Reforestation Fund Project Deviates. The Forestry Service wants People not to 
Report Directly to the Media" (Kaltim Post, 29 September, 2003d) cited the head of Kutai Barat 
Forestry Service's expectation that allegations of violations/deviations be reported to the Project 
leader first instead of directly to the media. The issue then would be investigated by a team of 
district officials consisting of the District Forestry Service, the Bawaskab, and BAPPEDA. The 
case not only reflects the ineffectiveness of direct communication mechanisms between the 
masyarakat and the District Forestry Service, but also the preference of the District Forestry 
Service to handle matters internally before any allegations of deviations become public 
knowledge. Public knowledge appears to have created pressures on the District Forestry 
Service. 
The media has not only been useful in disseminating local forestry issues, albeit its 
limitations, but itself has become involved in some of the issues more deeply. In one 
observation at the office of the Kaltim Post branch, the reporter who committed to publishing 
information on the alleged illegal logging in a village as reported by two community 
representatives, also "advised" these community representatives to follow up the issue directly 
50
' Interviews with Radar Tarakan representatives in Bulungan District, B-M-1 and B-M-2, and an 
NGO activist, B-N-1a 
"" The issue of highlighting mostly ceremonial events was also criticized by the members of the 
Bulungan District DPRD, B-L-1 b and B-L-2, but they have done nothing about it, 
'
0
' Interview with an NGO activist, B-N-3 
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to the Kapoi res, head of district-level police unit. 506 The community representatives did follow 
this suggestion, and the story was published the following day. A senior District Forestry 
Service official insisted that this particular media representative was often out of line: rather 
than restricting himself to journalism, he was seen as provoking communities to pursue an 
. 501 issue. 
As of March 2006, according to an informant, Kutai Baral District terminated its 
cooperation with Kaltim Post, and instead made a new arrangement with another daily, Tribun 
Kaltim , also based in Samarinda. Apparently, the Bupati perceived that Kaltim Post had printed 
an unbalanced coverage about the district and did not appreciate it. 508 
Both Kaltim Post and Radar Tarakan are regional dailies and are part of the Jawa Pos 
News Network, one of the nations' largest media networks in terms of the number of copies 
printed and the area of distribution. Kaltim Post and Radar Tarakan are regional media, but 
have local reach and cover local news; their operations are run and managed in Samarinda and 
Tarakan, respectively. News about Bulungan printed in Radar Tarakan is also printed in the 
Kaltim Post. 
An effort to establish a local , district-based media in Kutai Baral has faced challenges. 
Beginning 2001 , as requested by the Bupati, a Dayak native of the district who had previously 
migrated to Java and had media-related experience, returned to the district and established a 
weekly, Sendawar Pos. Soon however, the weekly faced operational difficulties: the low buying 
power among communities and little commercial interests in the paper on the one hand, and 
lack of capital, high printing costs and operational costs of maintaining an adequate number of 
journalists, on the other. The low buying power of the population forced the publisher to 
maintain a low price for the weekly, but as a consequence the cost of its distribution to each 
sub-district had to be subsidized. Local businesses did not show much interest in placing 
advertisements in the weekly. Lack of capital and equipment resulted in the printing of the 
paper in Banjarmasin, the capital of the neighbouring province of South Kalimantan, thus 
inflating its costs. Placing at least one correspondent in each of the 21 subdistricts to obtain a 
balanced coverage in terms of area or locality, also proved to be costly. Although the district 
government financially supported it, this district-based media could not continue to operate due 
to unmet costs. By 2004 it had ceased operation. This case shows the challenges in establishing 
a local, district-based media striving to operate with idealistic conditions where it emphasized 
reliability and balanced coverage of stories in terms of locations/sites in the district. By mid 
July 2004, the individual who had established this weekly had become a DPRD member. 
'
06 At the time, the nearby Po/res was located in the neighbouring district of Kutai Kertanegara. A 
Po/res based in Kutai Baral was established in October 2004. 
'°' lnteNiew with K-G-1b 
'°' Personal communication with EM, an NGO activitist working in Kutai Barat, 8 March 2006 
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The increasing role of the local media, however, is tainted with the mushrooming of the so-
called "journalists" who are making use of the freedom of the press post-reformasi to extract 
rents from district officials.309 These individuals, who hold a press ID, make visits to district 
functionaries and follow their activities by claiming to represent a particular media organisation. 
However, their interviews or coverage are never actually published. Under the pretext of 
covering or publicizing an issue, their motivations are to secure dues from district officials. 
These so-called "journalists" are referred to as "journalists without a newspaper" (Wartawan 
Tanpa Suratkabar), Wartawan Bodrex or Wartawan Amplop (envelope journalists). They are 
called Wartawan Bodrex because they often operate in a group to "attack" officials demanding 
money5'0 ; they are referred as Wartawan Amplop because their presence is synonymous with 
demanding an envelope of money. Officials in both study districts, including the Bupati of 
Kutai Barat who often became the target of these types of journalists, have not only expressed 
their concern towards this trend but have also feared that these actions were eroding their trust 
towards the media in general. ' 1' 
The advantage of the existence of established regional newspapers publishing local news is 
not only thei~ reach downwards to the local level, but also their potential reach "upwards". 
Because of their availability through the web, they allow the Provincial Forestry Service and the 
Ministry of Forestry to conveniently obtain secondary information on districts' forestry 
activities. For instance, a senior Ministry of Forestry official acknowledged that under regional 
autonomy his department cannot depend on districts to report their forestry activities, such as 
the promulgation of district PERDAs, and is forced to find ways to obtain information, 
including through media reports. 512 
While in the past, radios have been used to disseminate government information to 
otherwise inaccessible areas, in the study districts radio programs appear to have not been 
particularly utilised for disseminating district government information on forestry. Radios arc 
mostly used for entertainment purposes, rather than more serious issues. 31 i 
7.3.3 Direct citizen action 
Some citizens, at least, have evidently seen the accountability mechanisms at the district 
level, both formal and informal, as inadequate or ineffective in some cases, leading them to 
report their concerns to a higher level. For instance, district government's slow response to 
"" The guestbook in the UPTD office of Bulungan, for instance, was filled with numerous visits of 
these types of reporters. 
"
0 A 1970s TV advertisement of a type of aspirin called Bodrex showed the aspirin attacking the 
source of headache, thus Wartawan Bodrex is an analogy of several individuals "attacking" 
officials at the same time. 
'
11 For instance, interviews with DPRD members of Bulungan, B-L-1b and B-L-2 and interview 
with the Bupati of Kutai Baral, K-G-*) 
'
12 Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Forestry, N-G-9 
"'Interview with a senior district forestry official, K-G-1c; personal communication with NL. an 
indigenous forester residing in the district, 21 May 2007 
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citizens' reports on an allegedly manipulated RHL activity led a concerned citizen to inform the 
provincial district attorney directly and request that the issue be investigated (Kaltim Post, 21 
May, 2003b). 
However, the extent to which this has taken place appears to vary between districts as well 
as between individuals: 
"The people of Kutai Barat tend to speak out more than the people of Kutai 
Kertanegara, where everyone just keeps quiet." (interview with K-G- I 7b) 
Such cases were atypical during the New Order period; thus the freer environment to 
express opinions and aspirationss1• post-reformasi has clearly reached the regions. While Kutai 
Barat may be more open than some of the other districts in East Kalimantanm, which is at least 
partly influenced by the character of the district's leadership, the relatively more established 
NGO activities and the "extended" role of the media, similar trends of reporting to higher level 
authorities are also reported nation-wide in the media. 
7.4 Conclusions 
Several major conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. First, the legal-regulatory 
framework does provide for formal and institutionalized district-level downward accountability 
mechanisms, that is, for constituencies to directly and indirectly (the latter through the DPRD) 
place a check on the powers of district governments. The fact that they exist, however, does not 
by any means guarantee that they are effective. There are clearly institutional, practical, as well 
as behavioural problems associated with the institution of accountability, in this case, the 
DPRD. Second, other forms of formal accountability involving vertical state actors (judiciary, 
national agencies) have proven to be not only relevant to but also useful in affecting the 
accountability of public actors in the districts. The fear of legal sanctions is of utmost 
importance. Third, the ways in which bureaucratic accountability has been applied over the 
districts' leaders and public officials in the two district regimes have raised issues of both 
effectiveness and fairness. Fourth, the flouri shing of civil society has allowed for its increasing 
role in providing informal mechanisms of accountability. Although accountability avenues 
through this group show some promise, however, the limitations associated with this group are 
an important issue. 
' " The Indonesian word is aspirasi, meaning political and social desires. 
'" As reflected in the frank interview with the Bupati. This openness was also suggested by the 
district government building an area, in the government precinct, specifically for the population 
to stage protests and demonstrations. 
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7.4.1 Formal downward accountability mechanisms, 
implemented but ineffective 
Both districts demonstrated formal downward accountability processes; for example, the 
Bupati called to account by the DPRD, the latter as the citizens' representatives. According to 
Mulgan (2003), Schedler (1999), and Grant and Keohane (2005)'s definition, however, they are 
incomplete accountability processes. They do not consist of all of the accountability clements, 
but are mostly limited to the answerability dimensions and lacking the enforcement or 
rectification dimensions. 
These formal accountability processes appear to be weak and constrained, and held mostly 
to satisfy formal requirements, rather than to rectify substantive issues. A lthough forestry is 
important to both study districts and is associated with many problems, the Bupatis' 
performance with respect to forestry was accepted by the DPRDs without difficulty. 
Thus, mechanisms of formal downward accountability exist but are not effective. They are 
ineffective due to various problems. These have included the imbalance of actual power 
relations between the executive and the legislative; DPRD's lack of capacity; and DPRD's own 
interests and motivations that override the interests of the public. 
Besides election every five years, there are no other formal accountability mechanisms to 
hold the institution of accountability, the DPRD, accountable themselves. There are no other 
mechanisms that can hold the DPRD accountable, either for their ineffectiveness or abuse of 
power (in this case by not exercising power when it was supposed to be exercised). There are no 
formal mechanisms for second-order accountability (Schedler, 1999, Appendix l ). This is 
particularly important because the DPRD, as the citizens' representatives, in turn should be 
accountable to the population. ln this regard, Ribot (2002, 2004, and 2005) suggested the 
importance of the concept of accountable representation as a sustainable and institutionalized 
form of public participation in decision making, and thus it is critical for the effectiveness of 
democratic decentralisation. 
7 .4.2 Other formal accountability mechanisms effective in 
certain issues, but not in others 
Other accountability processes, viz. the calling and holding of district officials to account 
by vertical and/or independent government agencies, the judiciary (thus horizontal 
accountability) or the Ministry of Forestry for the use of public funds (financial accountability), 
and for failures of legal compliance to laws and national policies (legal accountability), were 
also applied. These types of accountability were relevant in affecting, to some extent, certain 
forestry decisions and thei r implementation at the district level. Notably, they were effective, 
though in Bulungan only temporari ly, in terms of district governments' increased attention to 
the appropriate uses of the DAK-DR Reforestation Fund through the RHL Project. These forms 
of accountability had clear criteria both on which the accountor was assessed (deviations in the 
use of the funds) and on the sanctions (taken to court and jailed if found guilty). At the current 
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stage of Indonesia's decentralisation and democratization, these types of formal accountability 
processes appears to be more effective, and thus more relevant, than the existing formal 
downward accountability mechanisms. Accountability on issues with less straightforward 
criteria, however, such as districts' allowing illegal logging to proceed unchecked, is more 
difficult to realize through similar institutional avenues. 
District governments and officials have paid increased attention to respecting and 
following the national legal-regulatory framework. Their behaviour was notably influenced not 
only by accountability processes involving vertical agencies that were applied to them, but by 
processes applied to other distric ts. This was clear in the interviews with the Bupati of Kutai 
Barat and district officials. Therefore, these types of accountability mechanisms are 
advantageous in terms of their snowball effects; their effects have not been limited within the 
district(s), in contrast to accountability processes within a district whose effects are confined to 
that particular district. 
7.4.3 Bureaucratic accountability: issues of ineffectiveness and 
unfairness 
The ways in which bureaucratic accountability was applied to the leadership of the districts 
and to district officials were not only limited in terms of their effectiveness in improving 
forestry outcomes, but also in allowing the processes of accountability to go unexamined. 
In the two case study districts these state-sanctioned types of accountability processes were 
only applied to district officials, who reported directly to the Bupati. Although the ultimate 
responsibility for the implementation of the RHL Project rests with the Bupatis, both of the 
Bupatis were untouched. When formal downward accountability mechanisms within the 
districts are ineffective, how can the Bupatis, through formal institutional avenues, be made 
accountable, other than through elections held every five years, for their lack of performance in 
the RI-IL Project? The Bupati administratively reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs, but the 
Project is within the Ministry of Forestry's regime. The not-so-amicable working relationship 
between the two ministries (Chapter 3), was complicated further by the difficulties in 
determining the criteria for the Bupatis' performance. Such problems signalled the difficulties in 
the application of bureaucratic accountability between the Bupati and the Minister of Home 
Affairs and were therefore unlikely to occur. 
Bureaucratic (and performance) accountability of district officials to the Bupati in Kutai 
Barat resulted in mixed outcomes. In one case, it led to efforts for improved implementation of 
the district's RHL Project. In another case, the sacking of a senior forestry official, which 
ostensibly was associated with his poor performance in curbing illegal logging, did not affect its 
inc idence; illegal logging continued re latively unchecked in the district. 
Importantly, within a decision-making sphere in which officials work under frequent 
interventions from higher-level district functionaries, bureaucratic accountability is not likely to 
correctly identify the actors actually responsible for the decisions. Worse yet, bureaucratic 
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accountability was demanded by officials at the higher level in the district hierarchy, and 
therefore by those who often intervened in the decisions of district officials being held 
accountable. 
Moreover, the lack of independence of the district unit responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of district projects or policies carried out by district units, the Bawaskab, due to 
its limited operational capacity and its position in the districts' hierarchical structure, allow for 
bureaucratic accountability processes within the districts to go unexamined both in terms of the 
issue and in terms of who is really accountable for a decision. With the exception of 
administrative courts, there are no other grievance procedures for district officials who are being 
held accountable, let alone procedures that guarantee independence from those demanding 
bureaucratic accountability. Thus, in the context of the two study districts, this type of 
accountability relation raises the questions of impartiality and due process. 
7.4.4 Informal accountability mechanisms potentially 
promising, but with serious caveats 
By contrast, informal grass-root driven mechanisms of downward accountability, including 
citizens' protests and reports channelled through the media and NGOs, are potentially 
promising, and especially in consideration of the challenges that render formal downward 
mechanisms within the district, ineffective. Citizens' reports to the DPRD, made either directly 
or indirectly through the media, instigated hearings between the DPRD and district forestry 
officials in Kutai Barat District. Communities' expectations that the DPRD mediate in 
burgeoning conflicts associated with timber fees helped the DPRD members recognize the 
social implications of district logging licenses. In Bulungan District these conflicts led to the 
DPRD initiating an assessment on the Bupati 's policy on district logging licenses. Although the 
hearings between the DPRD and district offic ials were limited both in frequency and in 
outcome, and the DPRD's initiative to assess the district policy on logging licenses was opposed 
by the Bupati, rendering it ineffective, these processes nevertheless show the DPRD's attempts 
to call the executive and its units to account. Similarly, community demonstrations and protests 
staged at the Bupati's office, community reports to the DPRD, and simultaneous media reports 
of the conflicts between the preman and communities (Chapter 6) forced the district government 
to take action, albeit only those within its powers. Thus, social institutions or civil society have 
p layed an indirect role in pushing for downward accountability processes. 
Citizens ' reports - directly and/or fac ilitated by NGOs - to the provincial district attorney 
or the police as well as media reports were sources o f valuable initial information in 
investigations on allegations of financial deviations of the RHL Project. To the extent that this 
initial information did lead to actual investigations into the implementation of the Project, c ivil 
society also played an indirect role in pushing for district forestry offi cials' accountability to the 
Ministry of Forestry through judicial processes. 
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Although these informal forces show potential in pushing for both downward and upward 
accountability, there are serious pitfalls. These have notably included the "co-optation" of the 
media by district governments through the purchase of space in the media that enabled district 
governments to bolster their PR campaigns; the high cost of gathering stories through true and 
balanced fact-finding that results in the publishing of stories without adequate checks; and the 
extended role of the media beyond responsible journalism in instances of the media's 
provocative acts over an issue. Furthermore, the opportunistic behaviour of certain media 
personnel and NGOs (section 6.1.2), ultimately may erode the public trust towards their role. 
District government officials and the public alike are already showing some disregard of some 
of these actors. 
7.4.5 The realities of accountability in the case study districts 
under decentralisation 
With all the impediments to the implementation of accountability mechanisms within the 
district and in holding the Bupati to account to vertical state agencies, accountability as a 
concept critical in democratic decentralisation remains quite remote and highly limited in the 
context of Indonesia's decentralisation. The only realm of activity where accountability is really 
being applied and effective is associated with financial accountability, where deviations in the 
use of project monies are scrutinized and have resulted in legal proceedings. Financial issues, 
however, are only part of a much larger suite of responsibilities in forestry. Although financial 
accountability does have some relevance to performance and political accountabi lity 
(demonstrated in the RHL Project of Kutai Barat, where the prospect of sanctions led to efforts 
for improved management) (Brinkerhoff, 2001 ), those entrusted with the management or the 
administration (directly or indirectly) of forests have not been held accountable in any sense that 
addresses the breadth of understanding and in particular, the assumed usefulness of downward 
accountability discussed in Chapter 2 and Appendix 1. 
While it is not possible to compare this study' s results directly with the processes of 
accountabi lity prior to decentralisation, it is nevertheless clear that accountability - let alone 
downward accountability critical in democratic decentralisation - has not been a strong feature 
of decentralisation as it has played out in the two case study districts. No one is actually being 
held responsible for forestry policies or decisions, or for the implementation of these decisions. 
No one is actually being held respons ible for the continuing and unchecked exploitation of 
forests for short term gain. The outcome is precisely the continuing and unchecked exploitation 
of forests for short term gain. 
There are many actors involved in one way or another in forest exploitation - and enjoying 
its benefits - from community level to district officials to the Bupati to the DPRD, police, 
judiciary and others described in Chapter 6. In particular, because the institutions of 
accountability , both formal (DPRD, police, judiciary) and informal (NGOs, media), have 
serious limitations in the form of "rogue" involvement, it is almost virtually impossible to 
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implement the concept of accountability, making it almost irrelevant in this kind of situation. 
This research therefore raises the fundamental question of whether accountability can be held 
"to account" in this context. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
The Indonesian economic and political turmoil in 1997-98 led to reformasi and 
subsequently.the promulgation of a multitude of policies and laws. Among those that had wide-
ranging implications were the two decentralisation laws, Law 22 of 1999 on Local Governance 
and Law 25 of 1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Centre and the Regions. The provisions of 
these laws were not only in stark contrast to the legal-regulatory framework under the New 
Order, but the sweeping changes were also to be applied immediately, within two years after 
their promulgation. The scale and the abruptness of that change are reflected in the term given 
to Indonesia's approach to decentralisation, "Big Bang Decentralisation" (Hofman and Kaiser, 
2002:1). 
The two laws transferred authority in many sectors to district governments and boosted 
the ir fi scal capacity. The extensive transfer of powers also encompassed the natural resource 
sector, including forestry. These far-reaching insti tutional changes have had an enormous effect 
on the dynamics of forest governance at the district level. Ini tially, as in other areas, high hopes 
and expectations were placed on decentralisation reforms in the forestry sector. However, prior 
to their officially effective implementation, changing local dynamics on the one hand, and 
national dynamics, on the other, were already at play. It soon became clear that decentralisation 
in Indonesia's forestry sector was not as straightforward and clear-cut as its theoretical 
underpinnings. 
8. 1 What the thesis set out to do, and how 
The main aim of this thesis was to understand Indonesia's decentralisation in the forestry 
context. It set out to answer the core research question: has Indonesia's decentralisation led to 
improved fores try governance at the district level? To answer this research question, three 
research sub-questions were addressed: 
I. What is the extent and nature of Indonesia's decentralisation in the forestry sector, 
formally and in practice? 
2. How have district decisions that affect forest use and management been shaped in the 
context of decentralisation? 
3. What have been the principal consequences of Indonesia' s decentralisation, and of 
decision-making about forests at the district level under that decentralisation, for patterns of 
forest use and management? 
The approach which this research adopted in addressing these questions was introduced in 
C hapter 1 and explored in detail in Chapter 2. It is based on the framework suggested by 
Agrawal and Ribot ( 1999) utilizing the analytical dimensions of actors, powers and 
accountabi lity, adapted to accommodate both Manor's (1999) focus on institutional analysis and 
that of Larson (1999) on power relations. This chapter summarises the results of the research, 
showing the dynamics of forestry politics in the two study districts under Indonesia's 
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decentralization, the utility of the research framework, and identifies areas for further 
investigation. 
8.2 Principal research findings 
The first objective of the research, to understand the extent and nature of Indonesia's 
decentralisation in the forestry context, is addressed through investigating which and how 
various powers have been devolved to district governments. Significant forestry powers - in the 
beginning of the decentralisation initiative - were devolved to district governments. These were 
the authority to issue district licenses and to apply district-level forestry charges. Districts 
immediately applied their new powers to create district forestry regimes. 
Although districts' new powers were significant, they were nevertheless partial; the legal-
regulatory framework did not provide a comprehensive devolution of powers in forestry, but 
allowed for a balance of powers among levels of government to be maintained. The major 
powers, relating to the designation and use of forest lands, continued to be under Central 
control. This is consistent with the theoretical emphasis on the need to maintain the balance of 
power among levels of authority, as unlimited powers over natural resources may lead to 
excessive exploitation of the resource (Appendix I). 
However, for at least some elements of the Centre, the devolution of forestry powers has 
been largely a reluctant process. This is reflected in the inconsistent and contradictory 
provisions between the decentralisation legal-regulatory framework and the forestry-specific 
legal-regulatory framework. While the decentralisation law has provided for the extensive 
transfer of powers, including forestry, to districts, the forestry law has limited the transfer of 
forestry powers to districts. Not only were those forestry powers that were specifically devolved 
through the forestry legal-regulatory framework limited, but the means by which the powers 
were transferred were also insecure, as they were specified by a weak form of legal instrument. 
The ambiguities of the position of district legal instruments vis-a-vis the Centre's legal 
instruments in the legal hierarchy contributed to the complications. 
The consequence was a bitter power struggle between the Centre - the actor relinquishing 
powers - and the district governments - the locus of decentralized powers - and the wielding of 
de facto powers at the district level. The struggle resulted in the Centre clawing back powers. 
However, for a period, districts had been able to put in place coping strategies to continue to 
benefit from decentralisation in forestry. Moreover, districts' authority in other sectors - which 
remains in place - continue to enable them to make decisions that significantly affect forests. 
The second objective of the research, to understand how district decisions that affect forest 
use and management have been shaped, was investigated in the context of the nature and extent 
of the decentralisation of forestry powers that have actually taken place. Notably, district 
forestry decisions have been significantly determined by the interplay of the legal regulatory 
framework (Figures 2.1 and 2.2), the power relations between the Centre and the district 
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governments (vertical relations) (illustrated in Figure 2.1) and by the power relations at the 
district level (horizontal relations) (shown in Figure 2.2). 
The perception of the insecurity of forestry powers transferred to the district level has 
significantly determined the trajectory of district forestry. The reluctance on the part of (some) 
Central actors to transfer formal forestry authority to districts has affirmed local governments' 
distrust of the intentions of the Centre to relinquish powers. At the community level, the past 
experience of forest exploitation that marginalized the local population had already sown the 
seeds of distrust among the local population towards the existing forestry policies, and fostered 
an attitude of "getting the benefits from our forests while we can". District-level forestry-
decisions have been strongly motivated by the related goals of boosting district development 
and of ensuring that the benefits of forest exploitation should accrue more to the district 
population than to those in more distant areas. Hence, district governments have implemented 
strategies to filter national policies, selecting those they could use to their advantage and 
ignoring those that were not advantageous, and have manoeuvred to achieve these objectives. 
Besides these organisational objectives, however, personal interests have also been at play 
in district forestry decision-making. Decentralisation has resulted in the redistribution of powers 
at the district level. District governments have gained authority and local non-state actors have 
assumed the positions of centrally-connected actors previously powerful in district forestry 
operations. Thus, personal as well as organisational interests have largely determined the actual 
power relations between and among district actors, which in tum have affected district forestry 
decision-making. 
Power relations have affected the distribution of benefits to the local level. While 
communities have benefited from decentralization, other more powerful actors have been able 
to reap a larger proportion of the benefits. 
The legal-regulatory framework set up formal accountabi lity mechanisms, but it is clear 
that the practice of the democratization process illustrated by the two case study districts is still 
in its infancy. Serious limitations have constrained the accountability relations and processes in 
Indonesia's forestry sector. This ineffectiveness is inherent in the formal institutional 
mechanisms of accountability, in the actual power relations between those accountable and the 
formal institutions of accountability, and the power relations between those held accountable 
and those who were and should be actually accountable. 
Informal accountability mechanisms have increasingly played a greater role in the checks 
on districts' powers. However, they too have serious pitfalls associated with the advancing of 
personal interests over organisational objectives. 
These findings inform the third research objective, viz. the principal consequences of these 
decentralization dynamics for patterns of forest use and management. The short-term economic 
focus of the major actors - at least in the first few years of decentralisation - has resulted in the 
continuing (perhaps accelerated) exploitation of forests in the case study districts. 
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8.3 Detailed findings 
The details of the principal findings above are elaborated in the following sections. 
8.3.1 Findings related to the first research sub-question 
The first two research sub-questions posed in Chapter 2, and repeated below, are 
interconnected. Therefore, it is not possible to discuss the findings of each of the research 
questions in isolation; the main findings related to each sub-question, and elements common to 
each, will be discussed. 
The first research sub-question, "What is the extent and nature of Indonesia's 
decentralisation in the forestry sector, formally and in practice?", has been answered by 
examining the legal-regulatory framework underpinning the decentralisation process, and how 
the process has actually been manifested in practice. 
The legal-regulatory framework for decentralisation in forestry 
The legal-regulatory framework for Indonesia's extensive decentralisation underpins all 
three major types of decentralisation: political or democratic decentralisation, fi scal 
decentralisation, and administrative decentralisation. Law 22 of 1999 specified the election of a 
Bupati by the district legislative body (DPRD), whose members in turn were elected by the 
citizens of the district. Subsequently, the superseding decentralisation law (Law 32 of 2004) 
provided for the direct election of Bupatis. Law 25 of 1999 and its superseding version, Law 33 
of 2004, gave a much greater authority o ver fiscal expenditures to district governments, as well 
as the opportunity but at the same time, the responsibility, to generate the ir own revenues. 
Higher percentages of revenues derived from natural resources, including forestry, are now 
enjoyed by district governments. In terms of administrative decentralisation, Law 22 of 1999 
transferred the authority over many services, including education, health, and infrastructure 
from the Centre to districts. Forestry administration, according to one provision in Law 22 of 
1999, with the exception of conservation areas, was also handed over to districts. However, 
there was one provision within the very same law that could make the interpretation of the locus 
of forestry authority somewhat ambiguous. As in other Indonesian laws, the provisions of Law 
22 of 1999 were general: their specifics and implementation were determined through 
government regulations and other lower regulatory instruments. 
Within Agrawal and Ribot's framework of actors, powers, and accountability (Chapter 2), 
Indonesia's legal-administrative arrangement for decentralisation has given district 
governments, as the locus of decentralisation, broad decision-making powers in forestry and has 
instituted formal downward accountability relations and mechanisms. District governments 
were explicitly au thorized to formulate district regulations (PERDA) while their forestry 
authority implied that they, with the exception of conservation areas, could make and enforce 
forestry decisions. Out of the four types of decision-making powers set out in Agrawal and 
Ribot's framework (that is , the powers to make rules, to make decisions, to implement and 
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enforce decisions, and to adjudicate issues arising from decisions), the power of adjudication 
was the only one not transferred to district governments, but remained with the judiciary, a 
responsibility of the Centre. There are no other formal mechanisms for adjudication at the 
district level. The election of Bupatis and the DPRD, as well as the periodical and issue-specific 
formal accountability processes of the Bupatis to the DPRD provided for the institutionalisation 
of downward accountability mechanisms. The analysis of Indonesia's legal-administrative 
decentralisation framework around the dimensions of actors, power, and accountability as 
adopted in this thesis, therefore, suggests that the Indonesian case in the context of forestry 
conforms to democratic decentralisation. 
However, forestry decentralisation has followed a path that has been significantly 
determined not only by the legal-administrative arrangement of decentralisation, but also by the 
legal-regulatory underpinnings in the forestry sector. The districts' authority in forestry 
administration as specified by Law 22 of 1999 was complicated by the provisions of the 1999 
forestry law (both laws have the same status in the legal hierarchy) which affirmed the Centre's 
authority over forests and forest administration. Because Law 22 of 1999 was the product of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, while the Forestry Law was the Ministry of Forestry's, these 
inconsistencies have not only shaped the trajectory of decentralisation in forestry, but have also 
shown the relevance of power relations between sectoral interests. 
The extent and nature of forestry decentralisation in practice 
From the very beginning, two opposing "forces" have determined how forestry 
decentralisation has actually played out in practice. One is the transfer of power away from the 
Centre to districts; the other is that of reaffirming power at the Centre. The results have been a 
struggle for power between district governments and the Centre, the pendulum of power 
swinging back to the Centre, and districts manoeuvring over the clawing back of power until it 
was no longer possible to find room for further manoeuvres. There are various motivations 
underlying the struggle over forestry powers. The districts' diminishing power in forestry, 
however, does not mean that districts no longer adopt policies that affect forestry. On the 
contrary, other broader decentralized forces allow district governments to make forestry-related 
decisions that may have major implications for forests. 
Power struggle between those relinquishing powers and those receiving powers 
Decentralisation in forestry has been imbued with tension between the district government 
and the Centre's unit responsible for forestry, the Ministry of Forestry. Interpreting the 
decentralisation law to their own advantage, district governments established district legal-
regulatory frameworks and/or made decisions that conflicted with the new forestry law. 
Districts did obtain authority to issue small-scale logging licenses immediately prior to the 
promulgation of the decentralisation laws, which was part of a series of the Ministry of 
Forestry's policies to appear in a favourable light to localities and communities. With 
decentralisation, districts' power was now boosted beyond control. With the euphoria of 
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reformasi still in full swing at the time, and pressured by the broader decentralisation exercise, 
the Ministry of Forestry initially had to jump on the bandwagon. Through a ministeria l decree, 
the Ministry first devolved one of its most important and sought-after authority: logging 
licensing. Although this authority may seem insignificant in comparison with the breadth of 
forestry administration, its implications have been, on the contrary, enormous. This was the first 
time district governments had gained the authority to issue logging licenses encompassing the 
entire range of licensing scales, from small to large-scale licenses. The district governments, 
however, now empowered by the decentralisation law, not infrequently abused their authority. 
They issued numerous licenses, sometimes deliberately in areas with active centrally-licensed 
rights when they were not supposed to, ignoring technical and ecological requirements, or 
turning a blind eye to operational violations. 
The Ministry of Forestry took steps to halt the exercise of the d istricts' perceived or actual 
(depending on whose interpretations) authority. Both study districts, however, continued to 
issue licenses despite the Centre's directives to stop them. Districts thus used national policies 
that were advantageous to them, but ignored those that were not. The lack of explicit elucidation 
of the status of ministerial decrees or directives vis-a-vis PERDAs in the legal hierarchy 
provided the district governments with the justification to interpret their authority in ways 
tailored to their own needs. Kutai Baral, for example, promulgated a comprehensive PERDA on 
forestry which resembles the forestry Jaw in text, except that the authority and powers of forests 
and forest administration were placed in the district's hands, rather than in the Centre's. 
Struggles over powers between district governments and the Ministry of Forestry were thus 
unavoidable. 
The clawing back of powers and districts' coping strategies 
The struggle over powers resulted in the withdrawal of districts' logging licensing 
authority through a national regulatory instrument which held a higher status in the legal 
hierarchy than a PERDA (Chapter 3). Despite its revocation by a much stronger and thus 
uncontested national regulatory instrument, this clawing back of authority was nevertheless 
contested by those losing powers. District governments sought strategies to continue district-
sanctioned timber operations. Two years after the withdrawal of this authority, the two study 
districts could still manage to find ways to evade the restrictions imposed by the Centre and 
district governments continued to provide administrative services for district-induced timber 
operations. 
The struggle over powers was also evident between the district and the provincial 
governments. By 2007, the powers of the provinces have been somewhat augmented (through 
the superseding decentralisation Jaws), and the Ministry of Forestry retains its firm grip on 
forestry powers (see Appendix 5: Postscript) . This reaffirms the Ministry of Forestry's in tention 
to retain control over forestry. 
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Partial forestry decentralisation and districts' broader powers of decentralisation 
In summary, while decentralisation of significant powers did take place in the forestry 
sector, the ceding of forestry powers has only ever been partial (Appendix 2). This situation is 
consistent with that promoted by advocates of decentralisation who assert that effective 
decentralized NRM requires the balance of powers between authorities. However, after only a 
few years, the formal authority that had been devolved was withdrawn (Chapter 3). 
In addition to the decentralized powers in forestry administration per se, when they were 
devolved, the districts' increased powers in the fiscal domain were a critical driving force in 
district forestry policies or decisions. The opportunity and responsibility which districts 
received to secure their own funding to finance their development, as well as their increased 
share of forest revenue transfers, only reinforced districts' motivation and raised their incentives 
to exploit forests to fill their coffers. Although the districts' forestry authority in logging 
licensing had already been revoked, they continued to be responsible for and authorized to raise 
Locally Generated Revenues (PAD). District governments continue to augment revenues as 
much as they possibly can, often from activities that directly or indirectly affect forests. Because 
districts now concentrate on activities outside the forestry sector in pursuit of PAD, the Ministry 
of Forestry now has more difficulty in controlling strategies that can affect forests, such as 
setting up plantations and carrying out mining, because they are officially beyond the forestry 
sector. 
Therefore, decentralized authority in other sectors and in the fiscal arena has given and 
continues to give district governments powers that affect forests. Despite the withdrawal of their 
authority over forestry, the districts' broader decentralized powers in other land-related sectors, 
and their continued authority over and pursuit of PAD, have meant that their powers over the 
fate of forests within their jurisdiction arc far from diminished. On the contrary, the effects of 
decentralisation on forests are now more difficult to curtail, because no particular actor or 
organisation is specifically responsible to oversee extra-sectoral pressures on forests. 
In this regard, although the district governments have lost the battle over the control of 
forest administration, they have not lost the war. These findings partially answer the first 
research sub-question. 
8.3.2 Findings related to the second research sub-question 
The findings that specifically relate to the second research sub-question, "How have 
district decisions affecting forest use and management been shaped in the context of 
decentralisation?'', revolve around the dynamics of horizontal relations between and among 
actors operating in the districts (Figure 2.2). These findi ngs centre on the types of actors who 
have emerged and/or were able to capitalize on the opportunities presented by decentralisation, 
the dynamics of the power relations between and among district actors in the two districts, and 
the flow of benefits from decentralization in the forestry sector. 
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External actors, donor and development agencies, academics, and NGOs to a certain 
extent, have been able to influence both policy processes and their substance. However, there 
has been notable incoherence between the district forestry policies that these actors were able to 
influence and the actual forestry practice in the districts. 
The de facto powers wielded by the districts, through their ability to manoeuvre around the 
national legal-regulatory framework, show the importance of power relations between district 
governments and the Centre, affirming their significance in the vertical interactions of actors 
(Figure 2. 1 ). Thus, the district governments' increased formal authority in forestry and their 
general broader authority under decentralisation were not the only factors determining forestry 
decisions and operations in the districts. This research also shows that horizontal power 
relations, that is, the power relations between and among actors at the district level (Figure 2.2), 
also significantly influence the ways in which district forestry decisions have actually been 
implemented or manifested. Power relations in the districts are complicated and, in some cases, 
subtle. The implementation of district policies or decisions over forestry were often negotiated, 
challenged, compromised, and abused by other actors. 
Power redistribution and the shift of power concentration 
Under decentralisation, there has been a shift in the power holders among non-state actors. 
Prior to decentralisation, power was centred on one major actor, the HPHs; decentralisation has 
not only shifted the locus of power but has also distributed it among other actors. 
The emergence of local and regional actors 
Decentralisation has thrown into prominence the emergence of powerful local or regional 
timber actors. These actors were not new in the districts, but during the New Order period, they 
had been overshadowed by HPHs. A similar pattern is evident in both case study districts: these 
local or regional timber actors now have exerted more influence on districts' forestry decisions 
and/or operations vis-a-vis other actors. The local and regional entrepreneurs have won the 
support of both the district governments and the local people because of their local roots and 
local orientation. 
Shift of the concentration of power 
The new actors in the timber arena have not only flourished under decentralisation, but 
have taken over the roles of the centrally-linked actors, the HPHs, that were influential in the 
past. Both district governments and the local people preferred local and regional entrepreneurs 
because they provided an alternative to forestry entities with central links. In an environment 
where HPHs were being perceived as "villains", any other alternatives were seen as preferable. 
From the perspective of district governments, local and regional businesses were more useful 
than centrally-licensed HPHs because of their "contributions" (Chapter 6) to district political 
processes. District governments, either directly or indirectly, pressured HPHs to make way for 
the operation of district licenses. 
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In Kutai Barat, one actor in particular, the preman, gained influence and power in forestry. 
This actor obtained this overt power through conniving operations and force, or coercion. 
However, the preman 's true and covert power was obtained from its Jinks with and support 
from powerful state-actors who were actually supposed to be responsible for ensuring that the 
actor's operations did not transgress legal boundaries. 
Distant actors at play 
Although decentralisation has seen the rise of local and regional timber actors, this does 
not, however, eliminate the participation of other external and new actors. Notably, Malaysian 
and Jakarta-based investors had provided the capital, technical expertise, and marketing 
networks for the operations of district licenses. District governments' preference for district-
licensed operators over centrally-licensed HPH operators appears to have not been due to the 
HPH operators being an external actor per sc, but has been associated with the extent of control 
that can be exercised over them. Because HPH holders were operating in the districts through 
central licenses, district governments had less control over them compared to over any other 
timber operators whose licenses were issued by the district governments. Thus, in addition to 
the timber operator's ability to provide capital, technical expertise, and marketing networks, 
district governments' major considerations for involving a particular timber operator has been 
the level of control they can exert on the timber operator, rather than its local or regional 
features. 
The strengthening of local elites 
Decentralisation as it has progressed in the two districts has seen the strengthening of local 
e lites. The elites that could capitalize on the opportunities presented by decentralisation were 
not only limited to local entrepreneurs, but also extended to district functionaries (that is, the 
executives and legislature) . It was not uncommon that district functionaries themselves held a 
district logging license or were closely associated with timber operations under district licenses. 
At the community level, sub-district or village functionaries and adat leaders led negotiations 
with timber interests representing their communities and often abused their function for 
personal gains. District information about projects passing through sub-district and village 
officials, rather than being disseminated to villagers, was not infrequently kept from villagers so 
that these officials could take advantage of the projects themselves. 
The increasing influence of communities 
Although the local people prefer local or regional actors compared to HPHs, this did not 
necessarily mean that they bowed to timber interests operating in their areas, as they had to in 
the past. Communities were now more confident in articulating and defending their demands. 
Development initiatives or establishments that impacted on lands were now often challenged if 
they did not secure the consent of affected communities. These concerted actions were often 
facilitated by NGOs. Whether communities' consent was ultimately reached through fair or 
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manipulative negotiation processes is outside the scope of this research and requires further 
examination. However, the findings of this research do imply that communities were gaining 
increasing influence in forestry operations and land-related developments vis-a-vis other actors. 
The strength of communities' influence in district decisions was tested in a case involving 
the preman. The communities' action was the driving force that led the Bupati to act on the 
district' s behalf against this powerfu l actor. The communities' extended demonstration at the 
Bupati's office in protest against the force of the preman ultimately compelled the Bupati to 
take action, after a peri od of premanism in the district, by reporting the preman to higher 
authorities in Jakarta. 
This is one arena in which decentralisation in Indonesia differs from the decentralisation 
experiences of other countries. Under Indonesia's decentralisation, two forces have been at 
work in parallel, those of reformasi and decentralisation. Villagers and district officials, when 
referring to communities' actions like demonstrations or articulating the ir demands, referred to 
reformasi; but in the context of districts' authority, they referred to regional autonomy (that is, 
decentralisation in the Indonesian context). Thus, it is difficult to separate the forces of 
reformasi from those of decentralisation in the dynamics of power relations in the district. 
Horizontal power relations (Figure 2.2) thus critically determined districts ' decision-
making. This finding has partially answered the second research sub-question. 
The flow of benefits 
The involvement of Malaysian and Jakarta-based investors and local and regional eli tes in 
district logging regimes brings the issue of the distribution of benefits to the fore: whether or not 
a decentralized regime benefits local people, and how much? Decentralisation has been assumed 
to advantage local-level beneficiaries through increased local partic ipation (Chapter 2 and 
Appendix 1 ). 
In both the operations of district logging licenses and the implementation of the DAK-DR-
Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project (RHL Project), district forestry policies that attempted to 
secure the flow of benefits from forestry for local communities were hindered by factors 
associated with the imbalance of power relations among the relevant ac tors. In addition to the 
lack of and access to capital and the Jack of technical capacity, communities also lacked the 
networks to obtain information and to carry out timber marketing. Thus, although licenses were 
targeted to benefit communities, many of them were ultimately actually .issued to companies 
bearing the name of local entrepreneurs. Local entrepreneurs often acted as brokers or 
contractors, who late r worked in partnership with regional, Jakarta-based or Malaysian 
investors. The benefits from timber explo itation were thus distributed along a chain of actors, 
communities, brokers and contractors, and capital holders. 
Studies that have specifically investigated the flow of benefits of district-induced logging 
operations at the district level in East Kalimantan have come to a simi lar conclusion, viz. that 
communities were not the group of actors who had received the largest share of the benefit 
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(Limberg et al., 2004; Engel and Palmer 2006). The findings of this research support the results 
of these studies. It is very important to note, however, that local communities in the case study 
districts nevertheless did benefit directly more from forest sector activities under 
decentralisation compared to those in the New Order period. 
On the state side, forestry rents have also been redistributed - they now accrue formally to 
the district as PAD (locally generated revenues), as increased shared revenues, and as informal 
dues to district officials. The case studies demonstrate that the actual process of allocation and 
distribution of shared revenues can be as important as the size of the allocation itself. In this 
regard, certain officials in the central agencies that determined the actual process of allocation 
and distribution of districts' share of forestry-derived revenues have also benefited informally. 
Similarly, the imbalance of power relations within communities has concentrated the 
benefits of the RHL Project around village elites. At least in the first few years of 
decentralisation, village elites often used their posi tion or authority to capitalize on the 
opportunity to reap benefits for themselves. Although the magnitude of the DAK-DR (the 
Reforestation Fund allocated to districts) was extremely significant, there was nevertheless not 
enough money for everybody to share. This prevented the participation of the entire rural-
agriculturalist population; only a limited number of farmer groups participated within one 
community in any given year. Information on the Project was disseminated through sub-district 
or village heads, enabling the withholding of the information from vi llagers. Furthermore, 
village elites had other advantages: in the case of penghijauan (regreening/afforestation), 
re latively more access to capital to start up a project; in the case of reboisasi (reforestation), a 
wider network which made them more "visible" to the contrac tors. Thus, the first years of the 
Project saw more participants with family ties to village elites. Moreover, the disbursement of 
funds through representatives of the farmer groups (pengurus) was often non-transparent and 
often led to the embezzlement of funds. 
8.3.3 Findings related to both the first and second research 
sub-questions 
Four of the major findings of this thesis are intricately connected and relate to both the first 
and second research sub-questions. These are: the underlying motivations for control over forest 
resources and district decisions; accountability; vertical power relations; and the issue of trust. 
Motivations for control over forestry administration and for district 
forestry decisions 
One broad emerging theme in both the implementation of decentralisation and in the 
dynamics of district decision-making within that decentralisation has been control over the 
administration of forests. "Struggles over resources lie at the centre of struggles over power" 
(Peets and Watts, 2004: xiv). Many of the tussles over the authority of forest administration 
have been essentially a struggle over control of the resource and the associated formal and 
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informal benefits. State actors, at the district, provincial, and national levels, carry their own 
organisational and individual interests and motivations. 
Local nuance of motivations: district development and local beneficiaries 
District governments' struggle to maintain their forestry authority as well as their 
motivations in making forestry decisions were addressed in this thesis in the context of district 
governments' organisational objectives or motivations as well as those of the individual state 
actors. At the organisational level, first and foremost, the ultimate objective of district 
governments' policies and decisions has been and still is local development. Both districts, as 
most districts in the Outer Islands, were and are struggling with the lack of even the most basic 
infrastructure and services, hence districts' focus on development. Within this overarching 
objective of district development, district governments' have sought to manage their natural 
resource endowment to (I) use the resources for financing district development, and 2) to ensure 
that the benefits from their utilization accrue to districts' citizens or communities, rather than to 
external actors. Gaining and maintaining forestry authority would allow districts to adopt and 
implement policies that support these goals. 
The research conducted for this thesis finds consistency in these motivations through 
observations that districts consciously exerted extra efforts to ensure that they received their 
rightful share of forestry revenues as determined by the fiscal decentralisation legal-regulatory 
framework . Tensions between district authorities as the loci of decentralisation and Central 
Ministries as the actors relinquishing power have also occurred in the fiscal arena. 
Corruption 
At the level of individuals, districts' gaining authority over forestry administration opened 
up avenues for district officials to pursue their personal interests. It also meant that district 
officials accrued more powers in determining the ways in which their personal interests were 
articulated. For instance, the authority to issue district logging licenses opened up opportunities 
to extract rent over the entire process of their issuance. Districts' responsibility to administer 
logging operations provided them with the powers to determine the "under-the-table" terms that 
affect whether their administration would be followed through smoothly or hindered. 
Similar lines of argument, embodying personal interests as one of the underlying 
motivations of the struggle over forestry powers, are also legitimate at other levels of 
government. They are not meant to downplay the genuine concerns of individuals at all levels of 
government over the sustainability of the forests, as there are clearly officials that are strongly 
committed to appropriate management and use of forests. However, the Jess well-intentioned 
motivations need to be recognised as they are relevant to understanding the extent and nature of 
Indonesia's decentralisation in forestry and in district forestry-related decisions. 
In addition to the objectives of local development and securing local benefits, officials in 
both districts underlined the importance of maintaining a "conducive" environment in the 
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districts , referring to a socially and politically stable environment. Community blockades and 
seizures of logging equipment in the earlier period of reformasi and regional autonomy, 
horizontal conflicts among and within communities associated with both the operations of 
district logging licenses and the RHL Project, and previous ethnic violence in West and Central 
Kalirnantan, all have shown the potential for people's power to "go bad" in terms of its effects 
on district development and the social cohesion of the district community. 
The actions of district officials, however, through their opportunistic behaviour, were not 
infrequently contradictory in terms of this need of maintaining social order in the district. 
Forests were used not only as a cash cow for district development, but also as a source of 
informal rent. The issuance of district licenses and thus forest exploitation was, at least partly, a 
response to community desires to derive benefits from "their" forests. However, the excesses 
triggered by this policy, as well as district elites' opportunistic rent-seeking behaviour, 
promoted horizontal conflicts and undermined social cohesion and social order. 
Districts' increased authority in forestry under decentralisation, through the issuance of 
logging licenses and in the implementation of the RHL Project, has increased the powers of 
district officials vis-a-vis other actors. Their formal powers have allowed them to determine the 
terms by which their exercise of powers affect the operations of timber interests. These te rms 
have involved informal transactions between district officials and district-licensed as well as 
centrally-licensed timber operators. 
Control over the resource thus has been intricately linked to the prevalence of informal 
exchanges between district officials, in return for administrative favours or the relax ing of 
technical or operational procedures. Patterns of reciprocity at the local level have been 
documented in other contexts, for instance, over logging access in the Solomon Islands (Bennet, 
2001), in Sumatera's forest frontier prior to decentralisation (McCarthy, 2006) and in other 
devolved forestry regimes (Robbins, 2000). A similar pattern is evident in the two study 
districts. 
Local corruption has been prevalent under the decentralized regimes in both districts. It has 
not only been prevalent, involving many different actors, but has also become "acceptable" to 
local actors as, in terms of local development, the benefits were perceived to stay in the districts. 
The incidence of local corruption has been perceived as acceptable particularly when it is 
compared to the incidence and perceived magnitude of corruption over local resource benefits 
by distant (central) actors in the past. In this sense, corruption in the context of decentralisation, 
as it has progressed in the two case study districts, has become institutionalized (Robbins, 
2000). However, in contrast to Robbins' argument suggesting that local corruption may not 
necessarily affect SFM negati vely, the findings in the case study districts suggest that it 
seriously li mits the effectiveness of checks on the powers of district authorities, therefore 
limiting their accountabil ity. Insofar as accountability is assumed to correlate positively with 
SFM, then local corruption hinders SFM. 
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Power relations between district governments and the Central Government in the fiscal 
domain have also led to corruption within some Central Government agencies. It has been 
argued elsewhere both that decentralisation increases local corruption, and that it decreases it 
(Appendix l ). This research shows that decentralisation has led to incidences of corruption 
involving state actors on both sides of the equation, as both the "giver" and the "receiver". In 
the case study districts in the context of decentralisation, corruption has occurred not only 
between non-state actors and state actors, but between state actors. Further, corruption has 
occurred not only at the local level, but also between state actors at the district level and with 
state actors at a higher level. Thus, this research provides no evidence that decentralisation 
necessarily reduces the level of corruption. 
Accountability 
The issues of decisions motivated by rent-seeking and the struggle for power over forest 
resources raise questions about the effectiveness of the transfer of powers to local authorities 
and whether the exercise of those powers can result in positive outcomes for NRM. The 
discussion now turns to accountabi lity, a dimension assumed to be critical in the effectiveness 
of decentralisation and in achieving its assumed benefits. The discussion includes the formal 
accountability framework and its actual implementation. 
Formal accountability relations and mechanisms 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is clear that significant forestry powers were, in practice as 
well as principle, devolved to districts under Indonesia's decentralisation. According to Agrawal 
and Ribot (l 999), the effectiveness of democratic decentralisation is determined by downward 
accountability, that is, the accountability of those receiving powers (under decentralisation) to 
their constituencies. They proposed that downward accountability determines whether or not 
democratic decentralisation in the natural resource sector can achieve its stated aims in natural 
resource management. The issue of accountability is therefore relevant to both the first two 
research sub-questions. 
Several major conclusions around the accountability dimension discussed in Chapter 7 can 
be drawn from the thesis. First , the legal-regulatory framework does provide for formal and 
institutionalized district-level downward accountability mechanisms, that is, for constituencies 
to directly and indirectly place a check on the powers of district governments. These 
mechanisms have included the election of the Bupati (prior to 2004, by the DPRD; from 2004, 
directly elected by district constituencies) and both periodic and issue-oriented accountability 
processes. The existence of these mechanisms, however, does not by any means guarantee that 
they are effective. Accountability processes outside elections so far have been largely 
ineffective. These processes were often merely window dressing and were held to satisfy legal-
regulatory requirements, rather than to provide real checks on the exercise of power of elected 
and assigned public officials. There are institutional, practical, as well as behavioural problems 
associated with accountability processes that have prevented them from holding elected and 
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appointed district officials accountable for forestry decisions and for the implementation of 
these decisions. Among the limitations were imbalanced power relations between those being 
held accountable and the DPRD, which is the principal formal institution of accountability 
(section 7.4.1 ); these limitations were associated with the DPRD's lack of capacity, with its lack 
of independence, and with its own interests that took precedence over the interests of the 
citizens that it represents. 
Other forms of formal accountability involving vertical state actors (judiciary, national 
agencies), that is, upward or horizontal accountability, depending on which definition is 
followed, have proven both relevant to and effective in holding the accountability of public 
actors in the districts. However, there are at least two important constraints associated with 
these forms of accountability as applied in the two case study contexts. One is the limited 
breadth of the issues over which the accountor has been held to account. The issue for which the 
accountors were held accountable was only in the financial realm (that is, financial 
accountability), where the criteria by which the accountability was measured, were clear; the 
accountability process involved the judiciary (that is, legal accountability). The other involves 
the difficulty of conducting accountability processes that are based on a complete assessment of 
the situation. Accountability processes based on insufficient understanding and considerations 
of bureaucratic power relations in the districts may result in the erroneous identification of who 
should really be held to account for particular actions. In the two districts, bureaucratic power 
relations have often curtailed the discretion of public officials, through the interventions of 
district functionaries at higher levels in the hierarchy. 
Fear of sanctions of legal proceedings did appear to act as a deterrent, at least temporarily, 
in the case study districts. District officials, recognizing that their actions were now more 
closely watched and scrutinized, put more effort into improving implementation of the Forest 
and Land Rehabilitation Project. However, the limiting factors inherent in district-level 
bureaucratic accountability relations (that is, appointed district officials being held accountable 
by higher ranks in the district who essentially appointed them), where dominant actors often 
intervene in and impose certain decisions, and where there are no impartial and independent 
means or institutions of second-order accountability mechanisms (Appendix I), can result in 
misdirected accountability processes. Focusing accountability processes on the wrong target not 
only raises the issue of fairness, but is unlikely to support efforts for the improved management 
of natural resources. 
Civil society and informal accountability mechanisms 
With the limitations of the existing formal accountability mechanisms, informal 
accountability mechanisms can become more relevant. Informal accountability mechanisms 
involving civil society show potential, but there are also problems with them. Communities and 
ordinary citizens, directly and/or with NGOs, NGOs, and the media, have all taken part in 
informal accountability processes. Citizens' demonstrations at the Bupatis' and the DPRD's 
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offices, reports to the Bupatis, the DPRD, or vertical state agencies (police, judiciary), and 
citizens making press releases, are all increasingly common in the districts. However, the 
opportunistic behaviour of certain segments of civil society (some NGO and media actors), the 
incidence of which has increased under decentralisation, has begun to erode the trust of district 
officials and the public in their role. This risks lowering the effectiveness of that segment of 
civil society that has been and/or is truly committed to the cause. 
Despite the potential usefulness of informal accountability mechanisms, however, 
sanctions for the inappropriate exercise of forestry powers remain fundamental to the 
accountability of district officials . It was the legal sanctions that were ultimately most effective 
in the case studies. 
Vertical power relations between district governments and the 
Centre 
The fear of legal sanctions for breaching national legal-regulatory instruments, as in the case of 
sanctions for inappropriate behaviour or decisions, also to a large extent determined district 
decision-making. In the end, despite their strategies and manoeuvres, distric t governments had 
to largely bow to national directives and policies. Local power relations and other motivations 
did underlie district decisions. However, formal district decisions were ultimately determined by 
vertical power relations (Figure 2.1). For instance, although district forestry decisions were 
driven by the desire to advance district development and to favour local beneficiaries, district 
governments in the end had to officially stop issuing district licenses. This was largely caused 
by the fear of legal sanctions for breaching national legal instruments. The Ministry of Forestry 
took steps to ensure that districts' powers were put in check by initiating processes that would 
bring defiant districts to· court. This outcome was thus associated with the effectiveness of 
formal accountability mechanisms through the legal system. 
Trust 
The insecurity of their forestry powers drove district governments to rush to implement 
decisions which were indiscriminate in their impact on the forest resources. Districts' authority 
in the issuance of logging licenses had been provided through a Ministerial Decree, which could 
be revoked at any time. Because there was no certainty or reasonable guarantee that this power 
would last, district governments made sure that they used that window of opportunity while it 
lasted. The issue of the security of the transfer of powers (Conyers, 1990, cited in Ribot, 2005; 
Appendix 1) has thus been relevant not only in the extent of decentralisation, but also in the 
implementation of forestry decisions under Indonesia's decentralisation in the two districts 
studied. 
However, the issue is not merely that of the level of certainty associated with the security 
of powers transferred. In the two case study districts, the issue has been much deeper: it has 
involved trust , or lack thereof. District governments did not trust the Centre's intentions, 
particularly whether or not the Centre would continue to allow power over a lucrative resource 
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to be maintained at the local level. Those affected more directly, the local communities in and 
around forest areas, did not trust that the authorities would continue to allow them access to 
forest resources. The high level of distrust between actors has motivated both the district 
governments and local communities to either promote, be directly involved in, or at the very 
least be indifferent to, indiscriminate uses of forest resources. The subsequent withdrawal of 
districts' powers over timber licensing, and the consequent diminished opportunities for 
communities to be more directly involved in commercial timber utilization, reinforced this 
distrust. 
8.3.4 Findings related to the third research sub-question 
The third research sub-question, "What have been the principal consequences of 
Indonesia's decentralisation, and of decision-making about forests at the district level under that 
decentralisation, for patterns of forest use and management?", is answered from a qualitative 
perspective, as noted in section 2.1. 
Governments and individuals have chosen to battle each other for short-term economic 
gains from the forests because the longer term authority over them was not clear or uncertain. 
Thus, the ways in which decentralisation was implemented, and district governments' and local 
peoples' articulation of that decentralisation, resulted in the lack of attention to the state and 
sustainability of the resource. The focus on who should maintain control over the resource has 
diverted all levels of governments' energy and resources, from looking after the forests and 
managing them appropriately to strugg ling over their control. Furthermore, district 
governments' lack of attention and motivation to maintain the resource led to inadequate 
reinvestment of the proceeds from forest extraction into the resource, either for res toring the 
resource or for mitigating further degradation of the resource. As a consequence, patterns of 
resource use and management have continued to be unsustainable and unchecked. 
In some ways. the districts' emphasis on revenue generation and their limited commitment 
to reforestation resembles that of the Central Government's forest management pre-
deccntralisation. The command and control under the New Order, the hierarchical 
administrative structure, and the relatively unambiguous Central authority, although in many 
ways not effective, were to a certain extent able to install and enforce national policies that were 
directed towards SFM. Under decentralisation, the breakdown of the forestry data collection 
system, the Jack of effective connections in the administrative structure, and the failures of 
accountability and control mechanisms in decisions that affect forest exploitation - where other 
means of control such as command and control were also absent - have created a vacuum in 
forest management. As a result, whi le everybody wants to be in charge of this resource, no 
particular actor is effectively in charge of it. 
The findings of this research highlight the continuing role of the Centre as an important 
player in local forestry governance under Indonesia's decentralisation. The Centre, including 
relevant minis tries and vertical agencies such as the judiciary, has an important role as the actor 
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who (1) relinquishes power - to whatever ultimate extent; 2) determines whether accountability 
mechanisms could work; and 3) can initiate efforts to build the trust of local governments and 
the local people. All of these, as they significantly shape decentralisation and its 
implementation, ultimately determine the outcomes of decentralisation for forests. To date, 
those outcomes in the two case study districts, have been almost completely adverse, in terms of 
the management of the resource. An obvious question, as discussed further below, is the nature 
of the outcomes from decentralisation as it matures beyond the early stages which this research 
was able to examine. 
8.4 The utility of the research framework and areas for 
further research 
The research framework developed here was a modified version of that put forward by 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) (Chapter 2) that emphasized the three dimensions of actors, powers, 
and accountability. Agrawal and Ribot focused on four broad types of decision-making: the 
powers to make rules, to make decisions, to enforce and implement those decisions, and to 
adjudicate decisions. The research framework of this thesis, however, incorporated Manor's 
institutional approach ( 1999) of analysing the political, fiscal, and administrative transfer of 
powers, and - in the analysis of the power dimension - Larson's (1999) emphasis on power 
relations between and among actors. While Agrawal and Ribot's framework emphasized the 
importance of downward accountability, this thesis also analysed other forms of accountability 
relations (Figure 2.2). 
8.4.1 Findings that relate to the research framework 
The research framework developed here has proven useful in relation to the research 
objectives of analysing decentralisation and the dynamics of local governance in the context of 
that decentralisation. These are discussed below. 
Forestry and extra-sectoral domains 
With respect to the implications of decentralized powers for forest resources, in some cases 
decentralized authority in other sectors or other domains, in addition to those in forestry, is as 
important as decentralized authority in forestry. Because of the influences of these external 
forces, focusing solely on powers transferred or not transferred in forestry will tend to be 
misleading. Thus, observations of these other sectors and/or domains are essential, in order to 
understand the full scope oflndonesia's forestry in a decentralized context. The framework used 
here followed Agrawal and Ribot's approach in terms of also observing powers devolved in 
other domains that affect the four broad types of districts' forestry decision-making powers. The 
findings of this research, for instance, specifically underlined the importance of fiscal powers 
and the powers transferred in other land-based sectors, such as plantation and mining. ln the 
fiscal decentralisation domain, the ways in which the money is actually allocated and 
transferred to local governments are as important as the amount of the transfer itself. 
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De facto versus de jure powers 
The analysis of both de jure and de facto powers within the research framework adopted 
has proven valuable in analysing the dynamics of local government decision-making under 
decentralisation. Observing the legal-regulatory framework in term s of the de jure powers ceded 
to the locus of decentralized power is not adequate for achieving an understanding of the 
dynamics of decentralisation relevant to the study districts. De facto powers, in some 
circumstances to a significant extent, determined how decentralisation has played out at the 
local level vis-a-vis national directives. The tussle for power between levels of government, and 
districts' ability to filter and manoeuvre around the national-regulatory framework in 
implementing their decisions, despite the withdrawal of districts ' authority, shows the extent of 
de facto powers at play. The wielding of de facto powers has been a notable featu re in the two 
study districts in cases where de Jure powers disadvantaged the districts, and to the extent that 
they could be manipulated or avoided. Thus, de facto powers can be as relevant as, if not more 
relevant than, the de jure powers specified in the legal-regulatory framework. 
The relevance of de facto powers in district decision making needs to be emphasized in 
relation to Agrawal and Ribot' s framework, which did not explicitly distinguish between de 
facto and de jure powers of local authorities. This raises the question of whether the wielding of 
local authorities' de facto powers to make decisions and enforce those decisions qualify, within 
a decentralisation context, as decentralisation, or whether it would be better characterised as 
another phenomenon. Manor (1999:8) refers to this phenomenon as "inadvertent 
decentralisation", where the actual powers gained were greater than intended. It also raises the 
issue of whether the wielding of local authorities' de facto powers hinders the effectiveness of 
decentralisation, in terms of local authorities' accountability; this is discussed below. 
Accountability 
The research framework placed other accountability relations, in addition to downward 
accountabil ity, at the centre of the accountability analysis; this has proven valuable in 
explaining the decentralisation dynamics at the local level. The two case study districts 
exemplify not only the ineffectiveness of formal downward accountability, but also the 
effectiveness, albeit in a limited fashion, of other accountability relations. This suggests the 
relevance of accountability relations in general, and not only downward accountability, in local 
authorities' decision-making within the context of a decentralized regime. 
However, the issues surrounding accountability relations in the study districts also raise 
other questions. First, in an early phase of democratization and where other forces are strong, is 
the concept useful in the context of natural resource decentralisation? The complexities of both 
forestry issues and intertwining interests make it impossible for accountability to be applied in a 
true (that is, not only rhetorical) and complete (including the sanction or rectification 
component) manner, and render the concept in its simplest sense not on ly ineffective, but often 
out of touch with reality. The misdirection of the forms of accountability that were effectively in 
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force, leading to "barking up the wrong tree", was prevalent in the case studies. This raises the 
question of the relevance, or the degree of usefulness, of the commonly-understood concept of 
accountability at this point in time and in these particular contexts. 
Second, downward accountability of local authorities is often demanded for decisions that 
are not necessarily supportive of SFM. For instance, communities desired the extension of 
district logging licenses. The issue of trust, in the transfer of power and in the articulation of that 
power in terms of providing improved access to resources, is an important factor determining 
the kinds of forestry decisions communities expect from local authorities with decentralized 
powers. Thus, accountability criteria are not necessarily consistent with those related to the 
appropriateness of resource use. 
The usefulness of the research framework 
The findings of this research confirm that the research framework developed here is a 
useful refinement of those from which it draws, which better informs the dynamics of 
decentralisation and local decision-making in the forestry context. 
First, it is clear that the power dimension needs to include de facto forms of power, in 
addition to de jure powers. What powers are manifested in practice can be very different from 
those for which the legal framework has provided. Second, a more specific focus on the 
financial powers of those receiving decentralized powers is essential, in particular in terms of 
the processes involved in financial transfers. Third, an analysis of decentralized powers in other 
land-based sectors can illuminate how they affect forestry governance. Fourth, the fram ework 
affirms the critical role of accountability relations beyond just down ward accountability . Fifth, 
while power relations per sc are an important element, the underlying motivations and factors 
behind the dynamics of power relations are critical in determining the trajectory of 
decentralisation and local decision-making. The analysis of power relations becomes more 
important in the light of the ineffectiveness of the accountability relations. These factors and 
motivations include organisational interests as well as personal interests associated with forestry 
rents, and trust. It would be informative to explore the utility of the framework developed here 
in other situations, which might also assist in further refining it. 
8.4.2 Areas for further research 
This research was conducted over a period that corresponds to the first six years of 
Indonesia's decentralisation. The most obvious question it raises is whether the outcomes and 
trends found here will continue as they have during this initial period, or whether they will 
change as the decentralisation process and associated insti tutions mature. This research suggests 
that this issue is particularly important for the case of accountability mechanisms. which were 
not particularly effect ive in linking local governance with more sustainable patterns of resource 
use and management. The work conducted for this study suggests that, as discussed above, 
further theoretical development, to better understand and assess the role of various forms 
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of accountability in explaining the direct casual-effect linkages between local-level governance 
and NRM, is particularly important. Refining and testing such an improved research framework 
over the next phase of Indonesia's decentralisation, as well as investigating decentralisation 
elsewhere, would be very informative. 
Even under the current situation where centralized forestry administration has been firmly 
reestablished (see Appendix 5: Postscript), and the roles of district-level institutions clarified, 
local forestry governance will remain crucial for the management of Indonesia's forests. This 
research has identified the suite of reasons for the district- and community-level decisions which 
have continued the unsustainable management of the case study districts' forests under the first 
several years of decentralisation. This understanding could inform future studies, which could 
thus focus on the incentives and motivations more likely to lead to district decision-making that 
would be more favourable for forest sustainability. Given the continuing pressures on 
Indonesia's forests (due to, among others, the prevalence of illegal logging, section 6.4), and the 
high level of international interest in assisting Indonesia to address forest loss and degradation 
because of its global significance (for example, Australian Government, 2007), such research is 
both urgent and important. 
The research suggested here would help underpin, for example, the development of 
effective arrangements for avoiding deforestation and enhancing carbon sequestration. Only 
with adequate understanding of the dynamics of decision-making at the local level, and their 
interactions with higher levels of governance, will initiatives intended to conserve and sustain 
Indonesia's forests be successful. 
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Appendix 1: Decentralisation: from 
development to NRM 
The centralization of state power and centralized control over development activities have 
been notable features in most developing countries since the early 1950s (for instance, 
Rondinelli and Nellis, 1983; Mawhood, 1987; Slater, 1989; Manor, 1999).s16 During this period, 
planning and administration were centralized to allow for coherent policies for the use of 
resources in the promotion of rapid industrial growth (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). 5 17 The 
benefits of concentrated industrial investment in a few major metropolitan centres were 
expected to "trickle down" and spread throughout the nations' economies, generating income 
and alleviating poverty (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). As many of these nations had then only 
recently gained their national independence, centralized control and planning were considered 
essential not only for their economic development but also for maintaining national unity 
(Rondinelli et al. 1983; Mawhood, 1987; Manor, 1999). Furthermore, leaders of the then new 
emerging Asian and African countries were considered heroic figures, which "translated into 
faith in the concentration of state power" (Manor, 1999:23). The already limited attempts of 
some form of decentralized systems in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s were 
overshadowed by the prominence of the development discourse that took on a centralized 
approach (Manor, 1999). 
During the 1970s, the basic premises of centric-approaches came into question in terms of 
efficient and equitable development (Rondinelli et al., 1983 ). It was recognized that 
development requires a basic transformation of social , economic, and political structures that 
enables the poor to help themselves to increase their productivity and incomes. The 1970s and 
1980s thus saw a shift in the directions and priorities of development; decentralisation became 
an important policy objective in developing countries' pursuit of a more equitable economic 
growth and for meeting the basic needs of the poor. This period also saw a move in emphasis on 
public participation, local leadership, and decentralisation of administrative authority 
(Rondinelli e t al.1983 ; Cohen and Peterson, 1996). Since the late 1980s, there has been a 
growing interest in political decentralisation, or devolution), reaching Southeast Asian 
governments in the 1990s (Schuurman, 1997; Manor, 1999; Blair, 2000; Turner, 2006). 
Decentralisation has since been used as a means to promote both development and democratic 
objectives (Hutchcroft, 2001). 
'
10 Mawhood (1987) points out that during this period, local governments were not forgotten 
altogether, although they did not have meaningful powers. 
"' However, Slater (1989:518) contends that in third world countries, particularly African 
countries and others such as China and Cuba, central planning was not a feature. He 
emphasizes the need to avoid conflating central planning with the centralization of state power. 
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A 1-1 The concept of decentralisation 
The term decentralisation means different things to different people, and is often used in a 
number of different ways and in different contexts (Fesler, I 965; Conyers, 1984; Devas, 1997; 
Hutchcroft, 2001). Since this study is focused on decentralisation and local government 
decision-making in forestry in the context of a decentralized regime, it is necessary to 
understand the concept and the various ways in which the term is used. 
In general , decentralisation refers to "the dispersal or transfer of decision-making power to 
individuals or parts of an organisation at lower levels in a hierarchy" (Frerks and Otto, 1996:9). 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) define decentralisation as "any act by which a central 
government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-
administrative and territorial hierarchy." It is a political phenomenon involving both 
administration and government. Decentralisation is also about "the redistribution of power, 
resources, and administrative capacities through different territorial units and across local 
groups" (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001: 487). Other definitions of decentralisation have included 
privatization, that is, the transfer of authority to the private sector (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; 
Litvack and Seddon, 1999). The meaning of decentralisation includes the reversal of the 
concentration of administration at a single centre and the granting of powers to local 
government (Smith, 1985). Regardless of the recipients, however, all forms of decentralisation 
share one common feature: the shifting of power and resources away from the central 
government (Schneider, 2003). Accordingly, the concept of decentralisation is often discussed 
in terms of each of political, administrative, fiscal, and market (that is, privatization) 
decentralisation. 
As this thesis is concerned with the dispersal of power and authority and the relinquishing 
of resources by the central government to sub-national governments, privatization is not 
discussed any further. Political decentralisation is often referred to as democratic 
decentralisation (Smith, 1985; Manor, 1999; Blair, 2000; Ribot, 2004) or devolution (Ribot, 
2004); the thesis uses the term democratic dccentralisation.m This appendix focuses on the first 
three forms of decentralisation, democratic, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation, and their 
relationship to democratic decentralisation. Administrative, fiscal and democratic 
decentralisation are closely interconnected and should be present if democratic decentralisation 
is to succeed (for instance, Manor, 1999). 
Democratic decentralisation (discussed in Chapter 2), involves "the transfer of resources 
and power and often, responsibilities, to lower level authorities which are largely or wholly 
autonomous, and which arc democratic in some way and to some degree" (Manor, 1999:6). This 
"' Democratic decentralisation enables democratic local governance to occur (Blair, 2000) or 
local governments to operate in a more responsive, accountable, participatory, and effective 
manner (Center for Democracy and Governance, 2000). 
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definition thus includes several fundamental criteria. The first is that the territorial subdivisions 
of the state must have a measure of autonomy or self-governing capacity (Smith, 1985). The 
second is that the authorities with decentralized powers must be democratically recruited and 
make decisions according to democratic procedures (Smith, 1985). Here, the necessary 
elements accompanying the transfer of powers are financial resources and administrative 
capacity, and critically, accountability mechanisms (Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; 
Blair, 2000). 
Administrative decentralisation, also referred to as deconcentration (Parker, 1995; Ribot, 
2004 ), occurs when powers arc devolved to local branches of the central government, including 
local technical line units of central ministries or appointed administrative extensions of the 
central government (Smith, 1985; Parker, 1995; Manor, 1999). The transfer of powers is 
classified as administrative decentralisation when the actors to whom the powers are transferred 
are accountable to their superiors in a hierarchy (that is, upward accountability). Although they 
are primarily responsible to the central government, their functions may result in citizens 
demanding some accountability (that is, downward accountability). 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) treat accountability as a central dimension in distinguishing 
democratic from administrative decentralisation. The transfer of powers falls within democratic 
decentralisation when the actors receiving powers are accountable to their constituents (Agrawal 
and Ribot, 1999; also Ribot, 2004). This downward accountability is the critical element 
distinguishing democratic decentralisation from administrative decentralisation, although some 
upward accountability may remain. However, Hutchcroft (2001) asserts that there is always a 
complex interplay between administrative and democratic decentralisation. Thus, while the 
thesis does not focus specifically on administrative decentralisation, the discussion in most of 
the chapters includes it as a result of the new administrative responsibilities of sub-national 
governments and the changes in the administrative structure. 
Fiscal decentralisation refers to the ceding of influence over budgets and financial 
decisions (World Bank, 1997), which include the transfer of authority to raise revenues and 
make expenditure decisions, from the central government to sub-national authorities (Parker, 
1995; Manor, 1999). Fiscal capacity, on both the revenue-raising and the expenditure sides, is 
necessary for the effective implementation of decentralized functions (for instance, Manor, 
1999). Revenues can be generated locally or obtained through the transfer of funds from central 
government. Local revenues can be raised through a number of ways, including the ability to 
tax, charge fees, or impose fines. The transfer of funds can be effected in block grants or 
through schemes of revenue sharing among levels of governments. 
A 1-2 The promises, challenges, and outcomes of 
decentralisation initiatives 
The latest global wave of decentralisation is being carried out to achieve a multitude of 
objectives. Manor (1999: 1) suggested these objectives are: 
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a means to shift power away from the commandist state which has resulted 
in rent seeking and corruption; a possible alternative to the failures of central 
government in addressing rural poverty; a means for the need to better utilize 
local knowledge at the grass roots; a way to deepen democracy where 
interest groups can organize, compete and assert themselves; a way to 
transfer expensive tasks to others lower down; a substitute for 
democratization at the national level and as a safe way to acquire legitimacy 
and grass-root support. 
Other important objectives have been to maintain political stability associated with 
demands for local autonomy or to prevent national secession (Smith, 1985; World Bank, 2000), 
or as an ideological principle in itself (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). 
Decentralisation has been justified on the grounds of greater efficiency, equity, 
participation and responsiveness of government to citizens (Parker, 1995; World Bank, 1997; 
Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000; Smoke, 2003). These expectations have been based on 
the premise that decentralisation brings government closer to citizens, both spatially and 
institutionally (World Bank, 1997). By "bringing the state closer to the people", that is , 
bringing popular voice through broad participation into policy-making, where individual 
citizens, private sector organisations and other groups in civil society have their say, 
decentralisation is believed to promote democracy (World Bank, 1997:110). Decentralisation is 
also believed to improve resource allocation, efficiency, accountability and equity by "linking 
costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, 1988 cited in Larson, 
2003b, 212). It is argued that local governments know the needs and desires of their 
constituents better than national-level authorities, and thus can be more responsive, while at the 
same time greater contact between citizens and local governments make it easier for 
constituents to hold local leaders accountable (Smith, 1985; World Bank, 2000). By building 
popular participation and accountability into local governance, government at the local level can 
be more responsive to citizens' desires and more effective in service delivery (Piriou-Sall, 1998; 
Smoke, 1999; Blair, 2000). 
However, evidence suggests that in many cases, decentralisation has fallen short of these 
assumed benefits, in terms of both development performance and governance (for instance, 
Azfar et al. 1999; Rowland, 2001; Conyers, 2003; Smoke; 2003). ln a comprehensive review of 
the decentralisation literature, Frerks and Otto (1996) show that empirical evidence for the 
successes and failures of decentralisation in development has been at best ambivalent, 
suggesting that experiences of decentralisation on the whole are disappointing and frau ght with 
problems. For instance, Crook and Manor ( 1998) found some promising improvements in 
development performance in India, but much Jess in Bangladesh or Ghana (Crook, 2003). Other 
positive reports tend to be based on instances of success that are largely anecdotal (Smoke, 
2003); and Wunsch (199 l :433) says, rather pessimistically: 
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With all the diverse efforts in diverse countries, and good theoretical reasons 
to expect improved performance through decentralisation, it is discouraging 
and more than a little perplexing that the results so far have been rather 
dismal ... In general, decentralisation efforts have not significantly expanded 
participation, improved project effectiveness or efficiency, increased 
orientation to rural needs and wants, expanded financial support for local 
projects and services by rural dwellers, reduced central costs or redistributed 
wealth, status or power to the rural areas. Planning systems do not seem any 
more responsive to rural priorities, local institutions of governance any more 
viable, and projects any more likely to be sustained after donor and/or 
central state investments have been completed. 
Rather than improving accountability, Hausman and Stein (1995, cited in Schneider, 
2003), argue that decentralisation may result in less effective monitoring and accountability of 
government at the local level. They suggest that formal and informal institutions of 
accountability at the local level, from the legislature, judiciary, civil society organisations, and 
the media are smaller in scale and more recently established, compared to those at the national 
level. Thus, they are less likely to be as effective as those operating at the national level. 
Critics emphasize the caveats of decentralisation, which include the ways in which it 
functions and its benefits arc distributed. Among the most notable criticisms are: I) the 
reluctance of central authorities to forgo power and resources; 2) the likelihood of decreasing 
quality of public services due to lack of capacity of local decision-makers; 3) an increased 
likelihood of elite domination; and 4) an increase in the incidence and distribution of local 
corruption. 
Because it is about the relinquishing of power and resources, one of the most common 
problems in decentralisation initiatives has been the reluctance or resistance of central 
authorities to carry out the meaningful devolution of powers and distribution of resources (for 
instance, Ribot et al., 2006). Decentralisation initiatives often have li ttle to do with the assumed 
long-term gains of decentralisation, but rather, with short-term calcu lation of political benefits. 
The Philippines and Argentina (Eaton, 2001) and some African countries (Olowu, 2003) 
provide ample examples of decentralisation initiatives that have subsequently resulted in the re-
shifting of some of the decentralized power back to the Centre. 
Local governments' lack of capacity is one constraining factor that prevents 
decentralisation from achieving its desired results (for instance, Azfar et al., 1999). 51 9 Local 
governments' capacity, including human capital, that is, the quality of locally-based civil 
servants, and physical capital, such as technology and equipment used at the local level, are 
often much less established than those of their counterparts at the national level (Fi tzbein, 
1997). The argument over local-level lack of capacity has provided the justification for some 
,,. Capacity refers to the "ability, competency, and efficiency of sub-national governments to 
plan, implement, manage and evaluate policies, strategies, or programs designed to impact on 
social conditions in the jurisdiction" (Shafritz, 1986 cited in Azfar et al., 1999) 
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countries not to devolve meaningful power and resources to the local level (for instance, 
Sandbukt, 1995; Ribot, 2004). 
One of the perceived pitfalls of decentralisation is that it is prone to elite domination (for 
instance, World Bank, 1992 cited in Frerks and Otto, 1996:3-4; Olowu, 2003; Capistrano and 
Colfer, 2005). This includes dominance of elite groups, dominance of elites within groups, and 
dominance of elites within government, and is particularly an issue in the decentralisation of the 
natural resource sector (Carney, 1995; Kaimowitz et al., 1998). Although the power, 
knowledge, and networks of local elites are useful to sustain democratic decentralisation 
(Olowu, 2003), the problem of elite capture520 can disadvantage certain segments of the local 
population. Thus, it is those with power and wealth that is likely to take the most advantage of 
new opportunities arising from decentralisation, as in the case of the resource allocation of the 
Bolivian forestry sector (Kaimowitz et al., 1998; Pacheco, 2005). 
Smith (I 985) points out that local institutions are as susceptible to manipulation by elite 
groups as the central government, allowing clientelism to be maintained in local contexts 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). However, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) assert that the 
relative capture of local and central governments are determined by a variety of factors that 
would need to be substantiated empirically. For instance, Crook (2003) reports that, in Ghana, 
the already limited level of participation and representation of the poor in public decision-
making eventually faded and remained to benefit mostly the local elites. 
Decentralisation has been associated with the increased distribution and incidence of 
corruption. While corruption is not the main focus of this thesis, the issue often emerged in the 
interviews and in media reports. For the purposes of this thesis, corruption is defined as "the use 
of public office for private gain" (Bardhan, 1996 cited in Goudie and Stasavage, 1998: 11 5) or 
" the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain" (Shleifer and 
Vishny, I 993 cited in Goudie and Stasavage, 1998: 115). Literature linking fiscal 
decentralisation and corruption mostly comprises economic models that use multi-country 
regression analysis or limited case studies of local authorities through a political science 
approach. In the former type of studies , the decentralisation of expenditure is linked with 
governance. Corruption is used as one of the various indicators of governance and measured 
through a corruption index (Transparency International, 2006). For instance, Huther and Shah 
( 1998), based on a model using multi-country data, contend that greater fiscal decentralisation 
may enhance governance quality. Similarly, de Mello and Barenstein (2001 ), also based on 
cross-country data, find fiscal decentralisation to be associated with various indicators of 
"
0 Elite capture, where "local-level elites tend to appropriate for themselves whatever portion of 
the resources that they need and to let the poor have the leftovers only" (Platteau and Gaspart, 
2003: 1688). 
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governance. Gulsun Arikan (2004), once more based on a multi-country analysis, suggested that 
fiscal decentralisation may lead to a lower level of corruption. 
Other authors have focused on in-country studies of corruption, linking it with the level of 
authority. In a study of the United States, Dincer et al. (2006) found that the incidence of 
convicted corrupt state officials was lower in states with more powers over taxation and 
expenditure decisions. However, the findings of Fisman and Gatti' s research (2002), also in the 
United States, suggested that larger federal transfers were associated with higher rates of 
conviction for state-level corruption. Fjeldstad (2001) observed that increased discretionary 
fiscal (taxing) powers of local authorities have led to corrupt practices. 
Studies linking corruption and Indonesia's decentralisation have focused on the democratic 
and administrative aspects of decentralisation, rather than on fiscal decentralisation. Henderson 
and Kuncoro (2006)'s analysis, based on quantitative analyses of firm behaviour in districts 
across Java, cautiously concluded that the first three years of local democratization in Indonesia 
(2001-2004) reduced the level of corruption at the district level. In contrast, Pramusinto {2005), 
in his study of the business sector in the district of Sidoarjo, Java, maintained that Indonesia's 
current decentralisation has not reduced the level of local corruption. 
Irrespective of the outcomes of decentralisation initiatives, decentralisation continues to be 
on the agenda of many countries, not only because of political objectives (for instance, Conyers, 
2003; Smoke, 2003) but because the alternative, centralization, is not attractive either 
(Rondinelli et al., 1984). However, there are exceptions; in her seminal work, Tendler (1997), in 
Good Government in the Tropics, using an example from Brazi l to support her case, 
convincingly shows that central government's role is indispensable in making decentralisation 
work. Thus, in contrast to decentralisation proponents who have "rolled back the role of the 
central state", Tendler has instead argued to "put the central state back in". Some analysts, such 
as Turner and Podger (2003:5) are more pragmatic, by simply arguing that decentralisation has 
been popular because "it is simply happening". 
A 1-3 Decentralisation of Natural Resource Management 
Decentralisation reforms have not only been promoted and implemented to achieve 
development and poverty alleviation objectives, but also to achieve better environmental and 
equity outcomes associated with the exploitation or management of natural resources. 
A 1-3-1 Justifications and assumptions for natural resource 
management decentralisation 
The thinking and fashion in governance for decentral isation have also been applied to the 
natural resource sector. 
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The failure of state-centric approaches of natural resource 
management 
Parallelling the nature of state control more generally, control over natural resources in 
developing countries since the colonial era that many experienced has tended to be vested in the 
central state (for instance, Repetto and Gillis, I 988; Carney and Farrington, 1998; Ascher, 
2000). However, this does not mean that these states have been able to manage their resources 
effectively; rather, it means only that national governments have had the power to allocate use 
rights over natural resources according to their priorities and interests (Carney and Farrington, 
1998; Ascher, 2000). For instance, in most developing countries, scarce resources makes it 
difficult for governments to monitor those who were given the rights to use these, often 
extensive resources, and to prevent distantly-located bureaucrats from abusing their positions 
(Carney and Farrington, 1998; Lowe, 2000). 
State control over the use of renewable natural resources has had two main effects. It has 
tended to disenfranchise the traditional users of the resources, and not infrequently, has led to 
the destruction of existing local natural resource management regimes (Carney and Farrington, 
1998). Second, state intervention has tended not to preserve the resource nor utilize it 
sustainably (Carney and Farrington, 1998). There is now a consensus among natural resource 
practitioners that state-centric approaches of natural resource management have largely failed or 
been inadequate (Repetto and Gillis, 1988; Dembner and Per!is, 1999; Ascher, 2000). The 
failure to manage natural resources sustainably, and/or the prevalence of natural resource abuses 
in many countries, has/have prompted scrutiny over not only how they have been managed, but 
by whom. 
The shifting interest to local-level natural resource management 
As in development thinking more generally, the perceived inadequacies of top-down, 
centralized approaches have created the impetus for the increasing popularity of decentralized 
governance of natural resources to local level actors or institutions. They have included the 
transfer of authority over the management of water resources (Vermillion, 1997; Brannstrom, 
2005), wildlife (IUCN, 1997; Shackleton et al., 2002; Conyers, 2002; Conyers, 2003), pasture-
lands (Mearns, 2005) and forests (for instance, Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Resosudarmo, 
2005; Colfer and Capistrano, 2005; Andersson et al. 2006; Sikor and Thanh, 2007). 
The transfer of authority over forest management and/or use has followed two major 
approaches. The first devolves some types of property rights to local institutions, including local 
communities and individuals. The second involves the transfer of formal powers of government 
to sub-national levels (of government). Both of these approaches to natural resource 
management are championed based on the premise of the values of the "local" and of the 
compatibility of " local" features with the characteristics of natural resources. These are 
explained below. 
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The values of the "local" and natural resource management 
Predominant approaches to the management and protection of natural resources have now 
embraced the centrality of the notion of local communities (for instance, Wyckoff-Baird et al., 
2000; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003/21• The features often attached to local communities are 
believed to be "compatible" with the characteristics of natural resources such as forests, which 
are often locally specific and change over time (Ostrom, 1990; Carney, 1995; Ealand and 
Platteau, 1996; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Larson, 2003, Persoon et al., 2005) 
The core notion underlying the argument for the devolution of forest management to the 
local level is the assertion that local people as the users of forests are equipped with the time 
and specific knowledge, information, and incentives necessary for successful management of 
the forests on which they are dependent (Ostrom, 1990; Carney, 1995; Ealand and Platteau, 
1996; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Larson, 2003). Knowledge and information are gained from 
an extended and close relationship between the members of the community and the local 
(physical and social) environment (see reviews by Ealand and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). 
Communities' dependence on these resources is believed to create incentives to maintain their 
sustainability (Ostrom, 1990). Because those most directly dependent on forests are local 
communities living in and around forest areas, the transfer of legal rights to local people is 
justified on the grounds that it will result in better and more equitable outcomes (see reviews by 
Baland and Platteau, 1996; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003).522 
The ingredients of decentralisation (that is, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and 
democracy), as set out earlier in this Appendix, are largely parallel with the aims of natural 
resource management that advocate the values of the "local". Locally-based NRM decision-
making is believed to speed up decision-making (Carney, 1995; Larson, 2003b), produce a 
greater sense of ownership and observance or rules and regulations (Carney, 1995; Agrawal, 
2001; Larson, 2003b). Furthermore, it is argued that local people's involvement in decision-
making can provide a better chance to include marginalized groups in influencing natural 
resource management decisions (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Larson, 2003b), thereby enhancing 
equity. 
A 1-3-2 Participation, CBNRM, and democratic local governance 
Agrawal and Ribot ( 1999) contend that the most fundamental objective of decentralisation 
is to achieve just political governance, that is, democratization, or the desire that each person 
"' See Persoon et al. (2005) for the differing perspectives on the definition of a community; 
Johnson and Forsyth (2002) define communities as groups whose solidary and membership are 
based on face to face interaction. 
m Agrawal and Gibson {1999) and Agrawal (2000) point out, however, that positive 
representations of community obscures the divergent interests and processes within 
communities, and between communities and other actors. These can affect the outcomes of 
community based NRM. 
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should have a say in his or her own affairs (also Rondinelli et al., 1983; Turner, 1999). This has 
stemmed from one important rationale for decentralisation, that is, the assumption that greater 
participation in public decision making is a "positive good in itself' (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 
475). 
The basic underlying rationale often given for decentralisation to local government and for 
devolution to local communities is participation. Thus, although these processes are different in 
terms of who receives the power (the locus of power), they are not at odds with each other 
(Piriou-Sall, 1998).52i A functioning democratic local governance, of which one criterion is 
accountable representation (Ribot, 2005), should therefore represent citizens and communities 
and is an institutionalized form of "participation by proxy" (Piriou-Sall, 1998: 13). 524 
Many decentralisation initiatives in forest resources thus have followed the rubric of 
community-based conservation, in which communities hold varying degrees of collective 
control over forests (Agrawal and Ostrom, 200 I). Attention to community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) projects has been pushed to the fore by the twin factors of the 
perceived limits of the state in safeguarding natural resources and greater emphasis on popular 
participation (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). Brandon and Wells (1992), after reviewing 23 
conservation and development programs, asserted that the weaknesses of central ized state 
policies made CBNRM a better option than centralized, top-down approaches of forest 
management. CBNRM has been recognized as a way to support rural livelihoods dependent on 
natural resources while at the same time maintaining the sustainability of the resource on which 
they depend (for instance, Poffenberger, 1994; Lutz and Caldecott, 1996). However, many of 
these are small, isolated projects that have been driven by and implemented with external 
support (for instance, Ribot, 2002; Larson, 2003b; Persoon et al., 2005), raising questions about 
both their sustainability and general izability. 
Ribot (2002) suggested that claims of community participation be treated with caution, 
based on the following considerations. Firstly, cases of meaningful devolution, that is, the 
meaningful role of communities in forest resource decisions, are rare (Fisher, 2000). Secondly, 
as Little (1994) points out, the positive linkages between participation and environmental 
improvements, have not been clearly demonstrated. Enters and Anderson (1999) challenge the 
traditional assumptions of local community participation: whether local populations are actually 
interested in and able to maintain sustainable forest resource use and conservation; the fact that 
rural communities are in reality heterogenous and often unstable (also Sihlongonyane, 200 I); 
and whether local community-based tenurial , knowledge and management systems are uniquely 
"' Others, however, such as Upreti and Shrestha (2000) and Lynch and Harwell (2002), contend 
that decentralisation can undermine community-based natural resource management regimes. 
'" Wellstead et al. (2003), however, point out that most of the literature addressing relationships 
between representation and public participation in NRM use incomplete assumptions and 
therefore problematic. 
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suitable for forest conservation. Similarly, other observers point out that local participation is 
apparently not a necessary or sufficient condition for agricultural enhancement or better forest 
use (Uphoff and Esman, 1974, quoted in Ribot, 2002; Larson, 2003b). 
Broad-based decision making, or what Ribot (2002) refers as "popular participation" is 
often hindered by the high differentiation within and among communities, such as by class, 
ethnicity, religion, gender, and vested interests. m Agrawal and Gibson (1999), in their insightful 
investigation of the concept of community in the context of natural resource conservation and 
management, propose several ways in which to observe communities' roles in NRM and 
development. These are the multiple interests and actors within communities, how these actors 
influence decision-making, and the internal and external institutions that shape the decision-
making process. 
To integrate and mediate these differences, Ribot (200 l , 2002, 2004, 2005) emphasizes the 
importance of proper representation. He argues that the shift from a community- based 
participatory approach to local government approaches represents a shift "from ad hoc and 
experimental mobilization and inclusion techniques to more institutionalized, more easily 
replicable and potentially more sustainable forms of participation through local democracy" 
(Ribot, 2002:5.). He contends that the potential benefits of participation (that is, equity, 
efficiency, and environment and development benefits) will be only be achieved if and when 
decision-making powers and responsibilities are devolved to representative and accountable 
authorities or groups. "Representative local authori ties are a means for establishing permanent -
institutionalized and therefore sustainable - and large-scale - covering whole national territories 
- popular participation" (Ribot, 2004: 17). This is where participation fits into the 
decentralisation picture. Democratic decentralisation or democratic local governance526 cntai ls: 
( 1) representative and downwardly accountable local authorities (or local governments); (2) 
who hold secure and autonomous discretionary decision making powers to enable their 
implementation (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2001, 2004). 
"' Ribot (2004) uses the term "popular participation" to distinguish broad-based participation 
from stakeholder participatory approaches. Stakeholder participation, that is, the inclusion of 
interested parties in decision making, rather than all the citizens of a specific jurisdiction, is not 
considered a popular form of participation or n;ipresentation. Stakeholder approaches, although 
they have been widely promoted and embraced by development agencies, at the same time 
have been also criticized for their shortcomings. Participatory approaches are typically applied 
to seek the inputs of local populations in a decision making process. Rather than empowering 
local communities by incorporating their voices and demands into local decisions, however, in 
practice these approaches are often manipulated and used to legitimize and impose external 
agendas. See in particular Cooke and Kothari (2001) for critiques of participatory approaches in 
development and natural resource management from various perspectives. Broad-based 
participation occurs when intended beneficiaries have a voice (Azfar, 1999). 
"
0 Blair (2000) uses the term Democratic Local Governance (DLG) to mean democratic 
decentralisation. 
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A 1-3·3 The potential and stakes of decentralisation of NAM 
By definition, decentralisation initiatives are political as well as economic processes 
because they are about the redistribution of power and resources. Natural resources have 
specific characteristics that render them more political and economic in nature, compared to 
services and infrastructure, the two major sectors often targeted for decentralisation reforms 
(Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002). These characteristics could enhance the promise of effective 
decentralisation, but at the same time could also heighten the challenges (Kaimowitz and Ribot, 
2002; Larson, 2003b). Another specific feature of natural resources is, despite their local 
characteristics, their multiple-scale effects. 
The political and economic nature of natural resources 
For the most part, natural resources are sources of income and wealth for various segments 
of the populations and for states (for example, Repetto and Gillis, 1988; Ascher, 2000). These 
characteristics therefore can have direct implications for rural poverty, local development, and 
equity. Because natural resources are critical for rural livelihoods, their redistribution of control 
through decentralisation can provide greater opportunities for increasing equity and alleviating 
poverty (for instance, Larson, 2003b). 
Transferring natural resource management responsibilities to lower level governments is 
believed to involve less cost compared to decentralisation of services and infrastructure because 
the revenue-generating properties of natural resources mean that their management could be 
self-financing (Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002). Rather than being an expenditure, control over 
natural resource rights through regulation or taxation can be a significant source of revenue for 
local government coffers (for instance, Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002; Resosudarmo et al., 2006). 
Decentralisation of control over natural resources, therefore, can be used to provide local 
development opportunities. Financial or economic considerations were observed as the most 
notable determinant of local governments' interests in forests in a number of countries (for 
instance, Kaimowitz et al., 2001; Toni, 2003). 
Natural resources can also be used to establish a more expansive patronage network and 
provide greater economic opportunities compared to other sectors (Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002). 
This was one of the distinct features of forestry in Indonesia during the New Order period (Barr, 
1998, Ross, 2001; Resosudarmo, 2002). 527 The productive nature of natural resources means that 
they can offer highly lucrative extractive opportunities. Access to the use of natural resources 
through concessions, from small to large-scale, constitutes an important base for economic and 
political power (Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002). Decentralizing control over natural resources to 
"' In broad terms, patronage is the act of supporting or favouring some person, group, or 
institution. A patronage system has different characteristics depending on the area in which it is 
practised. Generally it can be described as a system where someone in a powerful position {the 
patron) offers handouts in return for support. 
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local governments, therefore, can determine how local power relations are played out, which in 
turn can influence equity outcomes (Larson, 2003). 
The commercial value attached to natural resources makes them a potential source of rent. 
They consequently attract the interest of various actors to pursue their own objectives, in the 
forms of taxes, fees, or informal revenues (Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002; McCarthy, 2002). This 
could lead to conflict between local governments and other levels of governments over who wi ll 
capture the rents, as well as conflicts between local governments and other actors (Conyers, 
2002). 
According to Kaimowitz and Ribot (2002), the ability to allocate natural resources, 
resources which are tied intricately to local livelihoods and/or income and wealth, reflects the 
power of a particular actor. Thus, local governments' authority over access to and use of forests 
obtained through decentralisation makes local governments politically, economically, and 
socially important to the local population (Kaimowitz and Ribot, 2002). As noted in section 
A 1-2, a particularly important associated problem here is thus the issue of elite domination. 
The issue of scale 
Despite being locally specific, one feature that distinguishes the management of natural 
resources from other sectors such as services and infrastructure is their cross and multiple-scale 
effects. They include, for example, downstream effects of water use and deforestation, or 
national and global effects of deforestation and biodiversity loss (for instance, Thomson, 1994). 
The appropriate management scale therefore does not always coincide with predetermined 
political or administrative boundaries. The extent to which local populations' interests diverge 
from the interests of the larger community adds another layer of complexities in the 
decentralisation of NRM. 
This locally-specific yet multi-scale feature of forests raises the issue of subsidiarity. The 
principle of subsidiarity refers to the idea that decisions should be made at the lowest political-
administrative level where competencies exist (Follesdal, 1998). Thus subsidiarity is the 
concept behind acts of decentralisation. To what level should authority over forest management 
be devolved? Or what kinds of authority should be devolved to whom? According to Anderson 
(2000), along with empowerment, pluralism, and social capital , subsidiarity is an important 
consideration in understanding decentralisation of forest management. Subsidiarity aims for the 
effective implementation of tasks within a given policy and a hierarchical level, which 
minimizes costs and maximizes social well-being. Thus, subsidiarity can be used as a tool to 
assess the options for decentralisation efforts; to assess the capacity of levels of authority or 
entities, and to provide a comparison of responsibilities and authority to the most appropriate 
entity (Anderson, 2000). 
The principle of subsidiarity applies to decentralisation reforms in two ways. It relates both 
to the size of the jurisdiction over which powers are devolved and to the balance of powers 
among levels of authority. Studies have shown that there is an important correlation between the 
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sizes of the jurisdiction to which powers are devolved with the outcomes of decentralisation 
reforms (Agrawal, 200la; Rowland, 2001). Similarly, the balance of powers among levels of 
authority has been a critical component in natural resource decentralisation. The importance of 
maintaining the balance of powers among various levels of authority is discussed in the next 
section. 
A 1-3-4 Key elements affecting the outcomes of decentralized 
NRM 
As elaborated above, the two primary elements in democratic decentralisation are power 
and accountability. This section first elaborates the dimensions of power critical to democratic 
decentralisation, and then discusses the concept and application of accountability. 
Within the power dimension, the following elements are believed to be critical in the 
implementation of democratic decentralisation process and outcome: the nature and types of 
powers devolved to lower-level authorities, the means for the transfer of power, the balance of 
powers among authorities of power, and power relations among and between actors. 
Discretionary powers of decision-making 
Decentralisation is hinged upon the transfer of meaningful discretionary powers to the 
local level (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2004, 2005). Ribot (2004) argues that discretion 
determines the effectiveness of decentralized natural resource governance, both on the basis of 
natural resources' particular characteristics and on the principles underlying democratic 
governance. The first major reasoning revolves around natural resources' specific features 
discussed in section A 1-3-3, above. Local discretion is required in NRM to tailor to natural 
resources' spatial, temporal and social variations. Furthermore, discretion often has to be 
applied in determining the use and allocation of natural resources as they are associated with 
significant political and economic opportunities. The wealth-generating and livelihood 
opportunities associated with natural resources lead to a multitude of interested actors. Thus, 
discretion is often necessary in natural resource governance as it allows for flexible and 
informed negotiations among the multitude of actors claiming the resource. 
The second major rationale for local discretionary powers revolves around the components 
of democratic public decision making. Local-level discretion is argued as critical in natural 
resource management in the ways in which it determines local governments' responsiveness. 
Local governments' discretionary powers allow them to make decisions and take actions that 
are responsive to the needs and demands of their citizens. Citizens then can respond to local 
governments' decisions and actions. People and civil society are more likely to engage in 
activities that aim to influence local government decision-making if local governments arc able 
to respond to their activities. 
The kinds of discretionary powers devolved to the local level correspond to the powers in 
government. They are the power to make rules or modify existing rules (legislative), the power 
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to make decisions and implement or enforce those decisions (executive), and the power to 
adjudicate disputes arising from the new rules or decisions Uudicial) (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Ribot, 2004). Each of these types of powers was discussed in Chapter 2, Research Framework 
(Box 2.2) 
Means of transfer 
Another e lement within the power dimension critical to decentralisation is the means of the 
transfer of power (Conyers, 1990 cited in Ribot, 2005). The means of power transfer can take 
different forms, ranging from the most secure form of constitutional transfers to the less secure 
form of laws, to the least secure in the form of ministerial decrees or administrative orders 
(Ribot, 2005). The means of transfer is insecure if it can be easily changed or revoked. 
The security of the transfer of power can affect the outcomes of natural resource 
decentralisation. For instance, in Kumaon, India, the insecurity over the rights to fell timber 
resulted in a rush to exploit the resource and in over-cutting (Agrawal, 200la). The perceived 
insecurity over the locus of power has led to the "get-it-while-you-can" attitude in timber 
exploitation in Indonesia (Resosudarmo, 2004). 
As pointed out in section A 1-2, one of the issues often observed in decentralisation reforms 
is the reluctance to relinquish powers. This is reflected in the transfer of powers as a mandate, 
rather than significant discretionary powers (therefore, largely administrative decentralisation, 
rather than democratic decentralisation). Thus, forms of incomplete or partial decentralisation, 
where powers are transferred only as a mandate or without relinquishing the accompanying 
resources, and the swinging of the pendulum back to the Centre, where decentralized powers 
and authority arc taken back, are not uncommon (Ribot et al., 2006). The transfer of power 
through weak means, such as through ministerial decrees, makes it easier for national 
governments to subsequently withdraw powers devolved to local levels. 
Balance of powers 
The granting of unlimited powers to local authorities can result in the excessive 
exploitation of natural resources and in the disregard of the interests of the weaker segments of 
the community. This can occur even in cases where local authorities meet the criterion of 
(downwardly) accountable representation (Ribot, 2004). Larson (2003a:6) asserts that an ideal 
form of decentralisation comprising a "perfect combination of formal powers and downward 
accountability may never be achieved in practice, or at hest, will only exist in a state of dynamic 
tension". Again, the inherent revenue-generating feature of natural resources, compared to other 
sectors which mostly incur costs, by its very nature provides an incentive to exploit the 
resource. This is further exacerbated by the fact that externalities associated with the 
exploitation of natural resources are mostly borne by those largely outside the area where the 
resource is located, or by future generations. Thus, it is argued that to protect social and 
environmental values, not all powers should be devolved to lower levels (for instance, Ribot, 
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2004, Larson, 2003a; Larson, 2003b; Capistrano and Colfer, 2005). Rather, an appropriate 
balance of powers between and among levels of government is required (for instance, Piriou-
Sall, 1998, Larson, 2003a; Larson, 2003b; Ribot, 2004, 2005). How powers and responsibility 
are shared between the Centre and local-level authorities is context-specific and should be 
determined on the basis of both local and broader public interests (Capistrano and Colfer, 
2005). S28 
Local power relations 
The outcomes of decentralisation are believed to be determined by several factors. One of 
these is power relations among local actors (Larson, 2003b; Toni, 2003; Pacheco, 2005). Local 
governments' decision making occurs within the realm of a complex arena of interacting local 
actors, and thus is subject to political pressure. The realities of local politics determine the 
outcomes of decentralisation of natural resources (Gibson and Lehoucq, 2003; Wardell and 
Lund, 2006). In addition, other factors, such as incentive structures (Kaimowitz et al., 1998; 
Larson, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Andersson, 2003; Andersson et al., 2006), environmental and 
social ideologies (Larson, 2003b), and local government capacity (Larson, 2002), are also 
important. 
Understanding power relations 
Although the theories of power are not the focus of this thesis, to understand power 
re lations it is necessary to briefly review the central concept of power. 
The concept of power 
There has been considerable debate about the definition of power among theorists'29 , but 
the essential idea of power is "the ability to affect the actions or ideas of others, despite 
resistance" (Olsen and Marger, 1993:1). The actors exercising powers can be either individuals 
or groups or organisations (Barnes, 1988; Olsen and Marger, ! 993 ). The usage of the term can 
be reduced to a single underlying concept and described as a generalized capacity to act 
(Hindess, 1996: 1 )'3°, as well as a capacity to control or influence others (Wrong, 1995: 11 ). It 
refers to "a generalized capacity of an actor, in his relations with others, to reduce resistance to 
the course of action he prefers in a given fie ld (i.e., in the 'presence ' of other actors) about a set 
of matters over a period of time" (Etzioni, 1993: 19). 
"' Thomson (1994) argues that the central government's role in natural resource management 
should be limited to being a "passive referee", comprising establishing enabling legislation, 
dispute resolution , information dissemination, co-financing of natural resource management 
initiatives, and in biodiversity conservation in cases where local regimes do not have the 
capacity or are not interested in doing so. 
"" See for instance, Clegg, 1989; Olsen and Marger, 1993; Hindess, 1996. 
''° Following Weber (1976, cited in Hindess, 1996) and Lukes (1974, cited in Hindess, 1996). 
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The term "political power" is used in the political context and has to do with questions of 
governance and the democratic nature of government. Bertrand de Jouvenal (1945 cited in 
Wartenberg, 1990) for instance, treats the term "power" as identical to "government". Social 
power is a much broader phenomenon in society and extends beyond the governmental sphere 
(Wartenberg 1990). 
Power, influence, and authority 
Power and influence are often used synonymously. Etzioni (1993) distinguishes influence 
and power in terms of the preferences of the actor. When power is applied, it changes the actor's 
situation, but not his preferences. The exercise of influence, on the other hand, results in an 
authentic change in the actor's preferences. 
Similarly, the terms power and authority are also often conflated. Politics includes a 
struggle for power (Wrong, 1995) and the exercise or use of power (Bratton, 1994), and also a 
struggle to limit, resist, and escape from power (Wrong, 1995). Authority is defined as 
legitimate power (Etzioni, 1993; Bratton, 1994).531 Legitimate authority can rest on traditional 
values, beliefs, or norms, or on legal prerogatives, or special expertise or knowledge (Olsen, 
1993). 
Power implies a relationship between two actors. "Power relations are asymmetrical in that 
the power holder exercises greater control over the behaviour of the power subject than the 
reverse, but reciprocity of influence - the defining criterion of the social relation itself - is never 
entirely destroyed except in those forms of physical violence" (Wrong 1995: IO). Power is 
employed when there is a difference of perspective, interest, or when there is conflict between 
actors. Thus, power implies a struggle, negotiation, and compromise (Villareal, I 992). Actors 
who are often considered weak, such as people in peasant societies and women, are often able to 
apply their own weapons to challenge those in power and find room to manoeuvre in everyday 
forms of resistance, including foot dragging and false compliance (Scott, 1985). 
Local politics and power relations in natural resource use and management 
Local-level power relations rather than legal or policy prescriptions often determine the 
actual access to or rights over natural resources. Sikor (2004) described the overt and successful 
resistance of villagers in Vietnam over state-imposed land allocation. In Ghana's 
decentralisation, for example, supposedly illegal agricultural activities and illegal fi shing were 
allowed to continue as officials wielded their powers through rent extraction (Wardell and 
Lund, 2006). Also in Ghana, local politics defined the actual effective rights of access to land 
use (Wardell and Lund, 2006). 
"' See also Barnes (1988) discussion on influence and power 
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Increased powers of those often considered "weak" are often gained by forging alliances 
with other actors. For instance, Brown and Rosendo's (2000) study of Brazilian rubber tappers 
concluded that alliances at the local level between rubber tappers and environmental 
organisations have increased their influence in relation to other powerful actors, such as cattle 
ranchers and loggers, in national natural resource policy. Consequently, grassroots actors have 
gained increased political powers, although less so in terms of economic powers. Similarly, 
Peluso (1995) documented activists' support for community mapping to counter state claims 
over their areas and Johnson and Forsyth (2002) observed that assistance by NGOs and 
academics has led to some Thai communities gaining control over forest lands from the state. 
A 1-3-5 Accountability 
The other core component of democratic decentralisation is accountability. Within the 
various forms of accountability, Agrawal and Ribot ( 1999), and others (for example, Larson, 
2003b; Pacheco 2005), emphasize that downward accountability of local authorities with 
decentralized powers, that is their accountability to their constituencies, is the most critical form 
of accountability in the arena of natural resources (section Al- above). As accountability is one 
of the core dimensions applied in the research framework of the thesis (Chapter 2), this concept 
is discussed in some detail in the following section. 
What is accountability 
Accountability, just like decentralisation, is now also fash ionable in government, 
development, and natural resource management discourses. Just like decentralisation, the term 
is often understood and used differently (Blair, 2000). It is also a complex, ambiguous, and 
contested concept (Sinclair, 1995; Schedler, 1999; Mulgan, 2003). 
The term accountability is used to express the continuing concern for the need for checks, 
oversight, and institutional constraints on the exercise of power (Schedler, 1999). Mulgan 
(2003: 1) refers to accountability as the "obligation to account, a method by which the public is 
kept informed and the powerful in check". 
The need to keep the powerful in check is consistent with the recognition that "every type 
of power is subject to abuse" (Grant and Keohane 2005:41 ). The functions of accountability are 
thus primarily to expose and sanction two sorts of abuse: the unauthorized or illegitimate 
exercise of irresponsible or unjust power decisions (Grant and Keohane 2005). In addition to a 
means of controlling the potential abuse and misuse of public authority, Aucoin and Heintzman 
(2000) provided additional purposes of accountability: to assure the public of the proper use of 
public resources, adherence to the law, as well as a learning process for improved governance 
and public management. 
Central to the discussion of decentralized natural resource governance is political 
accountability. Broadly defined, political accountability encompasses any acts of accountability 
addressed to public officials, including politicians, civil servants, judges, police officers, 
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military officers, and diplomats (Schedler, 1999). For instance, these officials can be assessed 
for the appropriateness of the policies and policymaking processes; the expediency or 
procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts; the use of public money (financial accountability); 
and the observance of legal rules. 
Allernatively, political accountability has also been defined in terms of the level of 
uncertainty over which judgments are made, in contrast to the more straightforward issues 
associated with financial compliance or the performance of certain objectives or agreed-upon 
obligations. Political accountability can be described as: "oversight of public officials and 
agencies in terms of their responsiveness to political leaders and to citizens, and of fulfilment of 
the public trust" (Brinkerhoff, 2001 :6) or " . .. has to do with institu tions, procedures, and 
mechanisms that seek to ensure that government delivers on electoral promises, fulfils the 
public trust, aggregates and represents citizens' interests, and responds to ongoing and emerging 
societal needs and concerns" (Brinkerhoff 2001 :8). 
Accountability and power 
Accountability is "defined, created and enforced by power" (Newell and Bellour 2002:23). 
The ability to demand and exercise accountability presupposes power, the right to demand and 
the willingness to respond to calls for accountability assumes relations of power (Schedler, 
1999; Newell and Bellour, 2002; Grant and Keohane, 2005). According to Lonsdale (1986), the 
need for accountability emerges from the fact that power is unequally shared. If power were 
equally shared, that is, if nobody could command compliance or service from anybody, it would 
cease to exist and its accountability would not be a problem (Lonsdale, 1986). If "power is not 
to some extent shared, there can be no effective base from which it may be controlled, or any 
protected right to discuss its purposes" (Lonsdale 1986: 128). 
Schedler (1 999) emphasizes that the idea of political accountability is to control political 
power, not to eliminate it. Accountability processes are carried out to restrain power, to limit its 
arbitrariness, and to prevent or redress the abuse of power to keep its exercise in line with pre-
established rules and procedures. 
The existence of power provides their very raison d'etre. Without power, 
without the capacity to make decisions and the corresponding capacity to 
attribute decisions, it does not make any sense to talk about accountability. 
Nobody can hold anybody accountable for the things beyond that person' s 
control (Schedler, 1999: 18-19). 
Mulgan (2003) explains accountability using the principal-agent relationship. In the 
delegation of power, those who delegate (the principals or the account-holders) would need to 
check the actions of those to whom they delegate power (the agents or the accountors). Thus, 
accountability here is seen as one important means of protecting the interests of the principal, 
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manifested in the principal's right to call an agent to account, to seek information, explanation, 
and justification. 
Grant and Keohane (2005) propose two comprehensive models of accountability which are 
based on different conceptions of the legitimacy of political authority. Their models, called the 
"participation" and "delegation" models of accountability, are fundamentally different with 
regard to who is entitled to hold the powerful accountable. In the "participation" model, the 
performance of power-wielders is evaluated by those who are affected by their actions. In the 
"delegation" model, on the other hand, accountability is demanded by those entrusting them 
with powers. In addition, each model has two variants to distinguish the relation between the . 
powerful and the publics they serve. Power-wielders are viewed either as agents of the public or 
as authorities with discretion. 
The rationale for accountability is based on two broad types of j ustification. The first 
involves rights of prior authority or ownership. This links accountability and the principles of 
democracy, where government draws its authority from the people and thus is ultimately 
"owned" by the people (Day and Klein, 1987). The second involves the principle that a person 
whose rights or interests are unfavourably affected by the actions of another has a right to hold 
that person to account for the way he/she has been treated. Thus, citizens' rights to hold the 
government to account are justified by both the principle of rights of ownership and affected 
rights and interests (Mulgan, 2003). 
Accountability is viewed to consist of two principal dimensions: answerability and 
enforcement or rectification (Schedler, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2001; Mulgan, 2003; Grant and 
Keohane, 2005). Accountability obliges power to be exercised in a transparent manner and to 
justify its actions. Accountability has informing and j ustification aspects. In terms of democratic 
governance, the informing aspect relates to transparency, while the justification aspect relates to 
government responsiveness and to the exercise of voice by citizens. Accountability thus 
contains clements of monitoring and oversight, as well as reasoning. Another defining element 
of accountability is the availabili ty and application of sanctions for illegal or inappropriate 
actions and behaviour. According to this view, sanctions without enforcement significantly 
diminish accountability. Accountability is complete when the enforcement or rectification 
dimension is fulfilled: agents are not only called to account, rather they must also be held to 
account. 
Accountability versus responsibility, control, and responsiveness 
If we adhere to the core meanings of accountability described above (adopted by, among 
others, Schedler, Brinkerhoff, Mulgan, and Grant and Keohane), that is, in essence, calling and 
holding institutions or officials to account, Mulgan (2003) asserts that there is a need to 
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recognize the distinction between accountability and other types of related processes that are 
sometimes used interchangeably: responsibility, responsiveness, and control.m 
Accountability versus responsibility 
One of the reasons why political accountability is a complicated concept to use is because 
of its ambiguity vis-a-vis other concepts. The concept of accountability is often conflated with 
that of responsibility. As Lonsdale (1986) explains, political accountability comprises a dual 
notion: it combines the ideas of responsibility and accountability. "Rulers claim to be 
responsible to their people; people try to hold them to account. Accountability is thus a measure 
of responsibility" (Lonsdale 1986: 127). m 
Accountability implies a relationship between two parties, the account-holder (the 
principal) and the accountor (the agent). The accountor is subject to external scrutiny from the 
account-holder. Responsibility is associated with internally-driven action, that emerges from the 
capacity to act from free choice to fulfil certain tasks, whereas accountability involves scrutiny 
imposed by someone else (Mulgan, 2003). The two concepts are closely connected in that 
holding someone to account often implies that the individual being held to account is personally 
responsible for his or her actions (Mulgan, 2003). Accountability and responsibility, however, 
diverge in the case of collective actions. Blame, fault, or praise over the performance or process 
being scrutinized involving an organisation may not personally be attributed to the head of an 
organisation, although they are the ones being held accountable (Mulgan, 2003). They are 
accountable not because they arc personally responsible for the case, but because of their role as 
the head of the organisation. Accountability in this case is attributed to their role (role 
responsibility), rather than personal responsibility (for instance, Schafer, 2000). Thus 
accountability presupposes personal or role responsibility (Schedler, 1999; Mulgan, 2003). 
Responsibility, on the other hand, does not always entail accountability: a person can act 
responsibly without being requested to justify his/her actions. 
Accountability and control 
Accountability is generally understood as involving inquiries after certain actions have 
occurred and imposing improvement or sanctions over these past, perceived unsatisfactory 
actions. Thus, accountability operates ex-post, and therefore is essentially backward-looking 
(Mulgan 2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005). However, the prospect of sanctions can have a 
"' Accountability is often used interchangeably with the similar concepts of responsiveness, 
responsibility, and representation (see Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999 in Newell and 
Bellour 2002) and transparency, as well as trust (see Cornwall, Lucas and Pasteur, 2000 in 
Newell and Bellour 2002). 
"' Pellizoni (2004) proposes four dimensions of responsibility relevant in environmental 
governance: care, liability, accountability and responsiveness. Thus, according to Pellizoni, 
accountability is but one dimension of responsibility. 
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deterrent effect on those held accountable, which in turn influence future actions (Mulgan, 
2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005). 
The retrospective feature of accountability distinguishes it from the various forward-
looking means of control, such as laws and regulations. 534 Accountability only comes into play 
after procedures for enforcing the rules and guidelines are specified. Control implies "ex ante 
application in a decision, while accountability involves ex post oversight" (Scott 2000:38). 
According to Mulgan (2003), legal and administrative controls may result in public decisions 
that are more responsive to the interests of the public, but are not themselves mechanisms of 
accountability. The purpose for the enactment and the enforcement of most Jaws and regulations 
is to enable and control the actions of individuals or organisations, although some laws and 
regulations can directly concern accountability. Thus, accountability performs one aspect of 
legal and regulatory control that constitutes an essential part, but not the whole, of an effective 
system of institutional control (Mulgan 2003). Scott (2000) proposes that control and 
accountability be viewed as linked concepts that operate on a continuum. However, this would 
need more discussion. 
Accountability and responsiveness 
In addition to responsibility and control, accountability is often closely identified with 
responsiveness. For instance, one definition of accountability is : "the legal obligation lo be 
responsive to the legitimate interests of those affected by decisions, program, and interventions" 
(Wilson, 1978 cited in Considine, 2002:22). A responsive government acts according to 
citizens' preferences. One of the key aims of accountability processes is to ensure that the 
accountors are responsive to the interests and desires of their principal s. Mulgan (2003) sees 
accountability as a means to achieve public officials' responsiveness : "Responsiveness is an end 
to which accountability is a means" (Mulgan, 2003:21 ). However, accountability is not the only 
way to make governments responsive to citizens. There are other ways to secure responsiveness 
that do not involve scrutiny like accountability, such as enhancing corporate culture of public 
officials (Thomas 1998 cited in Mulgan, 2003; Considine, 2002). 
Types and categories of accountability 
Various typologies of accountability have been offered in the analysis of the public sector, 
yet none have been accepted unanimously. For instance, Day and Klein ( 1987), suggest two 
types of issue for which those being called to account are answerable: actions where the criteria 
of judgment are contestable (political accountability) and tasks conducted according to agreed 
criteria of performance (managerial accountability). Romzek and Dubnick (1987), apply two 
criteria, the externality or the intemality of the source of demand for accountability and the 
extent of control. Four basic types arc advanced based on these cri teria : legal (external with 
, ... Cohen and Peterson (1999), for example, includes laws as a means of accountability. 
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high control), political (external with low control), bureaucratic (internal with high control), and 
professional (internal with low control) accountability. Oliver (1991 cited in Mulgan, 2003) 
focuses more directly on different institutional directions of accountability: to ministers and 
parliament (political accountability), to courts (legal accountability), to non-parliamentary 
bodies such as ombudsmen (administrative accountability) and directly to the public (public or 
consumer accountability). 
Deleon (1998) categorized different forms of accountability based on the degree of clarity 
or certainty of what the accountor is being asked to be accountable for, that is, either for results 
or processes. Based on these criteria, four types of accountability are established: bureaucratic, 
political, professional, and anarchic accountability. Bureaucratic accountability occurs when 
goals are clear and means are specified, and where the accountors can be held accountable for 
both results and processes. Political accountability occurs when goals are unclear or even 
conflicting, but where means to achieve the goal can be understood. In this case, accountability 
is demanded not for results but for processes. Professional accountability occurs when goals are 
clear but means are not, and focuses on results. Anarchic accountability refers to a situation 
where neither the goals nor the means arc clear; demanding accountability for results or for 
processes is thus not justified. In this situation, Deleon suggests that the most appropriate 
mechanism for accountability would be the participation of those involved in the organisation. 
535 
Brinkerhoff (200 1) suggests three typologies for accountability relevant to systems of 
democratic governance: democratic or political accountability, financial accountability, and 
performance accountability. Political accountability (defined above) reflects the quality of 
democracy. Financial accountabi lity deals with the control and monitoring of financial 
resources used government administration. Performance accountability links resource use with 
achievement or results. Brinkerhoff asserts that these types of accountability are not stand alone 
processes; rather, they exist in complex interconnections. 
Directional analysis of accountability includes vertical and horizontal accountabi lity. 
However, analysts generally agree that there is not yet a clear consensus as to what each one 
means (Schedler, 1999; Scott, 2000; Mulgan, 2003). 
Vertical accountability can be seen as corresponding to the normal exercise of power or 
"top-down" chains of control. Instances where individual officials are accountable to their 
superiors are refeffed to as upward accountability. Vertical accountability can also imply the 
inverse of the usual power relations, corresponding to "bottom-up" flow . Thus, downward 
accountability refers to instances where organisations or individuals are being held for judgment 
by those over whom they wield authority. The accountability relation between elected or 
appointed officials to cit izens represents downward accountability. However, the relation 
"' International politics is Deleon's example involving anarchic accountability. 
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between a superior with some degree of accountability to his/her subordinates also illustrates 
downward accountability. O'Donnell (1998; 1999), however, reserves vertical accountability to 
mean the ways in which citizens keep state power in check through elections or through other 
societal means. 
The term horizontal accountability is also understood and used in different ways. In the 
literal sense, horizontal accountability refers to someone (or organisation) holding someone else 
(or another organisation) of roughly equal power accountable, such as among members of the 
executive, legislative, or judiciary. But because power is relational, it is difficult to measure. In 
particular, identifying instances of roughly equal political power in the real world of democratic 
politics is an impossible task (Schedler, 1999). Furthermore, for accountability to be effective, 
the accounting party should be more powerful than and not on equal footing with those being 
held accountable (Schedler, 1999). To overcome these difficulties, Schedler (1999) suggests 
that horizontality would be better defined in terms of autonomy, where the accountor and the 
accounting party do not stand in a relation of formal subordination or superiority to each other. 
O'Donnell proposes horizontal accountability to refer exclusively to intra-state 
institutional oversight, checks and balances: 
... the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, 
and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine 
oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or 
omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as 
unlawful (O'Donnell, l 999:p.38) 
While O'Donnell reserved the notion of horizontal accountability to intrastate relations, 
others (for instance, Sklar, 1999; Schmitter, 1999) suggest that it also includes actors outside the 
state, such as ci vii society, that hold state agents accountable. 
Given the complexity of accountability structures, accountability specialists suggest that 
we look at four sets of accountability questions: who is accountable, to whom, for what, and 
how (Schedler 1999; Scott, 2000; Mulgan, 2003). 
Who is accountable? 
The person held accountable is the person who is responsible, that is, the person who can 
choose to act or not to act in the performance of certain duties and who is therefore liable for 
success or fault. This could be individual accountability and collective accountability. An 
individual accountability occurs when a single responsible person is held accountable; a 
collective accountability refers to that of an organisation, such as a government agency or a 
company. In addition to collective accountability of an organisation, members within that 
organisation are also individually accountable for performing their respective duties (individual 
or personal accountability). 
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To whom? 
In the simplified model of accountability, there is a single account-holder, either an 
individual or a collectivity, that is seen as the owner or initiates the activity. Thus, in the case of 
government, the ultimate account-holder is the people or the citizen body. Government agencies 
are also accountable to the individual citizens whom they deal with directly. This function is 
usually delegated to specialized institutions which act as accountability agencies on the people's 
behalf. These agencies include various courts and tribunals , together with the police and other 
enforcement agencies. 
For what? 
Accountability can be focused on the performance of the agent's task, on the agent's 
particular decision, and on compliance of rules and regulations. In the public sector, 
performance goals are often not easy to specify, where accountability usually revolves around 
process and procedures. Thus, some performance accountability are general in nature where the 
agent being held accountable is obliged to act according to the interests and preferences of the 
account holder (for example, voters). 
How? 
Mechanisms of accountability include both the processes or procedures and the different 
institutional structures or avenues through which officials and institutions are made accountable. 
Mulgan (2003) writes that these include the wide range of processes and procedures such as 
financial accounts and other written reports, formal investigation and questioning through 
public hearings in a court, open discussion in political debate, and private discussion and 
interrogation. The institutional avenues include review and audit agencies and directly to 
members of the public. 
While Mulgan (2003) asserts that accountability should only be used to describe processes 
that involve external scrutiny and sanctions, others have often used the term to include the 
means of control of power even if they do not involve calling and holding anyone to account 
(for instance, Peters, 1984; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 
2000; Ribot, 2004). The latter typically include non-state institutions, such as civil society or 
interest groups, as instruments of accountability (Peters, 1984). This broadened concept of 
accountability, often referred to as societal accountability, is discussed next. 
Societal accountability 
The broadened concept of accountability adopts means of checks and balances by social 
institutions. Formal accountability mechanisms involving state institutions have certain 
limitations. For instance, elections, the most common mechanism of accountability, take place 
periodi cally, often within several years of spaced intervals and address only broad issues. 
Furthermore, elected representatives often fail to effectively hold civil servants to account for 
their performance or in accommodating citizens' concern and preferences in their decisions 
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(Goetz and Gaventa, 2001). This gap has led to jnitiatives for the involvement of civil society as 
mechanisms of accountability or in impelling accountability processes and increasing 
governments' responsiveness. Societal accountability includes monitoring by third party such as 
the media and NGOs, political pressures, lobbying by associations, social movements or social 
mobilizations, and threats of social unrest and resistance (Peters 1984; Fox, 2000; Agrawal and 
Ribot 1999; Azfar et al., 1999; Blair, 2000; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Ribot, 2004). Of these, 
monitoring by a third party is the most critical, and is discussed here. 
Media' 
One social accountability institution that can enhance the effectiveness of democratic 
decentralisation has been the involvement of the media (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Media 
contributes to state accountability, both by filling the gaps left by ineffective state institu tions of 
accountability and by enhancing their effectiveness (Fox, 2000). Media can promote local 
governments' transparency and accountability by disseminating information about local 
government decisions and actions. At the same time, it can also monitor and investigate local 
governments' actions. Public exposure and humiliation of wrongdoers through the media can 
restrain politicians and bureaucrats from abusing their authority and power for personal gain. 
However, there are issues with regard to the role of the media in societal accountabi lity. 
One issue relates to the risks to maintaining individual rights (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti , 2000) . 
The media's effectiveness in exposing abuses of public positions is often derived from the 
media's accusations of wrongdoings. Even if they were unsubstantiated, according to Smulovitz 
and Peruzzotti, coverage of such accusations leads to a perception of guilt. Thus, rather than the 
common rule of someone being "innocent until proven guilty'', effective media coverage often 
creates the perception that someone is "guilty until proven innocent" (Smulovitz and Peruzotti, 
2000:154). 
Another problem has to do with the media's own accountability (Fox, 2000; Muller, 2005). 
Fox (2000) points out that, in addition to being a societal actor, the media is also a market actor. 
Thus, the media are often accountable to market pressures and do not necessarily have strong 
incentives to contribute to improved governance. Like any other actor, both publishers and 
journalists are not free from institutional and personal interests; this can affect the information 
disseminated. For instance, in a comprehensive study on media accountability in Australia, 
Muller (2005: 261) finds: 
the system of media accountability is fragmented , lacking transparency in its 
operations, inherently biased towards the interests of journalists and 
publishers, and lacking credibility The mechanisms of media 
accountability are inadequate both in absolute terms and when compared 
with the standards of accountability demanded by the media of other 
institutions such as parliament, executive government and the judiciary. 
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The issues conveyed by Muller parallel the problem of second-order accountability 
pertaining to state institutions of accountability. As Schedler (1999) points out, institutions of 
accountability are also susceptible to the same inefficiency and abuse as any other locus of 
power. 
NGOs 
Both development and natural resource management discourses have promoted the role of 
NGOs through the strengthening of civil society and local governance. For instance, NGOs have 
helped empower villagers in asserting their rights over forest control in Thailand (Johnson and 
Forsyth, 2002). More recently, NGOs have also been active in institutionalized forest 
monitoring initiatives (Young, 2007). Krishna (2003) observed the mutually reinforcing 
partnership between local governments and NGOs. Larson (2002) found that the relationships 
between NGOs and local governments and with each other have determined the level of interest 
in local resource management. 
In certain cases, however, the extent to which NGOs participate in local public decision-
making arenas and their outcomes are dubious. In the Philippines' experience of 
decentralisation, the active participation of NGOs reportedly has had mixed outcomes. Despite 
their "active participation", in practice NGOs have had little power in policy planning and 
exercise in public service delivery sectors. Furthermore, their actual participation has been 
ambiguous, as some mayors have created rubber-stamp NGOs (Azfar et al., 2000). 
To maintain their legitimacy and effectiveness to support their cause successfully, it is 
important that NGOs themselves be accountable (Edwards, 2004; Kilby, 2006). As Jepson 
(2005) argues, trust and accountability go together in public-NGO relations. Erosion of public 
trust will weaken the NGOs' capacity to deliver on their promises. In this regard, similar issues 
of accountability identified in the case of the media also prevail with NGOs. For instance, 
NGOs can be self serving and elitist; they may not necessarily serve local government policies 
(Smoke, 1999) and even engage in rent-seeking activities (Contreras, 2003). In addition to 
problems associated with NGOs' accountability, Newell and Bellour (2002) also point out 
issues associated with their representativeness. There is no clear path where NGOs can be held 
accountable by their constituencies whose interests they purportedly represent (Najam, 1996 
cited in Kilby, 2006). Kilby (2006) finds that informal accountability processes are not effective 
in linking NGOs to their constituency or in community empowerment, and suggests that formal 
forms of accountability processes are required. 
Thus, while decentralisation in both development and NRM arenas is advocated by 
analysts, practitioners, and donors alike as an alternative to a centralized mode of governance, it 
is not free from limitations. The challenges are potentially even more pronounced in NRM 
because of the specific nature and characteristics of natural resources. 
The extent to which democratic decentralisation is able to deliver its promises in terms of 
improved NRM, as suggested by current theories and conceptions, is dependent on the 
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fulfilment of certain elements. Among the most important of these are discretionary decision-
making powers, the means of transfer of powers, the balance of powers between levels of 
authority, and the power relations between and among relevant actors. 
Accountability is a critical component for keeping the exercise of powers - by those to 
whom powers are granted - in check. Democratic decentralisation, which rests on the key 
principle of participation in decision-making and which underpins improved NRM, is perceived 
to hinge on downward accountability, that is, the accountability of those holding powers to their 
constituencies. The effectiveness of downward accountability relations is dependent on the 
workings of formal and societal (informal) accountability mechanisms. 
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Appendix 2: Forestry Administration 
under the New Order and the Legal 
Regulatory Framework for Indonesia's 
Decentralized Forestry (1999-2004) 
The dissatisfaction over the highly centralized concentration of power and authority under 
the New Order period and the ways in which this power had been exercised drove Indonesia' s 
wide-ranging politico-socio and economic reforms, reformasi. Among the driving forces was 
regional dissatisfaction over the concentration of both control and beneficiaries of natural 
resources at the Centre. For instance, during the New Order period, the intensive exploitation of 
forests had only margina lly benefited regions and localities where the resource was located. 
Consequently, a multitude of institutional reforms was put in place through a flurry of laws. 
A set of landmark decisions paved the way for administrative, political, and fi scal reforms 
in May 1999: the promulgation of the decentralisation laws, Law 22 of 1999 on Regional 
Governance and Law 25 of 1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Centre and the Regions.536 
Consistent with the ways in which these two laws have been referred to in Indonesia, unless 
otherwise noted, the "decentralisation law" or the "regional autonomy law" refers to Law 22 of 
1999 on Regional Governance; the " fiscal decentralisation law" refers to Law 25 of 1999. When 
the term "decentralisation laws" or "regional autonomy laws" are used, they refer to both Law 
22 and Law 25 of 1999. In September of the same year, the Parliament also passed the new 
forestry law, Law 4 1 of1 999 on Forestry. 
A2-1 Brief overview of forest administration and 
management of forests during the New Order period 
Under Indonesia ' s Constitution, the authority and responsibility over "branches of 
production which are important for the State and which affect the lives of most people" rest 
with the State " the soi l, water and natural resources are controlled by the State and used for the 
people's welfare".m Control over forests and their management during the entire New Order 
period was guided by the 1967 Basic Forestry Law, promulgated immediately after the New 
Order regime came into power. The law opened up the way for the Central Government to 
utilize the Outer Island forests as the "engine of development" by generating revenues much 
needed by the country (Resosudarmo, 2002: 162- 163). 
" " See Mokhsen (2003} and Turner and Podger (2003) on the processes of the formulation of 
the two laws. 
" ' Articles 33(2) and 33 (3) of the Indonesian Constitution 
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A2· 1·1 Basic Forestry Law (Law 5 of 1967 on Basic Forestry) 
The Basic Forestry Law served two purposes: it provided the national government with de 
jure control over forests in the Outer Islands and provided the framework for the commercial 
exploitation of forests. Thus, it legally positioned the Central Government as the "stewards" of 
these forests and profoundly changed the ways in which outer island forests were managed, 
from being largely limited to local uses and manual harvest to large-scale mechanization for 
commercial purposes. 
The Central Government's authority over forests encompasses the protection, production, 
conservation of forests, forest inventory, research, and extension and training. Most 
importantly, the BFL allowed the Minister in charge of forestry to designate forest areas as 
Forest Estate (Kawasan Rutan)i38 providing the areas with legal tenure as state controlled forest 
land (GOVFAO, 1990). This authority was subsequently used to delineate forests into functional 
categories of protection forests, production forests, nature reserves and/or recreation forests). s39 
Various subsequent regulations and the TGHK (Tata Guna Rutan Kesepakatan or Forest Land-
use Plan by Consensus) identified five functional categories of forests: Conservation Forests, 
Protection Forests, Production Forests (Production and Limited Production Forests), and 
Conversion Forests. The figure for the Forest Estate was then determined as 144 million 
hectares, although actual forested area in the Outer Islands as of 1982 was 112 million hectares 
and (GOI/FAO, 1990). The forested area of the Forest Estate has since decl ined (see Chapter 2 
of the thesis). 
The BFL also provided the legal framework for large-scale commercial timber production. 
Subsequent implementing Government Regulations provided specifically for the harvesting and 
management of production forests through the issuance of concession rights, Rights of Forest 
Exploitation (Hak Pengusahaan Rutan, HPH) or Rights of Forest Products Harvesting (Rak 
Pemungutan Rasil Hutan, HPHH). i•o The HPH is a large-scale forest concession license granted 
to private or state-owned companies by the Central Government. The HPHH was issued for 
small-scale areas of up to 100 hectares by the Provincial Forest Service. In return for the rights 
to the timber resources (through HPH), concessionaires were (and are) obliged to pay license 
fees and royalties (Chapter 4). 5' 1 
A2-1-2 Central control, intensive logging, and deforestation 
The BFL set off a logging boom in forest-rich areas of Sumatera and Kalimantan. For a 
short period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, district governments in East Kalimantan 
"' Article 7 (2) 
m Article 7(3) 
"
0 Government Regulation 21 of 1970 
""' The Reforestation Fund was a performance bond, but later effectively became nationally 
imposed charges to allow the government to carry out reforestation activities. 
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could issue medium-scale licenses of up to 5000 hectares, and the Provincial Government up to 
10,000 hectares (Manning, 1971; Magenda, 1991 ). However, the available literature only 
documents licenses over small areas (Magenda, 1991; Potter 1991 ). Furthermore, logging 
activities were carried out using traditional hand methods of extraction (Magenda, 1991; Potter, 
1991). Logs were moved downstream through flooded rivers during the rainy seasoris. This was 
known as the banjir kap phenomenon. 
Large-scale commercialization of Indonesia's national forests ended these operations. At 
the beginning of the 1970s the Central Government adopted a policy of large-scale timber 
concessions, with a minimum area of 50,000 hectares. These concessions were allocated 
exclusively by the Central Government. 
The governments' policy led to domestic and multinational companies seeking concession 
rights to exploit timber of high-value (mostly Dipterocarps). Large, foreign-owned concession 
holders replaced the earlier, smaller concession holders, and mechanization took over from 
manual felling. In the 1980s, large national companies took over. These logs were largely 
produced for export (Resosudarmo, 2002): export earnings from the forestry sector in 1971-
1972 amounted to 170 million USO and increased to 2.1 billion USO in 1979- 1980 (Gillis, 
1988). More than 25 million cubic metres were cut in 1980 (Gillis, 1988; Potter, 1991). In 
practice, timber companies worked in partnership with the actual holders of the HPH, many of 
which were military officers or politico-bureaucrats (Potter, 1991 ; Ascher, 1998; Ross, 2001 ). 
Rights over lucrative forest resources were allocated based on patronage, to nurture and 
maintain loyalty to the regime in power (Ross, 2001 ). For a fee, the holders of these rights acted 
as "sleeping partners" (Resosudarmo, 2002: 170). In terms of the resource, because the forestry 
agreement bound the holder of the rights, rather than the partner companies, this kind of 
partnership arrangement had discouraged responsible forest management (Resosudarmo, 2002). 
In terms of benefit, this has meant that the riches of these forests became largely enjoyed by 
outsiders. 
With this development, thousands of banjir kap producers lost their livelihoods (Potter, 
1991 ). Provincial authorities could only issue a limited number of small-scale, 100 hectare 
HPHHs, allowing for limited continuation of non-mechanized logging for local use in some 
areas (Magenda, 1991; Potter, 1991 ). Traditional access to the forest was only marginally 
maintained by allowing the collection of firewood and harvest of timber for non-export use like 
ironwood (ufin or Eusideroxylon zwagerei) (Potter, 1991 ). However, local people faced serious 
issues in marketing their timber, as they had to sell to the larger producers who set the price. 
Even this residual means of access to forest resources did not last: the provinces' authority to 
issue HPHHs for small-scale areas of up to 100 hectares was revoked in January 1989 
(GOUFAO, 1990). 
This forestry development focusing on export-oriented log production ( l 970- 1980) 
subsequently entered a second phase, the development of the plywood industry (1980-1990) and 
then a third phase, the production of pulp and paper and timber plantations (1990s to the 
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present). All these activities have led to intensive and unsustainable extraction of the resource 
(for a review of Indonesia's forestry policy over these three periods, see Resosudarmo, 2002). 
For instance, vertical integration between the plywood industry and HPH concessions resulted 
in both unsustainable methods and rate of harvest (Kartawinata and Vayda, 1984; Tarrant et al., 
1987; Sagala, 1997) and poor efforts in reforestation (Pramono, 1992; Awang, 1993; 
Kartodihardjo, 1998). By 1995, the Central Government granted 62 million hectares of forest to 
585 HPH concessionaires (Brown, 1999). The highest estimate of the deforestation rate reached 
2,400,000 hectares per year in 1996 (Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996). From I 996 to 2002, 
the deforestation continued of the order of 2 million hectares annually (FWI/GFW, 2002: xi). 
Central policies during this period tended to neglect or inadequately consider local 
interests (for instance, Potter, 199 1; Soetrisno, I 992; Sandbukt, 1995; Fay and Sirait, 2002). 
State appropriation of forest lands which local communities saw as their property displaced 
communities and deprived them of their traditional livelihoods (Barber et al ., 1994; Fay and 
Sirait, 2002; Alhamid, 2004; Thorburn, 2006). Large-scale emphasis on forest exploitation and 
the patronage system largely left local people with residual economic opportunities such as low-
paying labouring jobs (Gellert, 1995, cited in Maunati, 2005) while the larger portion of the 
benefit accrued to central or centrally-linked actors (Ascher, 1998; Barr, 1998; Ross, 2001 ). 
Regional governments, however, did (for instance, Gillis, 1988) and continue to receive a 
proportion of forestry-derived revenues (Chapter 4). 
Thus, in summary, the BFL and its derivative legal instruments led to forestry development 
under the New Order period with two major consequences relevant to the discussion of the 
thesis. First, Central Government control over forests resulted in the unsustainable management 
of the resource. Second, the ways in which these forests were managed have largely resulted in 
a skewed distribution of benefits against forest-dependent communities. Instead, they have 
accrued to those at the Centre or those closely associated with the Centre. 
Decentralisation was not only pushed, at least partly, as a reaction to perceived injustices 
with regard to who had benefited from the extraction of Outer Island natural resources, but was 
also expected to remedy the perceived injustices and improve the management of the resource. 
The decentralisation laws provided the legal framework for the increased power of local 
governments and the basis for democratic local governance intended to achieve, among others, 
these objectives. s•2 · 
A2-2 Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Governance 
Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Governance differed markedly from the previous 
decentralisation law, Law 5 of 1974 on the Principles of Governance in the Regions, in several 
ways. First, the 1999 law provided for the transfer of political power to regions, thereby 
"' Interview with N-G-6a 
337 
providing the legal framework for political or democratic decentralisation. It explicitly defined 
decentralisation as the transfer of authority to autonomous regions. In contrast to its 197 4 
predecessor, in which regional autonomy was laid out in terms of the regions' responsibility to 
support national development, this law set out regional autonomy in terms of the regions' rights 
to discretionary decision-making and responsibilities over their jurisdictions.543 The law denoted 
the term "regions" to mean provinces, districts, and municipalities. 
A2-2-1 Major stipulations of the law relevant to the thesis 
The major provisions of the law relevant to the discussion in this thesis included the locus 
of the broad decentralized power, the locus of authority over forest resources, and the 
strengthening of the legislative body as the representatives of district citizens and as the 
institutionalized body holding those with decentralized power accountable. 
Who received what power? 
Prior to the implementation of Law 22 of 1999, district governments, as the second level of 
sub-national governments, were subordinate to the provinces, as the first level of regional 
government. According to Law 5 of 1974, these administrative units were hierarchical, and all 
regional heads (that is, the governor of provinces and Bupatis of districts) were responsible to 
the Central Government following the hierarchical structure of the government. 5" Under Law 
22 of 1999, however, power was largely transferred to districts (kabupaten, for rural areas) and 
municipalities (kota, for urban areas), bypassing the provinces. The relationship between the 
two levels of autonomous governments, the provincial and the district/municipal governments, 
was thus no longer hierarchical. 545 As discussed in Chapter 3, this provision was critical in 
shaping the relationship between districts and the province. 
Law 22 of 1999 provided for the expanded role of regional governments. Article 7 
stipulated that all authority with the exception of foreign relations, national defence and 
security, monetary and fiscal affairs, religion, and "other matters" were granted to regions. 
"Other matters" included macro policy on development planning, fiscal balancing fund, state 
administration and economic institutions, development and empowerment of human resources, 
the utilization of "strategic natural resources" and technology, conservation, and national 
standardization. 
The increased powers of regional governments, as stated in Article 7 above, were granted 
to districts and municipalities, rather than to the provinces. ''6 As autonomous units, provinces 
were given the authority over cross-district matters or matters that districts/municipalities had 
"'Article 1 and its elucidation 
'"In laws and legislation, "government" is defined as the Central Government, unless specified 
otherwise 
"·'Article 4(2) 
"''Article 11 (1) 
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no capacity to handle. Law 22 of 1999 thus clearly circumscribed and shrank the authority of 
provinces. As administrative units, however, provinces performed deconcentration functions, 
where they could act or exercise authority on behalf of the Central Government. 
Ambiguities and inconsistencies in the decentralisation law 
With regard to the authority over natural resources, however, there were some ambiguities 
resulting from inconsistencies in the provisions of the law. Article 7 assigned the authority for 
utilization of "strategic natural resources" to the Central Government. Article 10 of the same 
law, however, empowered regions to manage "national resources" within their territories and at 
the same time assigned regions with the responsibility to maintain the environment. Despite the 
clarification of the meaning of "national resources" in the elucidation of the law, that is, as 
natural, man-made resources and human resources, the law did not elaborate, neither in the body 
of the law nor in its elucidation, what it meant by the term "strategic natural resources". Did 
forests fall into the category of "national resources" or "strategic natural resources"? These 
ambiguous and inconsistent provisions led to different interpretations and became one source of 
conflict among levels of governments (Chapter 3). 
Regional legislative bodies strengthened 
Law 22 enhanced the powers of the regional legislative body, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah or DPRD, at both the provincial and district levels. They were empowered to e lect 
district heads (Bupati) and deputy district heads (Wakil Bupati) and to dismiss them if 
necessary. The DPRDs, together with the district head, were given the power to stipulate district 
regulations (Peraturan Daerah or PERDA) and draw up the district budget. The DPRD had 
supervisory responsibilities over the implementation of local and national regulations, the 
Bupati's decisions, the district budget and district policies, and the responsibilities to facilitate 
and follow up the "aspirations" of localities and communities. 547 According to Article 19, the 
DPRD had the right to hold the district head "accountable", to request information, to conduct 
investigation, to make amendments on drafts of district regulations, to express opinion, and to 
submit drafts of district regulations. 5' 8 
The DPRD nominating and electing the regional head (a governor for provinces or 
Bupati!Walikota for districts/municipaliti"es) is in stark contrast to the New Order. During the 
New Order period, the candidates and election process conducted by the DPRD had only been a 
formality; in practice regional heads were effectively appointed by the Centre (Mokhsen, 2003). 
'"Article 18; aspirations from the Indonesian word aspirasi, meaning political or social des ires 
(Stevens and Schmidgall-Tellings, 2004) 
"' Bennet (2002) found no original Indonesian word for the term accountabil ity. The word often 
used that has the closest meaning is "responsibility" (tanggungjawab) . In the past several years, 
both the words tanggunggugat or akuntabilitas have been used to mean accountability. 
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Article 43 defined the responsibilities of regional heads. They included maintaining the 
integration of the Republic, the Constitution, and the state's ideology, enforcing laws and 
regulations, maintaining order, proposing regional regulations, and with the approval of the 
DPRD, promulgating regional regulations. 
Regional heads were to be responsible to the DPRD in performing their duties and tasks. 549 
The accountability process involved three types of accountability reports.550 The first was a 
mandatory accountability report that must be submit_ted by regional heads at the end of each 
fiscal year. The second was an accountability report over specific issues, which would be 
submitted upon the DPRD's request. In addition, regional heads were required to submit 
reports, at least annually, on the implementation of local governance to the President through 
the Ministry of Home Affairs. District heads must also submit a copy of these annual reports to 
the Governor. 
As common with Indonesian laws (Bell, 2001), and in accordance with the hierarchy of 
Indonesian legislation, the implementation of Law 22 of 1999 required further elaboration 
through implementing regulations (Figure A2.l). The implementing regulation for this law was 
Government Regulation 25 of 2000. The major relevant provisions of this Government 
Regulation pertaining to forestry are discussed next. 
"' Article 44 
"
0 Articles 45 and 53 
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1945 Constitution 
( Undang-undang Dasar) 
i 
Resolution of the People's Consultative 
Assembly (Ketetapan MPR) 
i 
Law 
( Undang-undang) 
i 
Government Regulation Substituting a 
Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti 
UU) 
i 
Government Regulations 
(Peraturan Pemerintah) 
l 
Presidential Decree/Presidential 
Regulation (Keputusan 
Presiden/Peraturan Presiden) 
i 
Regional Regulation 
(Peraturan Daerah• ?ERDA) 
Figure A2.1 Indonesia's Hierarchy of Legislation 
Source: Resolution of the People's Consultative Assembly 
of the Republic of Indonesia Number III Year 2000; Law 10 of 2004 
In practice, there are other legal instruments in use. They include Presidential Instructions 
(lnstruksi Presiden), Ministerial Decrees (Keputusan Menteri) and Circular Letters (Surat 
Edaran). These other forms of legal instruments are not explicitly included in the legal 
hierarchy. The omittance of Ministerial Decrees and Circular Letters in the official legal 
hierarchy turned out to be significant in the implementation of decentralisation, as it Jed to 
district governments' interpretation that PERDAs had a higher legal status vis-a-vis Ministerial 
Decrees or directives. These different interpretations have often resulted in inconsistencies 
between legal instruments. 
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A2-2-2 The regulatory framework for the implementation of 
the Decentralisation Law 
Although Law 22 was passed in May 1999, the Government did not release its 
implementing regulation, Government Regulation 25 of 2000 on Government Authority and 
Provinces' Authority as Autonomous Regions, until a year later, in May 2000. 
According to Bell (200 I), it is not uncommon that laws providing for a separation of 
powers assign residual powers to a specific level of government. Powers not specifically 
assigned to any levels of government will belong to the government that holds such residual 
powers. This was the case with Government Regulation 25 of 2000. Although Law 22 of 1999 
primarily ceded powers to district and municipal governments, and not to Provincial 
Governments, this Government Regulation assigned residual powers to districts and 
municipalities. Hence Government Regulation 25 of 2000 described the Central Government's 
and the province' authority, and whatever powers were not assigned here would be the authority 
of district and municipal governments. 
According to Government Regulation 25 of 2000, the Central Government's authority in 
the forestry and plantation sectors mostly centred on four major groups of tasks. The first set of 
tasks involved setting up the criteria and standards for forest administration, including in forest 
planning and forest management. The Government thus had the power to determine the criteria 
and standards for the establishment of forest management areas, conservation areas and nature 
reserves. It also had the authority to determine the criteria and standards for the licensing of the 
utilization of forest areas, the utilization (exploitation) of forests, as well as the harvest forest 
products and their tariffs. It had the power to determine the criteria and standards for forest 
structuring and conservation. The Government's second major set of tasks lay in the power to 
assign forest lands and change of status and function. The third set of tasks included the 
management and granting of licenses for activities associated with nature reserves and 
watersheds, hunting grounds, and the distribution of endangered species. The fourth set of tasks 
involved the licensing of cross-provincial utilization of production forests and cross-provincial 
nature tourism. 
The same Government Regulation gave the provinces authority over forestry affairs in the 
following areas. The major first set of tasks was associated with forestry activities that involved 
cross-district or cross-municipality jurisdictions. These included forest and pl antation macro 
planning, the granting of permits for the utilization of wood and non-wood fores t products for 
areas spanning across one district, the development of cross-district plantation areas, and the 
protection of forests in areas that crossed districts borders. The second major group of tasks was 
to provide guidelines in forest administration and forest protection. They included providing 
guidelines associated with inventory, mapping and the establishment of forest boundaries, and 
guidelines for the implementation of rehabilitation and reclamation of production and protection 
forests. The third task was to actively work with the Central Government in assigning forest 
lands and the change of their status and function, particularly in the context of provincial spatial 
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planning that was to be made based on agreement between the province and 
districts/municipalities in the province. 
As noted above, the fact that Government Regulation 25 of 2000 only assigned the tasks 
and authority of the central and Provincial Governments meant that districts and municipalities 
were left with residual authority and responsibilities not described in the regulation. All 
authority not described in this regulation then could be interpreted as belonging to 
districts/municipalities. It was not therefore explicitly elaborated whether or not the authority to 
carry out forest administration, particularly the assignment of licenses for the utilization of 
forest products, was under districts' jurisdiction. 
A2-3 The 1999 Forestry Law 
Four months after lhe passage of the decentralisation laws, a new forestry law, Law 41 of 
1999 on Forestry, was endorsed by the parliament. ln contrast to the decentralisation law, many 
provisions of this law have a centralistic tone. The affirmation of central authority is re flected in 
the law's provisions that maintain state control over forests and forest administration. 
A2-3-1 Forest control 
The basic tenets concerning the locus o f control and tenure over forests in Law 41 of 1999 
on Forestry remain unchanged from the earlier forestry law, the 1967 Basic Forestry Law or 
Law 5 of 1967 on Basic Forestry. All forests within the Republic's jurisdiction are under the 
control of the state.'5 ' State control grants the Central Government the authority to regulate and 
administer all aspects related to forests, forest areas, and forest products and to assign the status 
of a particular area as a fores t or non-forest area. State control of fores ts recognizes the rights of 
customary communities or masyarakat hukum adatm "in so far as they exist, their existence 
acknowledged, and in so far as they do not contradict national interests". m 
As with iL-; predecessor, Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry distinguishes a forest into either of the 
following two possible status: 1) a state forest, defined as a forest located on lands with no 
ownership of rights, or 2) a rights forest, defined as a forest on lands with ownership of rights. A 
customary or adat forest is defined as a state forest located within a customary community area. 
The status of a forest is determined by lhe Government. 
In addition to the status of a particular forest, the Government also determines the 
functional category of a forest. According to their functions, forests are classified into one of 
three categories: conservation, protection, and production forests. ss• Conservation forests 
"' In Indonesian: dikuasai oleh negara 
"' Adat is often translated as customary, traditional. It is however. "a rich and complex concept 
touching on law, tenure, religion, symbolism, practice, and ethnicity" (Colfer and Resosudarmo, 
2002: 421). 
"' Article 4, Law 41 1999 
"' Article 6 
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function to preserve plant and animal diversity and their ecosystems. Protection forest is set 
aside to protect life-supporting systems for hydrology, to prevent floods, control erosion, 
prevent sea water intrusion, and maintain soil fertility . Production forest is determined 
specifically to produce mainly timber. 
A2-3-2 Forest administration 
One of the repercussions of state control over forests is that the Government has the 
authority to administer all forests. sss The administration of forests includes forestry planning, 
forest management, forestry research and development, education, training and extension, and 
supervision. 
Forestry planning covers forest inventory, forest area gazettal, fores t area land use, 
establishment of forest management areas, and the drawing of forestry plans. Authority over the 
establishment of forest management areas includes making decisions over changes in the use 
and function of a particular forest area. This means that any conversion of forest lands into non-
forest uses is determined by the Central Government. This authority is one of the centrally 
retained powers that was "challenged" by district governments (Chapter 3). 
According to this law, forest management includes several activities: forest structuring and 
the drawing of forest management plans, utilization of forest and use of forest areas, forest 
rehabilitation and reclamation; and forest protection and nature conservation. Among these, one 
of the activities concerning the utilization of forest and use of forest areas, in particular, forest 
utilization licensing scheme, has been of major interest for all level of governments (Chapter 3 ). 
This 1999 forestry law's provisions on rehabilitation and reclamation of forest lands 
include reforestation, regrecning, enrichment activities and the application of conservation 
techniques. 556 The implementation of rehabilitation of land and forests is to be mainly done 
through a participatory approach with the aim of developing and empowering communities. 557 
The obligation to carry out rehabilitation activities associated with protection and conservation 
objectives rests with the party who has ownership of, manages, or utilizes that particular critical 
or unproductive forest. 158 
The Government administers the protection of forests within and outside forest areas. The 
responsibility for the protection of state forests rests with the Central Government. However, 
parties assigned the rights to use or granted the authority to manage a particular area of forest 
are responsible for the protection of that area, including in the case of forest fires.s59 
"' Article 4(2a) 
,,. Article 41 
"' Article 42 
"' Article 43 
"' Article 48 
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It should be noted that at least one provision of Law 41 on 1999 on Forestry provides for 
some form of decentralisation of authority. Article 66 states: "the Government shall delegate 
parts of the authorities to local governments". Again, the implementation of this provision was 
to be elaborated further in a Government Regulation. 
The law also provides the framework for the application of forestry fees and royalties, 
including the license fee, royalty, and reforestation funds (discussed in Chapter 4). 
Overall, many provisions of Law 41 on 1999 on Forestry are vague and general statements, 
requiring further explanation for their implementation. As in Law 22 of 1999, and as is common 
with other Indonesian Laws, the specifics of some of the provisions of this law are to be 
elaborated and detailed through implementing Government Regulations. Despite generalization 
and the vagueness of some of these provisions and their subsequent need for further guidelines 
prior to their implementation, and despite the prospect for the delegation of forescry authorities 
as stated in Article 66, it is clear that the 1999 forestry law affirms the authority of the Central 
Government over forestry affairs. Therefore, Law 41 of 1999 on forestry, in contrast to the 1999 
decentralisation laws, has a centralistic tone. 
A2-3-3 The regulatory framework for the implementation of 
Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry 
The implementation of Law 41 was to be elaborated by its implementing regulations. Until 
the promulgation of its implementing regulations, therefore, previous regulatory framework 
would still prevail. It was not until June 2002 that the government passed one implementing 
regulation, Regulation 34 of 2000 concerning Forest Structuring and Development of Forest 
Management Plans, Utilization of Forests and Use of Forest Areas (Government Regulation 34 
of 2002). This regulation is only one among the many implementing regulations needed to 
implement the law. However, this Government Regulation had specifically been much awaited 
for because it concerned the authority over logging licensing. This section provides a summary 
of the components of the regulation most relevant to the issues discussed in the thesis: the 
utilization of forest lands and licensing of forest lands that pertain to timber or wood harvest. 
Forest classifications and the utilization of forest areas 
In line with Law 41 , Government Regulation 34 of 2002 establishes three basic 
classifications for forest lands that apply to both state and private forests: Protection Forests, 
Conservation Forests, and Production Forests. 560 The type of activities (that is, utilization) that 
can take place on forest lands are determined by that forest's classifications. Protection Forests 
are divided into protection and utilization zones; conservation forests into Nature Reserve, 
Wildlife Sanctuary, National Parks, Grand Forest Parks, and Nature Tourist Parks; Production 
Forests into Natural Forests and Plantation rorests. The utilization of forests is allowed in all 
, .. Article 5 and Article 69 
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three classifications of forests, with the exception of Nature Reserves, core and rimba (primary 
forest) zones of National Forests. 561 
The utilization of forests can take one among six forms: utilization of the area, utilization 
of the forests' environmental services, utilization of timber products, utilization of non-timber 
products, harvest of timber products, and collection of non-timber products. 
The harvest of timber products is only permitted in natural forests and is restricted for the 
purposes of individual or community subsistence needs. The utilization of timber products, 
however, can take place in both categories of Production Forests. The activities include felling, 
transportation, planning, maintenance, safeguarding, processing, and marketing. The utilization 
of timber and non-timber products in production forests, as well as the restrictions of the use 
(that is, the commercialization or subsistence use) of the harvest of timber and non-timber 
products were to be determined by a Ministerial Decision. 
Licensing on Forest Lands 
Under decentralisation, licensing for timber harvest on forest lands was one of the issues 
that sparked controversy between the Central and sub-national Governments. Government 
Regulation 34 of 2002 clarified the issue by specifying a licensing scheme for each form of 
utilization of forest lands. This scheme elaborates the conditions for licenses, eligibility 
qualifications for licensees, authority for the issuance of licenses, and the procedural 
requirements for applications. The following summarizes the important points of the scheme 
with regard to the ut ilization and harvest of timber products. 
Timber licensing regulatory-framework prior to Government Regulation 34 of 2002 
Two major legal national documents governing the licensing of timber activities were 
critical in shaping forestry dynamics in the beginning of reformasi and the decentralisation 
process. They were Government Regulation 6 of 1999 on Forest Exploitation and Forest 
Products Harvesting in Production Forests and Ministry of Forestry Decree 05.1 of 2000 on the 
Criteria and Standard of Licensing for Forest Products Utilization and Forest Products 
Harvesting in Natural Production Forests (see Appendix 3). Both of these instruments gave the 
Bupatis authority over timber licensing. 
Government Regulation 6 of 1999 granted the Bupatis the authority to issue small-scale 
logging licenses. soi This government regulation was promulgated in January 1999, or prior to 
the promulgation of both the 1999 decentralisation law and the forestry law; it thus referred to 
the 1967 Basic Forestry Law. It specified that the Rights to the Harvest of Forest Products 
(HPHH) be granted to cooperatives, individuals who were Indonesian citizens, or to wholly 
'" Article 16 
"' Article 22 
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Indonesian-owned corporate bodies. 563 These rights were granted to harvest forest products from 
a maximum area of 100 hectares or a certain amount; for a maximum period of I year; and 
primarily with the objective to fulfil the needs of the local population. 56' The holders of these 
HPHH permits were obliged to pay forestry royalties and fees, the PSDH (Provisi Sumber Daya 
Hutan) and DR (Dana Reboisasi or the Reforestation Fund) (Chapter 4). 565 
Ministerial Decree 05. l of 2000 was a major breakthrough in terms of the devolution of 
timber licensing authority: it granted the Bupatis the authority to issue a whole range of licenses 
in terms of their total area scale, from small to large-scale. 566 Small-scale licenses were to be 
issued for a one-year maximum duration. The decree did not specify the maximum allowable 
volume of timber that could be harvested under such licenses. Medium-to large licenses were to 
be issued for an initial period of 20 years and up to 50,000-hectare area. This decree had led to 
district policies allowing for the proliferation of district logging licenses for a period. 
Timber licensing regulatory-framework under Government Regulation 34 of 2002 
Government Regulation 34 of 2002 maintained the maximum one-year duration for small-
scale licenses, but it differs significantly from Ministerial Decree 05.1 of 2000 in that now it 
limits the quantity of timber that can be harvested to only 20 cubic meters. The justification for 
this meager volume has to do with the objective of the license, that is, to provide for household 
needs or public facilities. 56' 
Licenses for the harvest of timber products can only be given to individuals that are 
members of a local community or to cooperatives. The authority of the issuance of this type of 
licenses depends on the jurisdiction of the area in question. Licenses for activities in an area 
falling within one district are issued by the Bupati; licenses for activities over an area crossing 
district boundaries are issued by the Governor; and licenses for activities over an area that 
crosses provincial jurisdictions are issued by the Ministry of Forestry. 
Although Bupatis retain the authority to issue timber harvesting licenses within their 
districts, the restrictions on the volume of timber that could be harvested severely diminished 
district governments' authority, as the Bupatis were now no longer had the authority over the 
licensing of commercial timber exploitation (Chapter 3). 
The maximum duration of licenses for the utilization of timber forest products is much 
longer: 55 years in natural forests and 100 years in Plantation Forests. Individuals, 
cooperatives, privately owned companies, and state-owned companies are eligible for this type 
of license. There is no restriction on the number of licenses that can be granted to any single 
16
i Article 22 
'"' Article 24 
165 Article 25 
166 In February 2002, this Ministerial Decree (and consequently all the provisions therein) was 
revoked by Ministry of Forestry Decree 541 of 2002. 
'" Elucidation of Article 33(1) 
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entity. All holders of Licenses for the utilization of timber forest products are obliged to pay 
forestry fees including license fees (IIUPH or luran !Jin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hutan), royalty 
(PSDH or Provisi Sumber Daya Hutan), and the Reforestation Fund (DR or Dana Reboisasi) 
(Chapter 4). 
Special attention needs to be given to Article 42 of this government regulation concerning 
the authority to issue licenses for the utilization of timber products. The authority to issue 
licenses for this type of activity rests with the Ministry of Forestry, on the recommendation of 
lower levels of government. As this is the only permitted activity involving timber utilization 
from forests for commercial purposes, it is by and large the highest revenue generating activity. 
Consequently, the authority over licenses for this type of activity was of highest interest to both 
regional and Central Governments. 
In summary, this regulation achieved two things. First, it clarified some of the provisions 
of Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry. Second, it affirmed the authority of the Ministry of Forestry 
over forestry affairs, in contrast to the spirit of the decentralisation law. 
A2-4 The structure of forestry administration after 
decentralisation 
The structure of forestry administration post-decentralisation has seen many changes from 
what it was under the New Order. These changes have had strong and important implications 
for forestry governance in the two districts under study. This section describes the changes 
relevant to the discussion in the thesis. 
A2-4-1 Government structure and forestry administration 
Decentralisation as governed by Law 22 of 1999 changed the structure of forestry 
administration directly and indirectly, in two major ways. First, through the elimination of the 
hierarchical responsibilities of the Bupati to the Governor (section A2-2- l ), and second, through 
the abolition of Forestry Regional Offices or Kantor Wilayah Kehutanan (Kanwil) that is, at the 
provincial level. The administrative control over forests before and after decentralisation is 
depicted in Figure A2.2 and Figure A2.3 respectively. 
Prior to decentralisation 
Under the New Order, the Ministry of Forestry's control over forestry extended to regions 
mainly through its regional offices, Kantor Wilayah Kehutanan (Kanwil) at the provincial level 
as well as its technical units in the regions, all of which directly reported to the MOF (Figure 
A2.2). However, day to day forestry operations at the local level (that is, at the district level) 
were handled by the provincial branch of· the Forestry Service, Cabang Dinas Kehutanan 
(CDK). This unit was directly responsible to the Provincia l Forestry Service, and ultimately 
responsible to the Governor. The CDK had no reporting responsibility to the district 
government, only to the Provinc ial Forestry Service. Under this arrangement, therefore, there 
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were often overlaps and ambiguity over authority and responsibility between the Provincial 
Forestry Service and the Forestry Regional Offices (Richardson, 1990; GOI/FAO, 1990). These 
overlaps and ambiguity often led to misunderstanding or misinterpretation of forestry tasks 
(Richardson, 1990). This feature of overlapping and unclear forestry tasks in the regions under 
the New Order not only continues, but is also more pronounced after decentralisation (Chapter 
4). 
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Figure A2.2 Government Structure and Forestry Administration before 
Decentralisation 
After decentralisation 
Decentralisation resulted in the abolition of Regional Forestry Offices (Kanwil) (Figure 
A2.3) in all provinces. With the demise of the Kanwil, the Ministry of Forestry no longer has 
the capacity to control forestry administration, in particular those associated with logging/forest 
exploita tion, at the district level. The Ministry of Forestry now has to depend on the Provincial 
Forestry Service, as an entity in the regions carrying out a deconcentration function, in place of 
the Kanwil. However, the Ministry of Forestry still maintains its technical implementation units 
that oversee other aspects of forestry, such as the gazettal of the Forest Estate and watershed 
management. 
The increased power of district governments enabled them to establish their own forestry 
units, the District Forestry Service. The District Forestry Service reports and is responsible to 
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the Bupati, with only lines of coordination, but not of reporting, with the Provincial Forestry 
Service and the Ministry of Forestry. Both districts officially established their District Forestry 
Services in 2001. However, Bulungan District Forestry Service was only operational in 2002. 
During the transition period until their operations, both districts had to work closely with the 
Provincial Branch of the District Forestry Service (Cabang Dinas Kehutanan or CDK). 
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Figure A2.3 Government Structure and Forestry Administration after 
Decentralisation in East Kalimantan Province 
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A2-4-2 The structure of forest responsibilities in the two 
case study districts 
The East Kalimantan government established technical units that operate at the district 
level, the Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah (UPTD). 568 In this way, the Provincial Government 
continues to maintain control over key forestry responsibilities, notably those associated with 
timber production. Thus, there are two forestry units operating at the district level: the District 
Forestry Service, a unit established by the district government and which reports to the district 
government and the UPTD. Bulungan District follows this structure. 
Kutai Baral District's circumstances, however, were different. In addition to being a newly 
established district (section 2.4.2), Kutai Barat was partitioned from an original district that took 
part in an earlier pilot project of decentralisation involving 26 districts (section 2.4.2). This 
affected the structure of forest administration of the district after decentralisation. In contrast to 
Bulungan District, which was not part of the pilot project, the Provincial Government did not 
establish a UPTD in Kutai Baral District (Figure A2.4). Therefore, the Kutai Baral District 
Forestry Service handled all forestry responsibilities in the district, including the administration 
associated with the operation of centrally-licensed HPI-Is. Kutai Barat' s Forestry Service, 
similar to Bulungan's, is only responsible to the Bupati. In this particular case, there is no 
hierarchy that links forestry authority operating at the district level with that of the provincial 
level. The relationship between Kutai Barat District's Forestry Service (similar to Bulungan 
District's Forestry Service) is limited to coordination only. 
The "duality" of authority handling forestry affairs that exists in Bulungan District (Figure 
A2.3) and the existence of only one authority in Kutai Barat District (Figure A2.4) have 
implications for the actual forestry powers of district governments, and is discussed in Chapters 
4 and 6. 
,., Each province can structure its own units. The establishment of UPTD was East Kalimantan's 
initiative. It is not known whether similar units were established in other provinces. 
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The issues described above provided the context for the ways in which the transfer of 
forestry authority under decentralisation has actually played out in practice and how it has been 
exercised by districts. Thus, the ways in which Outer Islands' forests have been managed in the 
past, the ways in which the legal framework has been interpreted by government actors at 
various levels, the structure of government and overall forest administration, and the existing 
forestry structures at the district level, have set the stage for district- level forest governance 
under decentra lisation. 
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Appendix 3: Indonesian National Legal 
Instruments Relevant to Local Forestry 
Governance 
Resolution . of the People's Consultative Assembly 
Resolution III of 2000 
Laws 
Law 33 of 2004 
Law 32 of 2004 
Law 18 of 2004 
Law 10 of 2004 
Law21 of200 1 
Law 18 of2001 
Law 34 of 2000 
Law 41of1999 
Resolution of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic 
of Indonesia Number III of 2000 on Legal Instruments and 
Hierarchy of Legislation (Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor I/I/MPR/2000 tentang Sumber 
Ifukum dan Tata Urutan Perundang-undangan), 18 August 2000 
Law 33 2004 on Fiscal Balancing between the Central Government and 
Regional Governments ( Undang-undang Nomor 33 Tahun 2004 
tentang Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan 
Pemerintah Daerah), 15 October 2004 
Law 32 of 2004 on Regional Governance (Undang-undang Nomor 32 . 
Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah), 15 October 2004 
Law 18 of 2004 on Plantations ( Undang-undang Nomor 18 tentang 
Perkebunan), 11 August 2004 
Law 10 of 2004 on the Formulation of Legislation ( Undang-undang 
Nomor JO tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan), 22 
June 2004 
Law 21 of 2001 on Papua Special Autonomy Law (Undang-undang 
Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua), 
2 1 November 200 I 
Law 18 of 2001 on Aceh Special Autonomy Law ( Undang-undang 
Nomor 18 Tahun 2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi sebagai 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) , 9 August 2001 
Law 34 2000 on the Amendments of Law 18 of 1997 on Regional 
Taxes and Levies (Undang-undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2000 tentang 
Perubahan atas Undang-undang Nomor 18 Tahun 1997 tentang Pajak 
Daerah dan Retribusi Dae rah), 20 December 2000 
Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry (Undang-undang Nomor 41 tentang 
Kehutanan), 30 September 1999 
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Law 25 of 1999 
Law 22 of 1999 
Law 20 of 1997 
Law 18 of 1997 
Law 5 of 1974 
Law 1 of1 967 
Law 5of1967 
Law 25 of 1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Central Government 
and the Regions (Undang-undang Nomor 25 Tahun 1999 tentang 
Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah), 19 
May 1999 
Law 22 of I 999 on Regional Governance ( Undang-undang Nomor 22 
Tahun 1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah), 4 May 1999 
Law 20 of 1997 on Non-tax State Revenues ( Undang-undang Nomor 
20 Tahun 1997 tentang Penerimaan Bukan Pajak), 23 May 1997 
Law I 8 of I 997 on Regional Taxes and Levies (Undang-undang 
Nomor 18 Tahun 1997 tentang Pajak Daerah dan Retribusi Dae rah), 
23 May 1997 
Law 5 of 1974 on The Principles of Governance in the Regions 
( Undang-undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1974 tentang Pokok-pokok 
Pemerintahan di Daerah), 23 July I 974 
Law I of 1967 on Foreign Investment ( Undang-undang Nomor 1 
Tahun 1967 tentang Penanaman Modal Asing), I 0 January 1967 
Law 5 of 1967 on the Principles of Forestry or the Basic Forestry Law 
(Undang-undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1967 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan 
Pokok Kehutanan), 24 May 1967 
Government Regulations 
Government Reg ulation 38 of 2007 
Government Regulation 38 of 2007 on the Division of Governmental 
Affairs among the Government, the Provincial Government and District 
and Municipal Governments (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 tahun 
2007 tentang Pembagian Urusan Pemerintahan antara Pemerintah, 
Pemerintahan Daerah Provinsi, dan Pemerintahan Daerah 
Kabupaten/Kota), 9 July 2007 
Government Regulation 6 of 2007 
Government Regulation 6 of 2007 on Forest Structuring and 
Development of Forest Management Plans, and the Utilization of 
Forests (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 6 Tahun 2007 tentang Tata 
Hutan dan Penyusunan Rencana Pengelolaan Hutan serta 
Pemanfaatan Hutan), 8 January 2007 
Government Regulation 35 of 2002 
Government Regulation 35 of 2002 on the Reforestation Fund 
(Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 35 Tahun 2002 tentang Dana 
Reboisasi), 8 June 2002 
Government Regulation 34 of 2002 
Government Regulation 34 of 2002 on Forest Structuring and 
Development of Forest Management Plans, Utilization of Forests and 
Use of Forest Areas 2002 (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 34 Tahun 
2002 tentang Tata Hutan dan Penyusunan Rencana Pengelolaan 
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Hutan, Pemanfaatan Hutan dan Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan), 8 June 
2002 
Government Regulation 75 of 2001 
Government Regulation 75 of 2001 on the Second Amendment of 
Government Regulation 32 of 1969 on the Implementation of Law 11 
of 1967 on the Basic Mining Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 75 
Tahun 2001 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Peraturan Pemerintah 
Nomor 32 tahun 1969 tentang Pelaksanaan Undang-undang Nomor 11 
Tahun 1967 tentang Ketentuan ketentuan Pokok Pertambangan), 30 
November 2001 
Government Regulation 107 of 2000 
Government Regulation 107 of 2000 on Regional Borrowing 
(Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 107 Tahun 2000 tentang Pinjaman 
Daerah) , 10 November 2000 
Government Regulation 104 of 2000 
Government Regulation 104 of 2000 on Balancing Funds (Peraturan 
Pemerintah Nomor 104 Tahun 2000 tentang Dana Perimbangan), IO 
November 2000 
Government Regulation 25 of 2000 
Government Regulation 25 of 2000 on Government Authority and 
Provinces' Authority as Autonomous Regions or Peraturan Pemerintah 
Nomor 25 Tahun 2000 tentang Kewenangan Pemerintah dan 
Kewenangan Propinsi sebagai Dae rah Otonom), 6 May 2000 
Government Regulation 92of1999 
Government Regulation 92 of 1999 on the Second Amendment of 
Government Regulation 59 of 1998 on the Tariff of Non-Tax State 
Revenue in the Ministry of Forestry and Plantations or Perubahan 
Kedua atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 59 Tahun 1998 tentang Tarif 
atas Jenis Penerimaan Negara bukan Pajak yang Berlaku pada 
Departemen Kehutanan dan Perkebunan), 13 October 1999 
Government Regulation 74 of 1999 
Government Regulation 74 of 1999 on the Amendment of Government 
Regulation 59 of 1998 on the Tariff for Non-tax state revenue in the 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (Peraturan Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia No. 74 tahun 1999 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan 
Pemerintah No. 59 tahun 1998 tentang tarif atas jenis penerimaan 
negara bukan pajak yang berlaku pada departmen kehutanan dan 
perkebunan), I 0 Agustus 1999 
Government Regulation 6 of 1999 
Government Regulation 6 of 1999 on Forest Utilization and Forest 
Products Harvesting in Production Forests (Peraturan Pemerintah 
Republik lndonesia Nomor 6 Tahun 1999 tentang Pengusahaan Hutan 
dan Pemungutan Hasil Hu tan pada Hutan Produksi), 27 January 1999 
Government Regulation 62 of 1998 
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Government Regulation 62 of 1998 on the Granting of Some 
Governmental Affairs to Regions (Peraturan Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 62 Tahun 1998 tentang Penyerahan Sebagian Urusan 
Pemerintahan di Bidang Kehutanan kepada Dae rah), June 23 1998 
Government Regulation 59 of 1998 
Government Regulation 59 of 1998 on the Tariff of Non-Tax State 
Revenue within the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (Peraturan 
Pemerintah No. 59 Tahun 1998 tentang Tari[ atas Jenis Penerimaan 
Negara Bukan Pajak yang Berlaku pada Departemen Kehutanan dan 
Perkebunan), 5 May 1998 
Government Regulation 52 of 1998 
Government Regulation 52 of 1998 on the Amendment of Government 
Regulation 22 of 1997 on the Types and Remittance of Non-Tax State 
Revenue (Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 22 Tahun 
1997 tentang Jenis dan Penyetoran Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak), 
20 April 1998 
Government Regulation 51 of 1998 
Government Regulation 51 of 1998 on Forestry Resource Rent 
Provision (PSJ)H) (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 51 rahun 1998 
tentang Provisi Sumber Daya Rutan), 20 April 1998 
Government Regulation 22 of 1997 
Government Regulation 22 of 1997 on the Types and Remittance of 
Non-Tax State Revenue (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 22 Tahun 1997 
tentang Jenis dan penyetoran penerimaan negara bukan pajak), 7 Ju ly 
1997 
Government Regulation 28 of 1985 
Government Regulation 28 of 1985 on Forest Protection (Peraturan 
Pemerintah Nomor 28 Tahun 1985 tentang Perlindungan Hutan), 7 
June 1985 
Government Regulation 21 of 1970 
Government Regulation 21 of 1970 on Rights of Forest Exploitation 
and Rights to Collect Forest Products (Peraturan Pemerin.tah Nomor 
21 Tahun 1970 tentang Rak Pengusahaan Rutan dan Hak Pemungutan 
Hasil Hulan) , 23 May 1970 
Government Regulation 64 of 1957 
Government Regulation 64 of 1957 on The Transfer of Some Central 
Administrative Matters in the Pields of Ocean Fishery, Forestry, and 
Smallholder Rubber to the First Level of Sub-national Governments 
(Peraturan Pemerintah No. 64 tahun 1957 tentang Pen.yerahan 
Sebagian dari Urusan Pemerintah Pusat di Lapangan Perikanan Laut, 
Kehutanan dan Karet Rakjat kepada Daerah-daerah Swatantra Tingkat 
[), 18 December 1957 
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Presidential Decrees 
Presidential Decree 67 of 1998 
Presidential Decree 67 of 1998 on the Amendment of Presidential Decree 30 of 
1990 on the Application, Collection and Sharing of Forest Product Royalty as 
had been Amended Several Times with the Latest Amendment by Presidential 
Decree 41 of 1993 (Keputusan Presiden Nomor 67 Tahun 1998 tentang 
Perubahan atas Keputusan Presiden No. 30 tahun 1990 tentang Pengenaan, 
Pemungutan dan Pembagian luran Hasil Hutan Sebagaimana telah Beberapa 
Kali diubah Terakhir dengan Keputusan Presiden No. 41 tahun 1993), 20 April 
1998 
Presidential Decree 41 of 1993 
Presidential Decree 41 of 1993 on the Application, Collection and Sharing of 
Forest Product Royalty as Had Been Amended with Presidential Decree 29 of 
1991 (Keputusan Presiden RI No. 41 tahun 1993 tentang Pengenaan, 
Pemungutan dan Pembagian liuran Hasil Hutan Sebagaimana telah diubah 
dengan Keputusan Presiden No. 29 tahun 199 /), 18 May 1993 
Presidential Decree 30 of 1990 
Presidential Decree 30 of 1990 on the Application, Collection and Sharing of 
Forest Product Royalty (Keputusan Presiden Nomor 30 tahun 1990 tentang 
Pengenaan, Pemungutan dan Pembagian Juran Hasil Hutan) , l July 1990 
Ministerial Decrees and Ministerial Regulations 
Ministry of Home Affairs 9 of 2005 on the Cancellation of Wonosobo District Regulation No. 
22 of 2001 on Community-based Forest Management in Wonosobo District 
(Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 9 Tahun 2005 tentang Pembatalan 
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Wonosobo Nomor 22 Tahun 200! tentang 
Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan Berbasis Masyarakat Kabupaten Wonosobo), 
3 March 2005 
Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.05 of 2006 
Ministry of Forestry Regulation 05 of 2006 on the Revisions to the Ministry of 
Forestry Regulation P.03 of 2005 on the Guidelines for the Verification of 
Licenses for the Utilization of Timber Forest Products in Natural Forests or in 
Planted Forests issued by Governors or Bupati!Mayors (Peraturan Menteri 
Kehutanan P.05/Menhut-lll 2006 tentang Perubahan Peraturan Menteri 
Kehutanan P.03/Menhut-1112005 tentang Pedoman Verifikasi Jjin Usaha 
Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Alam atau pada Hutan Tanaman 
yang Diterbitkan oleh Gubernur atau Bupati!Walikota), 18 January 2006. 
Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.07 of2005 
Ministry of Forestry Regulation 07 of 2005 on the Revocation of Ministry of 
Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 317/Kpts-IUI 999 dated May 7 1999 on 
R ights of Customary Communities to Forest Products Harvesting in Production 
Forests (Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No.P.07/Menhut J/12005) tentang 
pencabutan Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Nomor 317/Kpts-
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IJ/1999 tentang Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Masyarakat Hukum Adat pada 
Areal Hutan Produksi), 29 March 2005. 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 127 of 2005 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 127 of 2005 on the Revocation of Bupati 
Belitung's Decree 503/00383/SK/V/2002 dated 5 February 2002 on the 
Granting of IUPHHK in the area of Gunung Duren Permanent Production 
Forest, Subdistrict Dendang, Belitung District, Bangka Belitung Province ( 
Pencabutan Keputusan Bupati Belitung No. 503100383/SKIV/2002 tanggal 5 
Pebruari 2002 tentang Pemberian IUPHHK di kawasan hutan produksi tetap 
Gunung Duren, Kecamatan Dendang, Kabupaten Belitung, Provinsi Kepulauan 
Bangka Belitung), 17 May 2005 
Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.03 of 2005 
Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.03 of 2005 on the Guidelines for the 
Verification of Licenses for the Utilization of Timber Forest Products in 
Natural Forests or in Planted Forests issued by Governors or Bupati/Mayors 
2005 (Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No.03/Menhut-JJ/2005 tentang Pedoman 
Verifikasi /zin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Alam dan 
atau pada Hutan Tanaman yang diterbitkan oleh Gubernur atau 
Bupati!Walikora), 18 January 2005 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 477 of 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 477 of 2004 on the Cancellation of Bupati of 
Malinau's Decree 522.21/KPTS.08/DKPML/XIT/2001 dated 22 December 2001 
on the Granting of IUPHHK PT Wana Yasa Kahuripan Indonesia (Keputusan 
Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 477/Menhut!IJ/2004 tentang Pembatalan Keputusan 
Bupati Malinau No. 522121/KPTS.08/Xll/2001 tanggal 22 Desember 2001 
tentang /zin Usaha Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Kayu PT Wana Yasa Kahuripan 
Indonesia), 31 December 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 249 of 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 249 of 2004 on the Cancellation of Bupati of 
Pontianak's Decree 130 A dated 23 May 2003 on the Granting of IUPHHK in 
Natural Production Forests to PT Kandelia Alam in the District of Pontianak, 
the Province of West Kalimantan (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 
249/Menhut/1112004 tentang Pembatalan Keputusan Bupati Pontianak No. 130 
A Tahun 2003 tanggal 28 Mei 2003 tentang Jzin Usaha Pemungutan Hasil 
Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Produksi Alam PT Kandelia Alam di Kabupaten 
Pontianak, Provinsi Kalimantan Barat), 14 July 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 214 of 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 214 of 2004 on the Revocation of B upati of Kutai 
Barat's Decree 522.2111629/ProdaUXII/200! dated 28 December 2001 on the 
Granting of IUPHHK in Natural Production Forests to PT WLA over± 19,900 
hectares in Kutai Barat District (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 
214/Menhut-Jl/2004) tentang Pencabutan Keputusan Bupati Kutai Barat No. 
522.2111629/Proda!IXIJ/2001 dated 28 December, 2001 tentang Jzin Usaha 
Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Produksi Kayu Alam PT WLA di 
Kabupaten Kutai Barat seluas ± 19,900 hektar), 17 June 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 205 of 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 205 of 2004 on the Cancellation of Bupati of 
Pasir's Decree ~22.2 111 5/EK-PROD.l/ll/2002 dated 22 February 2002 on the 
Granting of lUPHHK to PT Mentari Multi Sumber Abadi in the District of 
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Pasir, the Province of East Kalimantan (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 
205/Menhut!J/12004 tentang Pembatalan Keputusan Bupati Pasir 
522.21!15?EK-PROD.l!ll/2002 dated 22 February 2002 tentang Pemberian 
JUPHHK atas nama PT. Mentari Multi Sumber Abadi di Kabupaten Pasir, 
Provinsi Kalimantan Timur), 14 June 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 204 of 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 204 of 2004 on the Cancellation of The Governor 
of Papua's Decree 164 of 2002 dated 5 November 2002 on the Granting of 
IUPHHK in natural forests to PT Papua Rimba Lcstari in the district of 
Jayapura, Papua Province (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 
204/Menhut/1112004 tentang Pembatalan Keputusan Gubernur Papua No. 164 
Tahun 2002 tanggal 5 Nopember 2002 tentang Pemberian IUPHHK pada 
Hutan Alam kepada PT. Papua Rimba Lestari di Kabupaten Jayapura Provinsi 
Papua), 14 June 2004 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 128 of 2003 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 128 of 2003 on the Technical Guidance of the 
Procedures for the Application, Collection, Payment and Remittance of 
Reforestation Fund (DR) (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 128/Kpts-
!112003 tentang Petunjuk Teknis Tata Cara Pengenaan, Pemungutan, 
Pembayaran dan Penyetoran Dana Reboisasi (DR)), 4 April 2003, effective I 
April 2003 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 126 of 2003 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 126 of 2003 on the Administration of Forest 
Products 2003 Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor I 26/Kpts-J/12003 tentang 
Penataan Hasil Hutan), 4 April 2003, effective I April 2003 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 124 of 2003 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 124 of 2003 on the Technical Guidance of the 
Procedures for the Application, Collection, Payment and Remjttance of 
Forestry Resource Rent Provision (PSDH) (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan 
Nomor 124/Kpts-!112003 tentang Petunjuk Teknis Tata Cara Pengenaan, 
Pemungutan, Pembayaran dan Penyetoran Provisi Sumber Daya Hutan 
(PSDH)), issued 4 April 2003, effective I April 2003 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 16 of 2003 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 16 of 2003 on the Working Plan, Five Year 
Working Plan, Annual Working Plan and Working Scheme for the Utilization 
of Timber Forest Products in Natural Forests (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan 
Nomor 16/Kpts-J/12003 tentang Rencana Kerja, Rencana Kerja Lima Tahun, 
Rencana Kerja Tahunan dan Bagan Kerja UsahaPemanfaatan Hasil Hutan 
Kayu pada Hutan Alam), 8 January 2003 
Ministry of Home Affair's Decree 130-67 of 2002 
Ministry of Home Affair's Decree 130-67 of 2002 on the Recognition of the 
Authority of Districts and Municipalities (Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri 
Nomor 130-67 Tahun 2002 tentang Pengakuan Kewenangan Kabupaten dan 
Kata), 20 February 2002 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 541 of 2002 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 541 of 2002 on the Revocation of Ministry of 
Forestry Decree 05. J of 2000 on the Cri teria and Standard for the Licensing of 
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Forest Utilization and Forest Product Harvesting in Production Forests 
(Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 541/Kpts-1/12002 tentang Pencabutan 
Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 05.l/Kpts-1//2000 tentang Kriteria dan 
Standar Perizinan Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan dan Perizinan 
Pemungutan Hasil Hutan pada Hutan Produksi), 21 February 2002, effective 1 
March 2002 
Ministry of Forestry 1132 of 2001 and Ministry of Industry and Trade Decree 292 of 2001 
Joint Ministry of Forestry 1132 of 2001 and Ministry of Industry and Trade 
Decree 292 of 200 I on the Ban of Log/Chip Raw Material Export (Keputusan 
Bersama Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 1132/Kpts-II/200 I dan Menteri 
Perindustrian dan Perdagangan MPPIKEP/1012001 tentang Penghentian 
Ekspor Kayu Bulat dan Bahan Baku Serpih, 8 October 2001 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 79 of 2001 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 79 2001 (Kepmenhut 79/2001) (Keputusan Menteri 
Kehutanan Nomor 79/Kpts-1112001 tentang Penunjukan Kawasan Hutan dan 
Perairan di Wilayah Propinsi Kalimantan Timur seluas 14.651.553 (empat 
belas juta enam ratus lima puluh satu ribu Lima ratus Zima puluh tiga hektar), 
15 March 2001. 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 05 .1 of 2000 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 05.1 of 2000 on the Criteria and Standard of 
Licensing for the Utilization of Forest Products and for the Collection of Forest 
Products in Natural Production Forests (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor 
05.l!Kpts-llf2000 tentang Kriteria dan Standar Perijinan Usaha Pemanfaatan 
Hasil Hutan dan Perijinan Pemungutan Hasil Hutan pada Produksi Alam), 6 
November 2000 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 084 of 2000 
Ministry of Forestry Decree 084 of 2000 on the Suspension of the Decree of the 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops 310 of 1999 on the Guidelines for the 
Granting of Rights to Collection of Forest Products (Keputusan Menteri 
Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Nomor 084/Kpts-1/12000 tentang Penangguhan 
Pemberlakuan Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Nomor 
310/Kpts-II/1999 tentang Pedoman Pemberian Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan), 
13 April 2000 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 318 of 1999 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 318 1999 on the Participation of 
Communities in Forests Utilization (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan dan 
Perkebunan Nomor 318/Kpts-1/11999 tentang Peran Serta Masyarakat dalam 
Pengusahaan Hutan), 7 May 1999 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 317 of 1999 
Mini stry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 317 o f 1999 on Rights of 
Customary Communities to Forest Products Harvesting in Production Forests 
(Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Nomor 317/Kpts-1111999 
tentang Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Masyarakat Hukum Adat pada Areal 
Hutan Produksi), 7 May 1999 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 316 of 1999 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 316 of 1999 on the 
Administration of Forest Products (Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan dan 
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Perkebunan Nomor 316/Kpts-!I/1999 tentang Tata Usaha Hasil Hutan , 7 May 
1999 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 310 of 1999 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops Decree 310 of 1999 on Guidelines for the 
Granting of Rights to Forest Product Harvesting (Surat Keputusan Menteri 
Kehutanan dan Perkebunan No.310/Kpts-!I/1999 tentang Pedoman Pemberian 
Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan), 7 May 1999 
Ministry of Industry and Trade Decree 185 of 1998 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 185 of 1998 on the Exportation of Logs 
(Keputusan Menteri Perindustrian dan Perdagangan Nomor 
185/MPP!Kep/411998 tentang Ketentuan Ekspor Kayu Bulat), 20 Apri l 1998. 
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Appendix 4: List of people interviewed by 
category 
Guidelines for using the codes: 
Each interviewee is given a specific code with 3 characters. 
The first character denotes the level of governance 
B: Bulungan District 
K: Kutai Barat District 
N: national level 
P: provincial level 
The second character denotes the type of actor: 
A: academic/researcher 
C: community/local person 
G: government official 
I: international organisation 
L: legislature 
M: media 
N:NGO 
P: private sector/business 
V: vertical agency (police, judiciary) 
The third character denotes the order of the person interviewed in a particular category . 
The prefix after the third character denotes the specific interview among the several 
interviews with the same actor. 
Thus, B-G-7c denotes an interview with a Bulungan (B) government official (G), the 7'• 
interviewee from within this category of actor, and interviewed for the 3'd time (c). 
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National Level · Government 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
The Directorate 
Senior General of Forestry 170304 N-G-1 
official Planning, Ministry 
of Forestry 
Directorate of Bina 
Juran Kehutanan 170304 N-G-2 
Senior dan Peredaran 
official 
Hasil Hutan, 
Ministry of 
Forestry 
Bureau of Planning 
Senior B urcau, Minis try 170304 N-G-3 
official of Forestry 
Bureau of 
Official Planning, Ministry 170304 N-G-4 
of Forestry 
Centre for Forestry 
Senior Planning, Ministry 190304 N-G-5 
official of Forestry 
Directorate of 
Policy Facilitation 190304 N-G-6a 
Senior and Reporting of 260304 N-G-6b 
official Regional Autonomy, 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
Directorate 
General for Land 250304 N-G-7 
Senior Rehabilitation and 
official Social Forestry, Ministry of 
Forestry 
Directorate of 
Policy Facilitation 260304 N-G-8 
Senior and Reporting of 
official Regional Autonomy Unit, 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs. 
Secretariat General 
Senior of the Ministry of 010704 N-G-9 
official Forestry 
Senior Directorate of Oil 
official and Non-tax 
Revenue, Ministry 070704 N-G-10 
of Finance 
Directorate 
Official General of Forestry 250906 N-G-11 Telephone 
Planning, Ministry interview 
of Forestry 
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National Level - Researchers/ Academics 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Scientist Center for 080104 N-A-1 
International 
Forestry 
Research 
(CIFOR) 
Scientist Center for 080104 N-A-2 
International 
Forestry 
Research 
(CIFOR) 
Bogor 
Lecturer and Agricultural 090104 N-A/N-3 Academic 
senior official University and and NGO 
Forest Watch activist 
Indonesia 
Scientist Center for 
International 120104 N-A-4 
Forestry 
Research, 
(CIFOR) 
Scientist Center for 
International 090204 N-A-5 
Forestry 
Research 
(CI FOR) 
Researcher Center for 
International 090204 N-A-6 
Forestry 
Research 
(CIFOR) 
Scientist Center for 
International 100204 N-A-7 
Forestry 
Research 
(CIFOR) 
Lecturer University of 
Indonesia and 250304 N-A-8 
advisor to the 
Ministry of 
Finance 
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·National Level· International Agencies/NGOs 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Staff NRM 090204 N-I- 1 
Staff NRM 170304 N-1-2 
Senior GTZ 180304 N-1-3 
official 
Provincial Level - Government 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Senior Forestry 260204 
official Research Center P-G-1 
East Kali man tan 
Senior Planning and 
official Development 080304 P-G-2 Agency 
(BAPPEDA) 
East Kalimantan 
Senior Planning and 
official Development 080304 P-G-3 Agency 
(BAPPEDA) 
East Kalimantan 
Senior Office of the 090304 P-G-4a 
official Directorate 100304 P-G-4b General of 
Budget 290704 P-G-4c 
Senior East Kali man tan 
official Province Forestry 090304 P-G-5 
Service 
East Kali man tan 
Senior Planning and 100304 P-G-6 
official Development 
Agency 
(BAPPEDA) 
Watershed 
Senior Management 
official Agency 110304 P-G-7 (BPDAS) of 
Mahakam Hulu 
Watershed 
Senior East Kalimantan 120304 P-G-8a 
official Province Forestry 290704 P-G-8b 
Service 
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Provincial Level - Private Sector 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Indonesian 
Association of 
Senior Forest 100304 P-B-1 
official Concessionaires (APHI) and 
senior staff of a 
HPH 
Provincial Level - Academics/researchers 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Academic Mulawarman 
and University 170204 P-A-1 
researcher 
Provincial Level - International Organisations 
Position Institution Interview Date Code 
Natural 
Resources 
Senior staff Management 290704 P-VN-1 Project (NRMP), 
East Kalimantan 
Office 
Staff NRMP, East 
Kalimantan 290704 P-l/N-2 
Office 
Staff TNC Berau 180106 P-l/N-3 
office 
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District Level: Bulungan - Government 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
District Planning 
Senior and 210104 B-G-1 
official Development 
Agency 
(BAPPEDA) 
Statistical and 
Senior Data Collection 210104 B-G-2 
official Unit, Office of 
the Bupati 
Senior Office of the 210101 B-G-3 
official Bupati 
Senior Office of the 210104 B-G-4 
official Bupati 130704 
Senior Office of the 210104 B-G-5a 
official Bupati 190106 B-G-5b 
Senior Office of the 210104 B-G-6 
official Bupati 
Senior District 210104 B-G-7 
official Revenue Office 
Senior District Forestry 220104 B-G-8a Ex-NGO 
official Service 300104 B-G-8b 
District Planning 260104 B-G-9a 
Senior and 140704 B-G-9b 
official Development 010904 B-G-9c Agency 
(BAPPEDA) 190106 B-G-9d 
District Planning 
Official and 260104 B-G-10 
Development 
Agency 
(BAPPEDA) 
District Planning 270104 B-G-1 la 
Official and 300104 B-G-1 lb 
Development 
Agency 
(BAPPEDA) 
Senior District 
official Development 270104 B-G-12 
Unit 
Senior Land Agency 280104 B-G-13 
official 
Senior Land Agency 280104 B-G-14 
official 
Senior Technical 
official Implementation 280104 B-G-15 
Unit (UPTD) 
Senior District Forestry 280104 B-G-16 
official Service 
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Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Senior Ec9nomic Unit 290104 B-G-17 
official 
District Industry, 
Senior Trade, and 
official Cooperative 030204 B-G-18 Office 
Senior District 
official Agricultural 030204 B-G-19 
Service 
Official District Revenue 120704 B-G-20 
Office 
Senior District Forestry 120704 B-G-21 
official Service 140704 
Senior District Forestry 120704 B-G-22 
official Service 
Senior District Revenue 130704 B-G-23 
official office 
Offical District Legal 140704 B-G-24 
Unit 
Official District Forestry 140704 B-G-25 OAK-DR 
Service RHL 
officer 
Technical 
Senior Implementation 160704 B-G-26 
official Unit (UPTD) 
District Level: Bulungan - Legislature 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Forestry District 270 104 B-L-la 
Commission Legislative Body 280104 B-L- l b 
(DPRD) 
Forestry District 
Commission Legislative Body 280104 B-L-2 
(DPRD) 
Development District 
Commission Legislative Body 280104 B-L-3 
(DPRD) 
Development District 150704 B-L-4a Ex- NGO 
Commission Legislative Body 190106 B-L-4b (DPRD) 
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District Level: Bulungan - NGOs 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
200104 B-N-la 
260104 B-N-lb 
310104 B-N-lc 
070704 B-N-ld 
Member Pionir 110704 B-N- l e 
150704 B-N-lf 
170106 B-N- lg 
190106 B-N- lh 
280104 B-N-2a 
Member Pus aka 1801 06 B-N-2b 
190106 B-N-2c 
Member KNPI 150704 B-N-3 
Member Pus aka 100704 B-N-4 
Member FPPS 080704 B-N-5 
Member Pionir 180106 B-N-6 
District Level: Bulungan - Media 
Name Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Media 
Representative Radar Tarakan 190106 B-M-1 
in district and 
journalist 
Media 
representative Radar Tarakan 190106 B-M-2 
and journalist 
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District Level: Bulungan - Private sector 
Name Institution Interview Code Notes 
Date 
Staff HPH Concession 230104 B-P-1 
Staff HPH Concession 290104 B-P-2 
Consultant Spatial plan 270104 B-P-3 
Consultant 
Consultant Spatial Plan 270104 B-P-4 
Consultant 
Staff Regional timber 070704 B-P-5 
operator/company 
Field operator Contractor of a 100704 B-P-6 
HPH Concession 
Staff HPH Concession 120704 B-P-7 
Owner and Local 150704 B-P/C-8 Also an 
entrepreneur Company/Business adar 
leader 
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District Level: Bulungan - Communities (masyarakat) 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Village Village A 230104 B-C-1 
administrator 
Villager, Village A 230104 B-C-2 
shop owner, 
farmer 
Villager, Subdistrict S 280104 B-C-3 
NGO 
informant 
Village head Village SB 310104 B-C-4 
Villager Village SB 310104 B-C-5 
Villager, 
operator of Village SB 010204 B-C-6 
logging 
equipment 
Village head Village A 020204 B-C-7 
Adat leader Village A 020204 B-C-8 
Village head Village PS 100704 B-C-9 
110704 
Village Village PS 100704 B-C-10 
administrator 
Village Village PS 110704 B-C- 11 
administrator 
Adat leader Village PS 110704 B-C-12 
B-C-13 
3 villagers Village PS 110704 B-C-14 Group 
B-C-15 Interview 
Villager Village PS 110704 B-C-16 
Villager Village PS 110704 B-C- I 7 
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District Level: Kutai Barat - Government 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
170204 K-G- la 
030304 K-G- lb 
Senior official District Forestry 040304 K-G- l c 
Service 210704 K-G-ld 
280704 K-G-le 
300106 K-G-lf 
District Planning 
Senior official and Development 170204 K-G-2a 
Agency 180204 K-G-2b (BAPPEDA) 
180204 K-G-3a 
Senior official District Forestry 190204 K-G-3b 
Service 280704 K-G-3c 
Senior official District Public 180204 K-G-4 
Works 
Senior official Office of the 240204 K-G-5 
Bupati 
Senior official District Socio- 240204 K-G-6 
economic Unit 
Senior official District Social- 240204 K-G-7 
economic Unit 
Senior official District 
Governance Unit 240204 K-G-8 
Senior official District Finance 240204 K-G-9 
Unit 
District Office 
Senior official for Community 250204 K-G-10 
Empowerment 
Senior official Land Agency 250204 K-G-11 
Senior official District Revenue 250204 K-G-12 
Office 
District Also local 
Senior official Environment 260204 K-G-13 businessman/ 
Office enterpreneur 
Senior official District Revenue 260204 K-G-14a 
Office 270704 K-G-14b 
270204 K-G- I 5a 
Senior official District Revenue 020304 K-G- 15b 
Office 2 10704 K-G- 15c 
270704 K-G-15d 
Official District Forestry 270204 K-G-16 
Service 
270204 K-G- 17a 
Official District Forestry 030304 K-G- 17b OAK-DR 
Service 270704 K-G- 17c RHL Project 
officer 
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Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Official District Forestry 280204 K-G- 18a DAK-DR 
Service 270704 K-G-18b RHL Project 
officer 
Official District Forestry 040304 K-G-19 
Service 
Senior Official District Forestry 200704 K-G-20 
Service 
Senior Official District Forestry 200704 K-G-21 
Service 
Official District Forestry 200704 K-G-22 
Service 
Senior Official District Forestry 210704 K-G-23 
Service 
Official District Forestry 230704 K-G-24 
Service 
District Level: Kutai Barat - Legislature 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Forestry DPRD 260204 K-L-1 
Commission 
Member DPRD 010304 K-L(M/A)- Also media 
2 owner, also 
academic 
District Level: Kutai Baral - Arm of Vertical Agencies 
Name Institution Date of Code Notes 
Interview 
Official District Attorney 280704 K-Y-1 
Office 
Member Sub-district 240204 K-V-2 
Police ( polsek) 
District Level: Kutai Barat • NGOs and International Organisations 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Officer SHK Kaltim 270204 K-N/I-1 
Officer SHK Kaltim 290204 K-N/l -2 
Officer !FAD 010304 K-N/l-3 
Offcer KKPKD 020304 K-N/1-4 
Member KKPKD 020304 K-N/I-5 
Consultant GTZ 010304 K-NII-6 
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District Level: Kutai Barat ·Media 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Media 
Representative Kaltim Post 030304 K-M-l 
and journalist 
District Level: Kutai Baral· Private Sector/Businesses 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Business Coal Mining 240204a K-P-1 
owner Contractor 250204b 
District Also, 
IUPHHK Timber Business 040304 K-P-2 HPHH 
holder license 
holder 
Senior staff HPH Concession 230704 K-P-3 
Staff HPH Concession 250204 K-P-4 
Senior staff Mining 290204 K-P-5 
Company 
Senior staff Mining 290204 K-P-6 
Company 
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District Level: Kutai Barat. Communities (masyarakat) 
Position Institution Interview Date Code Notes 
Villagers Village LM 220204 K-C-1 Focus group 
discussion 
Villager Village LM 230204 K-C-2 Village 
functionary 
(LKMD) 
Villager Village LM 230204 K-C-3 Also a priest 
Villager Village LM 230204 K-C-4 
Foreman of 
Villager Village TI 270204 K-C-5 a Farmer's 
Group 
Member of a 
Villager Village TI 270204 K-C-6 Farmer 
Group 
Villager Village TI 270204 K-C-7 Member of a 
Farmer 
Group 
Villager Village Ml 270204 K-C-8 A Farmer 
Group 
Leader 
Villager Village G 280204 K-C-9 A Farmer 
Group 
Leader 
Villager Village SL 280204 K-C-10 A Farmer 
Group 
Leader 
Villager Village G 280204 K-C-11 Member of a 
Farmer 
Group 
Villager Village MB 280204 K-C-10 A Farmer 
Group 
Participant 
Villager Village B 290204 K-C-11 in SHK's 
KHM 
Project 
Appendix 5: Postscript 
Since the completion of the major fieldwork for this thesis (August 2004), the legal 
regulatory framework for decentralisation has been amended by subsequent national laws and 
regulations. Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Governance was succeeded by a revised version of 
Law 32 of 2004, with the same name (Law 32 of 2004 on Regional Governance), and Law 25 of 
1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Central Government and the Regions, by Law 33 of 
2004, also with the same name. 
The amendments to the 1999 laws have had major repercussions for district and municipal 
governments' authority and autonomy. Several changes are relevant to the discussion and 
findings of the thesis. First, where Law 22 of 1999 specified that there was no hierarchical 
relationship between district and municipal governments and the province, Law 32 of 2004 
specifies an explicit relationship between the Central Government and other levels of sub-
national government in government administration. This relationship specifically prevails over 
authority in fiscal matters, public services, the utilization of natural resources and other 
resources. Other than the authority over fisheries, Law 32 of 2004 does not specify which level 
of government has the authority over the management of natural resources, including forests. 
The law specifies that the relationship between governments in the use of natural resources 
governs the following particulars: the implementation of the utilization of natural resources that 
are under the authority of regions, the cooperation and sharing of natural resource revenue, and 
the management of co-licensing in the utilization of natural resources. However, the law also 
specifies that these relationships be regulated according to laws and regulations, without 
specifying which ones, leaving them unclear and ambiguous; the provisions thus can be 
interpreted in various ways. 
Second, the law also granted the Central Government increased power to supervise the 
implementation of local and regional governance. In addition to the annual accountability report 
to the DPRD, heads of government must now submit an annual report on the implementation of 
governance to the Central Government, and in the case of districts, through the Governor. The 
law also increased the responsibi lity (and thus authority) of the Governor in the supervision of 
district governance. 
Third, the law indirectly reduces the power of the DRPD, by providing for the direct 
election of Bupatis, mayors, and governors by citizens. Other functions of the DPRD remain 
unchanged, as stipulated in Law 22 of 1999 (Appendix 2 and Chapter 7). 
The revised Decentralisation Law does not specify who has the authority over forest 
administration: it leaves that to be specified by its implementing Government Regulations. Prior 
to these regulations being issued, the legal instrument specifying the authority of district 
governments continued to be Government Regulation 25 of 2000 (Appendix 2), referred to Law 
22 of 1999; however, this law is no longer valid. Therefore, there has been a high degree of 
uncertainty over what precisely is the authority of district governments; district governments 
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bewailed the necessity of coordinating many issues with the provincial govemment. 569 As in the 
promulgation of Government Regulation 25 of 2000, the delay has been caused by the difficulty 
of gaining sectoral agreement over what authority was to be held by which level of 
government. 510 
After 3 years, in July 2007, the Government issued the implementing regulation, 
Government Regulation 38 of 2007, for Law 32 of 2004: Government Regulation on the 
Division of Governmental Affairs among the Government, the Provincial Government and 
District and Municipal Governments. The authority of district governments revolves mostly 
around providing technical recommendations and inputs to higher levels of government and 
other "non-economic" authority. 
The peripheral authority of district governments in forestry had been reaffirmed earlier, in 
January 2007, through the issuance of Government Regulation 6 of 2007 to replace Government 
Regulation 34 of 2002, as an implementing regulation of the 1999 forestry law (Appendix 3). 
Under this superseding Government Regulation, the issuance of logging licenses remains with 
the Ministry of Forestry. Bupatis are able to issue licenses for the harvesting of timber, but only 
for miniscule amount and limited to subsistence needs, up to 50 cubic meters for community 
purposes and 20 cubic meters for individual needs. Thus, the new regulation continues to put the 
most sought-after and lucrative authority in the hands of the Centre. 
However Government Regulation 38 of 2007 also affirms district governments' authority 
in other sectors that could potentially affect the fate of the forests, as shown in the thesis 
(Chapter 3). District governments continue to be authorized to issue licenses for plantations 
(estate crops) and for certain mining ventures, such as coal mining. 
Of the provisions of Law 33 of 2004 that have revised those in Law 25 of 1999, one in 
particular has implications for the discussion in this thesis. The regions' share of the 
Reforestation Fund, the DAK-DR, is now no longer included as a Specific Allocation Fund 
Category, but is now included as Shared Revenue from Land and Natural Resource Taxes. The 
proportion of forestry-derived revenues redistributed to regions remains unchanged (Chapter 4 ). 
However, the revised law explicitly specifies that the 40 percent of the Reforestation Fund is 
redistributed to producing districts or municipalities, thereby eliminating the ambiguities in the 
term "producing regions" in its 1999 predecessor (Chapter 4 ). These monies however, continue 
to be earmarked for the Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project. 
District governments and district populations will not only continue to enjoy the inOow of 
the districts' share of the Reforestation Fund through the Forest and Land Rehabilitation 
Project, but now also have the opportunity for involvement in a national program, the Peoples' 
Plantation (Hutan Tanaman Rakyat, HTR). This HTR initiative, launched in early 2007 and 
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. funded by the Reforestation Fund accumulated in the national coffers, involves a new type of 
concession for the planting of timber species on forest lands by communities, for a period of up 
to 100 years (Nordwijk et al., 2007). Some 9.7 trillion rupiah (1.3 billion USD) of the 
Reforestation Fund has been allocated to the HTR program nation-wide, targeting some 5.4 
million hectares of land (Tempo lnteraktif, 29 January 2007a). While the scenarios of the types 
and forms of these establishments are still being discussed and developed, the proposed length 
of tenure can create an incentive for more certain and guaranteed future timber harvest, which is 
precisely what this study found to be lacking, and consequently limiting the success of the 
DAK-DR Forest and Land Rehabilitation Project. Nevertheless, the other issues identified in the 
implementation of the RHL Project are particularly relevant to the HTR program, and should be 
considered in its implementation. 
In summary, the Central Government has now increased its powers of oversight over sub-
national governments. Similarly, the provincial governments' powers have been augmented 
through increased oversight and coordination responsibilities over district and municipal 
governments. Thus, the trajectory of Indonesian decentralisation affecting forestry is becoming 
clearer. While the building base for democratization in terms of direct election of the Bupatis 
and the DPRDs is strengthened by the revised decentralisation law, the building base for 
democratic decentralisation to district governments is, on the contrary, weakened. The 
discretionary decision-making powers of district governments are now reduced because of the 
explicit hierarchical administrative linkages with the provincial government and the augmented 
supervisory role of the provincial and Central governments over district governments. Similarly, 
the authority of district governments in forestry has been significantly curtailed. 
However, it is also clear that Central Government policies do attempt to address the 
perceived forestry problems that have been the subject of this thesis. The stepping up of efforts 
in enforcement to curb illegal logging and the HTR program initiatives are the most prominent 
examples. As pointed out in this thesis, although past practices have shown the disjuncture 
between policies and implementation, these new policies are nevertheless a step forward. 
The changes in the national legal-regulatory framework undoubtedly have implications for 
local government decision-making and consequently local-level forest management and 
operations. Based on the findings of this thesis on the patterns of district governance, it is likely 
that, despite the narrowing window of opportunity, local authorities will continue to look to 
other sectors and other ways, to the extent possible, to find room to manoeuvre through the 
loopholes in national policy relevant to forests. Moreover, pressures arising from the economic 
attractiveness of other sectors that can affect forests, over which district governments continue 
to have authority, are still very real. 
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